Abid Khan Vs The MD Regional Director & Headmistress City School Mardan Campus

PESHAWAR HIGH COI]RT. PESHAWAR

(JTJDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

v Civil Revision No. 448-P/2019.

Abid Ktran

Petitioner.

Versus

The Managing Director, Regional Director and Headmistress The City School Mardan CamPus.

.........Respondents.

For the Petitioner: IVIr. Khalid Rehman, Advocate.

For the Respondents: Syed Haziq Ali Shah, Advocate.

Date of Hearing: 20 025.

JUDGMENT

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f.- Petitioner, Abid I(han is aggrieved of dismissal of his suit by learned civil court vide judgment and decree dated 19.11.2015. He is also aggrieved of judgment and decree dated 20.2.2019 of the Court of learned Additional District Judge-II, Mardan whereby his appeal filed against the judgment and decree of learned civil court was also dismissed. He has now invoked revisional jurisdiction of this court under section 1 15 code of civil Procedure, 1908.

2.Contents of his plaint filed before learned civil Cotrt v "\- was bearing the following narration of facts;

plaintiff obtains his Master Degree in English gets appointment in the yeff 2005 at City School Mardan Campus, where he teaches English to students intending to take their $O') level examination. The plaintiff performs his duties with due diligence and also received appreciation letters from the school administration from time to time. In this period he attends various courses and workshops for enhancement of his skill for better service delivery. His service is terminated all of a sudden in the year 2012 whereagainst he files a suit and same is then withdrawn as the school administration reinstates him in service. After his reinstatement in service he performs duties with increased zeal and zest. The school administration unfortunately starts harassing him by issuing unjust and baseless warnings.

Defendants No. 3 & 4 being Headmistresses of the concerned school branch also starts mentally torturing and harassing him as well as abusing him occasionally so as to compel him to leave the school. Due to this attitude of defendant No. 3 and 4 he remains in continued mental sffess and strain turning his professional life to miserable one. Harassment and abuse reaches a level where plaintiff has to take a few days break in his work. Plaintiff then sends a complaint to the high-ups i.e. defendant No.l (Managing Director) against harsh and unreasonable aftitude of defendants No. 3 and 4.It

is on 18.2,2014 that the defendants send the plaintiff a letter \-, of termination without affording him an opportunity of defending himself. After pleading this case' petitioner is invoking jurisdiction of learned civil Court for grant of relief of either reinstating the petitioner or paying him damages, gratuity, provident fund according to the prayer clause in the plaint.

3.Defendants were summoned by learned civil Cotrt who appeaxed and submitted their written statement. It was contended in the written statement that the plaintiff had never fulfilled his duties with devotion and that he had been served with certain warning letters etc. It was also stated that petitioner had also submiued his resignation once mentioning that he had not been able to meet the higlrer standards set by the school. It was also claimed that termination of the petitioner was fully justified.

4.After framing of issues on 23.5.2014, parties were put to evidence. Plaintiff got recorded his statement as PW-l wherein necessary documents were exhibited and after defendants counsel concluded cross examination on him he closed his evidence. Thereafter statement of one Farman Ali was recorded on behalf of defendants who also exhibited certain documents from school record beside deposing orally in support of the case of defendants and after learned counsel for petitioner concluded his cross examination, learned counsel for defendants also closed evidence of defendants.

After hearing arguments of learned counsel for parties, v learned civil court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 19.11.2015. Appeal filed by petitioner against the judgment and decree of civil court was also dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 20.1.2019 of learned appellate court.

5.Leaned counsel for petitioner while arguing the case of petitioner referred to rules of the City School and contended that petitioner had not been teated in accordance with said rules. While highlighting violations of said rules learned counsel stated that under the rules competent authority for termination of the petitioner was Managing Director but his services has rather been terminated by Headmistress of the concerned section and not even the Principal of the school. In this regard he relied on para 9.2.1 read with para-9.l of the rules. He also contended that just for reason of absence of four days from the duty his service had been terminated by the Headmistress of the concerned section without bothering to ask from the petitioner about the reason for such absence.

