Muhammad Mehboob vs Adj etc.

Form No: HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,

BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No.4596/2026/BWP

Muhammad Mehboob Versus Additional District Judge, etc.

S. No. of order/ Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge, and that of Proceeding Proceeding parties or counsel, where necessary 06.08.2026 Mr. Nadeem Akram Wahla, Advocate for the petitioner.

Through this Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has called in question the legality and propriety of the order dated 02.10.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge Rent/learned Rent Controller, whereby an application filed by respondent No.3 under Section 12(2), C.P.C. was allowed, the ex-parte ejectment order along with memo of costs dated 31.01.2024 was set aside and the ejectment petition was restored to its original position with a direction to the applicants therein to file an amended ejectment petition by incorporating the name of respondent No.3 in the memo of parties. The petitioner has also assailed the judgment dated 18.05.2026 passed by the learned Revisional Court, whereby the revision petition filed by the petitioner and respondent No.4 was dismissed.

2.The impugned orders have been assailed, inter alia, on the grounds that the learned Courts below misread, non-read the record and failed to appreciate the material available on record, exercised jurisdiction not vested in them, and committed material irregularity in allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. in proceedings governed by the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. It has further been contended that the ejectment order dated 31.01.2024 had already attained finality and had

been executed through delivery of possession, and, therefore, the learned Rent Controller had no lawful authority to recall the same.

3.I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at the preliminary stage and have carefully examined the available record with his able assistance.

4.At the outset, it may be observed that the controversy is required to be examined in the backdrop of the limited scope of Constitutional jurisdiction as well as the nature and extent of the jurisdiction exercised by a Rent Controller while dealing with an allegation that an order of ejectment has been procured through fraud, misrepresentation and concealment of material facts.

5.The record shows that the petitioner along with respondents No.4 and 5 instituted the ejectment petition against respondent No.6 and procured a final eviction order dated 31.01.2024. However, said order was assailed by respondent No.3 through moving an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., which was allowed on 02.10.2025 and resultantly order dated 31.01.2024 was set-aside. The order dated 02.10.2025 was challenged by the petitioner and respondent No.4 through a revision petition, dismissed on 18.05.2026, whereas respondent No.5 did not challenge the same. Respondent No.4 has also not joined the present proceedings. Consequently, the impugned orders have attained finality to the extent of respondents No.4 and 5. The controversy before this Court, therefore, survives only at the instance of the petitioner.

6.The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner along with respondents No.4 and 5 (hereinafter referred to as the applicants) filed an ejectment petition on 31.07.2023 against respondent No.6 in respect of a property situated at Mohallah Banigran, Mouza Bahawalpur, measuring 18 marlas. The case set-up in the ejectment petition was that respondent No.6 had obtained possession of the premises as a tenant pursuant to a tenancy/lease agreement dated 02.02.2022 at a monthly rent of Rs.5,000/- for a period of one year and had subsequently failed to pay rent and hand over possession despite demand and notice. The applicants claimed ownership over the property in different shares. According to them, the

petitioner and respondent No.4 were owners of 5 marlas each, whereas the remaining portion was claimed by respondent No.5 and her husband. Despite service, publication and opportunities, respondent No.6 did not appear before the learned Rent Controller was proceeded against ex-parte on 07.10.2023. The petitioner and the applicants produced their evidence, including respondent No.4 as AW-1, his affidavit as Exh.A-1, Ghulam Nabi and Muhammad Mushtaq as attesting witnesses of rent agreement as AW-2 and AW-3 along with their affidavits as Exh.A-4 and Exh.A-5, the tenancy agreement as Exh.A-2 and copy of the record of rights for the year 2019-20 as Exh.A-3. On the basis of the ex-parte evidence, the learned Rent Controller allowed the ejectment petition and passed the final eviction order along with memo of costs dated 31.01.2024. In execution of the said order, possession of the disputed premises was delivered to the applicants.

