Mst Muqadas vs Sho etc.

Stereo. HCJDA 38

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT

Multan Bench, Multan

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No. 12252-Q/2025 Muqaddas Vs.

SHO, Police Station Saddar Mian Channu, and others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 09.04.2026 Ch. Saeed Ahmad Farrukh, Advocate, For the Petitioner: assisted by Mian Muhammad Yasin Bhatti, Advocate.

Mr. Bashir Ahmad Buzdar, Assistant For Respondents No.1 & 2:

Advocate General.

For Respondent No.3: Ch. Hanif Hameed, Advocate.

Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J. – Respondent No.3, a Christian, lodged FIR No.1247/2025 dated 16.09.2025 against the Petitioner and four others at Police Station Saddar, Mian Channu, District Khanewal, under section 494 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (PPC). She stated that on 21.12.2019 she married Amir Sohail, also a Christian, and that a daughter, Duniya, was born out of that wedlock. Amir Sohail allegedly developed illicit relations with the Petitioner, as a result of which she became pregnant. Subsequently, they allegedly procured a forged Marriage Certificate dated 02.02.2025, in collusion with Pastor Daniel Benjamin, Sajjad, and Raees, in which Amir concealed his subsisting marriage and falsely represented himself as a bachelor. The Petitioner gave birth to a baby boy on 08.07.2025. Respondent No.3 further alleged that on 22.08.2025, when she confronted Amir in the presence of Naseem and Razia, he slapped her on the face, abused her, and threatened that if she took legal action against him, he would kill her and her family, implicate them in serious criminal cases, and make her life a hell.

2.Through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”), the

Petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.1247/2025. She contends that the offence under section 494 PPC is non-cognizable. Therefore, the police could not register an FIR and embark upon investigation without following the course contemplated by section 155 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (hereinafter referred to as “Cr.P.C.” or the “Code of 1898”), including obtaining an order of the competent Magistrate under section 155(2) Cr.P.C.

3.This Court admitted the petition to regular hearing and issued notice to the Respondents. During its pendency, the Investigating Officer sought an opinion from the District Public Prosecutor, Khanewal, who opined that the contents of the FIR disclosed offences under sections 496-B, 420, 468, and 471 PPC. Section 494 PPC was not applicable. He noted that under section 203-C Cr.P.C., courts could not take cognizance of an offence under section 496-B PPC except upon a complaint lodged before a court of competent jurisdiction. He advised that the FIR could proceed only under sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC, subject to the outcome of the investigation. Accordingly, the Investigating Officer deleted section 494 PPC and substituted it with the aforementioned offences.

4.Mr. Bashir Ahmad Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General (AAG), supported the aforementioned view. He submitted that the question as to whether the Petitioner or the other accused are liable under sections 420, 468, or 471 PPC involves a factual inquiry that falls within the domain of the police. This Court cannot undertake such an inquiry in proceedings initiated under its constitutional jurisdiction. He further submitted that the police would move for cancellation of the FIR if these offences were not established during the investigation. He therefore prayed that the petition be dismissed.

5.In rebuttal, the Petitioner’s counsel argued that the FIR was registered only under section 494 PPC, which is non-cognizable, and that its registration and investigation without prior permission of the Magistrate violated section 155(2) Cr.P.C. The subsequent addition of cognizable offences during investigation, he submitted, could not validate what was unlawful at inception.

6.The pivotal question is whether an FIR registered for a non- cognizable offence can stand if cognizable offences are subsequently added during the investigation. Resolution of this question requires an examination of the statutory scheme governing cognizable and non- cognizable offences.

Statutory framework

7.Part V of the Code of 1898 sets out the legal framework governing information to the police and their powers of investigation. Its objective is to prescribe a fair procedure for initiating criminal proceedings, ensure the integrity of investigations, and protect against arbitrariness or abuse of process.1 It is supplemented by the Punjab Police Rules 1934 (the “Police Rules”).