He added that due to unilateral termination despite long service of the petitioner in the school, petitioner had not only faced mental agony and torhrre but also humiliation and degradation in the society. Learned counsel also contended that petitioner had also suffered in terms of advancement of his career as teacher in private school because with the weight of stigma of termination other schools would not have

weighed his credentials as a high value teacher. Learned \-, counsel for petitioner relied on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in case of Habib Bank Limited through Attorney..vs..Mehboob Rabbani reported as 2023 SCMR 1189 and contended that the principles laid by the Apex Court in said judgment were squarely applicable to his case so far as grant of damages was concerned. He also pressed his main relief for re-instatement in service and in this respect placed reliance on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as 2009 SCMR 109.

6.Learned counsel for respondents contended that petitioner had not been serious in the school and warnings had been issued to him on various occasions in past. He contended that in 2Ol1 petitioner had himself tendered resignation stating that he could not achieve the high standards set by the school administration. He also referred to contents of the plaint as well as statement of petitioner and contended that absence had been admified by petitioner therefore there was no need of any inquiry or the show cause notice. The learned counsel also placed reliance on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as 2013 scMR l2o,2ol9 scMR 648 and 2020 scMR 994.

7 I have heard arguments of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

8.Perusal of record reveal that so far as prayer of \, petitioner regarding his reinstatement was concerned his relationship with the school was that of master and servant and was being regulated under terms and conditions of the contract read with relevant rules of the school and therefore his senzice were terminable on one month notice. In such a situation a case for reinstatement could not be pressed into service. Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan while giving its judgment in case of Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs .vs.

Muhammad Azam Chatta reported as 2013 SCMR 120 has held in this respect;

6' In addition to it, it is a cardinal principle of law that a contact employee instead of pressing for his reinstatement to serve for the leftover period can at best claim damages to the extent of expired period of his sewice.

A similar view has also been expressed by Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan while rendering judgment in case of Qazi Munir Ahmed .vs. Rawalpindi Medicat College and allied Hospital through Principal and other reported as 2019 scMR 648.

g. So for as claim of petitioner for grant of damages was concerned it requires re-consideration' In this respect arguments of learned counsel for petitioner that his case was a case of wrong termination was found holding water. Firstly termination of the petitioner had not been made in accordance with the mechanism provided in the rules and

secondly penalty of termination of service for just seven \, days of absence was also found to be harsh, trnreasonable, illogical and resultantly wrong.

In para-g.| of the rules misconduct has been defined in a manner that habitual late coming or unauth orized absence from duty had been included in the definition of behaviour amounting to misconduct particularly under clause-G of para-9.1.2. In para-9.2.1 ithas been provided that termination on misconduct would be at the sole discretion of the managing Director or Regional Director. Here in the case in hand the termination had not been made by the Managing Director or Regional Director. When confronted learned counsel for respondents relied on a clause in the appointment letter i.e. clause-vii, where it has been mentioned that in case of misconduct the Managing/Regional Director or Principal would be the sole Judge. It is important to be noted that in this case the termination order of the petitioner has not been issued by the managing Director or the Principal. When the rules have been providing the Managing Director or Regional Director as having the powers of firing an employee then the matter of termination being a serious issue for an employee, should have been made by higher authority provided in the rules but even if in case the Principal is taken for the purpose of this case (as competent to pass the order of termination) then the termination of petitioner has not been made by the principal also, which is evident from the termination order

Ex.PW-119. Same has been issued with the signature of \-, Headmistress of senior section of the City School Mardan Campus. Against same headmistress a complaint filed by the petitioner on ll.2.20ll has also been exhibited by the petitioner in his statement as Ex.PW-lltO. In such circumstances learned counsel for petitioner was also pleading existence of malafide but keeping that aspect aside it was apparent that Headmistress of the senior section of the school was not competent to pass order of termination of the petitioner and this fact was sufficient by itself to dub the termination order as wrongful termination.

10.Beside termination of service of the petitioner has been made for his absence from duties w.e.f 10.2.2014 till 18,2.2014. Learned counsel for petitioner also contended that the dates of 15.2.2014 was Saturday ( school off day) while 16.2.2014 was Sunday and when petitioner had attended the duties on 18.2.2014 he was handed over termination letter.

