Sh. Aamir etc. vs Idrees Javed etc.

Stereo.HCJDA 38.

JUDGMENT SHEET.

LAHORE HIGH COURT

RAWALPINDI BENCH, RAWALPINDI.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

WRIT PETITION NO.1480 OF 2023

SHEIKH AAMIR and another Versus IDREES JAVED and others

JUDGMENT

Dates of hearing: 09.06.2026, 10.06.2026, 15.06.2026, Petitioners by: Mr. Tahir Malik, Advocate.

Respondents No.1 & 2 by: Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate. Amicus Curiae: Barrister Ch. Imran Hassan Ali.

Mirza Viqas Rauf, J. This single judgment shall decide the instant petition as well as Writ Petition No.1873 of 2023, being interconnected on account of involvement of common questions of facts and law.

2.For the purpose of convenience, the petitioners in the instant petition shall be called as “petitioners” whereas petitioners in the connected Writ Petition No.1873 of 2023 shall be referred to as “respondents”

3.The matter in issue is an offshoot of the proceedings conducted by the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi on an application under Section 19 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act, 2009”) moved by the respondents. Through the application, respondents sought eviction of the petitioners from shop No.C-59/10 situated at Al-Misbah

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Market, Moti Bazar, Rawalpindi (hereinafter referred to as “demised premises”) on the grounds of default in payment of rent and expiry of tenancy as well as breach of terms and conditions of the tenancy agreement. The petitioners, being the respondents in the ejectment proceedings, moved an application for leave to contest under Section 22 of the Act, 2009. The leave to contest was, however, discarded and the ejectment application was accepted through order dated 26th October, 2022 passed by the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi, whereby petitioners were directed to hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises to the respondents within sixty days of passing of the order. The petitioners were also directed to pay the rent @ Rs.18954/- per month with 10% annual increase till the actual eviction as well as utility bills etc. They were also directed to pay the arrears of rent amounting to Rs.11,27,040/- to the respondents. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, who partly allowed the same vide judgment dated 24th March, 2023, hence, both these constitutional petitions.

4.We have noticed that this petition was admitted for regular hearing on 28th of April, 2023, however, on 11th November, 2024, a legal question was framed, in the light whereof, the matter was referred for placement before the Hon’ble Senior Judge for necessary orders. For ready reference and convenience, the same is reproduced below:-

The legal question involved in the matter can be articulated as under:

“Whether in an application filed under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009, leave to contest could be refused (partially) while ordering eviction of the tenant while at the same time ordering that the question of the arrears of rent on account of default and/or of payment of Pagri be separately determined by framing of issues and leading of evidence.”

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2.In this regard there are divergent views by the learned Single Benches of this Court inasmuch as in case reported as “Muhammad Liaqat Ali v. Majid Ali and others” (2022 MLD 1720), it has been held that once leave to contest is refused, final order is to be passed and there is no room for framing of issues regarding determination of arrears or Pagri whereas another learned Bench in case reported as “Asad Ali Khan v. Special Judge Rent and others” (PLD 2019 Lahore 363), has held that issue of Pagri can be separately decided while maintaining the eviction order and the remand order of the Appellate Court below therein was upheld.

3.In this view of the matter, it will be appropriate that matter be heard by the learned Division Bench of this Court. Matter be placed before Hon'ble Senior Judge for necessary orders.

5.The matter was though then placed before a learned Division Bench of this Court by the orders of the Hon’ble Senior Judge, but as in terms of Rules 4-A and 5, Chapter-3, Part-B of the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Volume-V, for constitution of Full Bench or Division Bench, the approval was to be obtained from the Hon’ble Chief Justice, so, vide order dated 16 th February, 2026, the office was directed to proceed accordingly and resultantly, this matter is now before us by the orders of the Hon’ble Chief Justice.

6.It would not be out of context to mention herein that in view of the legal proposition involved herein, we appointed Barrister Ch. Imran Hassan Ali as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court vide order dated 4th May, 2026.

7.Mr. Tahir Malik, Advocate, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that previously the respondents moved a similar application, which was allowed by the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi and the appeal preferred by the petitioners was dismissed by the appellate court. Learned counsel contended that the petitioners challenged the judgment of the appellate court before this Court by filing Writ Petition No.1364 of 2018, which was allowed

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vide judgment dated 16th September, 2021, whereunder the matter was remanded to the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi. Learned counsel added that in the post-remand proceedings, the ejectment application was allowed vide order dated 10th January, 2022, against which, an appeal was preferred by the petitioners before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, who allowed the same vide judgment dated 19th July, 2022 and the matter was again remanded to the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi but pending the first application, the respondents moved the present application, which is the second of its series. Learned counsel emphasized that the application for leave to contest moved by the petitioners was though disclosing sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence but the leave was refused and the application of the respondents was allowed vide order dated 26th October, 2022. Learned counsel maintained that the petitioners challenged the said order in appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, who proceeded to partly allow the same vide the impugned judgment. Learned counsel submitted that though the appellate court remanded the matter to the extent of default, arrears of rent, rate of rent and annual increase of rent while framing issues to that effect but simultaneously order of the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi, directing the petitioners to hand over the vacant possession of the demised premises was upheld. Learned counsel argued that as per mandate of sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the Act, 2009, the application for leave to contest is either allowed or discarded in toto. It is contended with vehemence that the learned Special Judge (Rent) as well as the appellate court have committed patent illegalities while passing the impugned order as well as judgment. Placed reliance on the cases of Mian UMAR IKRAM-UL- HAQUE vs. Dr. SHAHIDA HASNAIN and another (2016 SCMR 2186), Haji MUHAMMAD LATIF vs. MUHAMMAD SHARIF and others (2021 SCMR 1430), Malik ZAFAR-UL-ISLAM and 3 others vs. ABDUL AZEEM LATIF and 2

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others (2017 YLR 1509) and TANVEER AMJAD TAHIR vs. SHAHID

MEHMOOD (2026 YLR 547).

8.Conversely, Sardar Abdul Raziq Khan, Advocate, learned counsel for the respondents, seriously refuted the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioners. It is contended by the learned counsel that the Act, 2009 provides a completely different mechanism for adjudicating the disputes interse landlord and tenant. Learned counsel maintained that though the petitioners, being respondents in the ejectment application, submitted an application for leave to contest but it was not disclosing any ground for recording of evidence. It is argued emphatically that leave was rightly refused by the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi and the appellate court has erred in law while partly allowing the appeal preferred by the petitioners. Learned counsel contended that final order in terms of Section 2(b) of the Act, 2009 can be passed at any time of the proceedings regarding an issue which does not require recording of evidence. It is argued with vehemence that admittedly the petitioners did not pay any Pagri to the respondents and it was allegedly paid to the previous owner. Learned counsel submitted that the amount of Pagri, if any, cannot be adjusted towards the payment of arrears of rent in the circumstances. To fortify his submissions, learned counsel placed reliance on the cases of Mian UMAR IKRAM-UL-HAQUE vs. Dr. SHAHIDA HASNAIN and another (2016 SCMR 2186), USMAN through Special Attorney and others vs. MUHAMMAD YOUNUS GONDAL and others (2016 CLC Note 155), AKHTAR SALEEM vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE (2013 MLD 209), ALAY JAVED ZAIDI vs. HABIBULLAH and others (2024 SCMR 781), MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs. ISMAIL and 4 others (2000 SCMR 498), MIRZA BOOK AGENCY through Managing Partner and others vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and others (2013 SCMR 1520), MUHAMMAD ASIF vs. AMINA BIBI and others (2014 MLD 1084), Malik ABDUL AZIZ AWAN and another vs Rana MAQBOOL AHMAD KHAN and others (2012 SCMR 91).

