Shahida Bibi and others Vs Govt of Pakistan and others

v tudgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT PESHAWAR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

trUDGXDTT

IN

Writ Petition No.4575-P n^

Titled Shahida Bibi & another Vs Government of Pakistan etc

Date of hearing...oooroo.o....r.o.. 28.4.2025

Petitionefs.................Bf 3 Mr.Mumtaz Ahmad, advocate.

Respondents .By: Mr.Akbar Yousaf Khalil, DAG, for F'ederation.

Mr.Shahid Imran Gigyani, A.D.Legal NADRA.

* * * r**rl * {r* *** ** {. ** **

WIQAB AHMAID. J.. Through the instant petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (66the Constitution"), the petitioners have sought the following reliefl

"It is, therefore, prayed that by accepting this petition, respondents may please be directed to issue to'petitioner No.l her fresh CM ( by restoring the same/unblocking), the acts of the respondents may be declared as unlawful, illegal and ineffective upon the rights of petitioner."

2.The factual background, as set out in instant petition, reveals that petitioner No. 2, Inayat ur Rehman, an Afghan national, was granted a naturalization certificate in 2007, wherein the names of his wife ("petitioner No. 1, Shahida") and their children

were also recorded. Pursuant to said certificate, CMCs were issued to both spouses (copies annexed). The record further reflects that CNIC of petitioner No. 2 was blocked in 2016, which he successfully challengedthrough Writ Petition No.2565-P12019. Vide judgment dated 20.06.2019, this Court directed him to take oath of allegiance under Section 6 of Naturalization Act, 1926 ("hereinafter the Act"), which he duly did before the Magistrate on 03 .07 .2019, resulting in unblocking of his CNIC. Subsequently, CMC of petitioner No. I was blocked by the respondents, prompting the filing of present petition. The petitioners assert that, despite their representations, the respondents have declined to unblock CNIC of petitioner No. l. Comments from the respondents have been sought and are now on record.

3.Arguments heard and record perused.

4.Perusal of the record shows that CMC of petitioner No. 2 was blocked, which he challenged through Writ Petition No. 2656-P12019. This Court allowed the petition vide judgment dated 20.06.2019, directing him to take oath of allegiance under Section 6 of the Act. The decision was based on this Court's earlier judgment in Writ Petition No. 3952-P12017, decided on 19.12.2017. For ease of reference, relevant portion of the judgment dated 20.06.2019 is reproduced below:

"The petitioners Haji Hayatullah, Inayat ur Rehman and Hadi ur Rehman filed the instant writ petition seeking an appropriate writ directing the respondents to

facilitate them to take the oath of allegiance before a Magistrate and fulfil their other obligations pursuant to the certificates of Naturalization and also to direct them to release their CNICs and cancel any order passed for the cancellation of the certificates of Naturalization, their CNICs and their passports , etc.

lshoq Shah (wPHs7ePn024) (DBl Hon'bh Mr. tustke Wlgr Ahmod Hon'ble Ms tustlce Farah tamshed,

2.F'rom the available record, it is manifest that the case of the petitioners with regard to Naturalization has already been allowed by the Federal Government, however, the' petitioners instead of taking Oath of Allegiance before the Magistrate had directly approached the NADRA office for unblocking their CNICs.

3.Since the controversy with regard to Oath of Allegiance has already been set at rest by this Court while seizing of identical writ petitions bearing Nos.l 197-P12018, 3952-P12017, 1683-P12018 and 2122- Pl20l8 decided on 19.4.2018, 19.12,2017, 1,1L2018 and 18.10.2018 respectively, therefore, we while deriving wisdom from the above said judgments of this court and that too, when the other side has not seriously resisted the same, would like to give alike treatment to the instant writ petition.

4.In view of the above, this instant writ petition is disposed of in terms that the respondents shall not cancel the certificate of Naturalization, whereas the petitioners shall appear before the Court of Magistrate at Peshawar on 03.7.2019 for taking Oath of Allegiance as required under the law, therefore, the NADRA authorities shall unblock their ChlICs."

5.In pursuance of the above-quoted judgment, petitioner No. 2 appeared before the Magistrate on 03 .07 .2019 and took requisite oath of allegiance, leading to the restoration of his CNIC, which remains valid to date. The present petition, however, concerns the cancellation of CNIC of petitioner No. l. As noted earlier, petitioner No. I lshoq Shah (wPHsTs-P/20241 (DB) Han'blc Mn tustlcc Wlqor Ahmod Hon'ble Ms tustlce Forah tamshcd,

Y,

is the wife of petitioner No. 2 and was recorded as such in the naturalization certificate issued by the Federal Government. This factual position remains undisputed.