Entries in the calendar of the relevant yeat supports this assertion of learned counsel for petitioner. So the absence remains to be seven days after excluding the Saturday and Sunday. Petitioner had been serving in the school since the year 2OO5 and in such circumstances absence for eight days were not warranting imposition of the penalty of termination from service and that also without affording petitioner an opportunity of hearing and explaining the reasons for his absence. Learnecl counsel for petitioner also referred to a

document dated 11.2.2014, brought in evidence as Ex.DW- \-/ ll4 and contended that same Headmistress had earlier mentioned a period of his absence from 7.2.2014 while in the order of termination same had been mentioned w.e.f 10.2.2014 and claimed that it was indicating that the headmistress had been prejudiced against the petitioner. Be that as it ffioy, it was also mentioned in clause-4 of the appointment letter @x.DW-L/4) of petitioner that he would be entitled to l0 days casual leave. It had also been provided therein that absence of over and above 10 days, would be treated as leave without pay. It was also an option for the competent authority to have withheld salary for the period of absence and treated said days as leave without pay under above referred clause of the contract but this course was not adopted. It is also important that r:nder para-13.5 all absences had been provided to be deducted at the rate of the current gross salary drawn plus l}yo. Similarly under the rules also para- 12.2.3 provided that in case of an emergetrcY, casual leave could have been availed without prior permission of the Management and that application could have been submitted on resumption of duty. Petitioner was not even allowed, an opporhrnity for explaining reasons of his absence. Services of the petitioner were though on contract but same were provided in the rules to have been extendable uptill the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years in para-8.3.1 of the rules. In para-9.2 a number of penalties had been

provided where dismissal from service had been the last orle.

\-/ Opting for termination of seruice in a situation where alternate options of lesser punishment had been provided in rule was fourd to be harsh, illogical, unreasonable and therefore, wrongful, in the peculiar circumstances of this case.

I 1. So for as defence raised in the written statement regarding conduct of the petitioner was concerned it is apparent that in evidence also respondents had exhibited warnings letters like Ex.DWP ll I dated 3.2.201 l, Ex.DW-llz dated 6.2.2A11, Ex.DW-ll3 dated 13.5.2011, Ex.DW-Lls dated 13.1 .2014, Ex.DW-116 dated 13.1.2014, Ex.DW-ll7 dated 2.10.2013, Ex.DWpl/8 dated 23.45.2013, Ex.DW-l/g dated 4.ll.2}\1, but petitioner was serving in a private school where he had a lengthy tenure of almost eight years.

In such long tenure issuance of warnings or letters of concern, otr routine matters of the school was not something on the basis of which the impugned termination order has been passed. There is no mention of those warnings or past conduct of the petitioner in the termination letter.

Respondents have also been relaying on a defence plea that petitioner had once tendered resignation, mentioning that he could not achieve the high standards set by the school, copy of which is brought in evidence as Ex.DW-1 lI3. Perusal of same reveal that is had also been couched in a protesting language. It was also bearing date of 8.2.2011. Same was too

remote a phenomenon that it cannot be considered either way v in the matter of termination of petitioner in the year 2014 which termination had also been simply for absence from the duty. Beside, petitioner had never been confronted with these pieces of evidences before termination nor afforded opportumty of explaining his position viz a viz these pieces of evidences and have not been mentioned as the reasons for termination of his service therefore these would not be of any benefit to the respondents.

12.In case of wrongful termination award of damages has repeatedly been held to be an appropriate remedy in cases where the relationship between the parties is being governed by Master and Servant. Reliance in this respect may be placed on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in case of Gohar AIi and others..vs..Messres Hoechst Pakistan Limited reported as 2009 scMR 109 where the Hon'ble apex Court has held as;

g. A careful scrutiny of the record would reveal that salaries of the appellants were withheld by the respondent company without any legal justification. Appellants were transferred from one place to the other to compel them either to abide by the wishes of the management or tender resignation and ultimately services of the appellants were terminated vide letter, dated 23-1-1996 (Exh.P.'W. ll3) under clause & of the appointment letter dated 5-10-1987, which clause does not provide for such action. Neither any reason for said action has been given nor the required one month's notice was issued to the appellants before termination of their services. Nattrally by such illegal action on the part of the respondent-company without any justifiable reason appellants suffered in their reputation and prospects of futtrre employment

