Ashba Kamran Vs Federation of Pakistan etc.

Form No:HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Case No. Writ Petition No.51338/2026

Ashba Kamran Vs The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, etc.

S. No. of order/ Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge, and that of Proceeding Proceeding Parties or Counsel, where necessary.

11.09.2026 Petitioner in person.

Raja Abdul Jabbar Khan, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan.

Through the instant Constitutional petition, the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, questioning the conferment of Pakistan Civil Awards under the head of “Public Service”. The principal premise of the petition is that the expression “Public Service” occurring in Article 259(2) of the Constitution ought to be confined to extraordinary, unremunerated and voluntary civic contributions and should not extend to persons performing paid public employment, holding public office, engaging in political activity, journalism, religious preaching or commercial enterprise. On that premise, the petitioner seeks, inter alia, declarations regarding the constitutional meaning of “Public Service”; cancellation, forfeiture and withdrawal of awards allegedly falling outside the petitioner's proposed definition; production of the scrutiny and evaluation record relating to awards; and other consequential relief.

2.I have considered the submissions as well as contents of the petition, the reliefs claimed therein and the Constitutional and statutory framework governing civil decorations. The petition, in my view, raises an important question concerning the limits of

judicial review of executive action, but the question is that whether this Court while exercising its Constitutional jurisdiction can grant said relief.

3.Article 259(2) of the Constitution provides that no title, honour or decoration shall be conferred by the Federal or Provincial Government upon a citizen, but the President may award decorations in recognition of gallantry, meritorious service in the Armed Forces, academic distinction or distinction in the fields specified therein, “as provided by Federal law.” The present constitutional text expressly includes, inter alia, science, technology, medicine, arts and public service.

4.The inclusion of “public service” in Article 259(2) of the Constitution was made by the Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024, which received assent and came into force on 21 October 2024. The amendment substituted the expression relating to the fields of recognition in Article 259(2); it did not enact any definition declaring “public service” to mean only unpaid or voluntary civic activity.

5.This distinction is material. A Constitutional court interprets the words enacted by the Constitution; it does not ordinarily add qualifying words which the Constitutional text itself does not contain. The proposed definition in the petition would introduce limitations such as “unremunerated”, “voluntary”, “extraordinary” and “civic” into Article 259(2) of the Constitution. None of these expressions appears in the Constitutional provision. To accept the petitioner's construction would therefore not merely amount to interpretation; it would amount to constitutional legislation by judicial fiat, which is impermissible.

6.Moreover, Article 259(2) of the Constitution deliberately employs the expression “public service”, rather than “voluntary public service”, “unpaid public service” or “civil service”. The

Court cannot, under the guise of interpretation, substitute one of these expressions for the expression chosen by the Constitution.

7.The distinction between an entitlement to an award and the discretionary conferment of an award has already received judicial consideration. In “Khushdil Khan Malik v. Federation of Pakistan and others” (PLD 2024 Lahore 86), this Court held, in the context of Article 259 and the Decorations Act, that mere recommendation for a civil award does not create a vested, legal or fundamental right to its conferment. The judgment also examined the statutory role of the President in relation to civil decorations. This Court in the said judgment observed that:- “If Article 259(2) of the "Constitution" and provisions of Section 3 of the "Act" are put in juxta-position, it would be clarified that the President can only award the title, honour or decoration on any citizen in recognition of gallantry (awards in relation to Shuja'at), academic distinction (awards in the order of Imtiaz), sports, nursing, human rights and public service (awards in the order of Imtiaz) and the power to withdraw, forfeit or annul a title or decoration also vests with the President on whose personal approval, the title or decoration shall be restored if once withdrawn, forfeited or annulled. Now, the question arises what is the legal procedure for nomination of the Award as claimed by the Petitioner. As per the Act, the term "gallantry" has been redefined to include an act of bravery, heroism, courage and rendering dedicated services with self-sacrificing commitment in human rights and public service. The announcement for conferment of the Award is made once a year on the Independence Day (14th August) and the investiture ceremony takes place on the following Pakistan Day (23rd March). In this case, the most relevant procedural part is the recommendations,. which are invited by the Cabinet Division in December every year from all the Ministries/Divisions as well as the Provincial Governments. The complete particulars of the recommendees are firstly placed before the Awards Committee which, after conducting various meeting sessions and due scrutiny of the relevant documents, places the said details before the Main Awards Committee headed by the Federal Ministers, which then move a summary to the President through the Prime Minister for final approval. It is pertinent to mention here that the "Notification" and the "Instructions" have also been issued in this regard by the Cabinet Division but the

