Punjab Healthcare Commission through CEO Dr. Muhammad Saqib Aziz Vs D&SJ Faisalabad etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT AT LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No33544 of 2022

Punjab Healthcare Commission

VERSUS

District & Sessions Judge and another

JUDGEMENT

Date of Hearing: 03.9.2026 Petitioner by: Mr. Raza Bashir, Advocate Respondents by: Mr. Ajmal Khan Kakar, Advocate.

Mr. Basit Waheed Watto, Advocate.

MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL, J. Through the instant constitutional petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (“Constitution”), the petitioner has called in question the judgment dated 19.01.2022 passed by the learned District Judge, Faisalabad, whereby the appeal preferred by respondent No.2 under Section 31 of the Punjab Healthcare Commission Act, 2010 (“PHC Act”) was accepted and the order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the petitioner was set aside.

2.The brief facts necessary for disposal of the instant petition are that on 10.02.2021, an Assistant Director of the Punjab Healthcare Commission conducted an inspection of the premises of respondent No.2 and allegedly found him engaged in illegal/unauthorized practice of allopathic medicine at his medical store, without possessing the requisite qualification and registration with the competent regulatory authority. During the inspection, twenty-four (24) used syringes, six (6) injections of Diclofenac Sodium, fourteen (14) injections of Dexamethasone, one (1) injection of Ceftriaxone 500 mg and one (1) injection of Kenacort were also allegedly recovered. Upon seizure of the said items, the premises were sealed. Subsequently, during a routine inspection conducted on 04.05.2021, an authorized officer of the petitioner found the medical store/premises operational despite there

being no formal order for its de-sealing. The matter was accordingly reported to the Punjab Healthcare Commission.

3.Thereafter, respondent No.2 was summoned to face proceedings before the petitioner and he, accordingly, appeared before the Hearing Committee on 22.06.2021. According to the petitioner, during the course of hearing, respondent No.2 admitted the allegations against him and furnished an affidavit containing his admission. It is further the case of the petitioner that, in response to questions put to him by members of the Hearing Committee, respondent No.2 also admitted administering injections. Upon conclusion of the proceedings, a fine of Rs.300,000/- was imposed upon respondent No.2 vide order dated 22.06.2021 for violation of the provisions of the PHC Act as well as the Punjab Healthcare Commission Regulations for Barring Quackery in All its Forms and Manifestations and for Dealing with Quacks, 2016 (“PHC Quackery Regulations”). Aggrieved thereof, respondent No.2 preferred an appeal under Section 31 of the PHC Act before the learned District Judge, Faisalabad/respondent No.1, which was accepted vide judgment dated 19.01.2022, resulting in setting aside of the order dated 22.06.2021. Hence, the instant petition.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends that the impugned judgment is illegal, unlawful and the result of grave misreading and non-reading of the material available on record. He submits that respondent No.2 was engaged in the practice of allopathic medicine at his medical store without possessing the requisite qualification, registration or licence to practice medicine and was, therefore, indulging in quackery. He adds that the subsequent inspection, whereby the premises were again found operational despite having earlier been sealed, further demonstrates the conduct of respondent No.2. Learned counsel places considerable reliance upon the statement made by respondent No.2 before the Hearing Committee on 22.06.2021, as well as the affidavit furnished by him, and submits that respondent No.2 not only admitted the allegations but also sought pardon and undertook not to repeat such conduct in future. According to learned counsel, respondent No.2 was carrying on unauthorized medical practice in the garb of running a medical store, thereby putting the health and lives of members of the public at risk. He further submits that respondent No.2, of

his own volition and without any protest or reservation, deposited the amount of fine, i.e.Rs.300,000/-, on 06.08.2021, during the pendency of the appeal; hence, thereafter appeal was not proceedable. In this regard, reliance is placed on judgement dated 26.01.2021 passed by this Court in W.P. No. 61047/2019 “Punjab Healthcare Commission versus District and Session Judge, Faisalabad, etc.” as well as judgement dated 11.09.2023 passed by this Court in W.P No. 17513/2019 “Punjab Healthcare Commission versus District and Session Judge, Sargodha, etc.” Lastly, he contends that the learned District Judge failed to appreciate the material available on record in its correct perspective and that the impugned judgment, being based upon misreading and non-reading of material evidence, cannot be sustained.

