Shahbaz Anwar vs Province Of Punjab etc.

Form No:HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT

BAHAWALPUR BENCH BAHAWALPUR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No.4833 of 2026 Shahbaz Anwar Vs The Province of Punjab etc.

S.No. of Date of Order with signature of Judge, and that of parties or order/ order/ counsel, where necessary proceeding proceeding 24.08.2026 Mr. Muhammad Yaseen Ataal, Advocate for the petitioner.

The petitioner has filed the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (‘the Constitution’) seeking grant of the following prayers:

i. The impugned Office Order No.SO (E-III)WL/3-3/2026 dated 16.08.2026, may kindly be set aside as illegal, without lawful authority, coram non judice, mala fide, arbitrary and violative of the PEEDA Act, 2006 and the principles of natural justice.

ii. It is also humbly prayed that the operation of the impugned Office Order No.SO (E-III)WL/3-3/2026 dated 16.08.2026, may kindly be suspended and the respondent No.1 may kindly be restrained for taking any further coercive/adverse action against the petitioner on the basis of the impugned proceedings.

iii. Any other relief deemed just and proper in the circumstances of the case may kindly be granted.

2.The necessary facts, as set out in the petition and relevant for the adjudication of the present controversy, are that the petitioner is an employee of Pakistan Museum of Natural History, Pakistan Science Foundation, Ministry of Science & Technology, Islamabad. Since 10.04.2023, the

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petitioner has been with the respondent department and presently he is posted as the Curator, Bahawalpur Zoo, Bahawalpur, vide office order dated 19.08.2025. Petitioner was issued a letter dated 15.08.2026 seeking his explanation as to why he failed to report the death of 330 chicks of different species to respondent No.4/Deputy Chief Wildlife Ranger, Bahawalpur Region, Bahawalpur, which he had already replied. Subsequently, through order dated 16.08.2026, respondent No.1 has placed the petitioner under suspension for a period of 90 days with immediate effect (the ‘Impugned Order’) under Section 6 of the Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006 (‘PEEDA or the Act’) that has been challenged in this Writ Petition.

3.The sole argument advanced by the petitioner is that the Impugned Order has been passed by the Borrowing Organization without taking ‘prior approval’ from the Lending Organization, which is mandatory requirement under Section 15(1)(a) & (b) of the Act before placing a deputationist, like Petitioner, under suspension. Consequently, the Impugned Order placing him under suspension is illegal, unlawful, without jurisdiction and void ab initio, hence, liable to be set aside. While addressing the maintainability of this Writ Petition, learned counsel contends that he is on deputation with the respondent department, so the bar contained in Article 212(2) of the Constitution does not apply to the petitioner in view of Section 2(1)(b)(i) of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 whereby a person on deputation to the Province from the Federation or any other Province or Authority does not fall in the definition of civil servant. According to him, this

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Writ Petition is maintainable. In these facts and circumstances, the Petitioner prays for the acceptance of this Writ Petition by setting aside the Impugned Order of his suspension.

4.At the very outset, learned counsel was confronted qua the maintainability of this Writ Petition. Besides, he was inquired if he had any precedent to substantiate his submissions made at the bar. Learned counsel sought time to furnish case law in support of his petition and to refute the propositions of law expounded by this Court, which have duly been formulated and reproduced herein below. Subsequently, the case was taken up at the end of the cause list after conclusion of all court work, when the learned counsel for the petitioner frankly conceded that he could not find any precedent favouring his petition. However, he quibbled that he could also not find anything supporting the propositions of law as canvassed by this Court. He, therefore, insisted that Writ Petition is maintainable and the Impugned Order be set aside being illegal and without jurisdiction.

5.Be that as it may. Arguments have been heard at great length and the record of this case has been perused with the able assistance of learned counsel for the petitioner.

6.For complete determination of the controversy agitated in this petition, it is imperative to reproduce the following relevant provisions of PEEDA: Section 5. Initiation of proceedings.— (1) If on the basis of its own knowledge or information placed before it, the competent authority is of the opinion that there are sufficient grounds for initiating proceedings against an employee under this Act, it shall either—

(a)proceed itself against the accused by issuing a show cause notice under Section 7 and, for

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reasons to be recorded in writing, dispense with the enquiry:

Provided that no opportunity of showing cause or personal hearing shall be given where—

(i)the competent authority is satisfied that in the interest of security of Pakistan or any part thereof, it is not expedient to give such an opportunity; or

(ii)an employee has entered into plea bargain under any law for the time being in force or has been convicted of the charges of corruption which have led to a sentence of fine or imprisonment; or

(iii)an employee is involved in subversive activities; or

(iv)it is not reasonably practicable to give such an opportunity to the accused; or