8.The Code of 1898 categorizes criminal offences into two classes, cognizable and non-cognizable. Section 4 Cr.P.C. defines them as follows:

(f)“Cognizable offence”; “Cognizable Case”. “Cognizable offence” means an offence for, and “cognizable case” means a case, in which a police officer, may, in accordance with the second schedule or under any law for the time being in force, arrest without warrant.

(n)“Non-cognizable offence”; “Non-cognizable Case”. “Non- cognizable offence” means an offence for, and “non- cognizable case” means a case, in which a police officer, may not arrest without warrant.

9.The Code of 1898 prescribes distinct procedures for dealing with cognizable and non-cognizable offences through sections 154, 155, and 156. Section 154 Cr.P.C. mandates that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-in- charge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction and be read over to the informant, and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it. The substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in such form as the Provincial Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. and others (AIR 2014 SC 187).

Government may prescribe in this behalf.2 Although the term “First Information Report” does not occur in the Code, it is recognized in practice and under the Police Rules3 (see Rule 24.1).4

10.Section 154(1) Cr.P.C. uses the term “information” without any qualifying prefix, unlike section 54, which permits arrest without warrant on the basis of “reasonable complaint” or “credible information.” This distinction is deliberate. The omission of qualifiers in section 154 reflects the legislative intent that the officer-in- charge of a police station must register a case once information disclosing a cognizable offence is received, regardless of his personal view on its reasonableness or credibility. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC 604), while interpreting the analogous provisions of the Indian Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Supreme Court of India (SCI) observed that the absence of such qualifiers “may be for the reason that the police officer should not refuse to record an information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence and to register a case thereon on the ground that he is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information. In other words, ‘reasonableness’ or ‘credibility’ of the said information is not a condition precedent for Section 154 Cr.P.C. is subject to two provisos. The first provides that if the information is given by the woman against whom an offence under section 336-B, section 354, section 354-A, section 376 or section 509 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, is alleged to have been committed or attempted, then such information shall be recorded by an investigating officer in presence of a female police officer or a female family member or any other person with consent of the complainant, as the case may be. The second proviso states that where such a complainant is in distress, the aforesaid information shall be recorded at her residence or at another place of her choice, in the presence of a [female] police officer, a family member, or any other person with her consent.

In Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. (AIR 2014 SC 187), the SCI held that the “question as to whether the FIR is to be recorded in the FIR Book or Daily Diary (Station Diary), “is no more res integra.” The basic requirement is to record the FIR in the FIR Register. Additionally, its gist or substance may also be entered in the Daily Diary, but such an entry alone does not satisfy the mandate of section 154. The Court rejected the suggestion that an entry in the Daily Diary constitutes compliance with the statutory requirement.

See: Muhammad Bashir v. Station House Officer, Okara Cantt., and others (PLD 2007 SC 539).

Rule 24.5 mandates that the FIR Register shall be a printed book in Form 24.5(1), containing 500 pages, to be fully used before a new one is commenced. Each case should be assigned an annual serial number, and entries should be made using carbon copies to produce five identical pages. The original shall remain at the police station, while the other copies shall be distributed to (a) the Senior Superintendent of Police or any other Gazetted Officer nominated by him, (b) the Magistrate empowered under section 157 Cr.P.C., (c) the complainant, and (d) the District Crime Record Bureau. In murder cases, the Rules prescribe additional safeguards to ensure immediate transmission and acknowledgment of the FIR by the Magistrate. Rule 24.8 of the Police Rules requires each Superintendent to maintain a Register of Cognizable Offences in Form 24.8(1). This register is submitted daily to the District Magistrate when present at headquarters. Each case is assigned a serial number that begins and ends with the calendar year. Cases that are cancelled or transferred are struck off with a red line and are deducted from the total at the end of the year. The remaining requirements of the Police Rules are not relevant for the present purposes.

registration of a case.” In Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. v. Tapan Kumar Singh (AIR 2003 SC 4140), the SCI held that a First Information Report is “not an encyclopedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to required offence reported.” An informant need not be an eyewitness or possess complete knowledge of the occurrence. What is material is that the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence and gives the officer reason to suspect that such an offence may have occurred. At this preliminary stage, the officer is not required to assess the truthfulness or credibility of the information. His duty is to register the case and commence investigation, during which all necessary particulars and evidence may be gathered.