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9.On the other hand, Barrister Ch. Imran Hassan Ali, Amicus Curiae, assisted the Court on the legal question involved in the matter. Learned Amicus submitted that the controversy requires interpretation of the scheme of the Act, 2009. It is submitted that the provisions of the Act, 2009 are to be construed collectively so as to give effect to the legislative intent. Learned Amicus further submitted that the expression “final order” as defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, 2009 includes an order culminating the proceedings and also determination of matters relating to adjustment of Pagri, advance rent, security, arrears of rent, compensation or costs. Learned Amicus Curiae contended that the scope of Section 22 of the Act, 2009 is required to be examined independently without being overwhelmed by the said definition. It is further submitted that Section 22 of the Act, 2009 does not expressly place any restriction on grant of “partial leave to contest”. It is contended that consequences of grant or refusal of leave are to be determined in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act, 2009. Learned Amicus submitted that the object of the Act, 2009 is expeditious disposal of the disputes interse landlord and tenant, which has to be achieved while adhering the statutory framework provided therein. Learned Amicus has also made reference to the cases of TANVEER AMJAD TAHIR vs. SHAHID MEHMOOD (2026 YLR 547), ZAHEER AHMAD BABAR vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and 2 others (2015 YLR 1617), “ASAD ALI KHAN v. SPECIAL JUDGE RENT and others” (PLD 2019 Lahore 363), “MUHAMMAD LIAQAT ALI v. MAJID ALI and others” (2022 MLD 1720), Mian UMAR IKRAM-UL-HAQUE vs. Dr. SHAHIDA HASNAIN and another (2016 SCMR 2186, Haji MUHAMMAD LATIF vs. MUHAMMAD SHARIF and others (2021 SCMR 1430), SOHAIL NIAZ KHAN vs. BILAL RIZWAN and others (2024 YLR 1981), PAN ISLAMIC INDUSTRIES (PVT.) LTD. Vs ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE and others (2022 CLC 247), PIR MUHAMMAD MANJH versus NAVEED IQBAL MALIK and 2 others (2017 MLD 418), MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs. ISMAIL and 4 others (2000 SCMR 498), MIRZA BOOK AGENCY through Managing Partner and others vs.

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ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and others (2013 SCMR 1520), AZIZ UR REHMAN vs. PERVAIZ SHAH and others (1997 SCMR 1819), Mst. KARIM BIBI AND OTHERS vs. HUSSAIN BAKHSH AND ANOTHER (PLD 1984 Supreme Court 344), MUHAMMAD KHAN vs. OBAIDULLAH JAN BABAT and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 492), CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD vs. Messrs AL-TECHNIQUE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD and others (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 99), IFTIKHAR AHMAD and others vs. PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others (PLD 1988 Supreme Court 53), CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD vs. Messrs AL-TECHNIQUE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD and others (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 99) and THE BANK OF BAHAWALPUR LTD THROUGH ITS MANAGER vs.

THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE

AND ANOTHER vs. (PLD 1977 Supreme Court 164), Messrs PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LIMITED vs. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL), LTU, ISLAMABAD and others (2017 SCMR 1136), H.M. SAYA & Co. KARACHI vs. WAZIR ALI INDUSTRIES LTD. KARACHI and another (PLD 1969 Supreme Court 65) and Chaudhry PARVEZ ELAHI vs. DEPUTY SPEAKER PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY OF PUNJAB LAHORE and others. (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 678).

10.Heard. Record perused.

11.As we have been primarily assigned the task to resolve the disparity amongst the views expressed by two learned Single Benches of this Court in the cases of “MUHAMMAD LIAQAT ALI v. MAJID ALI and others” (2022 MLD 1720) and “ASAD ALI KHAN v. SPECIAL JUDGE RENT and others” (PLD 2019 Lahore 363), so, in the first instance, we would like to ruminate on the legal question framed to that effect, which, to our minds, mainly rests upon unearthing the true scope and import of Section 22 of the Act, 2009.

12.Before delving into the matter in controversy, we deem it apposite to observe that there are two limbs of the issues before us, out of which, the first is related to the legal question involved in the matter as encapsulated hereinabove, whereas the second corresponds

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to the merit of the petitions on the basis of the facts and circumstances of the case.

13.In order to comprehend the proposition in a proper and effective manner, it would be advantageous to have a brief historical background of the facts resulting in the promulgation of the Act, 2009. We are mindful of the fact that prior to the promulgation of the Act, 2009, there was the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (VI of 1959) (hereinafter referred to as Ordinance, 1959”); enacted to restrict the increase of rent of certain premises within the limits of urban areas and the eviction of tenants therefrom in the Province of West Pakistan, which was later on extended to the Province of the Punjab mutatis mutandis. The Ordinance, 1959 was, however, repealed through the promulgation of the Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance, 2007 (XXI of 2007). The Act, 2009 was finally enacted and accordingly published in the Gazette of Punjab (Extraordinary) on 17th November, 2009 after having assent of the Governor of the Punjab. From the very reading of the preamble of the Ordinance, 1959 and the Act, 2009, it is manifestly clear that the Act, 2009, was given a wider scope with regard to matters interse landlord and tenant as compared to the Ordinance, 1959. The Act, 2009, was enacted to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant, to provide a mechanism for settlement of their disputes in an expeditious and cost-effective manner and for the matters connected therewith.

14.We don’t feel any hesitation to observe that the Act, 2009, introduced a completely different mechanism and procedure for trying the disputes interse landlord and the tenant. By virtue of Section 4 of the Act, 2009, it has been given an overriding effect upon any other law for the time being in force. Chapter IV of the Act, 2009, deals with the establishment of the Rent Tribunal and its procedure. In

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terms of Section 16 of the Act, 2009, the Government of the Punjab was vested with the power to establish Rent Tribunal in the District or an area as it may deem necessary. The Rent Tribunal so established was bestowed with the exclusive jurisdiction over a case brought under the Act, 2009. The Rent Tribunal, established under the Act, 2009, consists of one or more Special Judges (Rent) to be appointed by the Government in consultation with the Lahore High Court.

15.Section 19 of the Act, 2009, prescribes the procedure for filing of an application in respect of a rented premises before the Rent Tribunal established under the Act, 2009 whereas Section 15, which is part of Chapter-III, enumerates the grounds for eviction. For ready reference, the same is reproduced below:-

15.Grounds for eviction.– A landlord may seek eviction of the tenant if–

(a)the period of tenancy has expired;

(b)the tenant has failed to pay or tender the rent within a period of thirty days after the expiry of the period stipulated in section 7;

(c)the tenant has committed breach of a term or condition of the tenancy agreement;

(d)the tenant has committed a violation of an obligation under section 13;

e) the tenant has used the premises for a purpose which is different from the purpose for which it has been let out; or

(f)the tenant has sub-let the premises without the prior written consent of the landlord.