(b)get an enquiry conducted into the charge or charges against the accused, by appointing an enquiry officer or an enquiry committee, as the case may be, under Section 10:

Provided that the competent authority shall dispense with the enquiry where--

(i)an employee has been convicted of any offence other than corruption by a court of law under any law for the time being in force; or

(ii)an employee is or has been absent from duty without prior approval of leave:

(Emphasis Added)

Section 6. Suspension.--- An employee against whom action is proposed to be initiated under Section 5 may be placed under suspension for a period of ninety days, if in the opinion of the competent authority, suspension is necessary or expedient, and if the period of suspension is not extended for a further period of ninety days within thirty days of the expiry of

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initial period of suspension, the employee shall be deemed to be reinstated:

Provided that the continuation of the period of suspension shall require the prior approval of the competent authority for each period of extension.

(Emphasis Added) Section 15. Procedure of inquiry against officers lent to other governments, etc.—

(1)Where the services of an employee are transferred or lent to any other government, department, corporation, corporate body, autonomous body, authority, statutory body or any other organization or institution, hereinafter referred to as the borrowing organization, the competent authority for the post against which such employee is posted in the borrowing organization may--

(a)suspend him under Section 6; and

(b)initiate proceedings against him under this Act:

Provided that the borrowing organization shall forthwith inform the lending organization of the circumstances leading to the order of his suspension and the commencement of the proceedings:

Provided further that the borrowing organization shall obtain prior approval of the lending organization before taking any action under this Act, against an employee holding a post in Basic Pay Scale 17 or above.”

(Emphasis Added)

7.Perusal of the above basic provisions of law reveals the scheme of PEEDA, whereunder the Competent Authority has two options available to it, if and when it is of the opinion that there are sufficient grounds for initiating proceedings against an employee under PEEDA. First, the Competent Authority can proceed itself against the employee under Section 7 of the Act by dispensing with the regular enquiry OR Second the Competent Authority can get an enquiry conducted by appointing an

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Enquiry Officer or Enquiry Committee (as the case may be) under Section 10 ibid. It would not be out of the place to briefly mention that there are procedural safeguards in built by the legislature and also those introduced by the Courts, from time to time, for structuring this discretionary power of the Competent Authority and guiding as to when a regular enquiry can be dispensed with or under what circumstances a regular enquiry is mandatory as well as for safeguarding and protecting the rights of the accused employee, but since they are not the subject matter of the instant writ petition, therefore, they are not being referred to herein below.

8.The first set of questions that need to be answered are whether the Competent Authority under the Act has the power or authority to place an employee under suspension. At what point in time, this power can be exercised by the Competent Authority? Are there any pre-requisites or condition precedent for exercise of power of suspension? Answers to all these questions are found in Section 6 of the Act. This power of the Competent Authority to issue a suspension order against an employee is derived from Section 6 ibid and is exercised if the suspension is necessary or expedient in the opinion of the Competent Authority at the time when the Competent Authority is proposing or contemplating to initiate any action against an employee under PEEDA. Except this rider, there is no other pre-requisite for exercise of such power by the Competent Authority for issuance of a suspension order. It is clear as day that the act of placing an employee under suspension precedes the initiation of proceedings under Section 5 of the Act and the passing of any adverse order in consequence thereof. By the bare reading of this Section, one is

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constrained to note that it is a stand-alone provision containing no reference, neither express nor implied, to any other section of the Act. In Section 6, there is no concept of seeking permission, prior or later, for placing the name of an employee under suspension for 90 days. Section 6, unlike Section 15, does not have any controlling proviso, which makes it obligatory upon the Competent Authority to seek prior approval of the Lending Organization. Section 6 is self- contained section of law without having any pre- requisites for exercise of such power, except the opinion of the Competent Authority that suspension is necessary or expedient. This exercise of power under Section 6 has not been made subject to or subservient to Section 15 ibid.

9.When interpreting different, apparently incongruent, provisions of a statute, the first and the foremost duty of the Court is to read, explain and apply those provisions harmoniously in such a manner that no part of law made by the legislature is made redundant, rendered surplus or made otiose1. By following this cardinal principle of law, when these two provisions of the Act, Sections 6 & 15, are put in juxtaposition and read harmoniously, it cumulatively follows that under Section 6 the Competent Authority, before initiation of any action as stated in Section 5, can place an employee under suspension for 90 days, if in the opinion of Competent Authority suspension is necessary or expedient. However, in case the employee in question has been lent, transferred or sent on deputation from one government to other government, department, corporation or authority etc., as explained in Section Aftab Shahban Mirani and others vs. Muhammad Ibrahim and others (PLD 2008 SC 779) Lucky Cement Ltd. vs. Commissioner Income Tax, Zone Companies, Circle-5, Peshawar (2015 SCMR 1494), Haji tooti and another vs. Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others (2023 SCMR 1980)