11.Section 155 Cr.P.C. prescribes the procedure for dealing with information in non-cognizable cases. It stipulates:

155.Information in non-cognizable cases. – (1) When information is given to an officer-in-charge of a police station of the commission within the limits of such station of a non-cognizable offence, he shall enter in a book to be kept as aforesaid the substance of such information and refer the informant to the Magistrate.

(2)Investigation into non-cognizable cases. No police officer shall investigate a non-cognizable case without the order of a Magistrate of the First or Second Class having power to try such case or send the same for trial to the Court of Session.

(3)Any police officer receiving such an order may exercise the same powers in respect of the investigation (except the power to arrest without warrant) as an officer-in-charge of a police station may exercise in a cognizable case.

12.Section 155(2) Cr.P.C. is couched in mandatory terms and prohibits the police from investigating a non-cognizable offence without an order of the competent Magistrate. The use of the word “shall” leaves no room for discretion at the stage of initiation of investigation. Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, it must be given effect according to its ordinary meaning, without recourse to other interpretive tools.5 Read in its statutory context, section 155(2) embodies Swedish Match AB and another v. Securities and Exchange Board, India and another

(AIR 2004 SC 4219).

a clear legislative command. The Police Rules reinforce this obligation.6

13.The mere mention of a particular section of the Pakistan Penal Code or any other statutory provision in the FIR is not conclusive. Rather, the applicability of an offence depends on the specific facts and allegations set out in the FIR.7 Generally, courts quash FIRs where the alleged offence is non-cognizable, and the procedural bar under section 155(2) Cr.P.C. has been violated.8 However, in Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Samad and others (2000 SCMR 1945), the Supreme Court of Pakistan considered a case where the accused were being tried for offences under sections 504, 506 (first paragraph), and 427/34 PPC. After framing of charge and recording of four prosecution witnesses, the accused moved an application under section 249-A Cr.P.C., which was dismissed. The High Court quashed the proceedings on the ground that section 506 (first paragraph) of the PPC was non-cognizable, and the investigation was conducted without the requisite permission of a Magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed that order, holding:

“... generally speaking, police officers are not competent to investigate an offence which is non-cognizable and requires permission from a competent Magistrate ... However, if through bona fide error or misconception of facts and law a police officer has undertaken investigation of a crime ... and a case is taken to a Court competent to try it in terms of section 190(1)(a) and (b), Cr.P.C., cognizance taken may not be altogether bad in law ... unless the trial has caused serious prejudice to the accused resulting in miscarriage of justice ... Courts should not normally encourage acts of police

Rule 24.3 of the Police Rules provides that where the information relates to a non-cognizable offence, it shall be briefly but intelligibly recorded in the station diary, shall be signed, sealed, or marked by the person making it on both foil and counterfoil. All particulars required by section 44 of Act V of 1861 shall also be noted. A copy of the entry in the diary made by the carbon copying process and signed and sealed with the station seal by the recording officer, shall be made over to the informant, who shall be referred to the Magistrate in accordance with section 155 Cr.P.C. Rule 24.7 mandates that if, after investigation, a case originally recorded under section 154 Cr.P.C. is found to be non-cognizable, civil in nature, or maliciously false, the Superintendent of Police shall submit the first information report along with the case record and the final report to a Magistrate of the First Class having jurisdiction for orders of cancellation. Upon receipt of such an order, the officer-in-charge shall cancel the FIR in the relevant register and return the original order to the Superintendent’s office for record. Rule 24.7 should be read in conjunction with Volume III, Chapter 11-D, Part D, Rule 1 of the Lahore High Court Rules and Orders, which empowers the Magistrate having jurisdiction to pass an order of cancellation upon police request where the case is found to be non-cognizable or false.