5.Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.2, at the very outset, raises an objection regarding the scope of this Court’s constitutional jurisdiction and submits that disputed questions of fact cannot be reappraised or adjudicated upon by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution as if sitting in appeal over the judgment of the learned District Judge. Reliance in this regard is placed on “M. Hamad Hassan versus Mst. Isma Bukhari” (2023 SCMR 1434), “Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen versus Shafqat Ali Kiyani” (2023 SCMR 246) and “Shajar Islam Versus Muhammad Siddique” (PLD 2007 SC 45). Further submits that the so-called confessional statement relied upon by the petitioner was obtained from respondent No.2 under coercion and duress and that the affidavit attributed to him was likewise procured under pressure. Adds that the inspection report dated 10.02.2021 was neither formally proved before the Hearing Committee nor did any officer who allegedly conducted the inspection appear to substantiate its contents. It is further contended that respondent No.2 was not afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the persons whose reports/statements formed the basis of the proceedings against him, which objection had specifically been raised in ground No.3 of the appeal preferred before the learned District Judge. Learned counsel further questions the legality of the fine imposed by the Hearing Committee, contending that the Committee lacked jurisdiction and submits that the lawful authority to impose fine vests exclusively in the Punjab Healthcare Commission and could not have been exercised by the Hearing Committee,

reliance in this regard is placed on judgment of this Court reported as “Muhammad Tariq Javed vs Punjab Healthcare Commission etc.” (2024 LHC 5323). Learned counsel maintains that the impugned judgment is a well-reasoned and speaking judgment based upon proper appreciation of the facts and applicable law and does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, perversity or patent illegality warranting interference in the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. Lastly, while defending the impugned judgment, learned counsel prays for dismissal of the instant petition.

6.Heard. Record perused.

7.Before delving into the merits of the controversy, it would be appropriate to advert to the scope and parameters of this Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The writ of certiorari under Article 199 may be invoked where a judicial or quasi-judicial authority acts without or in excess of jurisdiction, violates the principles of natural justice, or passes an order suffering from a patent error of law, perversity, or material misreading or non-reading of the record. In “Saeed Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan” (2026 SCMR 105), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction may be exercised to correct jurisdictional and legal errors and to prevent the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial power in a manner contrary to law. The judgments relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No.2 do not advance his case. “Shajar Islam Versus Muhammad Siddique” (PLD 2007 SC 45) pertains to the settled principle governing interference with concurrent findings of the Courts below in rent matters, whereas “M. Hamad Hassan versus Mst. Isma Bukhari” (2023 SCMR 1434) and “Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen versus Shafqat Ali Kiyani” (2023 SCMR 246), arising out of family disputes, reiterate the principle that constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for appellate jurisdiction and cannot ordinarily be invoked merely to reappraise evidence or re-examine questions of fact already determined by the competent fora. There can be no cavil with the principles enunciated in the said judgments. The present case, however, does not call upon this Court merely to undertake a fresh appraisal of evidence or substitute its own view for that of the learned Appellate Court. The challenge is founded, inter alia, upon alleged patent legal errors as well as

material misreading and non-reading of the record by the learned Appellate Court. The aforesaid judgments are, therefore, distinguishable in the context of the controversy at hand. Whether the impugned judgment suffers from any such defect warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution, shall now be examined in the light of the applicable statutory framework and the findings recorded by the learned Appellate Court.

8.Adverting now to the merits of the case, the Appellate Court proceeded on the premise that being a qualified dispenser and holder of a valid drug-sale licence, the respondent No. 2 was authorized and competent to run the medical store and that the recovery of used syringes and injections, by itself, did not establish that he was providing allopathic treatment to patients. The Appellate Court failed to appreciate that no plausible justification or explanation was forthcoming from respondent No.2 regarding the presence of used syringes at his medical store, except his assertion that the same had been used for administering injections to his relatives. Even otherwise, such approach overlooks the statutory scheme of the PHC Act. The preamble of the PHC Act declares that the Act has been enacted,

“to make provisions for the improvement of quality of healthcare services, to ban quackery in all its forms and manifestations and to provide for ancillary matters.”