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15, then the Competent Authority in the Borrowing Organization can (i) suspend him under Section 6, meaning thereby that the procedure as set out in Section 6 ibid would apply i.e. if in opinion of the Competent Authority suspension is necessary or expedient; and (ii) initiate proceedings against him under the Act i.e. either of the two actions stated in Section 5 ibid would take place. The only extra step, added in the case of an employee on deputation, is that the Borrowing Organization shall forthwith inform the Lending Organization of the circumstances leading to the order of suspension and commencement of proceedings. To reach to this conclusion, this Court has noted that the words ‘prior approval’ have only been used in the 2nd proviso to Section 15 stating to the effect that prior approval of the Lending Organization is required by the Borrowing Organization before taking any action under this Act. 2nd proviso does not supersede, overrides or control the 1st proviso. Rather these two provisos address two different subjects. 1st proviso casts obligation on the Competent Authority about relaying the information to the Lending Organization qua the circumstances leading to the issuance or passing of the order of suspension and the fact the proceedings under PEEDA have been initiated or commenced or begun against a deputationist employee. It is a Post facto obligation communicating of what has already transpired. On the other hand, 2nd proviso imposes a duty on the Competent Authority to obtain prior approval of the Lending Organization before taking any action under this Act against an employee on deputation holding a post in BPS-17 or above. This is an ex-ante or before the event obligation. Legislature’s conscious

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omission of words ‘prior consent’ in the 1st proviso to Section 15 ibid, is instructive of legislature’s true intent that no prior approval, advance permission or previous consent of the Lending Organization is needed for placing an employee under suspension and for initiation of enquiry against a deputationist. Had the legislature wanted so, it would have said so in the 1st proviso.

10.Besides it is also trite law that while interpreting a statute, the heading or title of section or provision is also useful internal aid or tool for interpretation2. The title / heading of Section 15 reads ‘Procedure of enquiry against officers lent to other governments, etc.’, so prima facie Section 15 only relates to the procedure of enquiry not the procedure of suspension. As opined earlier, the initiation of enquiry has a separate and distinct meaning in the Act whereas the passing of a suspension order is not an enquiry, it is just preface to an Enquiry. Nowhere in Section 15, the passing of an order of suspension been clogged or initiation of enquiry has been blocked. 2nd proviso to Section 15 relates to taking of action under this Act, which, prima facie, means order(s) that is to be passed by the Competent Authority on receipt of the report from the Enquiry Officer or Committee (as the case may be) under Section 13 or where enquiry has been dispensed with, before passing an order under Section 7.

11.In view of the foregoing facts and the applicable law, this Court is of the firm view that for the suspension order issued under Section 6, there is, as such, no requirement of seeking prior approval or consent of the Lending Organization by the Mst. Rehmat Begum vs. Mehfooz Ahmed and others (PLD 2024 SC 1108)

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Borrowing Organization. All that the Borrowing Organization is required to do is to forthwith inform the Lending Organization of the circumstances leading to the order of the suspension and the commencement of the proceedings. In other words, what has led to the suspension of the officer concerned and beginning of an enquiry that is to be conveyed to the Lending Organization by the Borrowing Organization.

12.At this juncture, it would not be out of the place to refer to, although in passing, the meaning and purport of phrase ‘forthwith’ as used in 1st proviso to the Section 15. According to Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Edition), edited by Bryan A. Garner on 05th April, 2024 and published by Thomson Reuters, the term “forthwith” is defined as follows:

1.Without unnecessary delay. 2. Within a reasonable time under the circumstances; with all convenient dispatch. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “(t)here are many cases which turn upon the question whether a person was not too late in complying with a requirement that a thing must be done forthwith.” Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co., 176 U.S 181, 193, 20 S. Ct. 311, 315 (1900). That was an anomalous case in which it was argued that the person required to do something forthwith did it too quickly. The Court held there was no good argument that the actor had “acted with too great haste.” Id. The court cited with approval, however, a lexicographic authority stating that the word “has a relative meaning, and will imply a longer or shorter period, according to the nature of the thing to be done.” Id. Cf.

IMMEDIATELY; PROMPTLY.