7.The controversy, however, did not end with the delivery of possession. Respondent No.3 thereafter approached the learned Rent Controller through an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., asserting that the ejectment order had been procured by misdescription and concealment of the identity and ownership of the property. He maintained that the premises from which possession had been obtained did not belong to the applicants but formed part of property owned by him and situated in Khata Nos.36/32 and 38/34. He relied upon registered sale deed No.780 dated 19.03.1986 and asserted that the question of his title had already been adjudicated in his favour up to the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The applicants contested the application and maintained that the disputed premises belonged to them and that possession had lawfully been delivered in execution of the ejectment order. Respondent No.6, who had remained absent throughout the original ejectment proceedings, also appeared at that stage and submitted a written reply supporting the applicants.

8.During the proceedings, it became apparent that the real controversy between the parties was not merely one of tenancy but concerned the identity and demarcation of the property in respect

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whereof the ejectment order had been obtained and executed. The parties, therefore, expressed consensus that the question of demarcation be determined through a Local Commission. Consequently, vide order dated 02.10.2024, the learned Rent Controller appointed the Tehsildar, Saddar, Bahawalpur, as Local Commission with directions to demarcate the disputed property and submit his report. The Local Commission conducted demarcation proceedings in the presence of the parties. The parties agreed to have the property identified through Global Positioning System (GPS). Muhammad Waseem son of Sanaullah, an expert in GPS technology, carried out the demarcation in the presence of the parties and prepared a site plan. The relevant portion of the said report is as under:- "رفنیقیاکومفقامستعایکایگ۔اوررہدورفنیقییکرطفےسشیپرکدہراکیرڈالمہظحایکایگ۔دعبذہاالمہظح راکیرڈوامستعومفقہینیقیایکاجانرضوریاپایایگہکالپٹدتموعہیسکربمنرسخہںیمواعقےہاسرپرہدو نیشم ےک ذرےعی امیپشئ رکایئ اجےئ۔ بسح راضدنمیGPS رفنیقی ےن بسح راضدنمی ےط ایک ہک ( ےکامرہوکالبایایگ۔سجGlobal Positioning System) نیشمGPSرفنیقیدمحمومیسودلانثءاہلل نیشم ومبوجدیگ رفنیقی امیپشئ رک ےک ہشقن ومعق رمبت ایک ۔ سج رپ ایعں ُہوا ہک الپٹGPS ےن ذبرہعی ںیمواعقےہ(ہشقنرمہبتفلذہاےہ)ومعق21کیلہربمن144/4(لیطتسمربمن13.4 M)دتموعہیربہبق رپدمیعرفدیادلنیےکزری ہضبقالپٹواکمنیکامیپشئذبرہعیہتیفرکایئیئگ۔اورہشقنومعقرمبتایکایگوج "ہکفلذہاےہ۔

According to the report, the property actually found on the spot measured approximately 13.4 marlas and was situated in Rectangle No.144/4, Killa No.21. The report thus materially differed from the description and extent of the property given in the ejectment proceedings. The Local Commission further recorded that the land so identified was not comprised in the ownership of the applicants in the manner asserted by them. The report also referred to the relevant revenue record and concluded that although the identified land did not stand recorded in the name of respondent No.3 in the manner alleged by him, the same was traceable to the ownership of his mother, Mst. Manzoor Masood, and had subsequently come into the possession of respondent No.3 through

Writ Petition No.4596 of 2026 -5-

private partition and before delivery of possession to the applicants through warrant of possession it was in the possession of respondent No.3. The Local Commission supported its conclusions through revenue material, site plan and the result of the physical demarcation. The relevant part of the said conclusion is as under:-

علہ دمیع رفدیادلنی یک یتیکلم13.4 M ( الپٹ دتموعہی لقتنم دشہ ربوے وراٹن ہضبق قحب دماع م ربہبق1)" ارایض ںیم اشلم ہن ےہ۔ اہتبل دمیع یک وادلہ امسمۃ وظنمر وعسمد وریغہ یک یتیکلم ارایض ںیم وموجد ےہ۔ ہکبج وطبرمیسقتاخیگندمیعرفدیادلنیاک13.4 Mیلقتنم ذبرہعیوراٹن ہضبقےسلبقہیدتموعہیڑکٹاارایضربہبق وبقمہضاھت۔

