Ms Popular International Pvt. Ltd. through Tayyab Abdul Sattar Vs Govt. of the Punjab etc.

H C J D A 38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

ICA No.17271 of 2026

M/s Popular International vs.

Govt. of Punjab, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing 30.06.2026

Appellants by: M/s. Yasir Akram Qureshi, Tahir Amin and M. Sabir Khan, Advocates.

Respondents by: Mr. Muhammad Nasim Kashmiri, Additional Advocate General, Punjab with Mr. Abdul Salam Senior Law Officer, PPRA. Mian Mubarik Arshad Legal Consultant PPRA.

Mr. Rashid Mehmood Gill, Muhammad Zeeshan Akhter, Muhammad Usman, Muhammad Akhtar Aleem, Advocates for respondent No.7.

Ch. Sultan Mahmood, J.- This Intra Court Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24.02.2026 passed by the learned Single Judge whereby Writ Petition No.5229 of 2026, instituted by the appellant under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, was dismissed.

2.Brief facts of the case are that an E-Tender Notice issued by respondent No.1 in May, 2025 for the bulk procurement of medical devices, including surgical disposable items, implants and sutures, for the financial year 2025-2026, pursuant whereto the appellant as well as respondents No.6 and 7, along with other bidders, participated in the bidding process by submitting their bids, requisite documents and product samples in accordance with the bidding documents. Upon opening of bids, the products offered by the participating bidders were subjected to technical evaluation by the duly constituted Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC), comprising

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end-users and technical experts, which, upon examination in terms of the prescribed criteria, declared the products of respondents No.6 and 7 as technically non-responsive in respect of the disputed item, namely sutures. The said determination was assailed by respondents No.6 and 7 before the Grievance Redressal Committee (GRC) constituted under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, which, after affording hearing to the parties and examining the record, upheld the findings of the TEC. Thereafter, respondents No.6 and 7 invoked jurisdiction under Rule 67-A of the said Rules before the Managing Director, Punjab Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), who, vide order dated 20.11.2025, accepted their complaints, set aside the decisions of both the TEC and GRC, declared them technically responsive for the disputed item and directed the Procuring Agency to proceed further strictly in accordance with law and the applicable procurement framework. The appellant, being aggrieved by the said order, challenged the same through Writ Petition No.5229 of 2026 before this Court, which was dismissed vide judgment dated 24.02.2026, hence the present Intra Court Appeal.

3.Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge failed to appreciate the controversy in its true legal and factual perspective and wrongly upheld the order dated 20.11.2025 passed by the Managing Director, Punjab Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA). It was argued that the Technical Evaluation Committee(TEC), being the expert body comprising end-users, had evaluated the bids strictly in accordance with the bidding documents and its findings were duly affirmed by the Grievance Redressal Committee; therefore, in the absence of any allegation of mala fides, procedural irregularity or violation of the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014, respondent No.5 had no jurisdiction under Rule 67-A to reappraise technical findings or substitute the opinion of the expert committees. It was further submitted that the impugned order is based on an assumption that the TEC’s evaluation lacked scientific basis, without there being any independent technical material or expert opinion on record to justify such conclusion. Reliance was also placed on earlier judgments of this Court recognizing the primacy of end-user assessment in technical evaluation, including “Walayat Ali Amir v. PIA” (1995 SCMR

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650)and “CIT v. M/s Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd.” (2009 PTD 1392). Lastly adds that the order under Rule 67-A constitutes an original adjudicatory determination affecting rights of the parties; therefore, the writ petition was maintainable and the present appeal is competent in terms of Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh (PLD 1984 SC 344).

4.Conversely, learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab, assisted by the learned Law Officer and learned counsel for the contesting respondents, supported the judgment under appeal. At the outset, they contended that the present Intra Court Appeal is not maintainable in view of the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, as the procurement framework provides a complete two-tier statutory mechanism of review against the decision of the Technical Evaluation Committee, first before the Grievance Redressal Committee under Rule 67 and thereafter before the Managing Director, PPRA under Rule 67-A. It was argued that both forums are empowered to re-examine and vary the findings of the Technical Evaluation Committee, thereby constituting remedies akin to appeal or review within the contemplation of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. It was further submitted that the determination of the Technical Evaluation Committee constitutes the original order in the procurement process, whereas the subsequent proceedings before the GRC and the Managing Director are in the nature of statutory review. Reliance was placed on “Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh” (PLD 1984 SC 344), contending that in view of the complete statutory remedial mechanism, the present appeal is barred and is liable to be dismissed on the question of maintainability alone.

5.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record. Since a preliminary objection regarding maintainability of the Intra Court Appeal has been raised by the learned Law Officer, the same is taken up first as it goes to the root of the matter.

6.The principal question requiring determination is whether an Intra Court Appeal is competent against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in a case where the impugned order was passed by a statutory authority

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after the aggrieved party had already availed the remedies provided under the Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014. Stated differently, the issue is whether the proceedings under Rule 67 and Rule 67-A constitute statutory remedies partaking the character of appeal, review or revision so as to attract the bar contained in the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972.

7.Rule 38 of prescribes procedure for technical evaluation, inter alia others, in a two-envelope bidding process. At the first stage, only the technical proposals are opened and evaluated by the procuring agency, which may either accept or reject a bidder's technical proposal, on rejection of the proposal Rule 35 mandates procuring agency to communicate the grounds for such rejection to the concerned bidder. A decision rejecting a technical proposal is amenable to challenge before the Grievance Redressal Committee under Rule 67. In deciding the complaint, the Committee is empowered to: decide the complaint lodged by any bidder before the proposal submission date; set aside the decision of technical evaluation committee; uphold the decision of technical evaluation committee; modify the decision of technical evaluation committee; and recommend scrapping of the procurement process with reasons to be recorded in writing.