16.The respondents claiming themselves to be the landlord of the demised premises moved an application under Section 19 of the Act, 2009, against the petitioners, seeking their eviction, inter alia, on the grounds of expiry of tenancy, rent default and breach of terms and conditions of the tenancy agreement, claiming the petitioners to be their tenants. As already observed that the Act, 2009 provides a completely different mechanism and procedure for settlement of

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disputes interse landlord and tenant, so, in terms of Section 21 of the Act, 2009, on receipt of an application under the Act, 2009, other than the application for deposit of the rent, the Rent Tribunal is obliged to issue notice to the respondent(s) in the form prescribed in the Schedule, for appearance of the respondent(s) on a date not later than ten days through process server, registered post acknowledgment due and courier service.

17.Section 22 of the Act, 2009 prescribes the mode for the respondent(s) to contest such application. For ease of reference, it is reproduced hereunder:-

22.Leave to contest. – (1) A Rent Tribunal shall not allow a respondent to defend the application unless he obtains leave to contest.

(2)Subject to this Act, a respondent shall file an application for leave to contest within ten days of his first appearance in the Rent Tribunal.

(3)An application for leave to contest shall be in the form of a written reply, stating grounds on which the leave is sought and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the respondent, copy of all relevant documents in his possession and, if desired, affidavits of not more than two witnesses.

(4)The Rent Tribunal shall not allow leave to contest to a respondent unless the application discloses sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence.

(5)The Rent Tribunal shall decide the application for leave to contest within a period of fifteen days from the date of its filing.

(6)If the leave to contest is refused or the respondent has failed to file application for leave to contest within the stipulated time, the Rent Tribunal shall pass the final order.

(Underlining is supplied for emphasis).

From the bare reading of the above noted provision, it clearly manifests that an application before the Rent Tribunal can only be contested by the respondent(s) while moving an application for leave to contest within ten days of his first appearance before the Rent Tribunal. The application for leave to contest shall be in the form of written reply stating the grounds on which the leave is sought and shall be accompanied by an affidavit of the respondent(s) copies of all

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the relevant documents, if desired and affidavits of not more than two witnesses. Leave to contest can only be allowed to a respondent if his application discloses sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence. Sub-section 6 of the Section 22 of the Act, 2009 contemplates that if the leave to contest is refused or the respondent has failed to file any application for leave to contest within statutory time, the Rent Tribunal shall pass the final order.

18.The term “final order” is defined in Section 2(b) of the Act, 2009 in the following words:-

2.Definitions.

(a)...

(b)“final order” means a final order passed by a Rent Tribunal culminating the proceedings including an order in respect of adjustment of pagri, advance rent, security, arrears of rent, compensation or costs but shall not include an order passed in an execution proceedings;

It is apparent from bare perusal of the above definition of the term “final order” that it corresponds to an order passed by the Rent Tribunal culminating the proceedings including an order in respect of adjustment of Pagri, advance rent, security, arrears of rent and compensation or costs.

19.Section 22 of the Act, 2009, neither recognizes the term “partial leave” nor “leave in toto”. For the purpose of obtaining leave, the respondent has to disclose only sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence in his application for leave to contest. Once leave is granted to the respondent, then his application for leave to contest is to be treated as a written reply by the Rent Tribunal as is laid down in Section 23 of the Act, 2009.

20.It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that while interpreting any provision of law, its plain meanings are to be adopted and where the lawmakers take notice of a specific situation and formulate a provision accordingly, then the legislative intent is

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not only to be respected across the board but it should also be given full effect. This oft-repeated principle of law is founded upon the maxim “litera legis”, a Latin term which connotes “the letter of the law”. Guidance to this effect can be sought from the case of MARKET COMMITTEE KARACHI vs. AMIN AKBAR ALI DOSSA and others (2026 SCMR 905). The relevant extract from the same is reproduced below:

9.Consistent with Section 21 of the 2010 Act, the APMA 1939 was to repeal on expiry of three years of the commencement of 2010 Act with the rider that the Government shall continue to exercise all the powers under the APMA 1939 to ensure that the statutory functions are performed by the notified markets until the same are transferred to market companies within the stipulated period as may be prescribed. Whereas Section 22 of the same Act brings to light an overriding clause that provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force. While Section 24, provides that Government shall ensure that the notified markets are transferred to the market companies within the stipulated time as may be prescribed. No lawful justification or rational has been presented by the learned counsel for the petitioner as to why 2010 Act was not implemented despite lapse/expiry of moratorium period of three years and why notified markets have not been transferred to the market companies within the stipulated timeframe. It is quite astonishing that the Sindh Wholesale Agricultural Produce Markets (Development and Regulations) Act was enacted in 2010 with only three years moratorium period. Now, it is the year 2025, but it is still unimplemented by the Government of Sindh without any justification. However, in the present context, the dispute is only confined to a product fishmeal. In APMA 1939, definition of agricultural produce the item “Fish” was not included but provided in the Schedule under the nomenclature of “Miscellaneous” as Fish (Fresh and Dry). The learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to a Notification dated 07.02.2011, issued pursuant to Section 27 of APMA 1939 (Powers to make Rules) whereby, certain amendments were made. Even in this Notification at Item No. (xv) only “Fish (Fresh and Dry) Rs.1.00 per 50 Kgs” is mentioned. While in the definition of agriculture produce provided under 2010 Act, it includes such agricultural produce or horticultural produce, livestock or poultry, fish or seafood and products and by-products which are capable of human consumption for sale or purchase in wholesale market within a boundary, which in our view, contemporaneously interprets that the items/products, not capable of human consumption cannot be treated or considered agriculture produce within the definition of agriculture produce. So far as the insertion of any item in the Schedule, appended pursuant to clause (a) of Section 2, either in AMPA 1939 or 2010 Act it shall have no legal sanctity if the same is found contrary or beyond the scope of the definition of agriculture produce or other provisions of law. Where the law takes notice of a specific situation and formulates a provision accordingly, then the legislative intent is not only be respected across the board but it should also be given full effect.

10.All the more so, the miscellaneous entry of Schedule only depicts the item “Fish (Fresh and Dry): which otherwise does not

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include the fishmeal in its literal sense that implies a product or substance not intended for human consumption. The legislative provisions are meant to be implemented according to its letter and spirit. The letter of law denotes and insinuates the verbatim phraseology whereas the spirit of law interprets the primary objective for which the law was enacted. To comply with the letter of the law means to abide by the ordinary dictate and while going along with the spirit of the law, the intention of the legislature needs to be mulled over why the law was enacted. The axiom “litera legis” is a Latin term which connotes "the letter of the law." The spirit of the law is a fundamental rule that lay emphasis on social and ethical values shielded by the letter of the law. The literal rule of interpretation of the Constitution and statutes, also known as the golden rule of interpretation, is that the words and phrases used therein should be read by keeping in view their plain meaning. The primary aim of the Courts must be to pay attention to the objectives of the statute, and then proceed with an interpretation that lends support thereto in essence adopting the purposive rule of interpretation. The rule of purposive interpretation of statutes lay down the keystone of the purposive rule of interpretation, that, if the literal interpretation of any provision of law is not acceptable or leads to absurdity, then such provision may be interpreted in line with the object and purpose which the legislature had in mind while enacting the law. According to Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (12th ed.), at page 228, where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, which can hardly have been intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence. While Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (4th ed.), at page 810, describes that a purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by:

(a)following the literal meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose or (b) applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with the legislative purpose.