Altaf Hussain v. Abdul Samad and others (2000 SCMR 1945), FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others (PLD 2023 SC 265).

See, for example, The State through Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore v. Chaudhry Muhammad Khan and others (PLD 2025 SC 254), Omer Nazeer v. The State and others (2025 MLD 724), Peshawar High Court Bar v. The State and others (PLD 2022 Peshawar 248), Muhammad Essa Rooshan v. The State (2021 PCr.LJ 1342), Shahid Khan and others v. The State through SHO and others (2017 YLR 2419), Sabz Ali Khan and others v. Inspector General of Police, KPK and others (2016 YLR 1279), Bux Ali and others v. The State and another (1980 PCr.LJ 626), and Mst. Mumtaz Begum and others v. The State (1968 PCr.LJ 97).

agencies without proper scrutiny ... Yet in appropriate cases, if a Court otherwise competent has taken cognizance ... the same may not be vitiated in the absence of any miscarriage of justice or grave prejudice to the accused.”

14.It is necessary to underscore that Altaf Hussain does not dispense with the statutory requirement under section 155(2) Cr.P.C., nor does it confer a blanket validation upon illegal police action. The exception recognized in that case applies only where a competent court has already taken cognizance, the trial has commenced, and no prejudice or miscarriage of justice has occurred. It cannot be invoked to retrospectively validate an FIR registered in contravention of section 155(2) Cr.P.C. and challenged at the pre-cognizance stage. The legality of an FIR must be tested with reference to the position obtaining at the time of its registration.

15.There is also a line of cases in which the challan in non- cognizable cases was treated as a complaint. This approach is grounded in section 190 Cr.P.C., which empowers a Magistrate to take cognizance of an offence either (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts constituting the offence, or (b) upon a report in writing made by a police officer, or (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge or suspicion. If the Magistrate validly assumes jurisdiction under any of these clauses, and the accused suffers no prejudice, the trial is not rendered void merely because the underlying investigation was irregular or unauthorized. In Muhammad Aslam v. The State and another (1980 PCr.LJ 742), the petitioner was challaned under section 112 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1965, for failing to issue tickets after collecting fare from passengers, which amounted to misappropriation of government revenue. The challan was issued by an ASI without prior permission from a Magistrate. The petitioner sought quashing of proceedings on the ground that the offence was non-cognizable and the investigation was without lawful authority under section 155(2) Cr.P.C. He also argued that the summons failed to comply with section 116 of the Ordinance, which rendered the proceedings invalid. The Court rejected both objections. It held that even if prior permission under section 155(2) Cr.P.C. had not been obtained,

the Magistrate’s cognizance was not vitiated. The report filed by the police officer could be treated either as a police report under section 190(1)(b) or as a complaint under section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. The Court relied on Mst. Sadan v. The State (PLD 1965 BJ 12), The Crown v. Mehar Ali (PLD 1956 FC 106), and other precedents to affirm that procedural irregularity in investigation does not nullify a subsequent valid trial. It also clarified that where no formal investigation is carried out, and the police officer personally witnesses the offence, the challan may be treated as a complaint. In that event the Magistrate is not required to examine the officer on oath under section 200 Cr.P.C. by virtue of the proviso (aa). The objection regarding the form of summons under section 116 of the Ordinance was found to be premature and too remote to vitiate the trial.

16.In Muhammad v. The State (1989 PCr.LJ 834), the appellant was charged under Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979, for possessing heroin. On appeal, it was argued that the offence was non-cognizable and that the investigation was vitiated due to non-compliance with sections 157 and 159 Cr.P.C. The Federal Shariat Court held that even if the investigation was conducted without prior permission under section 155 Cr.P.C., the defect did not vitiate the trial. The report could be treated as a police report under section 190(1)(b) or as a complaint under section 190(1)(a), and the irregularity was curable under section 537 Cr.P.C. However, since the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, the conviction was set aside, and the appellant was acquitted.