"Notification" shows various committees which include (1) Awards Sub-Committee on Science, Engineering and Education; (ii) Awards Sub-Committee on Arts and Literature; (iii) Awards Sub-Committee on Social/Welfare Work/Charity and Philanthropy; and (iv) Main Awards Committee while the "Instructions" discuss scope of the Award and also narrate various steps necessary for its recommendations. Criteria and the fields of activity for the conferment of the Award have been given in the Warrant of Institution of Pakistan Awards (Civil), the Warrant of Institution of the President's Award for Pride of Performance and the Warrant of Institution of the Awards in the Orders of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam and Khidmat, whereas the cases of the civil servants for nominations are processed through the Establishment Division, which scrutinizes the claims critically and verifies the HD denials of the nominees.”

Further held as under:-

“There is a complete mechanism for conferment of the Awards and after adopting all the procedural steps, the matter has been referred by the Committee to the President, for conferment of the Award, therefore, the contention raised by the Petitioner that the Committee has no authority to confer the Award on any citizen of Pakistan has no force. There are many kinds of awards, few whereof famously are known as (i) Nishan-i-Imtiaz (ii) Hilal-i-Pakistan (iii) Sitara-i-Shujaat (iv) Sitara-i-Imtiaz and (v) President's Award for Pride of Performance. There is no denying that Article 4 of the "Constitution" guarantees right of individuals to be dealt with strictly in accordance with law, but at the same pedestal Article 5(2) thereof requires obedience to the "Constitution" and law is the inviolable obligation of every citizen.............”

It was also held that:-

“It is also to be noted that the Cabinet Division invites nominations for the Pakistan Civil Awards from the Provincial Ministries/Divisions every year in the month of December or January with a cut-off date of 15th April, through a circular, and as per the given selection process, each nomination is considered by the respective nominating agency. After receiving of nominations in the Cabinet Division, the documents are verified and placed before the respective Awards Sub-Committee headed by the concerned Federal Ministers and once final recommendation is made by the Main Awards Committee, a summary is moved to the President of Pakistan, through the Prime Minister, for approval under provisions of Article 259(2) of the "Constitution" read with the Act..............”.

8.If even a person whose name has been recommended for an award does not thereby acquire a vested right to its conferment, it follows with greater force that a third party cannot, merely by filing a Constitutional petition, acquire a corresponding right to require the President to withdraw, forfeit or annul awards conferred upon other citizens, in the absence of a legally established ground warranting such action.

9.The administrative framework also does not support the narrow definition proposed by the petitioner. The Policy and Guidelines for Pakistan Civil Awards—2024, issued by the Cabinet Division, expressly treats “Public Service” as a distinct field and assigns the Establishment Division as its specified nominating agency. The policy also provides for scrutiny committees, awards recommending committees, sub-committees and a Main Awards Committee, with the final recommendations being forwarded through the prescribed process for approval.

10.More significantly, the quantified evaluation criteria for “Public Service” refer, amongst other matters, to contribution in policy making, services/significant contributions, contribution to public service delivery, service beyond the call of duty and reputation based upon fairness, honesty, impartiality and integrity. The policy expressly states that the emphasis is not upon routine career achievements but upon achievements benefiting society/public and demonstrating exceptional merit.

11.Thus, the administrative policy itself draws a distinction between routine performance of employment and exceptional contribution in public service. The fact that an individual happens to receive salary for holding public office or performing public duties does not, by that circumstance alone, render him constitutionally incapable of being recognized for an exceptional contribution to public service.

12.Equally, however, the existence of a public office or employment does not itself entitle any person to an award. The

relevant question in an individual case would remain whether the award was made pursuant to the constitutional, statutory and prescribed policy framework and whether the competent authority acted lawfully. Such individual scrutiny is fundamentally different from the categorical proposition advanced in the petition that all paid public service is constitutionally excluded from Article 259(2).

