Safdar Khan Vs Sajjad Khan

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT, ABBOTTABAD

BENCH

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Civil Revision No. 03-A/2023

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing...................17.09.2025.................................

Petitioner (Safdar Khan) By M/S Nasrullah Khan Jadoon and Fida Bahadur, Advocates.

Respondent (Sajjad Khan) By Mr. Muhammad Arif Khan Jadoon, Advocate.

AURANGZEB, J.- This revision petition is directed against the judgment and decree dated 27.10.2022, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-III, Abbottabad, whereby the respondent’s appeal filed against the order dated 15.06.2022 of the learned Civil Judge-VI, Abbottabad, was accepted.

2.The facts of the case, in brief, are that the respondent/decree-holder instituted an execution petition on the basis of an order dated 15.02.2017, whereby Civil Suit No.199/1 was disposed of in terms of a compromise arrived at between the parties. The respondent sought execution of the said compromise. However, upon consideration of the matter and after hearing arguments on the point of maintainability, the learned trial court, vide order dated 15.06.2022, dismissed the execution petition on the ground that no formal decree had

been passed in pursuance of the compromise order, nor was any decree sheet drawn, and therefore, the execution petition was not maintainable in the eyes of law. Feeling dissatisfied and aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the learned trial court, the respondent/decree- holder preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge-III, Abbottabad. The appellate court, after examining the record and hearing the parties, came to the conclusion that the order of the learned trial court was not sustainable, and accordingly, the appeal was allowed. It is against this backdrop that the present revision petition has been instituted before this Court, wherein the legality, propriety, and correctness of the impugned appellate order has been called into question.

3.I have heard arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record with their valuable assistance.

4.The available record unmistakably demonstrates that the lis between the parties was amicably resolved on the basis of their joint statement and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the compromise duly placed before the Court. However, owing to inadvertence, the

learned trial Court omitted to prepare and draw the requisite decree sheet in terms of the compromise order. It is by now a well-settled and firmly entrenched principle of law that no litigant ought to suffer on account of any act, error, omission, or neglect on the part of the Court or its ministerial staff. The doctrine that “an act of Court shall prejudice no one” is a salutary rule of law consistently upheld by superior Courts, premised upon the fundamental principle that justice must not be defeated or delayed because of procedural lapses attributable to the Court itself. Therefore, where the adjudication on merits stands concluded in terms of compromise, the absence of a formal decree sheet cannot be allowed to deprive a party of the fruits of the judgment, as the failure lies with the Court and not with the litigant. The august court in case titled Mian Muhammad Talha Adil and Mian Muhammad Lutfi (2005 SCMR 720) has observed that “no person shall suffer for the act or omission of the court and act of court shall not prejudice anyone”. The apex court in another case rendered in case titled Muhammad Ijaz and another versus Muhammad Shafi through L.Rs (2016 SCMR 834) wherein it was held that:- “........There is a well-known maxim "Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit"

(an act of the court shall prejudice no man) thus, where any court is found to have not complied with the mandatory provision of law or omitted to pass an order, required by law in the prescribed manner then, the litigants/parties cannot be taxed, much less penalized for the act or omission of the court.....”

5.It is not, by any stretch of legal obligation, the duty of a litigant to remind the Court or its office of their responsibility to draw up a decree once a judgment has been announced in any suit.

After pronouncing the judgment, the preparation of the decree sheet in accordance with the terms of the judgment becomes an exclusive and bounden duty of the Court. No litigant, whether victorious or unsuccessful, can be burdened with the obligation to monitor or supervise the ministerial acts of the Court’s office. It is universally acknowledged that the authority to pass a judgment carries with it a corresponding duty to complete the ancillary and consequential steps, including the preparation of a decree sheet. If, however, the Court or its office fails to discharge this statutory obligation, fairness and justice demand that a litigant cannot be penalized for such omission. To punish a party for the default of the Court would amount to subjecting the litigant to a liability for no fault of their own, which would not only be unjust but also

contrary to the fundamental principles of due process and fair trial.

6.Moreso, it is significant to observe that no specific time limit has been prescribed under Order XX Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure for the preparation or signing of a decree after the pronouncement of judgment. The provision merely enjoins that the formal decree prepared in any case shall bear the date of the judgment itself.

This shows that while the decree must relate back to the date of judgment, its preparation is essentially a ministerial act, dependent upon the office of the Court and not upon the volition of the litigant. The precise date on which the decree is actually signed thus remains uncertain and may vary depending on administrative processing within the Court’s establishment. The august Supreme Court has categorically observed that for the purposes of limitation under Article 156 of the Limitation Act, the period available for filing an appeal shall commence from the date of signing of the decree. Consequently, the intervening period which elapses between the announcement of the judgment and the eventual signing of the decree is to be excluded and duly accommodated, since a party cannot be expected to prefer an appeal

without the availability of a formal decree. To hold otherwise would amount to placing an unfair and impractical burden upon litigants, requiring them to perform an act which the law itself renders impossible. Such an interpretation would not only defeat the ends of justice but also run contrary to the settled maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel the doing of the impossible). In this backdrop, the judicial wisdom reflected through the pronouncements of the apex Court reaffirms the principle that litigants cannot be penalized for delays attributable to the ministerial functions of the Court or its office. The running of limitation is, therefore, safeguarded by law to commence only from the signing of the decree, ensuring that the valuable right of appeal is not rendered illusory by administrative lapses or omissions beyond the control of the parties.

7.Mere technicalities of procedure cannot be allowed to defeat or frustrate the substantive rights of any person. The law, in its wisdom, distinguishes between matters of form and matters of substance, and it has always been the consistent view of superior courts that procedure is meant to serve the cause of justice and not to stifle it. Although certain technicalities of law may,

in exceptional circumstances, assume relevance, particularly where a right has vested in the opposite party by efflux of time, or where considerations of public policy so demand, yet such technicalities cannot and ought not to be given preference in a manner that undermines the very ends of justice. It is a settled proposition that technical rules are designed as handmaids of justice, intended to regulate proceedings and ensure orderliness, but they cannot be elevated to the status of obstacles that deprive a litigant of substantive rights which have accrued under the law. Courts are under a bounden duty to ensure that justice prevails over mere formalities, and that no party is unjustly deprived of what is rightfully due merely on account of procedural lapses that do not go to the root of the matter. To permit otherwise would be tantamount to sacrificing the principle of substantial justice at the altar of technical compliance, an approach consistently deprecated by the apex court. Therefore, while the observance of legal technicalities is important for orderly administration of justice, such technicalities must never be interpreted or applied in a manner that extinguishes or nullifies a party’s substantive and vested rights. Justice, equity, and fair play

require that the law be construed in a manner that promotes rather than defeats the realization of rights, ensuring that litigants are not penalized for inconsequential omissions when the substance of their claim is otherwise well-founded in law and supported by principles of justice.

8.The petitioner has failed to point out any illegality or irregularity committed by the learned appellate court while passing the judgment calling for interference by this court in its revisional jurisdiction.

9.In light of what has been discussed above, this revision petition has been found to be meritless and same is accordingly dismissed.

Announced:

Aftab PS*/ JUDGE