17.In Musawar Hussain v. The State and others (2024 YLR 1653), the FIR, on its face, disclosed a cognizable offence under section 365-B PPC. In that context, the Court held that the police were justified in registering the FIR and that, if during investigation it transpired that a non-cognizable offence had been committed, the proceedings were not vitiated, as section 155 Cr.P.C. did not apply.

18.The following principles emerge from the statutory scheme and the case law discussed above. First, the legality of an FIR must be assessed with reference to the facts and allegations recorded at the time

of its registration, rather than by subsequent developments during investigation. Secondly, where the allegations disclose only a non- cognizable offence, the officer-in-charge of a police station lacks jurisdiction to investigate the matter without an order of the competent Magistrate under section 155(2) Cr.P.C. Thirdly, an investigation commenced in violation of section 155(2) Cr.P.C. is jurisdictionally defective at the pre-cognizance stage and cannot be retrospectively validated by the later addition of cognizable offences. Fourthly, where a competent court has validly taken cognizance under section 190 Cr.P.C., and no prejudice has been caused to the accused, the want of prior permission under section 155(2) Cr.P.C. may, in appropriate cases, be treated as a curable irregularity. Lastly, the curative principle recognized in such cases does not extend to validate an FIR challenged before the competent court takes cognizance and is found to have been registered in contravention of the statutory bar.

Case in hand

19.The Petitioner seeks quashing of FIR No.1247/2025 on the ground that it was initially registered for an offence under section 494 PPC, which is non-cognizable and, by virtue of section 155(2) Cr.P.C., could not be investigated without prior permission of the competent Magistrate. Her challenge is thus directed not to the truth or falsity of the allegations, but to the legal consequence of registering an FIR without jurisdiction. Accordingly, for purposes of this petition, the Court proceeds on the basis of the FIR as recorded, without entering upon its merits.

20.Since the FIR pertains to a marriage between persons professing the Christian faith, it is necessary to refer to the Christian Marriage Act, 1872 (the “CMA 1872”), which regulates the solemnization and registration of Christian marriages. A second marriage during the subsistence of a first may be impermissible under Christian personal law, but the CMA 1872 does not criminalize such conduct. It does not create any offence akin to section 494 PPC, nor does it impose criminal liability on parties to a marriage who conceal a prior subsisting marriage or misrepresent their marital status.

21.Part VII of the CMA 1872, comprising sections 66 to 75, contains its penal provisions. Section 66 creates an offence where a person, for the purpose of procuring a marriage, intentionally makes a false oath or declaration required by the Act, or signs a false notice or certificate required by the Act, and deems such conduct punishable as an offence under section 193 PPC. The remaining provisions in Part VII principally address misconduct by Ministers of Religion or Marriage Registrars, such as solemnizing a marriage without authority, in violation of statutory procedure, or falsifying marriage registers. In the present case, the FIR alleges that a forged marriage certificate was procured and that Amir falsely represented himself as a bachelor. However, its contents do not disclose that the Petitioner or Amir personally made or signed any statutory oath, declaration, notice, or certificate contemplated by the Act. In the absence of these foundational elements, section 66 of the CMA 1872 is not attracted.

22.The AAG contended that the alleged collusion of Pastor Daniel Benjamin with the Petitioner and Amir Sohail, and his knowingly solemnizing an illegal marriage, constituted an independent ground for registration of FIR No.1247/2025. On that premise, it was argued that the FIR was lawful. This contention is misconceived. Since section 494 PPC is non-cognizable, its abetment, as defined in section 107 PPC and punishable under section 109 PPC, when confined to facilitating that very offence, does not alter its non-cognizable character for purposes of section 155 Cr.P.C. The alleged involvement of Pastor Daniel Benjamin, therefore, does not cure the jurisdictional defect arising from registration of the FIR without compliance with section 155(2) Cr.P.C.