13.The petitioner's third prayer presents a further and more fundamental difficulty. Article 259(3) of the Constitution does not provide that all awards conferred before the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, 2024, stand annulled. The Constitutional provision specifically concerns titles, honours and decorations awarded “before the commencing day”, subject to the qualifications contained therein. The constitutional text therefore cannot be read as establishing a general power of retrospective annulment of all awards granted before October 2024.

14.The petitioner appears to conflate the historical operation of Article 259(3) of the Constitution with the subsequent amendment of Article 259(2). Such conflation cannot furnish a legal basis for declaring every award granted before 21 October 2024 to be null and void. A Constitutional amendment expanding or modifying the fields in which decorations may be awarded does not, without an express retrospective provision, operate as a blanket adjudication upon every individual award previously made.

15.The principle is particularly important in the present case because the petitioner seeks a declaration affecting a large and unspecified class of persons, without identifying, in each individual case, the precise legal instrument under which the award was made, the warrant applicable at the relevant time, the recommendation process followed, the approval granted by the competent authority, or the factual basis upon which the award was conferred.

16.Constitutional jurisdiction is not exercised upon generalized allegations or conjecture. If an individual award is alleged to have been procured by mala fide, made without jurisdiction, founded upon irrelevant considerations, or otherwise conferred in patent violation of the governing law, the legality of that particular action may be examined in appropriate proceedings upon a proper factual and evidentiary foundation. What cannot be done is to presume the invalidity of an entire class of awards and then require the executive authorities to justify each one merely because the petitioner disagrees with the Government's policy or assessment.

17.The answer requires some qualification. It would be incorrect to state that every executive policy decision is immune from judicial scrutiny. The power of judicial review extends to executive action where it is shown to be contrary to the Constitution or statute, taken without lawful authority, arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or otherwise amenable to judicial correction.

18.The Hon’ble Supreme Court has nevertheless repeatedly emphasized the constitutional division of functions between the organs of the State. In “Dossani Travels (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Travels Shop (Pvt.) Ltd.” (PLD 2014 SC 1), the Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized that policy-making lies primarily within the executive domain and that the Court does not ordinarily substitute its own assessment for that of the competent policy-making authority. Judicial intervention becomes justified where the policy or its implementation is shown to transgress constitutional or legal limits. The same principle has subsequently been reiterated in cases concerning executive policy. Likewise, the Islamabad High Court has recently reiterated that courts do not sit as appellate authorities over policy choices and ordinarily exercise restraint where the subject involves institutional design, administrative coordination and

policy considerations, while retaining jurisdiction where illegality, arbitrariness or mala fide is established. In the Dossani Travels case the august Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:-

“One of the seminal principles of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan is the concept of trichotomy of powers between the Legislature, Executive and the Judiciary. This principle underpins the rationale that framing of a government policy is to be undertaken by the Executive which is in a better position to decide on account of its mandate, experience, wisdom and sagacity which are acquired through diverse skills. The Legislature which represents the people enacts the law and the law so enacted acquires legitimacy. The judiciary on the other hand, is entrusted with the task of interpreting the law and to play the role of an arbiter in cases of disputes between the individuals inter se and between individual and the State. We may remind ourselves that judiciary neither has sword nor purse. The legitimacy and respect of its judgments is dependent on peoples' confidence in its strict adherence to the Constitution, its integrity, impartiality and independence. In changing times and judicialization of political issues, a certain degree of judicial activism by fearless and impartial judiciary is also essential for maintaining its integrity and peoples' trust. In most of the modern democracies, judiciaries have been called upon to provide wider meanings to various provisions of the Constitution so as to meet the challenges of modern times and to fill the gap between the law and the requirements of substantive justice. Every institution has to play its role P in enforcing the Constitution and the law. It is a multi- disciplinary exercise. However, implementation of rule of law is the primary function of judiciary. This role is multi- dimensional and the most challenging facet of this role is to keep various institutions and the judiciary itself within the limits of their respective powers laid down in the Constitution and the law. The legitimacy of its judgments does not arise from the beauty of the language or the use of populist rhetoric. Rather it radiates from the dynamism reflected in interpreting the Constitution and in particular its Fundamental Rights provisions, in judicial restraint displayed in deference to the principle of trichotomy of powers, and in an impersonal and impartial application of law.”

