Muhammad Awais Vs Federation of Pakistan etc.

Form No.HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P No.47831 of 2026

Muhammad Awais Vs.

Federation of Pakistan, etc.

JUDGEMENT

Date of Hearing: 28.8.2026 Petitioner by: Syed Irfan Haider Naqvi, Advocates for the petitioner Respondent by: Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Pasha, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL, J. Through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter to be called as “the Constitution”), the petitioner has called in question the action of officials of the Federal Investigation Agency (“FIA”), whereby he was off-loaded on 17.07.2026 at Islamabad International Airport and prevented from proceeding abroad.

2.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner possessed valid travel documents and that neither any written order nor any lawful justification for preventing his departure was communicated to him. He contends that the impugned action is arbitrary, without lawful authority and violative of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 4, 10-A and 15 of the Constitution. As regards territorial jurisdiction, learned counsel submits that the FIA performs functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation and, therefore, may be proceeded against before any High Court, including this Court. He further contends that the petitioner is a resident of the Province of Punjab and that the consequences of the impugned action continue to affect him within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Reliance has principally been placed upon “Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Interior v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others” (2017 SCMR 1179).

3.Conversely, learned Law Officer has raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction. He submits that the entire action complained of was undertaken at Islamabad International Airport as is evident from the off-loading stamp affixed on the petitioner’s passport; the FIA officials who allegedly off-loaded the petitioner were posted there and were performing their official functions at Islamabad; and no order was passed, act was done or proceeding undertaken within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. It is further contended that respondents Nos. 4 and 5, namely, the Director/In-charge, FIA Immigration, Departure Control/Exit Counter, Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore, and the In-charge/Officer, FIA Immigration, Departure Control Counter, Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore, respectively, have been impleaded improperly as they have no role in the impugned action. Learned Law Officer further adds that they may have purportedly been impleaded in order to attract the jurisdiction of this Court, notwithstanding that the impugned action was admittedly carried out by FIA officials posted at Islamabad International Airport.

4.Heard the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the available record.

5.Since the objection regarding the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to exercise powers under Article 199 of the Constitution goes to the very root of the matter, therefore, it would be appropriate to determine the question of territorial jurisdiction before entering into the merits of the petition. The question requiring determination may, therefore, be framed as follows:

Whether this Court possesses territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to examine the impugned act of off-loading admittedly undertaken by FIA immigration officials at Islamabad International Airport?

6.It is noteworthy that Article 199 of the Constitution confers extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction upon a High Court, subject to

the territorial limitations expressly incorporated therein. Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution, inter alia, empowers a High Court to make an order “directing a person performing, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court, functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local authority...” (Underlining and bold supplied for emphasis). Thus, subject to fulfilment of the other conditions prescribed by the Constitution, the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 is conditioned by the requisite territorial nexus with the act done, proceeding taken, or authority/person against whom constitutional relief is sought. The territorial limitation embodied in Article 199, ibid, is, therefore, not merely a procedural technicality; rather, it constitutes a constitutional restriction upon the exercise of jurisdiction by a High Court. This constitutional scheme is further reinforced by Article 175 of the Constitution, which envisages a High Court for each Province and a High Court for the Islamabad Capital Territory, thereby defining distinct territorial spheres within which the respective High Courts exercise their constitutional jurisdiction.

7.The mere fact that an authority/person is federal in character does not, by itself, confer unrestricted territorial jurisdiction upon every High Court in Pakistan. A federal authority may, depending upon the nature of the impugned action and the place where such action operates or has its legal effect, be amenable to the jurisdiction of more than one High Court. This principle, however, does not dilute or override the territorial limitation expressly embodied in Article 199 of the Constitution, particularly where the impugned action has been taken by an officer or establishment in the discharge of a localized function within a defined territorial domain. The Court must, therefore, look to the substance and dominant object of the grievance, identify the act or proceeding principally impugned, and determine the territorial nexus of such act with the jurisdiction invoked.

8.While examining the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court, in “Taufiq

Asif and others v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf and others” (PLD 2024 SC 610), has authoritatively held that an act done or proceeding taken at a particular place is ordinarily amenable to judicial review by the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction such act was done or proceeding taken. More importantly, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the “dominant object” test, observing that it is the principal grievance agitated and the ultimate relief sought in a constitutional petition which determine the territorial jurisdiction of a High Court. The principle enunciated in Taufiq Asif is consistent with the earlier jurisprudence of the Supreme Court in “Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue and others” (PLD 1997 SC 334) and “Amin Textile Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and others” (1998 SCMR 2389). In the latter case, while declining interference with the judgment of this Court dismissing a writ petition for want of territorial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Court must ascertain the “dominant object” of the writ petition. Thus, it is the substance of the controversy, rather than the manner in which respondents are arrayed or the relief is couched, that determines the forum possessing territorial jurisdiction. Reference may also be made to “Hassan Shahjehan v. FPSC through Chairman and others” (PLD 2017 Lahore 665), wherein, after surveying the earlier constitutional jurisprudence, including “Sandalbar Enterprises, Flying Kraft Paper Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenu” (1997 SCMR 1874), “Asghar Hussain v. Election Commission of Pakistan” (PLD 1968 SC 387) and “Messrs Al-Iblagh Limited v. Copyright Board” (1985 SCMR 758), it was reiterated that the territorial limitation embodied in Article 199 constitutes a substantive constitutional restraint upon the exercise of writ jurisdiction.

