Hafiz Muhammad Shoaib Vs Mohsin Bilal etc

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Civil Revision No.24315 of 2025

Hafiz Muhammad Shoaib Versus Mohsin Bilal & others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 22.06.2026.

Petitioner by: Ms. Saima Asif Rana, Advocate.

Respondents by: M/s. Muhammad Zain Qazi, Assistant Attorney General and Muhammad Saad Bin Ghazi, Assistant Advocate General, on Court’s call.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- Through the instant civil revision petition, petitioner has called in question the legality and propriety of the judgment and decree dated 16.11.2024 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Hafizabad, whereby his suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell was dismissed, as well as the judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025 passed by the learned District Judge, Hafizabad, whereby his appeal was dismissed and the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court were maintained.

2.Briefly stated, the petitioner instituted a suit for possession through specific performance on the basis of an alleged agreement to sell dated 10.09.2018. It was pleaded that respondent No.1 had agreed to sell his 2-Marla share in the suit property for a total sale consideration of Rs.600,000/-, received an amount of Rs.500,000/- as earnest money and undertook to execute the sale deed on or before 10.09.2019 upon receipt of the remaining amount of Rs.100,000/-. Petitioner asserted that despite repeated demands and his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract, respondent No.1 failed to honour the agreement, thereby necessitating institution of the suit. The suit was contested by respondent No.1 by filing a written statement. On the basis of the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed issues and recorded evidence and upon appraisal of the entire evidence, dismissed the suit vide judgment and

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decree dated 16.11.2024. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was likewise dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Hafizabad, through judgment and decree dated 25.02.2025. Hence, the instant revision petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Courts below have misread and failed to read material evidence available on record. She submits that respondent No.1 admitted his signatures and thumb impressions on every page of the agreement to sell and, therefore, a strong presumption regarding execution of the document arose in favour of the petitioner. She argues that the defence that blank papers were signed out of trust is inherently improbable and was accepted by the learned Courts below without any independent corroboration. She further submits that the evidence produced by the petitioner sufficiently established the execution of the agreement and that the learned Appellate Court failed to undertake an independent and meaningful reappraisal of the evidence as required by law. She maintains that the impugned judgments suffer from misreading and non-reading of evidence and are liable to be set aside in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

4.Heard. Available record perused.

5.The central question in the present case is whether the petitioner successfully proved the alleged agreement to sell dated 10.09.2018, the payment of Rs.500,000/- as earnest money and his consequent entitlement to a decree for specific performance. A careful examination of the record reveals that the most significant factor which weighed with both the learned Courts below was the petitioner's failure to prove the alleged payment of Rs.500,000/- forming the foundation of the transaction. According to paragraph No.2 of the plaint, the said amount was paid under and at the time of execution of the agreement dated 10.09.2018. However, while appearing as PW-1, the petitioner materially departed from his pleadings and stated during cross- examination that the amount had actually been paid approximately ten days prior to the execution of the agreement at his shop situated in Sabzi Mandi and that no witness was present at the time of such payment.

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This contradiction cannot be brushed aside as a minor discrepancy. It directly concerns the passing of consideration, which constitutes one of the most essential ingredients of the alleged contract. The law is well settled that parties are bound by their pleadings and evidence travelling beyond pleadings cannot ordinarily be relied upon as was held by the august Supreme Court in Muhammad Arif Tarar and another v. Matloob Ahmad Warraich and others (PLD 2025 Supreme Court 691). Relevant extract is provided below:

“5. ...pleadings frame the boundaries of a party's case and the parties are bound to lead evidence in line with them. A party is not permitted to go beyond its pleadings and cannot lead or rely upon evidence that is inconsistent with what has been pleaded; even if such evidence is brought on record, it must be ignored...”

The petitioner, having pleaded one set of facts in the plaint and having deposed to an altogether different version during trial, substantially undermined the credibility of his own case.

6.Equally significant is the fact that the petitioner failed to produce any witness who actually witnessed the alleged payment of sale consideration. Abdul Razzaq (PW-2) categorically stated that no amount was paid in his presence, while Sagheer Ahmad (PW-3), the petition writer, also deposed that no payment was made before him. Thus, although it was alleged that a sum of Rs.500,000/-, constituting more than eighty per cent of the total sale consideration, had been paid at the time of execution of the agreement, the petitioner failed to produce even a single witness to substantiate such payment. Besides the absence of ocular evidence, no receipt, bank record, financial transaction or any other independent documentary evidence was produced to establish either the source or the actual payment of the alleged amount. Such failure assumes greater significance in a suit for specific performance, where the plaintiff is under a continuous obligation to establish not only the payment of consideration, where so pleaded, but also his readiness and willingness to perform the contract. In Muhammad Jamil and others v. Muhammad Arif (2021 SCMR 1108), the august Supreme Court of Pakistan reiterated this principle in the following terms:

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“17. Agreement to sell, as noted above, is comprised of reciprocal promises and corresponding obligations to be performed in the manner provided for. A vendee cannot seek enforcement of reciprocal obligation on the part of vendor to execute sale deed, unless he demonstrate that he not only has the financial capacity but he was and is also always willing and ready to meet the same. The Promisor/Appellant (Vendor) need not perform his part of promise or obligation to execute conveyance, unless the promisee/Respondents, (the vendee) "is ready and willing to perform his reciprocal promise. .....”