23.The subsequent addition of sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC also cannot retrospectively validate the registration of the FIR. The legality of an FIR is determined with reference to the allegations made at the time of its registration. The exception recognized in Altaf Hussain applies only where a competent court has already taken cognizance, and no prejudice or miscarriage of justice has occurred, a stage not yet reached in the present case.

24.It was suggested that the Petitioner ought to have approached this Court immediately after registration of the FIR. Had she done so, it was argued, the Court could have intervened and quashed it. Since she did not do so, the FIR should now be treated as valid because it presently contains a cognizable offence. This argument is also misconceived. An act that is without jurisdiction at inception does not acquire legality merely by lapse of time or by subsequent developments during investigation.

25.The alternative argument is that the allegations, even at inception, disclosed offences under sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC, and the FIR ought to have been registered accordingly. Since section 420 PPC is a cognizable offence, the FIR is valid and cannot be quashed merely because the officer-in-charge of the police station failed to identify the correct provisions. Respondent No.3, it is contended, should not suffer the consequences of a procedural lapse committed by the police. To examine this argument, it is necessary to consider whether the allegations disclose the essential elements of the said offences.

26.Section 415 PPC defines “cheating” as deceiving any person and, fraudulently or dishonestly, inducing the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property. It also covers intentionally inducing the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, where such inducement causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person or any other person in body, mind, reputation, or property. The Explanation further clarifies that a dishonest concealment of facts constitutes deception within the meaning of this section. In Muhammad Nasim Khan and another v. Fida Muhammad Khan and another (1993 PCr.LJ 1795), the High Court held that the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating is “property.” Section 415 PPC comprises two parts. The first applies where a person is induced, by deception, to deliver property or to consent to its retention. The second covers intentional inducement to do or omit an act which the person deceived would not have done or omitted but for the deception. In cases falling within the first part, delivery of property pursuant to a fraudulent

or dishonest inducement is essential. In cases falling within the second, the inducement must be intentional and causative of harm. The Court clarified that the offence of cheating is not made out if no deception was practised and there was no consequential pecuniary loss. It further held that, for the purposes of establishing cheating, the requisite dishonest intention must exist at the time of making the act or promise and cannot be inferred merely from its subsequent non-fulfilment.9

27.Section 417 PPC prescribes punishment for cheating simpliciter. Section 420 PPC, on the other hand, applies where cheating results in the dishonest inducement of a person to deliver property, or to make, alter, or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security or anything signed or sealed and capable of being converted into a valuable security.10 The distinguishing feature of section 420 PPC is dishonest inducement leading to delivery of property or valuable security. In the absence of such inducement and consequential delivery or alteration of property or valuable security, the offence, if any, falls within section 417 PPC, which is non-cognizable.

28.The offence of forgery must next be examined. Section 463 PPC defines “forgery” as the making of a false document or part of a document. Such making must be with the intent to cause damage or injury to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to induce any person to enter into any express or implied contract. It also covers the making of a false document with the intent to commit fraud or with knowledge that fraud may be committed. Section 464 PPC explains when a person is said to make a false document. Section 468 penalizes forgery for the purpose of cheating, and section 471 punishes the use of a forged document as genuine. The offence under section 468 PPC is non- cognizable. The cognizability of an offence under section 471 PPC depends upon the nature of the forged document, as reflected in the Second Schedule to the Code of 1898.

Also see: Bashir Dawood and others v. Tanveer Ahmed and another (2000 PCr.LJ 1230).

“Valuable security” is defined in section 30 PPC.

29.In the present case, the FIR alleges that Amir Sohail misrepresented his marital status and colluded with the Petitioner and others to prepare a forged marriage certificate. However, there is no allegation that this misrepresentation dishonestly induced any person to part with property, confer a pecuniary advantage, or suffer legal detriment. Respondent No.3 does not claim to have been deceived into any act or omission within the meaning of section 415 PPC. Even if proved, the alleged conduct might, at most, amount to an offence under section 417 PPC, but that is non-cognizable and cannot, by itself, justify the registration of the FIR in question without the Magistrate’s permission under section 155(2) Cr.P.C.