9.The aforesaid principle has received further and significant affirmation from the Federal Constitutional Court in “Messrs D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited and others v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Revenue, Islamabad” (PLD 2026 FCC

168). While examining the territorial limits of the writ jurisdiction under Article 199, the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized that Article 199 restricts the operation of a High Court's writ jurisdiction to the official persons and acts falling within its territorial domain. The Court, accordingly, set aside a direction of the Islamabad High Court which purported to require the Federal Board of Revenue to issue a countrywide administrative instruction implementing the interpretation adopted by that Court. The judgment underscores that the writ jurisdiction of a High Court cannot, merely by reason of the federal character of the respondent authority, be extended so as to operate beyond the territorial limits prescribed by Article 199.

10.The judgment in “Federal Government through Secretary, Ministry of Interior v. Ms. Ayyan Ali and others” (2017 SCMR 1179), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner, is distinguishable. In that case, the subject matter of challenge was a Notification/Memorandum issued by the Federal Government imposing a continuing embargo upon the respondent’s departure from Pakistan. The respondent resided at Karachi, had the right and intention to travel through Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, and had previously been prevented from travelling from the same airport pursuant to the earlier notifications. The Supreme Court, therefore, found that the federal notification had taken effect at Karachi and that the continuing restraint was likely to be enforced again there. A substantial and operative part of the cause of action had, thus, arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of the Sindh High Court. The aforesaid judgment, therefore, does not support the petitioner’s contention in the circumstances of the present case. Rather, it demonstrates that where the impugned federal action imposes a continuing restraint which takes effect within the territorial jurisdiction of a particular High Court, such Court may exercise jurisdiction. The subsequent judgment in Taufiq Asif (supra), however, makes it clear that the mere federal character of an authority cannot, by itself, confer territorial jurisdiction upon a High Court where the

dominant object of the petition concerns an act or proceeding occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of another High Court. The Court is required to look beyond the form of the petition and ascertain its real substance and the ultimate relief sought.

11.The present case stands on an entirely different footing. No continuing notification, memorandum, placement on the Exit Control List, or other nationwide restraint taking effect within the Province of Punjab has been identified as the subject matter of challenge. The dominant, and indeed sole, grievance of the petitioner is against the completed physical act of off-loading carried out on 17.07.2026 by FIA immigration officials stationed at Islamabad International Airport. The petitioner presented himself for departure at Islamabad; his travel documents were examined there; the decision to prevent him from boarding was taken and communicated there; and its immediate enforcement also occurred there. Neither the impugned act nor any part of the proceedings leading thereto took place within the territorial limits of this Court.

12.The mere fact that the petitioner is a resident of the Province of Punjab does not, in these circumstances, confer territorial jurisdiction upon this Court. Residence may become relevant where a federal order or continuing restraint is shown to operate upon the petitioner within the Province, as was the case, on its particular facts, in Ayyan Ali. But residence alone cannot confer jurisdiction over an otherwise localized act which was completed outside the territorial limits of this Court. Likewise, the impleadment of the Federation of Pakistan or a senior FIA functionary possessing countrywide administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction where the dominant object of the petition remains the localized action of immigration officials at Islamabad Airport. Territorial jurisdiction is to be determined from the substance of the controversy and not from the description or array of respondents. The array of respondents cannot, therefore, determine territorial jurisdiction. Jurisdiction must be ascertained from the substance of the

controversy and the act or proceeding actually impugned. In the present case, respondents Nos.4 and 5 are officials posted at Allama Iqbal International Airport, Lahore, and no role has been attributed to them in the off-loading of the petitioner at Islamabad International Airport. Their impleadment, in the absence of any pleaded or demonstrated involvement in the impugned action, cannot create a territorial nexus which is otherwise lacking. It is also of significance that the petition does not challenge any subsequent action taken by the Lahore-based FIA officials against the petitioner. There is, therefore, no independent act, order, proceeding or continuing restraint within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court which could constitute a separate or material part of the cause of action.

13.To hold otherwise would effectively permit a litigant to challenge an action taken at Islamabad before any High Court merely because the authority concerned happens to be a federal agency. Such an interpretation would dilute the territorial limitation deliberately embodied in Article 199 of the Constitution and could encourage forum shopping by exposing the same administrative action to scrutiny before different High Courts having no immediate territorial nexus with the impugned act. It may be clarified that this conclusion does not leave the petitioner without a constitutional remedy. The fact that this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction does not amount to an adjudication upon the legality or otherwise of the alleged off-loading.

14.For the foregoing reasons, this Court lacks territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality of the impugned action. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed for want of territorial jurisdiction. The petitioner remains at liberty to invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court within whose territorial limits the impugned act was undertaken, subject to all other legal requirements governing such proceedings.

15.It is clarified that no opinion has been expressed on the legality or merits of the petitioner’s alleged off-loading. Any proceedings, if instituted before the competent forum, shall remain open for determination independently and in accordance with law.

16.There shall be no order as to costs.

(MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL)

JUDGE

ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT on 07.09.2026.

JUDGE.

APPROVED FOR REPORTNG.

JUDGE.

Javed Malik