6.When the respondents were directed to submit their comments in response to the petition, they took the position that the naturalization certificate held no effect with respect to petitioner No. 1 under Section 7 of the Act, for the reason that she had failed to fulfill the requirements of Rule 7 of the Naturalization Rules, 1961 ((hereinafter the Rules"). It was contended that petitioner No. I had not filed declaration on Form-G, rendering the certificate ineffective to her extent. Additionally, it is alleged that petitioner No. I had been involved in anti-state activities.

7.Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to first examine the respondents' primary objection, namely, that petitioner No. I failed to take the oath of allegiance as required under Rule 7 of the Rules, thereby attracting the consequences of Section 7 of the Act. Sections 6 and 7 of the Act, being relevant for determination of this issue, are reproduced below for ready reference:

"6. Oath of allegiance.- Every person to whom a certificate of naturalization has been granted shall, within thirty days from the date of the grant thereof take and subscribe the following oath, namely:-

"I, A. B., of do hereby swear (or affirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Constitution of Pakistan.

Provided that the Federal Government may extend the time allowed under this section in any case in which it is satisfied that failure to take and subscribe the oath within that time was due to suflicient cause.

lshoq Shah (wP#4s75-P/2024t (DB) Hur'blc Mn tustke Wlqar Nrmad Hon'blc Ms tustlce Faroh tomshed,

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7.Effect of grant of certificate and taking of oath.- (1). No certificate of naturalization shall have effect until the person to whom it is granted has taken and subscribed the oath prescribed by section 6, but upon the taking and subscribing of such oath such person, and any child of any such person who has been included in the certificate under subsection (2) of section 5, shall be deemed to be citizens of Pakistan and be entitled to all the rights, privileges and capacities of a citizen of Pakistan born within Pakistan, except such rights, privileges or capacities, if sny, as may have been withheld from them respectively by the certificate, and shall within Pakistan be subject to all the obligations, duties and liabilities of a citizen of Pakistanl and the wife of any such person to whom a certificate of naturalization is granted after the commencement of the Indian Naturalization (Amendment) Act, 1935, shall, if not already a citizen of Pakistan, in like manner be so deemed and be so entitled and so subject, if within one year, or such longer period as the F'ederal Government may in special circumstances allow, from the date of the taking and subscribing of such oath by her husband, She makes to the Federal Government a declaration that she desire to be deemed to be a citizen of Pakistan, and if she is an alien as delined in the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, obtains a certilicate of domicile under that Act, and takes and subscribes the oath prescribed by section 6 of this Act.

@ When the person to whom i certificate of naturalization has been granted has taken and subscribed the oath prescribed by section 6, any wife thereafter married by, and any child thereafter born to, lshoqShoh (wP,r&s7*P/2024) (DB) Hon'ble Mt. tustkc Wlqar Nmad Hott'ble Ms tustlcc Foroh tamshcd.

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such person shall, if she or he is not a citizen of Pakistan and if such person aforesaid at the date of the marriage or birth, as the case may be, retains any rights, privileges or capacities of a citizen of Pakistan under this Act, be entitled, subject, in the case of wife, to her making to the Federal Government a declaration as provided in subsection (1) and, if necessary, upon obtaining the certificate of domicile and making and subscribing the oath as further provided in that subsection, to the same rights, privileges and capacities, and be subject to the same obligations, duties and Iiabilities to which such person aforesaid was at the date entitled and subject."

8.Section 6 of the Act required petitioner No. 2 to take the oath of allegiance, which, as previously noted, he duly took before the Magistrate on 03.07.2019 in compliance with this Court's order. A copy of the oath is annexed with the instant petition (Annexure-A). Following this, his CNIC was unblocked and his naturaliz.ation certificate, along with his citizenship status, remains intact to date. Notably, tro proceedings have ever been initiated under Section 8 of the Act to revoke his naturalization, nor has any such information been placed before this Cotrt by the respondents

9.Turning to petitioner No. l, it is evident from the record that she was named in the naturali zation certificate issued to her husband and was, therefore, subject to the operation of Section 7 of the Act. Under the statutory scheme, once the husband is naturalized and takes the prescribed oath, the wife if not already a citizen, is required to make a declaration to the Federal Government within one year expressing her desire to be deemed a citizen of Pakistan. The effect of such a declaration, coupled with fulfillment of lshoq Shah (wP#4s75-P/2024) (DB) Hm'ble Mr. tustlce Wtqar Nmod Hon'ble Ms lustlce Faroh tamshed.

other conditions (if applicable), is that the wife is deemed to be naturalized by operation of law. Unlike her husband, she is not required to apply afresh for naturalization or to obtain a separate certificate. This legislative framework reflects a conscious intent to facilitate the unification and integration of families rather than their separation through bureaucratic or procedural formalities.

