The State Vs Khuda Bakhsh

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

D.I.KHAN BENCH

(Judicial Department)

Cr.A.No.37-D/2025.

The State..... Versus..... Khuda Bakhsh

JUDGMENT

For State-appellant: Mr. Khalid Saeed, Advocate.

For respondent: Mr. Muhammad Waqar Alam, Advocate.

Date of hearing: 14.11.2025.

INAM ULLAH KHAN, J.- The State has filed the present appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C., assailing the order, dated 30.10.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption, Southern Districts Camp Court at D.I.Khan, whereby the accused/ respondent was acquitted under Section 265-K Cr.P.C. in case FIR No.03, dated 02.10.2018, registered under Section 409 PPC read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, at Police Station ACE, Tank.

2.The prosecution case originates from a letter, dated 07.03.2011, addressed by Abdur Rauf Khan, Principal, Government Degree College, Tank, to the Director Higher Education, alleging that an amount of Rs.4.513 million was spent on a water supply scheme during 2004–05 by the office of Deputy District

Officer W&S, District Tank; that substandard material was used; and that the scheme failed within three months. The letter sought an inquiry against the officials concerned. On the basis of the said letter, the Anti-Corruption Establishment initiated open enquiry No.06/2012-PHE, during which a loss of Rs.

9,89,047/- was assessed and the accused/respondent, then serving as a Tube-Well Operator/Class-IV employee, was held responsible. Resultantly, the FIR was registered.

3.After investigation, challan was submitted and the accused/respondent was charged. The prosecution examined two witnesses. During trial, the accused/ respondent moved an application under Section 265- K Cr.P.C., which, after hearing both sides, was accepted vide the impugned order, dated 30.10.2024, whereby he was acquitted.

4.I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the available record.

5.PW-1, Abdur Rauf Khan, the complainant and author of the initiating letter, categorically stated during cross-examination that the respondent was originally appointed as Class-IV/water carrier and was not trained to operate tube-well machinery. He

was assigned work beyond his designation due to administrative necessity. He clearly stated that no fault could be attributed to the respondent in the failure of the scheme and that responsibility lay with officials of the C&W Department. He further asserted that the accused/respondent had committed no corruption or wrongdoing. This testimony alone substantially demolishes the allegation of dishonest intention or criminal misappropriation.

6.PW-2, Abdur Rehman, retired Sub-Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, admitted that the scheme remained functional up to 2009 after its completion in 2004–05; that complaints arose only in 2011; and that there was no evidence of corruption or criminal misconduct. According to him, even if any lapse could be associated with the accused/ respondent, it amounted at best to negligence, not an offence under Section 409 PPC or Section 5(2) of the PC Act.

7.The combined effect of the statements of both prosecution witnesses, including the complainant himself, completely negates the essential ingredients of the charged offences. No material has been produced to show dishonest intention,

misappropriation, misuse of authority, or pecuniary advantage obtained by the respondent.

8.To appreciate the legality of the impugned order, it is appropriate to briefly examine the scope of Section 265-K Cr.P.C. The provision reads:

“265-K. Acquittal of accused at any stage.— Nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to prevent a Court from acquitting an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence.”

9.The purpose of this provision is to prevent unnecessary and fruitless trials where the available material, even if accepted as true, does not disclose a reasonable probability of conviction. It is intended to save the accused from the rigours of a prolonged criminal trial where continuation of proceedings would amount to an abuse of process. A plain reading of Section 265-K Cr.P.C. shows that the Court must satisfy three statutory requirements before exercising jurisdiction:

i. The Court must hear the prosecutor; ii. The Court must also hear the accused; and iii. The Court must evaluate the overall facts, circumstances, and evidence on record.

Beyond these express conditions, the law imposes no other limitation. An application under this section may be filed at any stage of the proceedings; indeed, even in the absence of such an application, the Court may act on its own motion if the record indicates that continuation of trial would be purposeless. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld the wide discretion vested in the Trial Court under Section 265-K Cr.P.C., as elaborated in The State v. Asif Ali Zardari (1994 SCMR 798), Muhammad Sharif v. The State (PLD 1999 SC 1063), and Chairman Agricultural Development Bank v. Mumtaz Khan

(PLD 2010 SC 695).

10.Furthermore, an order of acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence already available to an accused. Unless the findings of the Trial Court are perverse, arbitrary, based on misreading or non- reading of evidence, or result in miscarriage of justice, interference by the appellate Court is unwarranted. If two views are possible, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted.

Interference with an acquittal is therefore permissible only when compelling and substantial reasons exist, such as where the impugned judgment is manifestly unreasonable or wholly unsustainable. Applying the

principles above to the present case, it is evident that the prosecution’s own witnesses have completely exonerated the accused/respondent. The material on record fails to disclose even a remote probability of conviction. The learned Trial Court, therefore, rightly exercised jurisdiction under Section 265-K Cr.P.C.

and acquitted the accused/respondent through a well- reasoned and legally sound order. No illegality, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence has been pointed out that may justify interference by this Court under Section 417 Cr.P.C.

11.For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is devoid of merit and is accordingly dismissed. The impugned order, dated 30.10.2024, passed by the learned Special Judge Anti-Corruption is hereby upheld.

Announced.

Dt:14.11.2025. –Sd/-- Imran/* JUDGE

(S.B)

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Inam Ullah Khan