After having an overview of the above noted principles dealing with the interpretation of the statutory provisions, we are of the considered view that the term final order used in sub-section (6) of Section 22 of the Act, 2009 cannot be given any other meaning except that mentioned in Section 2(b) of the Act, 2009. An order passed by the Rent Tribunal can only be termed as “final order” if it culminates the proceedings and it includes an order in respect of adjustment of Pagri, advance rent, security, arrears of rent and compensation or costs. The term “final order” is not only used in sub-section 6 of Section 22 of the Act, 2009 but it also figures in sub-section 4 of Section 24, sub-section (5) of Section 25 and sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act, 2009, which provides a remedy of appeal to an

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aggrieved person against a final order. Section 26 of the Act, 2009 is perhaps the only provision in which sub-section (3) portrays the situation where a Rent Tribunal may pass interlocutory order at any stage of the proceedings before passing the final order.

21.Looking at the aspect of relevance of the judgments cited before us by learned counsel for the parties as well as learned Amicus Curiae; we observe that all three have relied upon the case of Mian UMAR IKRAM-UL-HAQUE vs. Dr. SHAHIDA HASNAIN and another (2016 SCMR 2186). In the said case, the application was filed by the landlord before the Rent Tribunal while invoking the provisions of the Act, 2009, seeking eviction of the respondent therein, mainly on the ground of default in payment of rent and the respondent therein while denying the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant pleaded an agreement to sell in his favour. In view whereof, the Rent Tribunal granted leave to the respondent and framed the sole issue relating to the existence of the relationship interse parties as of landlord and tenant. In that backdrop, the question before the Supreme Court of Pakistan was whether an order under Section 24 of the Act, 2009 can be passed where the relationship of tenancy is denied and the effect of Section 10 of the Act, 2009 upon that. The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that where the relationship is denied, the interim order cannot be passed, however, when the tenancy is tainted and contumacious, the Rent Tribunal can refuse leave to contest and can simultaneously determine rent due and pass an order for rent under Section 24 of the Act, 2009 without framing of issues. It was further held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that where leave is granted, the Rent Tribunal shall first determine the jurisdictional fact, i.e. relationship. The principles laid therein are, thus, fully attracted to the case at hand.

22.In the case of Haji MUHAMMAD LATIF vs. MUHAMMAD SHARIF and others (2021 SCMR 1430), the facts and proposition was,

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however, quite distinct as in the said case, the application was filed by the landlord seeking eviction of the respondent-tenant therein on the ground of default but the same was refused. The Rent Tribunal, instead of passing an order in term of Section 22(6) of the Act, 2009, proceeded to fix the case for production of evidence in support of eviction application, which order was set-aside by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

23.Facts in the case of TANVEER AMJAD TAHIR vs. SHAHID MEHMOOD (2026 YLR 547) have one distinguishing feature as in the said case, the application for eviction was brought before the Rent Tribunal on the ground of expiry of tenancy and default in payment of rent, which was resisted by the tenant while filing an application for leave to contest, controverting the grounds for eviction asserting therein that he paid Rs.3,75,000/- as security to the landlord which was adjusted @ Rs.3000/- per month in the rent till September, 2021 and Rs.1,95,000/- are still outstanding towards the landlord but leave was declined to the tenant and the ejectment application was allowed. The order of the Rent Tribunal was though assailed before the learned Additional District Judge Fateh Jang, District Attock through an appeal but the same was dismissed, against which the tenant invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, which was allowed while allowing the application for leave to contest to the tenant in the light of its averments being disclosing sufficient cause for recording of evidence.

24.So far as the case of Malik ZAFAR-UL-ISLAM and 3 others vs. ABDUL AZEEM LATIF and 2 others (2017 YLR 1509) is concerned, the Rent Tribunal, while pondering upon application for leave to contest moved by the respondent therein, though arrived at the conclusion that there are triable issues in the case which require recording of evidence but specifically did not pass any order for allowing the

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application for leave to contest. A learned Single Judge-in-Chamber of this Court, in that backdrop, held that “... Here in this case the final order was not passed and Special Judge (Rent) felt a need to record evidence of the parties, therefore, for all intents and purposes the application for leave to contest was allowed, otherwise the result would have been passing of final order against tenant which is not the case. ...”.

25.The case of USMAN through Special Attorney and others vs. MUHAMMAD YOUNUS GONDAL and others (2016 CLC Note 155) though arose from a dispute interse landlord and tenant but it was under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, the provisions of which are not akin to and similar to the Act, 2009 and as such, the principles laid down therein are not applicable to the case at hand.

Similarly, the case of AKHTAR SALEEM vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE (2013 MLD 209), is rested on entirely different facts and is far away from the proposition at hand.

Likewise, the reliance of learned counsel for the respondents on the cases of ALAY JAVED ZAIDI vs. HABIBULLAH and others (2024 SCMR 781) and MUHAMMAD ASIF vs. AMINA BIBI and others (2014 MLD 1084) is highly misplaced.

The case of Malik ABDUL AZIZ AWAN and another vs Rana MAQBOOL AHMAD KHAN and others (2012 SCMR 91) though arose from the proceedings conducted by the Rent Tribunal under the Act, 2009 and sheds some light upon Section 22 of the Act, 2009 but it is not directly relevant to the issue at hand.

26.Before moving further, we would like to observe that contentions of the learned Amicus on the strength of MUHAMMAD KHAN vs. OBAIDULLAH JAN BABAT and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 492), CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD vs. Messrs

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AL-TECHNIQUE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD and others (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 99), IFTIKHAR AHMAD and others vs. PRESIDENT, NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN and others (PLD 1988 Supreme Court 53), CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE, ISLAMABAD vs. Messrs AL- TECHNIQUE CORPORATION OF PAKISTAN LTD and others (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 99) and THE BANK OF BAHAWALPUR LTD THROUGH ITS MANAGER vs. THE CHIEF SETTLEMENT & REHABILITATION COMMISSIONER, LAHORE AND ANOTHER vs. (PLD 1977 Supreme Court 164), that definition of the final order provided under Section 2(b) of the Act, 2009 would have no bearing on the term ‘final order’ used in Section 22 (6) of the Act, 2009, loses its efficacy in the light of our observations recorded in para 20 above. To this effect, we can safely rely upon the case of Messrs PAKISTAN TELEVISION CORPORATION LIMITED vs. COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE (LEGAL), LTU, ISLAMABAD and others (2017 SCMR 1136), wherein Supreme Court of Pakistan observed as under:- I