،ےہ۔ہکبجدمیعاانپ4K-14M)دمیعےکزریہضبقارایضوصبرتالپٹریمعتاتاوراخیلالپٹربہبق2( ہشقنومہعقرمبترک/اکااقحتسقراتھکےہ۔امیپشئ7K-16Mاخولتیمسلکرہبقدعتادی،اخہل،اینپوادلہ ےکفلھذاےہ۔

علہ علہ (ےک اماکلن ارایض ںیہ۔ اور دماع م یک ہی ارایض10M) ںیم رہبق دعتادی36 (دماع م اھکہت ربمن3) و کیلہ،2K-10Mربہبق1کیلہربمن145/1(ولیطتسم2M)(ذ)ربہبق6کیلہربمن125/13 لیطتسمربمن علہ ںیم لیطتسم ربمن39 ںیم واعق ےہ۔ دماع م ےن ہضبق ومعق الخف راکیرڈاھکہت ربمن1K-8M ربہبق10 ربمن 39 ںیم ےس احلص ایک ےہ۔ ہکبج احلص رکدہ ہضبق واےل اھکہت4K-7M نم ربہبق21 کیلہ ربمن144/4 علہ "ںیمدماع ماماکلنارایضہنںیہ۔

Thus, the report was not a mere opinion on a disputed question of law; rather, it furnished objective material concerning the identity, location, measurement and revenue particulars of the premises from which possession had been obtained through execution of the ejectment order.

9.The applicants submitted objections to the report of the Local Commission on 03.06.2025. The learned Rent Controller considered the objections and rejected them vide order dated 11.09.2025. Significantly, the said order was not independently assailed before the competent forum and, therefore, the findings recorded therein attained

finality. The consequence is that the report of the Local Commission, having been accepted after consideration of the objections of the parties, constituted an important piece of the record while determining the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C.

10.The learned Rent Controller, after examining the entire matter, allowed the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., set aside the ejectment order dated 31.01.2024 and restored the ejectment proceedings with a direction to the applicants to amend the ejectment petition by bringing the necessary party on record. The revisional Court, upon reappraisal of the material, maintained the order of the learned Rent Controller.

11.The petitioner has primarily questioned the maintainability of the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. on the ground that the ejectment proceedings were governed by the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (the “Act”) and that the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, stood excluded by virtue of Section 34 thereof. The objection, however, is misconceived.

12.Section 26 of the Act confers certain powers of a Civil Court upon the Rent Controller, whereas Section 31 provides that an order passed under the Act shall be executed as a decree of a Civil Court and, for that purpose, the Rent Controller may exercise any or all of the powers of a Civil Court. Section 34, no doubt, excludes the applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, to proceedings under the Act, except to the extent otherwise expressly provided. These provisions, however, are required to be read harmoniously and not in isolation. The expression “any or all of the powers of a Civil Court” employed in Section 31 is of considerable significance and cannot be rendered redundant.

13.The question, therefore, is not whether the provisions of Section 12(2), C.P.C. are attracted to rent proceedings by their own force, but whether the Rent Controller possesses the jurisdiction to recall an order which is alleged to have been obtained from it through fraud,

misrepresentation or concealment of material facts. The answer to this question is in the affirmative.

14.The foundational principle in this regard was recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others” (PLD 1975 SC 331), wherein it was held that judicial or quasi-judicial authorities possess inherent power to recall an order obtained by fraud. The principle is rooted in the maxim that fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings and that no person can be permitted to retain an advantage obtained by practising fraud upon a Court or Tribunal. The Supreme Court further recognized that, in this respect, no distinction can ordinarily be drawn between a Court of general jurisdiction and a Tribunal exercising limited jurisdiction, because the effect of fraud upon the judicial process remains the same.