10.The importance of this family-centered legislative intent has also been emphasized in this Court's judgment in W.P. No. 2469-P12022 titled uMst. Naureen Masood etc, v. Government of Pakistan throush Secretarv, Ministrv of Interior etc.."

decided on 01.12.2023. The Court held that family was the fundamental unit of human society, and its cohesion and integration was of utmost significance. The relevant portion of that judgment is reproduced below:

"12. This way not only an eligible foreigner would be dealt fairly but a citizen of Pakistan who happened to be a spouse of such a foreigner would also be saved from much hardship. It is equally a right of the spouse who happens to be Pakistani citizen to save his or her family from disintegration. He or she had a right to be dealt with in accordance with law under Article 4 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973.

Besides Article 35 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973, was providing a principle for framing policies which is reproduced hereunder for ready reference:

35.The State shall protect the marriage, the family, the mother and the child."

lshqShoh (wPas7tPn024, (DB) Hon'bh Mr, tust&;e Wlgr Nmd Hott'ble Ms tustlce Foroh lonshd.

13.Protection of family has not only been considered important by framers of Constitution while encapsulating it in the chapter principles of policy but same is also basic unit of a society whereupon the building of Islamic society is built. In so many verses of Holy Quran and Ahadees of the Holy Prophet (PBUII) great stress have been laid on protection of institution of marriage, family and integration of families. Every husband has a right to the company of his wife and every wife has a right to the company of her husband and so is the case with children. All the family members have duties towards others and corresponding rights and in no system of administration of justice it can be denied that a family may be allowed to be segregated just because one spouse happens to be a foreign national."

11.The legislative intent underlying SectionT of the Act is explicit and unanrbiguous. While the provision mandates that a male recipient of a naturalization certificate must take the prescribed oath of allegiance, it concurrently provides that his wife (if not already a citizen of Pakistan) shall be deemed to be a citizen, provided she makes a declaration within one year (or within an extended period allowed by the Federal Government) expressing her desire to acquire Pakistani citizenship. In effect, the wife's naturali zation flows directly from that of her husband. She is neither required to obtain a certificate under Section 5 nor obligated to take an independent oath under Section 6. Her sole obligation is to file a declaration indicating her intent to become a citizen. Once such a declaration is filed, that act alone suffices to complete her naturalization under the law.

lshoq Shoh (wP*157eP/m24) (DBl Hm'ble Mn tustkc Wgr Ahmd Hon'ble Ms /ltstlce Foroh lmrshcd.

12.It is well-established that while interpreting statutory provisions and applying them to the facts of a casie, the Court may consider the underlying legislative policy. In this context, relevant passages from Crawford's Statutom Construction (1998: pp. 371-372,374-375) are worth perusal, which read as follow:

"In spite of authority to the contrary, the general policy of the state. Or the established policy of the legislature as revealed by its legislation generally, should be considered in the construction of Statutes. The view opposed to this principle is based upon the premise that public policy is too unstable a ground upon which to rely in the interpretation of statutes [...].

Undoubtedly, so far as most of our important legislation is concerned, a rather definite legislative policy extending over a period of years is discernable. Once that public or legislative policy has been identified, it can obviously lend considerable assistance toward discovering the meaning of a given statute [...1."

13.Against this backdrop, the interpretive task before the Court must be approached through the lens of purposive construction. This method of interpretation requires that statutory provisions be read in a manner that advances the legislative objective and addresses the underlying mischief sought to be remedied. As underscored by Crawford, once the legislative policy is discernible, it serves as a reliable guide in construing the statute in a manner that aligns with its broader purpose. The Court must therefore give effect to the statute not merely through a literal reading of its text, but by lshqShoh (wPu57*P/m24) (DB) Hm'bh Mt. tustke Wlqor Nmod Hon'blc Ms htstlce Foroh lamshcd.

situating it within the broader legislative framework and intent it embodies. Similarly, Crawford on page 249 of his teatise further went on to say:

ttConsequently, when construing a statute, the reason

for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose. The court should seek to carry out this purpose rather than to defeat it [...]."