11.As discussed earlier, since no actual payment was made from PTV to WAPDA, therefore no deduction could have been made, resultantly category (ii) of 'deducted and paid' does not apply. Thus the question is whether the phrase "unless the person has paid the tax" in category (i) refers only to PTV or includes WAPDA as well. It is pertinent to note that till 2003, only category (ii) existed. Thus "person... deducted and paid" clearly refers to withholding agents as it is only they who 'deduct' tax. Category (i) came into being by virtue of the Finance Act, 2003 (I of 2003) which inserted the words "paid or" in section 21(c) supra. Prior to this amendment, the provision read "until the person has deducted and paid the tax. ...". The amendment cannot be regarded as inconsequential, rather it has to be given meaning. By inserting the phrase 'paid or' the legislature has essentially widened the scope of the word 'person' to cover not only withholding agents but the person liable to pay the tax (the person on whose behalf advance tax is being paid). If it is presumed that both the expressions 'paid' and 'deducted and paid' relate only to one person (withholding agents), the amendment would have no implication whatsoever on the scope of the statutory provision and render the phrase 'paid or' completely redundant. It is settled law that redundancy cannot be attributed to statutory provisions (or any part thereof). In this respect, the following judgments are relevant:- Collector of Sales Tax and Central Excise (Enforcement) and

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another v. Messrs Mega Tech (Pvt.) Ltd. (2005 SCMR 1166), Aftab Shahban Mirani and others v. Muhammad Ibrahim and others (PLD 2008 SC 779) and Messrs Master Foam (Pvt.) Ltd. and 7 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others (2005 PTD 1537). Thus, WAPDA is covered by category (i) and if it discharged its tax liability regarding the service fee, PTV is entitled to deduct the amount of such fee as expenditure under section 21(c) supra.

27.After having analyzed Section 22 of the Act, 2009, in the above perspective, we are of the considered opinion that while granting or refusing leave to contest to the respondent, the learned Special Judge (Rent) has to take into consideration the averments and contents of the leave application as a whole and if it arrives at the conclusion that the application for leave to contest discloses sufficient grounds for production of oral evidence, it can allow leave to the respondent, which could neither be painted with the words “part” or “toto”, rather it would only be “leave to contest” as is ordained in this section. Needless to observe that in case of refusal of leave to the respondent or his failure to file application seeking leave to contest within stipulated time, the Rent Tribunal shall pass the final order. On the contrary, if leave to contest is allowed, the application for leave to contest shall be treated as written reply by the Rent Tribunal as per mandate of Section 23 of the Act, 2009.

28.Section 24 of the Act, 2009, deals with the payment of rent and other dues pending proceedings and it mandates that if an eviction application is filed, the Rent Tribunal, while granting leave to contest, shall direct the tenant to deposit the rent due from him within a specified time and continue to deposit the same in accordance with the tenancy agreement or as may be directed by the Rent Tribunal in the bank account of the landlord or in the Rent Tribunal till the final order. In case of a dispute as to the amount of rent due or rate of rent, the Rent Tribunal shall tentatively determine the dispute and pass the

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order for deposit of the rent in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the Act, 2009. Sub-section (3) envisages that in case a tenant has not paid a utility bill, the Rent Tribunal shall direct the tenant to pay the utility bill. Sub-section (4) of Section 24 of the Act, 2009, provides the consequences of non-compliance of the direction or order of the Rent Tribunal, in terms whereof if a tenant fails to comply with a direction or order of the Rent Tribunal, the Rent Tribunal shall forthwith pass the final order. Section 25 of the Act, 2009, deals with the post-grant leave to contest situation and it postulates that at the time of grant of leave to contest, the Rent Tribunal shall direct a party to produce his evidence on a date fixed.

29.Attending the contentions of the learned Amicus that a Rent Tribunal, while analyzing the application for leave to contest moved by the respondent can pass the final order qua the grounds agitated in the application by the petitioner but not refuted by the respondent in his application for leave to contest and simultaneously proceed to grant leave to contest regarding rest of grounds agitated in the application for leave to contest; it is observed that it is not the object of the law at all and if this practice is allowed, it would amount to offend the scheme of the statute and also create an obscurity in the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal. We, however, deem it apposite to observe here that if the Rent Tribunal being persuaded with the contents of the application for leave allows leave to contest, he would not be precluded to pass an order qua the facts which in his estimation are admitted either in pleadings, or otherwise, by his own or on an application of any party at any stage of the proceedings on the analogy of Rule 6 of Order XII of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) (hereinafter referred to as “C.P.C.”). The question, however, arises in such a situation that when in terms of Section 34 of the Act, 2009, applicability of the provisions of C.P.C. and the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, (hereinafter referred to as the “Ordinance, 1984”) have been specifically ousted to the proceedings under the Act, 2009 before

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the Rent Tribunal then how a Rent Tribunal can take a recourse either to the provisions of the C.P.C. or the Ordinance, 1984, as the case may be. There is no cavil that Section 34 of the Act, 2009 excludes the applicability of provisions of the C.P.C. and the Ordinance, 1984, to the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal but it does not mean that Rent Tribunal would be completely debarred to call in aid any of the provisions of C.P.C. and the Ordinance, 1984, when ends of justice so demand and require. The purpose of ouster of the provisions of the C.P.C. and the Ordinance, 1984 in the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal is to avoid the technical implication of such provisions so as it would not frustrate and hamper the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal which otherwise are supposed to be speedy and expeditious. In nutshell, despite clog of Section 34 of the Act, 2009, in absence of any specific provision in the Act, 2009 dealing the subject, Rent Tribunals are not precluded to invoke the provisions of C.P.C. and the Ordinance, 1984 to draw an analogy therefrom for securing the ends of justice. Guidance to this effect can be sought from FOZIA MAZHAR versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, JHANG and others (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 771).

30.We are mindful of the fact that almost a similar provision is available in the Family Courts Act, 1964 in the form of Section 17, which excludes the applicability of the provisions of the Ordinance, 1984 and the C.P.C. with the exception to Section 10 and 11 of the C.P.C. to the proceedings before any Family Court but while dealing with somewhat similar facts and circumstances, in the case of MUHAMMAD TABISH NAEEM KHAN versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and others (2014 SCMR 1365), Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:-

3......As regard other pleas, all these are relating to the merits of the judgments and decrees of the Family Court and the Appellate Court, which cannot be considered in the circumstances when the petitioner never challenged and got the ex parte decree against him set aside and that decree had attained finality. We are not persuaded to hold, that the ex parte decree dated 4-7-2008 was void, for the reason that there is no provision in the West

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Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964 to strike off the defence of the petitioner, when he failed to file the written statement, thus it (decree) should be ignored; suffice it to say that the Family Court is the quasi judicial forum, which can draw and follow its own procedure provided such procedure should not be against the principles of fair hearing and trial, thus if a defendant of a family matter, who is duly served; and especially the one who appears and disappears and also does not file his written statement within the time allowed to him by the Court, the Court shall have the inherent power and ample power to proceed ex parte against him, to strike off the defence and to pass an ex parte decree in line with the principles as are enunciated by the Civil Procedure Code. In any case, such order (striking off defence) cannot be said, treated or deemed to be void, which should be ignored as nullity in the eyes of the law as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. If the petitioner was aggrieved of the order, he should have either got it set aside by filing an application before the Family Court or by challenging the same in appeal, which admittedly was not so done. As far as the argument, that the remand of the matter by the appellate Court is illegal and unlawful, we are not convinced, if there is any such illegality in the appellate court order, which has been upheld in the constitutional jurisdiction of the learned High Court as well. No case for the interference in the instant jurisdiction is made out. Dismissed. Leave refused.