10.Adverting to the question of gompensation it may be observed thai the effect of the application of the master and servant rule is that an employee of a coqporation in

the absence of violation of law or any statutory rule cannot press into service constitutional jurisdiction or civil jurisdiction for seeking relief of reinstatement in v senrice, his remedy for wrongful dismissal is to claim damages. It was held by this Court in Sufi Mtrhammad Ishaque v. The Metropolitan Corporation, Lahore through Mayor PLD 1996 SC 737 that there can be no yardstick or definite principle for assessing damages in such cases. The damages are meant to compensate a party who suffers an injury. It may be bodily injuty loss of reputation, business and also mental shock and suffering. So far nervous shock is concerned, it depends upon the evidence produced to prove the nature, extent and magnitude of such suffering, but even on that basis usually it becomes difficult to assess a fair compensation and in those circumstances it is the discretion of the Judge who ffioy, on facts of the case and considering how far the society would deem it to be a fair sum, determines the amount to be awarded to a person who has suffered such a damage. The conscience of the Court should be satisfied if that the damages awarded would, not completely, satisfactorily compensate the aggrieved party. " Beside, grffit of damages on account of wrongful termination petitioner was also entitled to grant of general damages under section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872. Section 73 of the Act was providing as:

73.Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract.- When a contract has been broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby, which nattrally arose in the usual course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew, when they made the contract, to be likely to iesult from the breach of it. Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and indirect loss or damage sustained 6y reason of the breach. Compensation for failure to discharge obligation resembling those created by contraci.- When an obligation resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has not been discharged, any person injtred by the failure to dischaxge it is entitled to reteive the same compensation from the party in default, as if such person had contracted to discharge it and had broken his contract. Explanation.- In estimating the loss or damage arising from a breach of contract, the means which existed of remedying the inconvenience caused by the non- performance of the contract must be taken into account."

13.Petitioner was appointed vide the appointment order brought in evidence as Ex.DW-112. The appointment order in its claue-9 was providing that the appointee agreed to be

bound by rules and regulations of the school, as amended v from time to time. This recital in the appointrnent contract would mean that relations between the parties were supposed to be regulated according to the rules and regulations of the school and that petitioner was bound under said terms and conditions and also entitled to rights provided therein. In other words both the parties would be deemed bound by the rules and regulations of the school, in extended terms of the contractual liability. As stated earlier the petitioner was supposed to have got retired on attaining the age of 60 years, unless his services were earlier terminated. The termination order of the petitioner was also found wrongful and therefore petitioner would also be entitled to grant of damages for breach of confiact under section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872. Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan while rendering its leading judgment in case of Habib Bank (supra) has held in the context of awarding of damages for breach of contract in somewhat similar situation as follows;

I .

The etymology of the word "damages" reveals that the word damages iiems from the words "dommage" in French and "damnum" in Latin, signifying that a thing is being taken away or that a thing is being lost which a party is eniitled to have restored to him so that they may be made whole again.

Damages have also been defined by the UK's House of Lords in the case of Livingstone v. Rawyards Coal Co. ((1Sg0) 5 App. Cas. 25) wherein damages have been defined as:-

"... that sum of money which will put the party who has been injured or who has suffered in the same position as he would have been if he had not sustained the wrong for which he is now getting his comPensation or rcParution. "

Similarly, while dealing with the para materia section of section 73 in the Indian Contr act Act of 1,872, the Calcutta

High Court in Great Easter Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR l97t Cal. 150) has held that:- "Chapter VI of the Act deals with the consequences of a breach of contract and section 73 is in Chapter VI of the Act. First paragraph of section 73 of the Act inter alia provides that whenever a party has suffered loss or damage in consequence of a breach of contract he is entitled to receive compensation from the party who has broken the contract Principle upon which such compensation is to be assessed is that a party injured by a breach of contract should be placed in the same position in terms of money as far as possible had the contract been performed by the party in default."

(Underlining is ours)

Another judgment of the UK's Courts of Exchequer in Robinson v. Harmain ((1848) I Exch 850) has held that:- "The rule of the common law is, that by where a party sustains a loss by reason of a breach of contract, he is, so far as money can do it, to be placed in the same situation with respect to damages as if the contract had been performed."