This foundational principle reinforces the judicial obligation to adopt a construction that effectuates, rather than frustrates, the purpose of the legislature.

14.In the present case, Section 7 of the Act deliberately excludes any requirement of a separate oath of allegiance by the wife, prescribing instead a simplified mechanism grounded in a declaration of intent. Her citizenship flows directly from her husband's naturalization, contingent only upon the timely submission of a declaration, not the taking of an oath. Rule 7 of the Rules, merely operationalizes this requirement by prescribing the format (Form "G") for such a declaration; it does not, in express terms, require or even mention any oath.

15.Viewed purposively, the scheme under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act must be construed in light of constitutional values, particularly Article 35, which mandates the State to protect the family, the marriage, the mother and the child. A hyper-technical interpretation that leads to fragmentation of the family unit by erecting procedural hurdles unsupported by the text of the statute would defeat this constitutional imperative. It is a trite law that a statute or any enacting provision therein must be construed as to make it effective and operative. This principle has roots in the famous maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void. The Superior lshoq Shoh (wPHsTUP/2024t (DBl Hotr'ble Mr. lustke Wlgr Nmad Hqfblc Ms tustlce Foroh tomshcd.

ll

Courts have time and again re-affirmed the principle in the cases of Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL). Islamabad v. S.K. Pvt. Limited (2025 SCMR 570) & F'ederation of Pakistan throueh Secretarr Ministrv of Communications. Islamabad and another v. Shu a Sharif and others (2023 SCMR 129).

16.In continuation of the legislative scheme discussed above, Sections 6 and 7 of the Act explicitly establish a simplified pathway for the wife of a naturalized person to acquire citizenship, requiring only a declaration of intent within the stipulated timeframe.

No separate naturalization process or oath is mandated for her. This statutory policy must guide judicial interpretation. Rule 7 of the Rules merely operationalizes this by prescribing the format and mode of the declaration, as reproduced below:

K7. Declaration of Pakistan Citizenship by wife.- A

declaration of Pakistan Citizenship by a wife of a person to whom a certificate of naturalization is granted under Sub-Section (1) of Section 7 of the Act, shall be made in Form 66G" hereto appended. Such declaration shall be made before any Magistrate. The Magistrate shall forward i copy of such declaration for record to the Directorate of Immigration and Passports through the Provincial Government.tt

This procedural formality requires only a signed declaration before a . In the instant case, petitioner No. 2's naturalization and subsequent oath were duly completed, following which petitioner No. 1 was issued a CNIC-an official act that strongly implies compliance with the requisite procedure.

lshoq Shoh (wPHsTeP/2024t (DB) Hon'blc Mn tusthc Wlqor Ahmod Hon'ble Ms tustlce Foroh tamshed,

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17.As for the objection regarding non-submission of the declaration, the prior issuance of a CNIC to petitioner No. 1 itself indicates that the requisite formality of expressing intent to acquire Pakistani citizenship was fulfilled. It is an inefutable presumption of law embodied in Article 129(e) ofthe Qanun-e-Shatradat Order, 1984 that all official acts are presumed to have been regularly performed in accordance with law, unless proven otherwise. Reliance is placed on Oasim Ali v. Rehmatullah (2005 SCMR 1926); Pakistan Railwavs v. Aimal Khan (2003 PLC (CS) 1027 Supreme Court);

Asif Islam v. Muhammad Asif (PLD 2001 SC 499) & Shahid lqbal v. GovernBent of Pakistan (1995 SCMR 660).

18.In these circumstances, the issuance of a CNIC to petitioner No. I gives rise to a valid presumption that the required declaration of intent was duly made and conveyed to the Federal Government. Nonetheless, by way of abundant caution and in

'W.P.

line with the judgment dated 19.L2.2017 in No. 3952-P12017, petitionerNo. I may once again be afforded an opportunity to submit a fresh declaration before a Magistrate First Class and dispatch it to the Secretary of the relevant Federal Ministry by post.