Reference to the above effect can also be made to MUHAMMAD ARSHAD ANJUM versus Mst. KHURSHEED BEGUM and others (2021 SCMR 1145) in which Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:-

The Family Court Act 1964 (W.P. Act XXXV of 1964) (the Act) was enacted for "...... expeditious settlement and disposal of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for matters connected therewith"; provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (P.O. No.10 of 1984) and those of the Code except sections 10 and 11 have been excluded to achieve the legislative intent. The exclusion of normal rules of procedure and proof, applicable in civil plenary jurisdiction for adjudication of disputes in proceedings before a Family Court, is essentially designed to circumvent delays in disposal of sustenance claims by the vulnerable; this does not derogate its status as a Court nor takes away its inherent jurisdiction to protect its orders and decrees from the taints of fraud and misrepresentation as such powers must vest in every tribunal to ensure that stream of justice runs pure and clean; such intendment is important yet for another reason, as at times, adjudications by a Family Court may involve decisions with far reaching implications/consequences for a spouse or a sibling and, thus, there must exist a mechanism to recall or rectify outcome of any sinister or oblique manipulation, therefore, we find no clog on the authority of a Family Court to re-examine its earlier decision with a view to secure the ends of justice and prevent abuse of its jurisdiction and for the said purpose, in the absence of any express prohibition in the Act, it can borrow the procedure from available avenues, chartered by law.

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31.In the case of Mst. MISBAH IFTIKHAR and another versus Mst. ALEESA and 3 others (PLD 2025 Lahore 249) while dealing with a similar proposition, this Court ruled as under:-

10.Now adverting to the moot point as to whether an application under Section 12(2) of the "C.P.C." is maintainable before a Family Court established under the "Act, 1964" in view of exclusion of provisions of the Code ibid in the light of Section 17 of the "Act, 1964"; suffice to observe that provisions of the "C.P.C." are generally ousted to the Family Courts to frustrate the technicalities to hamper the proceedings before the Family Courts, as the "Act, 1964" stresses upon speedy settlement of family disputes. The exclusion of provisions of the "C.P.C.", however, does not mean that it cannot be pressed into service at all by the Family Courts. Where there is no provision in the "Act, 1964" to deal with a subject, provisions of "C.P.C." can be invoked for the advancement of ends of justice. Needless to reiterate that the provisions of the "C.P.C." are though stricto sensu not applicable in family matters but the Family Court is always competent to mold the relief keeping in view the circumstances of each case to foster justice.

To the above fact, most relevant would be the case of GHULAM ALI vs. Rana BABAR KHAN and 3 others (PLD 2023 Lahore 507), the relevant excerpt from the same is as under:-

6.The moot point which requires determination by this Court is as to which provisions of C.P.C. are applicable to the proceedings initiated under the Act keeping in view the ouster provided in section 26 read with section 34 of the Act.

7.In the above backdrop, a perusal of Section 26 of the Act reveals that for certain purposes the learned Rent Tribunal can exercise powers of a civil court. For better appreciation of this provision, the same is reproduced as under:- "26. Rent Tribunal to exercise powers of Civil Court.-

(1)A Rent Tribunal may exercise the powers of a Civil Court to enforce the attendance of a person, compel the production of evidence inspect a premises or issue commission for examination of a witness or local inspection.

(2)A proceeding before a Rent Tribunal shall be deemed to be judicial proceedings and the Rent Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court within the meaning of sections 193 and 228 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) and sections 476 and 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act V of 1898).

(3)A Rent Tribunal may pass an interlocutory order at any stage of the proceedings before the final order.

In the above backdrop, reading of section 34 of the Act would further reveal that with the exception of the provisions of C.P.C. mentioned in section 26 of the Act there is a clear ouster of applicability of the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984

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and C.P.C. to the Act. For facility of reference section 34 of the Act is reproduced as under:-

“34. Provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order and Code of Civil Procedure not to apply.--- Save as otherwise expressly provided, under this Act, the provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (P.O. No.10 of 1984), and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) shall not apply to the proceedings under this Act before a Rent Tribunal, District Judge or Additional District Judge.”

Keeping in view the above provisions, a perusal of section 31 of the Act would show that a Rent Tribunal will execute the orders passed under the Act as a decree of a civil court and for the said purpose the Rent Tribunal may exercise any or all of the powers of a civil court. For ready reference section 31 of the Act is reproduced as under:- "31. Execution of orders.---A Rent Tribunal shall execute an order passed under this Act by a Rent Tribunal or a District Judge or an Additional District Judge as a decree of a Civil Court and for this purpose the Rent Tribunal may exercise any or all the powers of a Civil Court."

8.While dealing with an identical proposition and upon interpreting the provisions of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which are synonymous to the provisions of the Act regarding the applicability of the provision of C.P.C. in rent proceedings, the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, in a judgment reported as Mst. Fehmida Begum v. Muhammad Khalid and another (1992 SCMR 1908) has held as under:- "15. The legal position, which emerges from the above case- law, seems to be that under section 17 of the Ordinance, the jurisdiction to execute an order of ejectment passed therein was executable by the Civil Court and, therefore, the provisions of the C.P.C. relating to the filing of objections to the execution order were attracted to. However, after the substitution of section 17 in Punjab in 1969 by Punjab Ordinance No.9 of 1969, an ejectment order was to be executed by the Rent Controller as if it were decree of a Civil Court and this Court in the case of Muhammad Yasin (supra) has held that since the Controller has been conferred power to execute an order in the manner of a decree of a Civil Court, then by virtue of the ordinary rule of interpretation, all the powers necessary or enjoyed by the executing authority for effectively and completely executing a decree of a Civil Court shall be available to the Controller. It may further be observed that, as pointed out hereinabove, the original section 22 of the Ordinance did not provide that the Controller shall be competent to decide the question arising between the parties and relating to execution, discharge or satisfaction and that a suit would not be competent, but this Court in the case of Messrs Bambino Limited (supra) held that the Rent Controller was competent to have invoked the provisions of section 151 read with section 141, Order XXI, Rules 100 and 101, C.P.C. The above view was reiterated by this Court in the case of Mst. Kulsoom Bhai (supra). It also seems that the above cases of Haji Abdur Rashid and Muhammad Hussain Tahir (supra) proceeded before this Court on the assumption that an application under Section 12(2) C.P.C. is competent before the Rent Controller and that it can be filed even by a person

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who was not a party to an ejectment proceedings keeping in view the judgment of this Court in the case of Ch. Jalal Din (supra). It is, therefore, evident that if a person wishes to challenge the validity of an ejectment order on the plea of fraud or misrepresentation, he may file an application under section 12(2) C.P.C., before the Rent Controller, whereas if a person claims restoration of possession of a property on the ground that he was in possession of his own account or on account of some person other than the judgment-debtor but was ejected fraudulently, he may file an application for restoration of the possession under Rule 101 of Order XXI, C.P.C. or if he claims right or interest in or possession of immovable property under Rule 97 or Rule 100 of Order XXI, C.P.C., he may file an application under Rule 103, C.P.C. before the Rent Controller."