15.The same principle was subsequently considered in “Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another” (1992 SCMR 1908). While examining an analogous rent-law framework, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, even where the provisions of the C.P.C. are not applicable to rent proceedings by their own force, the Rent Controller, being a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction, may invoke the general principles embodied in Section 12(2), C.P.C. to recall an order obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The Court emphasized that Section 12(2), C.P.C. is itself a recognition of the broader and well-settled principle that every Court or Tribunal has jurisdiction to rescind or recall a void order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. It was held as under:-

“Whether an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. would be competent under the provisions of the Ordinance is a matter which does not present much difficulty even if the provisions of C.P.C. are not applicable by their own force. As expressed by me in Civil Appeal No.29-K of 1987, Ismail v Subedar Gul Inayat Shah, the Rent Controller, as a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction is, on the general principles recognized in our jurisprudence, competent to recall or review an order obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. In that case this aspect of the matter was expressed by me in the following words:

"There cannot be any doubt that section 12(2), C.P.C. is in recognition of the well-settled principle that every Court or Tribunal has inherent jurisdiction to rescind or recall a void order passed by itself. In the Chief Settlement Commissioner v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331, it was held that the preponderance of judicial authority supports the proposition that every authority, Tribunal or Court has power to even suo motu recall or review an order obtained from it by fraud, on the general principles that fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings, and no party should be allowed to take advantage of his own fraud. On this principles in that case the Court held that there can be no distinction between the powers available in this behalf to a Court of general jurisdiction and a Court or Tribunal of a special or limited jurisdiction, for in either case the effect of fraud is the same and the duty to undo that effect must lie on the authority on which fraud is practised. Therefore, on the rule that the equitable principles of C.P.C. can be invoked by the Rent Controller and that fraud vitiates the proceedings of a Court or a Tribunal, there can be no escape from the conclusion that the Rent Controller under the Rented Premises Ordinance has the power to set aside any order which has been secured by practising fraud or misrepresentation upon him."

16.The statutory position under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 was subsequently examined by this Court in “Ghulam Ali v. Rana Babar Khan and 3 others” (PLD 2023 Lahore 507). This Court specifically considered the interplay between Sections 26, 31 and 34 of the Act and held that the exclusion contained in Section 34 does not preclude the Rent Tribunal from entertaining an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. where an order passed under the Act is challenged on the ground of fraud or misrepresentation. This Court, relying upon the principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held that where the Rent Tribunal can invoke the provisions of the C.P.C. in the execution of its order under Section 31 of the Act, an aggrieved person can challenge an order obtained through fraud by invoking Section 12(2), C.P.C., and the exclusion contained in Sections 26 and 34 does not operate as an absolute bar. The exact wording is as under:-

“In view of the above it is held that since the Rent Tribunal in view of section 31 of the Act can exercise/invoke the provisions of C.P.C. and exercise the jurisdiction accordingly, thus, where a person is aggrieved of an order passed by a Tribunal under the Act on the basis of fraud he can challenge the same through an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. and ouster as contained in sections 26 and 34 of the Act will not apply.”

The above authorities, read chronologically, demonstrate a consistent legal principle: fraud or material misrepresentation cannot be permitted to sanctify an otherwise vulnerable judicial order; the power to undo such an order is inherent in the judicial function; and, in the context of rent proceedings, the statutory exclusion of the C.P.C. does not prevent the Rent Tribunal from exercising such jurisdiction where the challenge is genuinely directed against an order allegedly procured through fraud, misrepresentation or concealment.

17.Thus, the principle that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings does not depend upon the technical applicability of Section 12(2), C.P.C. in a particular statutory proceeding. Where an order is alleged to have been procured by practising fraud upon the forum itself, the authority which passed the order cannot be rendered powerless merely because it is a Tribunal of limited jurisdiction.

18.The principle was also applied by this Court in “Allah Ditta and another v. Bashir Ahmed alias Faqiria” (PLD 1995 Lahore 76), wherein the exceptional circumstances in which, after allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., the Court may decline to remand the matter for a fresh trial were recognized.

Thereafter, in “Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others” (2006 SCMR 12), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that the normal consequence of allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is restoration or remand of the matter for decision on merits. At the same time, the Court recognized that, in exceptional circumstances, where the material brought on record during the proceedings under Section 12(2) demonstrates that no useful purpose would be served by remanding the matter, the Court may adopt an

appropriate course instead of ordering a de novo trial. The observation made therein is as under:-

“This is correct that in the normal circumstances if a decree is set aside under section 12(2), C.P.C.. the case is remanded to the trial Court for decision of the suit on merits in accordance with law brought on record by the parties in the proceedings under section 12(2), but in the facts and circumstances of the present case and the evidence brought on record by the parties in the proceedings under section 12(2), C.P.C., no useful purpose would be served in remanding the case to the trial Court.”