30.It remains to consider the allegation that Amir Sohail slapped Respondent No.3 on the face, abused her, and threatened that, if she took legal action against him, he would kill her and her family, implicate them in serious criminal cases, and make her life a hell. Section 503 PPC defines “criminal intimidation”, and section 506 PPC prescribes its punishment. The latter comprises two paragraphs. The first deals with criminal intimidation generally, while the second applies where the threat is of the aggravated kind specified therein, such as a threat to cause death or grievous hurt.

31.Section 503 PPC does not make every threat punishable. It criminalizes only those threats whereby a person threatens another with injury to his person, reputation or property (or to anyone in whom he is interested) with intent to cause alarm, or to compel him to do something he is not legally bound to do, or to refrain from doing something he is legally entitled to do, as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. In Ghulam Rasul v. Ch. Saleem Shad (1986 PCr.LJ 823), the Court held that a statement that the accused had abused the complainant and threatened to kill him did not, by itself, make out an offence under section 506 PPC because the further ingredients of section 503 PPC had neither been alleged nor proved. Likewise, in Syed Ali Asghar Shah v. The State (1988 PCr.LJ 270), Fida Hussain v. The State (2010 MLD 313), and Muhammad Riaz alias Dinga and others v. The State and another (2011 PCr.LJ 615), it was reiterated that threat

simpliciter does not amount to criminal intimidation unless the surrounding facts disclose the statutory intent required by section 503 PPC. The SCI took the same view in Manik Taneja and another v. State of Karnataka and another, [(2015) 7 SCC 423], while considering the corresponding provisions of the Indian Penal Code. It held that mere expression of words without intention to cause alarm is insufficient and that the material on record must show that the threat was made with the requisite intent.

32.In family or matrimonial matters, where angry and intemperate words are often exchanged in the heat of domestic discord, courts should ordinarily look for something more in the surrounding circumstances before inferring the mens rea necessary to constitute criminal intimidation. The statutory test remains the same, but the domestic setting is relevant when assessing whether the speaker truly intended to cause alarm in the legal sense contemplated by section 503 PPC. In the present case, the allegation arose out of a matrimonial confrontation. The FIR does not suggest that Amir Sohail was armed, that he attempted to carry out the alleged threat, or that any other surrounding circumstance existed from which the requisite intent to cause alarm could reasonably be inferred. Read in context, the allegation is of an angry outburst during a domestic quarrel, which does not constitute the offence of criminal intimidation within the meaning of section 503 PPC. Therefore, section 506 PPC was not attracted at the time when FIR No. 1247/2025 was registered. Even if it were otherwise, the allegation would, at the highest, fall within the first paragraph of section 506 PPC, which is non-cognizable.

33.Finally, it is necessary to consider whether principles laid down in the precedents discussed in paragraphs 15 to 17 above apply here. In Muhammad Aslam v. The State and another (1980 PCr.LJ 742) and Muhammad v. The State (1989 PCr.LJ 834), the courts held that irregularities in the investigation of non-cognizable offences without prior permission under section 155(2) Cr.P.C. did not vitiate the trial, as cognizance had already been taken. The defect was treated as curable at a post-cognizance stage under section 537 Cr.P.C.

The present case stands on a different footing, as the FIR was challenged before cognizance, and the question is whether it could have been registered at all. As for Musawar Hussain v. The State and others (2024 YLR 1653), it involved an FIR which, from the outset, disclosed a cognizable offence under section 365-B PPC, which rendered its registration lawful. Here, the FIR was initially registered for a non- cognizable offence under section 494 PPC, without the Magistrate’s prior approval, and the later addition of sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC does not retrospectively cure the original illegality.

Disposition

34.For the above reasons, this petition is accepted, and FIR No. 1247/2025 is quashed.

(Tariq Saleem Sheikh) Judge Naeem

Approved for reporting

Judge