(Emphasis supplied)

9.From the perusal of the afore-referred provisions of law and the interpretation made by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, it has surfaced that although in view of section 26 of the Act the Rent Tribunal can exercise limited powers as contemplated in C.P.C. and by virtue of section 34 of the Act there is a bar as to the applicability of the remaining provisions of C.P.C. etc. to the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, yet keeping in view the import of section 31 of the Act the Rent Tribunal is invested with the powers to execute its orders passed under the Act as a civil court, therefore, in view of case of "MST. FEHMIDA BEGUM" mentioned supra the Rent Tribunal by virtue of ordinary rule of interpretation can exercise all the powers as contemplated in C.P.C.

10.In view of the above it is held that since the Rent Tribunal in view of section 31 of the Act can exercise/invoke the provisions of C.P.C. and exercise the jurisdiction accordingly, thus, where a person is aggrieved of an order passed by a Tribunal under the Act on the basis of fraud he can challenge the same through an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. and ouster as contained in sections 26 and 34 of the Act will not apply.

11.As regards the judgment referred by the learned counsel for the petitioner, since proper assistance was not rendered to the Court at that point in time by way of not referring the case of Mst. Fehmida Begum (supra), therefore, the same is distinguishable and as such is not applicable.

In view of the above noted threadbare discussion, we are of the considered view that the law laid down in the case of “Asad Ali Khan v. Special Judge Rent and others” (PLD 2019 Lahore 363) is not the true interpretation of Section 22 of the Act, 2009 whereas the principles laid down in the case of “Muhammad Liaqat Ali v. Majid Ali and others” (2022 MLD 1720) are rested on actual mandate of the provisions of the Act, 2009. The legal question, framed hereinabove, is thus, answered accordingly.

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32.After setting at rest the moot legal question, we would now like to advert to the second limb of the matter in issue, which relates to the merits of both the petitions. It is noticed that the respondents sought eviction of the petitioners on the multiple grounds as mentioned hereinabove. Admittedly, the demised premises was originally owned by Tamheed-ul-Islam, from whom, the respondents purchased it through registered sale deed No.5556 dated 22 nd October, 2008. The petitioners are occupying the demised premises under the landlordship of the previous owner, so with the transfer of ownership, the status of the petitioners, being tenant, will not change.

33.So far contention of learned counsel for the petitioners that after purchase of the demised premises, the respondents did not send them any notice under Section 30 of the Act, 2009 regarding transfer of ownership; suffice to observe that mere fact that no separate notice was served upon the petitioners qua the change of ownership would not be sufficient to equip them with a valid defence to resist the ejectment application. Filing of an ejectment application itself is a notice to the tenant. Guidance in this regard can be sought from PIR MUHAMMAD MANJH versus NAVEED IQBAL MALIK and 2 others (2017 MLD 418) wherein it was held that:-

“7. Adverting to the point No.(i), it is observed that the respondents No.1 & 2 in their ejectment petition specifically asserted that they had sent a notice to the petitioner regarding change of ownership which remained unattended, however, in his application for leave to contest, which was granted and the same was treated as written reply in terms of Section 23 of “The Act, 2009”, the petitioner denied any such notice. To this effect issue No.2 was framed by the learned Special Judge (Rent) and onus of proof was placed upon the respondents. Admittedly the tenancy between the parties was not registered in conformity with the provisions of “The Act, 2009” and the respondents No.1 & 2 have deposited fine in the Government treasury in terms of Section 9 of “The Act, 2009”, so that their ejectment application should become entertainable. As per stance of respondents No.1 & 2, the suit

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premises was purchased by them through registered sale deed bearing No.378 dated 01st of October, 2012 (Exhibit-A7) from Muhammad Moazzam and the petitioner was occupying the premises as tenant under the previous owner. As the tenancy had expired so they informed the petitioner to vacate the suit premises as they do not want to continue the tenancy. They also sent a legal notice (Exhibit-A2) confirming their intention but the same was not responded, rather the petitioner instituted a civil suit against the previous owner without impleading respondents No.1 & 2 as party. The respondents No.1 & 2, however, moved an application under Order I Rule 10 of The Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) which was allowed and consequently they were made party in the said suit. It is evident from the record that notice (Exhibit-A2) was duly served upon the petitioner through registered acknowledgment due dated 08th of March, 2013 which was tendered in evidence as Exhibit-A3. This aspect was even affirmed by the petitioner himself by way of a suggestion to respondent No.1, when he appeared as AW1 in the following manner :-

“وکاجریایکایگاھت07.09.2013”درتسےہہکونسٹ

This leaves no doubt that due compliance was made to Section 30 of “The Act, 2009”. Even otherwise non-compliance of Section 30 does not entail any penal consequences, having adverse effect upon the competency of ejectment petition. This Court in the case of “Nadeem Zafar and others v. Muhammad Ismaeel and others” (PLD 2012 Lahore 178), while dilating upon the implication of Section 30 of “The Act, 2009” observed as under:- “6. The examination of this provision of law reveals that it is consisted upon the two parts. In the first place, it requires that a written intimation shall be sent to the tenant informing him about the new ownership and secondly, he shall also apply to the Rent Registrar for entering his name in the register as the landlord of the premises. Under sub section (2) of the Section, Rent Registrar, after receiving the application of the new landlord, shall inform the tenant through a notice about the transfer .of the ownership of the premises and the tenant shall not be, deemed to have defaulted in the payment of the rent if the rent due is paid or tendered to the new landlord within a period of 30 days from the date when the notice should in normal course have reached the tenant. It is nowhere provided in either part of section if no notice either to tenant or to Rent Registrar is sent whether ejectment petition would be liable to be dismissed. Although in section the word "shall" has been used, but it appears that the intention of the legislature while enacting this provision of law

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could be that the cases of the parties should not be thrown out of the court on the basis that notice of change of ownership has not been sent. This intention of the legislature is also evident from the preamble of the Act ibid which reads as under:-

"Whereas it is expedient to regulate the relationship of landlord and tenant, to provide a mechanism for settlement of their disputes in an expeditious and cost-effective manner and for connected matters." (emphasis provided).

Thus it follows that purpose of enactment is to provide expeditious remedy in rent matters but it does not allow expeditious disposal at cost of technicalities.