[emphasis applied]

In the circumstances of the case, both the learned Courts below were justified in drawing an adverse inference from the absence of any corroborative evidence regarding the alleged payment.

7.The evidence regarding execution of the document was also found to be inconsistent. PW-1 stated that the document was prepared at Anees Pinsar Store situated on Alipur Road during the evening hours. PW-3, however, stated that the document was drafted in his office at the Tehsil premises between 10:00 a.m. and 11:00 a.m. PW-2 admitted that he arrived only after the document had already been prepared. PW-3 further admitted that PW-2 was not present when the agreement was written and that he later obtained the thumb impression of PW-2 separately at another location.

These inconsistencies were not peripheral or inconsequential. Rather, they related directly to the manner, place and circumstances of execution of the alleged agreement. The learned Courts below were therefore fully justified in taking these contradictions into account while assessing the credibility of the petitioner's case.

8.It is also noteworthy that one of the marginal witnesses to the agreement, namely Muhammad Akram, had expired before his evidence could be recorded. Although his death certificate was brought on the record, the petitioner did not take any further steps to prove the execution and contents of the agreement through any legally admissible mode after establishing the witness’s unavailability. The august Supreme Court in Anwar Ahmad v. Mst. Nafis Bano through Legal Heirs (2005 SCMR 152) has held that the mere death of an attesting witness does not dispense with the legal requirement of proving a disputed document in accordance with law. The evidentiary burden assumes greater significance where execution of the document

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and underlying transaction are specifically disputed. Thus, the non- availability of one of the attesting witnesses, coupled with the other deficiencies in the petitioner's evidence, constituted an additional circumstance which the learned Courts below were justified in taking into consideration while assessing the evidentiary worth of the alleged agreement to sell.

9.Learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly relied upon the fact that respondent No.1 admitted his signatures and thumb impressions appearing on every page of Exh.P-1. There can be no dispute that such admission is a significant circumstance. Ordinarily, admission of signatures raises a strong presumption regarding execution of a document. However, it is equally well settled that admission of signatures does not, by itself, relieve a plaintiff of the obligation to prove the transaction embodied in the document, particularly where the very formation of the contract and passing of consideration are specifically disputed, as was held by the august Supreme Court in Abdul Hameed v. Mst. Aisha Bibi and another (2007 SCMR 1808). Relevant extract is provided below: “5. ..... sole question requiring determination would be whether the admission of vendor of his thumb-impression on the agreement to sell was sufficient to prove its execution and contents, the answer is in the negative as the document purporting to create a right in the property must be proved to have been actually executed by the person who allegedly executed such document...denial of Din Muhammad to have put his thumb-impression on blank paper, would seriously reflect upon the genuineness of the agreement in question. In view thereof, the admission of Din Muhammad of his thumb- impression on the agreement in question, would not ipso facto prove its contents to raise the presumption of it being a genuine document to have the legal force. .....”

10.The learned Courts below were conscious of the admitted signatures and thumb impressions of respondent No.1. Nevertheless, they found that despite such admission, the petitioner had failed to establish the transaction itself because the evidence regarding payment of consideration, execution of the agreement and surrounding circumstances was unreliable and internally inconsistent. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below, therefore, cannot be said to be founded merely upon the defence that blank papers had

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been signed; rather, they substantially rest upon the petitioner's own inability to prove the essential ingredients of his claim.

11.It is true that the defence advanced by respondent No.1, that blank papers were signed owing to a close familial relationship, may not be entirely free from criticism and perhaps could have been subjected to more elaborate scrutiny. However, the existence of a potentially weak defence does not automatically strengthen a plaintiff's case. The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the defence. In the present case, both the learned Courts below found that the petitioner had failed to discharge the burden cast upon him by law. Such conclusion is supported by the record.

12.Learned counsel for the petitioner has further argued that the learned Appellate Court failed to independently reappraise the evidence. I have carefully examined the impugned appellate judgment. The same reflects consideration of the contradictions appearing in the statements of PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3, the issue relating to payment of consideration, the evidentiary deficiencies regarding execution of the document and the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court. Merely because the learned Appellate Court ultimately concurred with the findings of the learned Trial Court does not imply abdication of its appellate function. No such defect has been pointed out which may lead to the conclusion that the appellate judgment was rendered without independent application of mind.

13.Upon an overall appraisal of the record, this Court is satisfied that the learned Courts below have accurately noticed the material contradictions appearing in the petitioner's evidence and have assigned cogent reasons for disbelieving the alleged transaction. The findings recorded by the learned Courts below constitute a plausible and legally sustainable view of the evidence available on record. Even if another view may theoretically be possible owing to the admitted signatures and thumb impressions appearing on the document, the revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked merely for substituting one possible view with another. The jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is supervisory and not appellate in nature. Reliance

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is placed upon Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 353).

14.In the present case, no jurisdictional defect, material illegality, procedural irregularity, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence has been demonstrated. The concurrent findings recorded by the learned Courts below are firmly rooted in the evidence available on record and do not call for interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C.

15.For what has been discussed above, this revision petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Judge

*A.H.S.*