21.This Court, while delivering its judgment in W.P. No. 3952-P12017, also held on 19.12.2017 as follows:

"6. The representative of the NADRA also brought to the notice of the Court that against the petitioners, the competent authority has passed an order as envisaged under Sections 18(1) & l7Q) of the National Database and Registration Ordinance' 2000 ("Ordinance"). When the Ministry of Interior has issued Naturalization Certificate to the petitioners, and the same has not been recalled, therefore, the order

lshoq Shah (wPH57s-P/2021t (DBl Hon'blc Mr. tustke Wlqor Ahmod Hqr'ble Ms tustlce Foroh tamshed,

issued under Sections 18(1) and l7(2) of the Ordinance would not be legally valid. CNIC issued to any person can be blocked and cancelled, inter alia, if the antecedents of the persons are doubtful. In the present case, admittedly the petitioners were foreign nationals and were granted Naturalization Certificate, which has not been disputed by the Federal Government. Hence, till the Naturalization Certificate of the petitioners is not recalled or cancelled, their rights to be provided Ch[IC and to enjoy the rights thereof cannot be denied.

7, Section 6 of the Naturalization Act, 1926, provides that;

"6. Oath of allegiance.- Every person to whom a certificate of naturalization has been granted shall, within thirty days from the date of the grant thereof take and subscribe the following oath, namely:-

"I, A. B., of do hereby swear (or aflirm) that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to the Constitution of Pakistan.

Provided that the Federal Government may extend the time allowed under this section in any case in which it is satisfied that failure to take and subscribe the oath within that time was due to sufficient cause."

8.The time for taking the Oath of Allegiance is expressly provided to be 30 days from the date of grant of the certificate. However, this period is not mandatory, as no penalty for its failure has been lshoq Shah (wP#4s7*P/2024t (DB) Hm'ble Mr. tuctke lMqar Nmod Hon'ble Mstustlcc Foroh lamshcd.

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provided. In fact, there is provision for condoning the same. In view thereof, the provision of the time period in section-6 of the Act can be regarded as directory and not mandatory. In the circumstances of the present case, the petitioners ought to be provided one last chance to take the Oath of Allegiance.

9.Accordingly, the petitioners are directed to appear before the Court of Magistrate-I, Peshawar, on 9th Januo{, 2018, who will take Oath of Allegiance from the petitioners in accordance with law."

19.The petitioner's case stands on a stronger footing, as she was not required to take an oath of allegiance under Section 6 ofthe Act; instead, she only neededto submit a declaration under Section 7 expressing her intention to be treated as a naturalized citizen.

She should, therefore, be granted another opporhrnity to fulfill this requirement, following the precedent set by this Court in 'W.P. No. 3952-P/2017, decided on

20.NADRA's assertion that the petitioner was involved in anti-state activities is unsupported by any FIR, conviction, or evidentiary record. Even if such involvement were assumed, NADRA lacks the authority under the NADRA Ordinance, 2000, to cancel a CNIC as a punitive measiure. Prosecution and punishment for criminal conduct withinthe remit of criminal law, not administrative discretion. Under Section 8 ofthe Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951, the revocation of a naturalization certificate is the exclusive prerogative of the Federal Government, with Section 9 outlining the legal consequences thereof. Unless and until such revocation occurs, NADRA cannot unilaterally impound or cancel the CNIC of a naturalized citizen. In Hafiz Hamdullah Saboor Government of Pakistan throush Secretar"y Ministrv of Interior. Islamabad lshoq Shoh (wP#4s7eP/2024t (DB) Hon'blc Mn tustlce Wqar Nmod Hott'blc Ms tustlce Faroh tonshcd,

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(PLD 2021 Islamabad 305), the Islamabad High Court held that CNIC cancellation without revocation of citizenship by the competent authority was unlawful, which read as follow:

"ll. Citizenship is the most valuable basic right of a human. All other rights, whether social or political, cannot be enjoyed if a person does not have a bond of citizenship with a State. The fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution are rendered meaningless if a person is stripped of citizenship. It has a devastating impact on human lives. A person once registered as a citizen cannot be deprived of citizenship othenvise than as is provided under the law. Article 15 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares that 'everyone has the right of nationality. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality'. Article 7 of Convention on the Rights of a Child recognizes that eyery child has the right to acquire a nationality. The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Page 24 'W.P. No.374812019 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness discourages States from creating statelessness. In a nut shell, citizenship is the sole and effective bond between a State and a human which enables the latter to enjoy all the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. It entitles the individual to the protection of the State and to enjoy civil and political rights. A State cannot adopt policies which will have the effect of even inadvertently rendering a person stateless. The Citizenship Act and the Citizenship Rules and the statutory safeguards prescribed therein are consistent with the mandate of lshoq Shoh (wP#4s79P/m24t (DB) Hm'blc Mr. twtkc Wlqor Nmad Hm'blc Mstustlcc Foroh tanshcd,