19.The relief claimed in the present petition goes considerably beyond judicial review. The petitioner asks this Court to determine who, as a matter of policy, ought to qualify for

recognition under “Public Service”; to exclude entire occupational and professional classes; to retrospectively invalidate awards; to direct the executive authorities to exercise statutory powers of cancellation and forfeiture; and to order an extensive audit of the Government's award-selection process. Granting such relief would necessarily require the Court to make policy choices which the Constitution and the governing statutory framework have entrusted to the competent constitutional and executive authorities. The Court would, in substance, be determining the eligibility policy for national civil awards and directing the manner in which the executive should exercise a statutory discretion. Such an exercise would cross the boundary between judicial review of legality and judicial substitution of policy.

20.The Constitutional role of the Court is to determine whether the exercise of public power conforms to the Constitution and law. It is not to determine whether a different policy would be wiser, more equitable or more desirable. As observed in the jurisprudence concerning policy matters, the Court does not possess a mandate to assume the role of the policy-maker or to substitute its own opinion for that of the authority constitutionally entrusted with the matter.

21.The fifth prayer seeks production before the Court of the complete scrutiny minutes, evaluation proforma and selection records concerning awards allegedly conferred upon wide categories of persons. Such an order may appropriately be made where a specific, legally cognizable challenge discloses a prima facie case requiring examination of the underlying record. It cannot, however, be used as a mechanism for commencing a roving or fishing inquiry into the entire national civil-award process. No specific award, specific decision, specific constitutional violation or specific act of mala fide has been demonstrated in the material before me which would justify the

Court directing the production of an entire class of governmental records. Judicial review proceeds from an identified exercise of public power and a demonstrated legal grievance; it is not an investigative commission into the wisdom or political desirability of executive policy.

22.The reliance placed upon Article 4 of the Constitution also does not advance the petitioner's case. Article 4 guarantees that every citizen is to enjoy the protection of law and be treated in accordance with law. It does not confer upon every citizen a judicially enforceable right to dictate the criteria by which the President and the Federal Government should exercise a constitutional and statutory function, nor does it authorize the Court to replace a lawful administrative policy with a policy preferred by a litigant. The Constitutional command of legality operates as a limitation upon governmental power; it does not transform every disagreement with governmental policy into a justiciable cause of action.

23.I am, therefore, unable to accept the fundamental premise of the petition that “Public Service” in Article 259(2) of the Constitution is constitutionally confined to unpaid and voluntary civic activity. The Constitutional text contains no such qualification, and the Court cannot insert one. The present statutory and policy framework likewise recognizes public service as a field in which exceptional contributions may be evaluated through an established administrative process.

24.It is well settled that a judge of the High Court or Supreme Court is not a king who can act according to his own wishes or whims. In every situation, a judge must follow the law and the Constitution. Reliance in this regard can be placed upon the case law titled as “Dr. Imran Khattak and another vs. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, PSO to Chief Justice and others” (2014 SCMR 122), wherein it was held as under:-

“No Judge of a High Court or the Supreme Court is robbed, crowned and sceptered as a King to do whatever suits his whim and caprice. In all eventualities, he is bound to abide by and adhere to the law and the Constitution.”

25.All the more, this Court cannot direct the President or the competent authorities to exercise discretionary powers of withdrawal, forfeiture or annulment in a predetermined manner. Such a direction would effectively substitute judicial assessment for executive discretion and would amount to interference in a policy and administrative domain entrusted by the Constitution and statute to the competent authorities.

26.Nothing stated herein should, however, be understood as conferring immunity upon any individual award or executive action from judicial review. If, in an appropriate case, a particular award is shown through concrete pleadings and material to have been made without lawful authority, in violation of the Constitution or statute, or through demonstrable mala fide, discrimination or other legally cognizable infirmity, the Court may examine such action within the permissible limits of Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. What is declined here is the generalized, retrospective and policy-substituting relief sought by the petitioner.

27.In view of the above, the prayers made in the Constitutional petition are found to be legally misconceived and incapable of being granted in the form sought. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed-in-limine.

(AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD)

JUDGE.

Approved for Reporting.

JUDGE.

Gull*