Any bidder aggrieved by the decision of the Grievance Redressal Committee may, under Rule 67-A, file a representation before the Managing Director, PPRA, whose decision is final and binding under the Rules, and admittedly Managing Director has all the powers of rejection or acceptance of complaint. The above survey of law clarifies that remedies so provided by the Rules 67 and 67-A of the ibid rules of 2014 are neither cosmetic nor illusionary.

8.In the present case, the TEC declared respondents No.6 and 7 as non- responsive, which determination was affirmed by the GRC. However, the Managing Director, PPRA, in exercise of jurisdiction under Rule 67-A, set aside both decisions vide order dated 20.11.2025 and declared the bidders technically responsive. The order impugned before the Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, therefore, emanated from a statutory remedial

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forum and did not constitute an original administrative determination. Nor can it, even in ordinary parlance, be described as an original order. The term used in Sec.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance has been expounded in “Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore” (PLD 1985 SC 107) wherein it has been held that “apparently the meaning of the expression “original” order is the order with which the proceedings under the relevant statute commenced. In view of this clear enunciation, in this case the proceedings in fact commenced with the rejection of the bid by the technical evaluation committee under Rule 38. Albeit the second remedy is not provided within the procuring agency but by a statutory forum provided under the same set of rules under proceedings actually commenced, so to argue that the order passed by the Managing Director is the original order is not tenable.

9.Now adverting to the earlier discussion qua the character of the remedies provided under the ibid rules against the rejection of technical bid because if those representation or complaints are akin to appeal then this appeal is not maintainable. It is now well-settled that for determining the maintainability of an Intra Court Appeal, the Court is required to examine the substance of the statutory remedy rather than its nomenclature. Where the statute confers power upon an authority to re-examine the matter and to affirm, vary or reverse the decision of the forum below, such jurisdiction partakes the character of appellate or review jurisdiction for the purposes of the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. The aforesaid principle stands consistently recognized in “Messrs. Shahzadi Polypropylene Industries v. Federation of Pakistan” (2017 PTD 2019), “Muhammad Ashraf Saeed v. Habib Bank Limited” (2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 13), and Hassan Mahmood v. Habib Bank Limited (2020 PLC (C.S.) 272), as well as in “Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs. Sahib Jee” (2017 PTD 1481), wherein it has been held that statutory remedies carrying the attributes of appellate scrutiny exclude the maintainability of an Intra Court Appeal under the said proviso. So, it would not be out of place to hold that the remedies so provided under Rule 67 and 67-A are akin to appeals, as have all those attributes.

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10.Moreover, the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on “Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh” (PLD 1984 SC 344) needs consideration, briefly the case arose out of proceedings under the settlement laws following the promulgation of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 (Act No. XIV of 1975). By virtue of the said enactment, the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 stood repealed, and all proceedings pending immediately before the repeal before different authorities ranging from Deputy Settlement Commissioner to Chief Settlement Commissioner constituted thereunder were transferred for final adjudication to an officer to be notified by the Provincial Government in the Official Gazette, styled by the Act of 1975 as Notified Officer. Proceedings were to be decided in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act, while the repealing statute expressly excluded any appeal, revision or review against the orders passed by the notified officer. In view of the complete statutory scheme and the express exclusion of further remedies, it was held that an Intra Court Appeal was not maintainable. for the ratio decidendi of Karim Bibi itself recognizes that where an order is amenable to appeal, revision or review under the relevant statutory framework, the bar contained in Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 is attracted, the scope whereof has since been authoritatively explained in “Frontier Holdings Limited” (2025 SCMR 1907) and “International Islamic University, Islamabad v. Syed Naveed Altaf” (2024 SCMR 472), it is, therefore, now well settled that where a special statute provides a complete and self-contained adjudicatory and appellate mechanism, an Intra Court Appeal does not lie unless such a right is expressly conferred by the legislature, Punjab Public Procurement Rules 2014 do provide remedies whereas procurement laws don’t create any remedy of intra court appeal. The test has been finally more fine-tuned in “Frontier Holdings Limited v. Petroleum Exploration (Pvt.) Ltd.” (2025 SCMR 1907), wherein it was unequivocally held that where a statute provides a complete and self-contained mechanism of appeal, review or reconsideration (emphasis supplied), an Intra Court Appeal is not maintainable unless such a right is expressly conferred by the statute. The dictum laid down therein is binding under Article 189 of the Constitution.

ICA No. 17271 of 2026

So, if there was any confusion with respect to nomenclature or specific omission of the term representation in Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, that has been finally put to rest. Now, it has only to be seen that whether statutory forum had jurisdiction to reconsider or not? In this case the forums provided to review decision of TEC can successively turn down or uphold the decision of the forum below. Precisely specific remedies have been provided here under special law, therefore, it extinguishes the scope of

ICA.

11.Applying the above principles to the facts of the present case, the contention that the order passed by the Managing Director under Rule 67-A constitutes an original order is misconceived. The statutory scheme clearly envisages successive tiers of scrutiny culminating in a reasoned determination by the Managing Director. Such mechanism unmistakably bears the characteristics of appellate review. The order challenged before this Court thus falls within the statutory remedial framework and squarely attracts the bar under Section 3(2) proviso of the Law Reforms Ordinance,

12.For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered view that the present Intra Court Appeal is barred by the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and is not maintainable. Thus, the appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.

(Malik Muhammad Awais Khalid) (Ch. Sultan Mahmood) Judge Judge

Approved for Reporting

Judge Judge

M.Shahzad/*