Damages therefore are costs that are imposed not as a deterrent or as a means to punish person(s) or party(s) who has/have breached a contract but instead to bring the person(s) or party(s) who has/have suffered from the breach of contract into a position which they would have been had the breach of contract not accrued. This principle is now legally known as the principle of restitutio in integrum (restoration to original condition). It therefore stands to reason that damages are in fact the compensation that the law awards when a breach of contract occurs as compensation for the loss that a person or party has suffered from a breach of contract.

12.Coming to section 73 of the 1'872 Contract Act itself, the proviso to the said Section has defined that only those damages which are not too remote or unforeseeable if the contract in question were to be breached ate to be awarded."

It has also been reiterated in said judgment that award of damages in a particular case would include general as well as special damages. August Supreme Court of Pakistan also held that in case of grant of general damages a plaintiff or claimant had to prove that there had been existence of a contractual relationship between the parties and that the contract had been breached beside proving the justification for granting of damages claimed. It was concluded that when the plaintiff or claimant had succeeded in discharging his

onus to said extent through preponderance of evidence then hr./ such a claimant was entitled to claim damages which in case of award of general damages would have to be reasonably determined by the court unless the damages sustained by reasons of breach of contract was found to be remote and indirect loss. While applying the principle annunciated in said case to the facts of the particular case before Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan it was held in paru-25 of the judgment (supra) as follows;

'025. In the present case, the Respondent had specifically deposed in his examination-in-chief that he had suffered mental agony, financial loss as well as reputational loss after he was wrongfully dismissed from service by the Appellant. While specific suggestions had been put to the Respondent that he had not suffered any mental agony, financial loss or economic loss by the actions of the Appellant, we note that the Respondent has specifically denied all such suggestions. It is only logical that when the Respondent was dismissed from service, it would have been difficult for the Respondent to be employed again owing to the fact that a dismissal from service on his record would have had the effect of either barring him from further employment or making it considerably more difficult for the Respondent to be employed again. That blot on his service pennanently marked the Respondent for the rest of his life and was only rvashed away when the Respondent passed away. Had the Appellant treated the Respondent in a just and fair manner and conducted a fair, open and impartial inquiry giving him the opportunity to defend himself, the financial and reputational aspect of a claim in tort would have been non- existent or too remote. Dismissal from service is clearly a stigma and financial and reputational loss apart from mental torture, agony and distress are logical consequences. In the present case, owing to denial of the right to defend himself without just cause leads towards a conclusion of wrongful dismissal and financial as well as economic loss and therefore could naturally be considered to arise out of the wrongful dismissal of the Respondent by the Appellant. Since we have also arrived at the conclusion that the Respondent had been wrongfully dismissed from service, the Appellant cannot be granted the premium of not being made to compensate the Respondent especially when the Appetlants have failed to prove that the damages the Respondent sought were too remote or did not naturally arise out of the breach of contract. Once the Respondent had proved that he had been wrongfully dismissed from service, the onus shifted on the Appellants to prove that the damages claimed by the Respondent were either too remote or did not arise out of the breach of contract. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Respondent was entitled to such damages that in the opinion of the Court considering

the facts and circumstances of the case arose directly out of the breach of contract as well as all damages claimed for wrongful dismissal from service."

Here in the case in hand also it was found that case of petitioner had not been dealt in accordance with the terms and conditions regulating his service i.e. relevant service rules and terms of the appointment. Besides, the penalty imposed was also found to be harsh, arbitrary and unreasonable. So for as damages caused to the petitioner was concerned both the courts below have held that petitioner had failed in leading proof of sustaining special damages due to the acts of termination. True that such evidence was not fonhcoming but the grant of general damages have wrongly been refused to the petitioner. On account of his wrongful termination mental agony and loss in reputation could have validly been inferred from the circumstances. Besides, teaching in private schools has developed as a profession for those teachers who teaches in such private institutions. With exponential growth of private schools the number of such teachers (teaching in such institution) have also grown. By now it can be safely said that teaching in private institutions have become a profession. In such profession, a teacher's worth is weighed for determination of his salary by the competing institutions. While hiring senrices of such teachers and determining their salaries on the basis of their past experience, tract record, qualification and teaching skills, there cannot be two opinions that a person catrying an entry of termination in his past track record would adversely suffer

in getting future employment or being rated as a high worth \v teacher. Therefore, wrong termination adversely affect a teacher desirous of joining a better job. Such aspect of the matter could have been considered by both the court below for testing entitlement of the petitioner viz a viz grant of general damages, even when petitioner could not have proved causing of special damages. Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan while rendering its judgment in case of Habib Bank (supra) has also explained the difference in specie as well as criteria applicable to grant of general and special damages inpara-13 of the judgment as follows;