The Supreme Court revisited this exceptional principle in “Haji Farman Ullah v. Latif-ur-Rehman” (2015 SCMR 1708), observing that dismissal of the original proceedings while allowing an application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is permissible only in rare and special circumstances. Thus, the ordinary rule remains restoration for adjudication on merits, whereas departure from that rule requires circumstances of an exceptional nature. The relevant portion is as under:- “This is an acknowledgment that only in very rare and special circumstnaces can the suit also be dismissed by the court while it accepts an application under section 12(2) ibid. This exception was resorted to in the judgment of the Lahore High Court report as Allah Ditta and another v. Bashir Ahmed alias Faqiria (PLD 1995 Lah. 76).”

19.It is, however, equally important to maintain a distinction between an ordinary challenge to the correctness of an ejectment order and a challenge founded upon fraud, misrepresentation or want of jurisdiction. Section 12(2), C.P.C. cannot be employed as a substitute for an appeal or revision, nor can a party circumvent the ordinary statutory remedies by merely attaching the label of “fraud” to a challenge on the merits. The jurisdiction under Section 12(2), C.P.C. is attracted where the validity of the judgment, decree or order is assailed on the specific grounds contemplated by the provision. Conversely, where a person who claims an independent interest in the very premises in respect of which an order of ejectment has been obtained asserts that the order was procured by concealing the true identity of the property, misrepresenting its

ownership or materially misstating the premises before the Court, the matter assumes a different character. In such circumstances, the Court or Tribunal cannot remain powerless merely because the impugned order has subsequently been executed.

20.The principle that fraud vitiates judicial proceedings is concerned with the integrity of the judicial process itself. No party can be permitted to retain the benefit of an order obtained by practising fraud upon the Court or by suppressing facts which go to the root of the adjudication.

21.Tested on the above principles, the present case cannot be characterized as a mere dispute regarding the ownership of the premises. The ejectment petition was instituted in respect of property described as measuring 18 marlas. The tenancy document relied upon by the applicants did not contain a sufficiently precise description enabling the premises to be conclusively identified. The lease agreement dated 02.02.2022 was admittedly executed on plain paper.

22.More significantly, the record of rights produced as Exh.A-3 did not, on its face, substantiate the entire ownership claim advanced by the applicants. It was asserted that the petitioner and respondent No.4 were owners of 5 marlas each, whereas the remaining portion was claimed by respondent No.5 and her husband. However, the documentary material produced before the learned Rent Controller did not satisfactorily establish the alleged ownership of respondent No.5 and her husband over the remaining portion.

23.The discrepancy, therefore, was not confined to the quantum of ownership. It extended to the very identity and location of the premises which were subjected to the process of the Rent Controller.

24.This aspect acquired decisive significance from the report of the Local Commission. The Local Commission was appointed with the consent of the parties vide order dated 02.10.2024 to determine the actual location and demarcation of the disputed premises. With the concurrence of the parties, the property was identified through GPS technology and a site plan was prepared.

25.The report found that the property actually existing at the spot measured approximately 13.4 marlas and was situated in Rectangle No.144/4, Killa No.21. The Commission further found, on the basis of the revenue record and physical demarcation, that the property delivered through the warrant of possession did not fall within the ownership of the applicants in the manner asserted by them. It further recorded that, although the identified land was traceable to the ownership of the mother of respondent No.3, it had subsequently come into his possession through private partition and was in his possession prior to the delivery of possession pursuant to the ejectment order.

26.Thus, the report was not merely an expression of opinion on a disputed question of law or title. It furnished objective material concerning the identity, location, measurement and revenue particulars of the premises from which possession had actually been obtained through execution of the ejectment order.