7.In view of this legal position of the law as well as rules of interpretation the word "shall" used in section shall be read as "May". This interpretation of the Section finds further support from the other facts that the question of default in the payment of rent is to be determined by the court after recording the evidence of the parties or in, cases where the default is evident from the record or in case where relationship of landlord and tenant is denied by the parties. This determination has to be undertaken even if no notice as required is sent. The purposes of the enactment of this section is to regulate and register the new landlord so that the dispute of denial of tenancy could be avoided which was a consistent practice when the repealed law was in the field. In those cases the ejectment petition remained pending in the court for years for determination of title of the landlord. Keeping in view this expediency and mechanism provided for expeditious disposal of the rent matter, it is held that ejectment petitioner may not be non suited on the ground that he did not send intimation regarding new ownership either to the tenant or to the Rent Registrar, particularly, when tenant had notice of the same when ejectment petition is instituted against him.”

Reference to the above effect can also be made to Hafiz MUHAMMAD SHAHID NAWAZ versus Hafiz MUHAMMAD SAEED (2010 CLC 1941). The relevant extract from the same is reproduced below:- “7.........The appellant's contention that respondent has never served any notice with regard to the change of ownership, is not maintainable, as filing of the ejectment petition is a sufficient notice of change of ownership in favour of the respondent, whereafter the appellant is not entitled to raise such an objection. This view has been supported by Syed Azhar Imam Rizvi v. Mst. Salma Khatoon (1985 SCMR 24), the relevant extract of which is as under: "

It is also not correct that after admission by the petitioner that he had received a copy of the ejectment application in 1978 wherein the factum of sale in favour of the respondent had clearly been mentioned, he was entitled to any other formal notice under section 13-A.

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The receipt of the copy of the ejectment application and knowledge gained thereby would constitute due notice and it will have to be treated as substantial compliance of section 13-A of the Ordinance...."

The same view was further reiterated by this Court in the case of Lt. Gen. (Retd.) MUHAMMAD AFZAL NAJEEB versus Mst. AYSHA KHANNA through General Attorney (PLD 2010 Lahore 56).

34.As already observed hereinabove that there were multiple grounds for eviction including expiry of tenancy and default in payment of the rent. When it is an admitted position on the record that there was no written tenancy agreement and the relationship was subsisting on oral terms, so, it can be treated as month-to-month tenancy which can only stay alive with mutual consent but when the ejectment application is filed it means that the landlord is no more interested to further extend the tenancy.

35.So far as default in payment of rent is concerned, the respondents specifically asserted the rate of rent as Rs.5000/- per month alongwith annual increase of 10%. The petitioners, in their leave to contest, submitted that the respondents neither approached them nor disclosed the execution of the sale deed and that no monthly rent was fixed. The petitioners, however, claimed that they were depositing the rent in the court. In view of divergent stances of the parties with regard to actual arrears of rent, it is necessary that it be determined after recording of evidence especially when it has come on the record that the respondents previously moved an application before the Rent Tribunal seeking eviction of the petitioners from the demised premises on the ground of default in payment of the rent and personal bonafide need, which was allowed vide order dated 14th December, 2017, passed by learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi and the petitioners though preferred an appeal against the said order before the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi but their appeal was dismissed through judgment dated 30th March, 2018. The

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petitioners then filed Writ Petition No.1364 of 2018 before this Court, which was allowed vide judgment dated 16th September, 2021 with the following observations:-

The nutshell of above discussion is that instant petition is allowed, as a result thereof, impugned judgment and order are set aside being illegal and unlawful, as a consequence application for leave to contest filed by the petitioners shall be deemed to be pending before the learned Special Judge (Rent), Rawalpindi, who shall first decide the same afresh on its own merits strictly in accordance with law and then proceed further. ...

It is an undeniable fact that in post-remand proceedings, pending previous application, the respondents moved the present application while including the grounds of expiry of tenancy in the same and then withdrew the first application from the Rent Tribunal.

36.Adverting to the claim of the petitioners with regard to Pagri, we feel no cavil to observe that the same is defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, 2009 in the following words:

“Pagri” includes any amount received by a landlord at the time of grant or renewal of a tenancy except advance rent or security.

Before proceedings further, we deem it apt to observe that the term “Pagri” as defined in Section 2(e) of the Act, 2009 also finds mention in Section 6 and Section 2(b) of the Act, 2009. Section 6 of the Act, 2009, prescribes contents of tenancy agreement and in terms of clause (g) of sub-section (1), a tenancy agreement alongwith other ingredients mentioned therein has to contain amount of advance rent, security or pagri, if any. It is the claim of the petitioners that they paid an amount of Rs.220,000/- as Pagri to the outgoing tenant namely Ashfaq Ahmad in presence of Noor-ul-Islam (original owner of the demised premises) and also an amount of Rs.55,000/- to the said original owner on account of Pagri which amounted to Rs.275,000/-. It is trite law that amount of Pagri cannot be adjusted

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against the arrears of rent. Reference to this effect can be made to MUHAMMAD ASHRAF vs. ISMAIL and 4 others (2000 SCMR 498). The relevant part is reproduced below:-

... It is, thus, fully established that no Pugri was ever paid by the petitioner to the respondents and even the allegation about the payment of Pugri to the previous owner remains in doubt. This being so, there could hardly be any question of the adjustment of the arrears of rent against Pugri. ...

37.Similarly, in the case of MIRZA BOOK AGENCY through Managing Partner and others vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE and others (2013 SCMR 1520), the dispute relating to Pagri involved therein was resolved by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the following terms:-

3.As regards the question that the tenancy is for an indefinite period of time, learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show us, if the alleged tenancy has been created under some registered instrument in which there is any such stipulation only for the reason that some pagri allegedly has been paid to the respondent or his predecessor-in-interest or to a person from whom the title has devolved upon the respondent, would by itself not make the tenancy in perpetuity. But this shall not foreclose the right and remedy if any available to the appellants for the recovery of the said amount of pagri from the person who is liable to return if permissible under the law, for which the appellant may bring an independent action, subject to the law (including the law of Limitation) before the appropriate forum. However, in the facts and circumstances, we are not inclined to interfere in the instant matter. Resultantly, this appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.

38.In the wake of above discussion, we are, thus, of the considered view that petitioners succeeded to make up their case for grant of leave to contest in terms of Section 22 of the Act, 2009. At the same time, we feel no hesitation to observe that as an iota of material has not been brought by the petitioners in negation to ground of eviction rested on expiry of tenancy, so, in the

Writ Petition No.1480 of 2023 Writ Petition No.1873 of 2023

circumstances, they are unable to point out any exception to the order/judgment concurrently passed to that effect, though it is tainted with some trivial procedural irregularities in the light of principles laid down, hereinabove. We are unanimous to hold that by remitting the matter on the basis of these procedural irregularities would serve no useful purpose except an academic exercise. We, thus, find no illegality or patent illegality in the impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi. Resultantly, both these petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.

Dictated on 07.08.2026.

Signed on 11.09.2026.

(SYED AHSAN RAZA KAZMI) (MIRZA VIQAS RAUF)

JUDGE JUDGE

Approved for reporting

(SYED AHSAN RAZA KAZMI) (MIRZA VIQAS RAUF)

JUDGE JUDGE

Announced in open Court on 16.09.2026

(ANWAAR HUSSAIN) (MIRZA VIQAS RAUF)

JUDGE JUDGE

M.Sajid*