(Emphasis Added) On the other hand, the word ‘forthwith’ in its ordinary parlance, as opposed to legal, means immediately, instantly, at once and promptly. Reference is made to Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English (10th Edition) by A.S. Hornby published by

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Oxford University Press in the year 2020, where term “forthwith” means immediately; at once. This term ‘forthwith’ has come under judicial scrutiny more than once, mostly, in the context of Order XVII Rule 3 CPC, where this term has been interpreted as ‘within reasonable time’3, without delay4 and was not equated with words ‘at once’5. So the judicial consensus is that the word ‘forthwith’ does not mean ‘immediately’ but ‘with all reasonable celerity’6. It has a relative meaning depending on the nature of the thing to be done. If the legislature wanted the Competent Authority to straightaway communicate the circumstances leading to the order of suspension and commencement of proceedings from Borrowing Organization to the Lending Organization, it would have used the words like ‘immediately’ or ‘promptly’ that imply urgency. The use of word ‘forthwith’ leaves the Competent Authority with reasonable time to do the needful. What is reasonable time is a fact specific question that will invariably fluctuate on case to case basis as it has, rightly, been pointed out in the above quoted definition from the Black’s Law Dictionary.

13.At this juncture, after having addressed the merits of arguments and submissions made by the learned counsel for the Petitioner, it would not be out of the place to recall that the Petitioner has only challenged the order whereby he has been suspended. To comment upon with the nature and effect of an order of suspension, let us begin by remembering that an order of placing an employee under suspension has never been termed, treated and accepted as a penalty Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khan vs. Mst. Shah Jahan Begum and 2 others (PLD 1971 SC 434) Lutfullah Virk vs. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh (PLD 2024 SC 887) Muhammad Aslam vs. Nazir Ahmed (2008 SCMR 942) Inspector General, Frontier Corps, Baluchistan, Quetta vs. The Superintendent, Central Jail, Mach, & 3 others (1990 MLD 2258)

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by the superior courts. Suspension is a temporary measure, effect whereof is to merely stop an official from performing his duties for the time being. Suspended employee continues to hold his office, receive pay or subsistence allowance, as the case may be, but is restrained from performing the actual functions of his office during the period of his suspension. It is not permanent removal from service, which order may only be passed upon completion of the enquiry. Thus, an order of suspension pending a departmental enquiry is not a penalty as it does not violate any legal right vesting in the suspended officer. Seminal judgment by a Full Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court on this score is Mian Muhammad Hayat v. The Province of West Pakistan reported as (PLD 1964 SC 321) that was later approvingly followed in the case of Abdul Khaliq Bangash v. The Secretary, Government of West Pakistan, Co-Operative Department, Lahore & 2 others (1970 SCMR 103), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court, after referring to the above exposition of law, was pleased to make the following important observation:

“The petitioner continues to remain in service in spite of his suspension and if he is ultimately exonerated in the enquiry, he can be re-instated and paid all the arrears of his salary that may be found due to him”. Subsequently, the above principle of law was followed in the case titled The Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Lahore v. Muhammad Halim through Legal Representatives and others (PLD 2000 SC 55).

14.As a necessary corollary of the discussion in the foregoing paragraphs, since this writ petition is aimed against an interim order of suspension that is

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not a penalty under the service laws, so this writ petition against an order of interlocutory nature is premature, non-maintainable and liable to be dismissed on this score alone. In this respect, reliance is placed on cases titled Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v. Engineer-in-Chief, Pakistan Army, GHQ and another reported as (1981 PLC (C.S.) 123), Professor Dr. Zafar Iqbal Chaudhry v. Province of Punjab and others reported as (2017 PLC (C.S.) 583), Ahmed Raza Sultan etc. v. Senior Member Board of Revenue reported as (PLJ 2014 Lahore 265) and Muhammad Amin Mughal v. Secretary Local Government and Rural Development Department/Chairman Punjab Local Government Board, Government of the Punjab, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and 4 others reported as (2002 PLC (C.S.) 816), where this Court was pleased to observe as follows:

“The suspension order or the holding of inquiry is step towards passing of the final order and no writ petition is maintainable against interim order. As if the inquiry the petitioner is found guilty of the charge and thereupon some action is taken against him, the petitioner has the remedy to file an appeal before the Service Tribunal. The High Court cannot interfere in such like interim orders in view of dictum laid down by the Karachi High Court in Abdul Bari's case (PLD 1981 Karachi 290, 303 and 309), Muhammad Mahmood Ali's case (1984 CLC 142 at page 145) and Nazir Ahmad Sheikh's case (1998 PLC (C.S.) page 607). In the light of the above discussion the writ petition is not maintainable and the same is dismissed.

15.Since the petitioner has only challenged the order of his suspension under Section 6 of the Act, whereas the Competent Authority is yet to initiate proceedings against him either through a regular

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enquiry under Section 10 or by dispensing with it under Section 7, let alone conclude the same, and the petitioner has other remedies available to him under the hierarchy of the Act as and when the enquiry proceeds, therefore, in the view of the aforementioned legal position, this petition is held to be premature, devoid of any merit and not deserving any interference by this Court at this stage. Hence, this Writ Petition is dismissed in limine.

(Muhammad Usman Ghani Rashid Cheema) Judge

Approved for reporting

Judge *M.Rizwan*