27.The objections submitted by the applicants to the Local Commission's report were considered by the learned Rent Controller and rejected vide order dated 11.09.2025. That order was not independently challenged before the competent forum and, consequently, the findings recorded therein attained finality between the parties. The petitioner cannot, therefore, indirectly reopen the same factual controversy in the present Constitutional Petition unless he demonstrates that the findings are perverse, arbitrary or based upon no evidence.

28.The accepted report, read with the revenue material and the circumstances attending the original ex-parte proceedings, provided sufficient material for the learned Rent Controller to examine whether the ejectment order had been obtained through misdescription, misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.

29.Another circumstance which cannot be ignored is the conduct of respondent No.6, the alleged tenant. He remained absent throughout the original ejectment proceedings and was proceeded against ex-parte. He did not contest the claim of the applicants, whereafter the ejectment petition was allowed and possession was delivered in execution. However, after possession had been obtained, respondent No.6

appeared and filed a written reply supporting the very applicants who had obtained the ejectment order against him.

30.This subsequent conduct, when viewed cumulatively with the defective description of the premises, the deficiencies in the documentary proof of ownership, the findings of the Local Commission and the circumstances in which the original proceedings proceeded ex- parte, furnished material upon which the learned Rent Controller could legitimately examine the allegation of collusion and misrepresentation. The finding in that regard cannot, therefore, be characterized as wholly without evidence or as a mere conjecture.

31.The fact that possession had already been delivered in execution does not confer an indefeasible right upon a party who is subsequently found to have obtained the underlying order through fraud or material misrepresentation. Execution cannot cure a jurisdictional defect, nor can it validate an order whose very foundation has been successfully impeached. If the order forming the basis of execution is lawfully recalled, the consequences flowing from such execution must necessarily be reconsidered in accordance with law.

32.Otherwise, a party could obtain an order by concealing material facts, execute it immediately and thereafter claim that execution has rendered the order immune from challenge. Such a proposition would defeat the very purpose of the inherent power of a judicial forum to undo the effect of fraud practised upon it.

33.In the present case, however, the learned Rent Controller, while restoring the ejectment petition, directed the applicants to amend the memo of parties by impleading respondent No.3. The subsequent impleadment of a person asserting an independent title and possession over the disputed premises fundamentally alters the nature of the controversy. The question is no longer confined to the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between the original applicants and respondent No.6; rather, the parties have raised competing claims regarding ownership, title and possession of the very premises from which eviction was sought and possession obtained.

34.The jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal in an ejectment petition is limited. It is primarily concerned with determining whether the requisite relationship of landlord and tenant exists and whether a statutory ground for eviction has been established. It is not a forum for finally adjudicating complicated and seriously disputed questions of title or ownership. In the present circumstances, respondent No.6, who had earlier remained ex-parte, has also supported the stance of the original applicants. With the appearance of respondent No.3 and his assertion of an independent proprietary interest, the real dispute between the parties has assumed the character of a title and ownership dispute. Such questions are appropriately adjudicated by a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction.

35.Ordinarily, upon setting aside an order under Section 12(2), C.P.C., the matter is restored or remanded for adjudication on merits. The authorities referred to above, particularly Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq (2006 SCMR 12) and Haji Farman Ullah (2015 SCMR 1708), make it clear, however, that in rare and special circumstances where no useful purpose would be served by a de novo trial, the Court may adopt a different course.

36.The present case falls within that exceptional category. The material brought on record demonstrates that the essential controversy concerns the identity, title, ownership and possession of the disputed premises. A remand to the Rent Controller for a de novo ejectment trial, in circumstances where the parties are contesting their competing proprietary claims, would not effectively resolve the foundational dispute and may result in parallel and potentially conflicting proceedings.

37.Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that, while dealing with the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C., the learned Rent Controller adopted an unusual procedure by deciding the matter on the basis of the Local Commission's report without framing issues or recording conventional oral evidence. This objection is equally without merit. Subsection (3) of Section 12, C.P.C., introduced through the Punjab Amendment Act, 2018, expressly empowers the Court, for purposes of disposing of an application under subsection (2), to adopt

such fair procedure as the circumstances of the case may warrant in the interest of expeditious disposal. It further contemplates proof by affidavit unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, directs otherwise. For ready reference, subsection (3) of Section 12, C.P.C. is as under:- “12(3). For purposes of the disposal of an application under Sub-section (2), the Court may, in the interest of expeditious disposal, apply such fair procedure as the circumstances of the case warrant, and shall, unless, for reasons to be recorded it directs otherwise, order any fact to be proved or disproved by affidavit.”