" 13 ... Principle for ascertaining the quantum of general and special damages is laid down in the leading case of Hadly v. Baxendale (18 54) 9 Exch , 341 which clearly provides the distinction between the two. The provisions of section 73 of the Contract Act, 1872 are not much different for purpose of practical application. Claim for damages was rejected as being too remote in the case of Banco de Portugal v. Waterlow and Sons Ltd. (1932) A.C . 452 and again in the case of Commell Lairds and Co. v. Managanese Bronze and Brass Co. (1993) 2 KB l4l. General damag€s,' naturally arising according to the usual course of things from the breach of contract are recoverable in the ordinary circumstances. Special damages are awarded in cases, as may reasonably, be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the time of contract. The law does not record consequential damages arising of delay in respect of money as one in the case of Graham v. Campbell. (1877) 7 Ch. D. 494 and Urquhart Lindsay and Co. v. Eastern Bank Ltd. (1992) I K.B. 318. Same view has been taken by honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Syed Ahmad Saeed Kirmani v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 1993 SCMR 441 ;', While relying upon the above said judgment, this Court in the case of Azizullah Sheikh v. Standard Chartered Bank Ltd. (2009 SCMR 27 6) has held as under:

"6. The petitioners did not produce any evidence to show that in fact they suffered any loss due to breach of contract. Solitary statement of petitioner No.l is not sufficient to decree the colossal suit amount, as P. W.2 did not state anything about the damages. Besides the reasons advanced by the learned High Court (single Bench and Division Bench) for declining the total claim of the petitioners, we may add here that the petitioners through production of evidence comprehensively failed to prove that due to breach of contract they are in fact entitled to damages and to what extent, which are sine qua non for the grant of damages

under section 73 of the Contract Act. Thus we are clear in our mind that the petitioners could not prove that they suffered any loss. They also failed to prove' through \- production of evidence on record, that they were entitled for decree of the total amount claimed in the suit."

In the case of Mrs. Alia Tareen v. Amanullah Khan (PLD 2OO5 SC 99), it has been held that in a suit for damages, the wrong done to the plaintiff must be proved to be the immediate, direct and proximate result of the act or acts attributed to the defendants.(Underlining is ours).

14.In the case in hand petitioner had successfully discharged onus of existence of the earlier contractual relationship between the parties, breach of contract as well as his entitlement to gfant of general damages. In awarding general damages, & rule of thumb nonnally follow however discretion lies with the court to calculate such compensation keeping in view circumstances of a particular case. In the case in hand petitioner has claimed award of damages to the tune of Rs. 90,00,000/- (rupees nine million) in his plaint. It is also claim of the petitioner that beside loss on account of mental torture, unjust humiliation, loss of future employment and loss of reputation, he was also supposed to have served the institution till date of superannuation and on account of all his losses, he has prayed for a total compensation of Rs.

90,00,000/- (rupees nine million). This court finds amount of Rs. g0,00,000/- to be exorbitant in the circumstances of the case. An amount of damages of Rs. 1.5 million would be approp riate, keeping in view the peculiar circumstances of this case. Resultantly petitioner is found entitled to grant of general damages in a sum of fts. 1.5 million (rupees fifteen lac). So for as prayer for grant of gratuity and provident fund

was concerned leamed counsel for petitioner could not point \( any law, rules or terms of confiact under which petitioner could be deemed to have been entitled to the grant of same or other terminal benefits.

15.In light of what has been discussed above instant civil revision is allowed to the effect that prayer made by petitioner /plaintiff in clause-d of the heading of his plaint is modified and suit of the plaintiff is decreed in a sum of Rs.

15,00,000/- (one and a half million rupees). However, the petitioner was not found entitled to the prayers made in rest of the heading of the plaint and same have rightly been declined. To above stated effect judgments and decrees of the two courts below (impugned herein) stands modified.

Announced on;

2Ah of June,2025 *Zortg,lrr,d*

(SB)Hon'ble Mr. Justice Wiqar Ahmad