the Constitution and the international obligations. Citizenship is so precious a right that cannot be taken away in a reckless or perfunctory manner. The facts relating to one of the petitionersr namely Haliz Hamdullah Saboor, have been discussed above. It is not even denied that he was born within the territory of Pakistan. He and his father have lived in Pakistan all their lives, They own properties and the petitioner has held various public offices as an elected representative. His son has the distinction and privilege of having been accepted as a commissioned officer in the Armed Forces. There could not have been a more glaring example of arbitrary and reckless action by the Authority of purportedly depriving a registered citizen of his citizenship and that too when the latter had no jurisdiction under the Ordinance of 2000 to do so. In all the other petitions the petitioners assert that they were born in Pakistan and this factum has neither been verified nor adjudicated upon by the competent authority in accordance with the provisions of the Citizenship Act read with the Citizenship Rules. The Authority has exposed itself to be sued for claim of damages for the devastating consequences and unimaginable mental agony suffered by the petitioners."

21.Additionally, depriving the wife of the benefits conferred under the Act on tenuous and hyper-technical grounds amounts to doubtful penalization and constitutes undue interference with constitutionally protected family rights, which fall turder the lshoqShoh (wPfi4s79Pn021t (DBl Hon'bh Mt, twtke tMgr Nmod Hon'blc Mstustlcc Foroh lanshed.

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v overarching umbrella of the State's policy. As Bennion on Statfiory Construction by Oliver Jones (Sixth Edition:2013, p. 760) explains:

"One aspect of the principle against doubtful penalisation is that by the exercise of state power the family arrangements of t person should not be interfered with, nor his relationships with family members, except under clear authority of law

[Headings omittedl

The presumption against imposition of a statutory detriment to family rights without clear words is an aspect of the general principle against doubtful penalisation, explained in Code 271.

It is the policy of law to uphold, rather than defeat the validity of a marriage. It is also the policy of the law to safeguard the foundations of family life. The law has always concerned itself with the protection of the home

22.Although traditionully, doubtful penalization has referred to strict construction of penal statutes, its application is no longer confined to the criminal domain. Bennion clarifies that the doctrine now extends, with varying degrees, to any form of statutory detriment, whether civil or criminal. This broader view has been reinforced in ESS Production Ltd v Sullv, [20051 EWCA Civ 554, decided by the Supreme Court of Judicature, Court of Appeal (Civil Division), where Arden LJ held at paragraph 78:

lshaq Shoh (wPu57eP/m24t (DB) Hm'blc lttr. tustke Mgr Aluttad Hon'blc Ms tustlcc Faroh tamshed,

"The presumption against doubtful penalisation is not Iimited to the imposition of criminal tiabilities. It applies whenever a particular construction of an enactment can be described as inflicting a detriment of any kind, whether criminal or civil..."

In the modern legal landscape, particulady in relation to family rights, the doctrine finds additional support in international human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966). Bennion further elaborates this idea on page 750 of his treatise:

"In this context, the term 'panel' has been treated as a term of ort, and yet given different meanings. This is misconceived, because a law that inflicts hardship or deprivation of any kind is in essence penal. There are degrees of penalization under statute, but the concept of detriment inflicted through the state's coercive power pervades them all.t'

The principle of doubtful penalization, when extended to civil detriments impacting family integrity, compels courts to interpret statutes with caution and fidelity to their text.

23.In light of the foregoing discussion, both grounds relied upon by NADRA for the cancellation of petitioner No. l's CMC are found to be without lawful authority and are accordingly declared null and void. Petitioner No. I shall appear before any Magistrate First Class and sign the declaration in the format prescribed under Form-G of

(DB)Hotr'ble Mr. tustke Wlqot Almd lshoqShah wPusTeP/m24) Hufble Ms htstlcc Fardt /plmshd.

the relevant Rules. The Magistrate shall endorse the fact of making and subscribing the declaration on the said Form-G. The original of this declaration shall be forwarded to the Secretary of the concerned Federal Minisfiry, while a notarized copy, along with postal receips and an attested copy of this judgment, shall be submitted to NADRA. Upon receipt of these documents, NADRA shall immediately restore the CMC of petitioner No. 1. The petition is allowed in the terms set out above.

J UID G.D

Announced on 28thA^'^ ^tr

lshaq Shoh (wP#4s7s-P/2024) (DB) Hon'ble Mr, tustlce Wlqar Ahmad Hon'ble Ms tustlce Foroh tomshed,