38.In the present case, both sides were claiming rights in respect of the same premises, though by reference to different Khata numbers. The controversy consequently required an objective determination of the location and identity of the property. The appointment of the Local Commission was made with the consent of the parties. The Commission conducted the proceedings in their presence, obtained assistance from a GPS expert because of the congested nature of the locality, prepared a site plan and examined the relevant revenue material.

39.The applicants were afforded an opportunity to submit objections to the report, which they exercised. Their objections were thereafter considered and rejected through a separate order dated 11.09.2025. In these circumstances, the procedure adopted by the learned Rent Controller was fair, proportionate to the nature of the controversy and consistent with the statutory discretion available under Section 12(3), C.P.C. No prejudice has been demonstrated merely because the conventional procedure of framing issues and recording evidence was not followed.

40.The petitioner has, therefore, failed to demonstrate that the concurrent findings of the learned Rent Controller and the learned revisional Court suffer from any jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, material irregularity or perversity. The Local Commission's report was considered, the objections thereto were adjudicated, and the resulting findings were based upon material available on record. The petitioner has

not shown that the Courts below acted without jurisdiction or that their conclusions were based on no evidence.

41.The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution is supervisory and discretionary. It is not intended to substitute the Constitutional Court for an appellate forum for the purpose of reappraising evidence or replacing a plausible and legally sustainable conclusion of the Courts below with another possible view. Interference is warranted where the impugned order is shown to suffer from a jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, material irregularity, violation of law or perversity resulting in miscarriage of justice. No such defect has been established in the present case.

42.For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the learned Rent Controller was competent to entertain and adjudicate upon the application filed by respondent No.3 under Section 12(2), C.P.C. The application was maintainable because the challenge was not directed merely against the correctness of the ejectment order on merits; rather, it questioned the very validity of the order on the grounds of misrepresentation, concealment of material facts and misdescription of the identity and ownership of the premises. The general exclusion of the C.P.C. contained in Section 34 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 did not, in the circumstances of the present case, constitute an absolute bar, particularly in view of Section 31 of the Act and the principles recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and subsequently applied by this Court.

43.The learned Rent Controller, upon consideration of the material available on record, particularly the Local Commission's report which had survived the petitioner's objections, the discrepancies in the description and measurement of the premises, the deficiencies in the documentary proof of ownership and the circumstances surrounding the original ex-parte proceedings, was justified in setting aside the ejectment order dated 31.01.2024. The learned revisional Court committed no jurisdictional error or material irregularity in maintaining that order.

44.At the same time, the restoration of the ejectment proceedings does not, in the peculiar circumstances of the present case,

warrant a de novo trial before the Rent Controller merely as a matter of form. The material on record demonstrates that the controversy has travelled beyond the limited question of ejectment and now substantially concerns competing claims of title, ownership and possession over the disputed premises. Such questions fall within the domain of a Civil Court of competent jurisdiction. The parties are, therefore, left at liberty to seek appropriate relief before the competent Civil Court for determination of their respective rights, title and possession in accordance with law. This course shall not prejudice any party's right to pursue such remedy, nor shall the observations made herein be construed as an adjudication upon the title or proprietary rights of any of the parties. Consequently, finding no jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, material irregularity, perversity or miscarriage of justice in the impugned orders, this Constitutional Petition is dismissed in limine. The orders dated 02.10.2025 and 18.05.2026 are maintained, subject to the clarification that the observations contained in this judgment are confined to the maintainability and adjudication of the application under Section 12(2), C.P.C. and shall not be construed as a final determination of title, ownership or possession of the disputed premises. The parties shall be at liberty to avail themselves of the remedy available before the competent Civil Court, where their respective claims shall be determined strictly in accordance with law and on the basis of the evidence produced before that Court.

(AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

Gull*