Section 2(xxix) of PHC Act defines a “quack” as “a pretender providing health services without having registration of the Medical and Dental Council, Council for Tibb, Council for Homeopathy and Nursing Council”. Section 4(1) of PHC Act mandates the Commission to exercise its powers for, inter alia, banning quackery. Section 4(2)(q) of PHC Act further empowers the Commission to take necessary steps to ban quackery, and Section 28(1) of PHC Act authorizes imposition of fine for contravention of the Act, rules or regulations. The statutory prohibition, therefore, extends to the unauthorized provision of healthcare services and is not confined merely to the unauthorized sale of medicines.

9.In this context, the distinction between a licence to sell, stock, exhibit and distribute drugs and authority to practice medicine or administer

allopathic treatment assumes significance. The certificate issued by the Punjab Medical Faculty itself contains an express stipulation that “This certificate does not authorize the holder to practice independently or to open a private clinic.” The qualification of respondent No. 2 as a dispenser, therefore, did not confer upon him any authority to practice allopathic medicine independently or to administer allopathic treatment. Likewise, his drug-sale licence authorized only the sale, stocking, exhibition and distribution of drugs in accordance with law; it did not authorize him to administer injections or practice medicine. The scope of the certificate and drug-sale licence is therefore misconstrued and erroneously treated as conferring an authority which the law expressly does not recognize.

10.The finding that the inspection report did not specifically state that respondent No. 2 was providing allopathic treatment to patients, overlooks respondent No. 2’s own admission before the Hearing Committee that he had administered injections, though claiming that they were given to his relatives. He also furnished an affidavit and answered the questionnaire, admitting his guilt and de-sealing without order. Such explanation could not render the admitted activity lawful, as he was not authorized to practice allopathic medicine independently. The admission, read with the inspection reports and other material on record, was sufficient to establish the relevant conduct.

11.Turning to the objection raised by learned counsel for respondent No.2 that the affidavit and statement/questionnaire were obtained from respondent No.2 under coercion and duress, appears to be a mere bald assertion, as no material whatsoever has been placed on record to substantiate the same. Such a plea, being a question of facts, must not only be specifically pleaded with necessary particulars but also supported by some credible material. The burden rests upon the person asserting it under Article 117 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. A mere assertion, bereft of particulars as to the circumstances in which the affidavit and statement/questionnaire were allegedly obtained, the identity of the person who purportedly exercised such coercion, the nature of the threat or pressure exerted, and the conduct of respondent No.2 immediately thereafter, cannot, by itself, be sufficient to discredit or invalidate the said documents.

Significantly, no contemporaneous complaint or protest regarding the alleged coercion has been shown to have been made before any competent forum. Moreover, the affidavit and statement/questionnaire form part of proceedings conducted before the Punjab Healthcare Commission in discharge of its statutory functions, to which a presumption of regularity attaches unless rebutted by cogent material as held in “Federation of Pakistan v. Saeed Ahmed and others” (PLD 1974 SC 151). In the absence of any such material, the plea of coercion and duress cannot be accepted merely on the basis of an unsubstantiated assertion. In “Dilber Hussain Hashmi v. Muslim Commercial Bank” (2001 SCMR 265), the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that mere fear of criminal proceedings does not amount to coercion where there is some basis for the prosecution. Similarly, in “National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Boghara Polyfab Pvt. Ltd.” [(2009) 1 SCC 267], it was observed that a bald plea of coercion or duress is not enough and the party who sets up such a plea must prima facie establish the same by placing material.

12.As regard the objection that neither any patient was produced nor the statement of any patient was record, it is observed that Regulation 5(3) of the PHC Quackery Regulations does not make production of a patient or prescription indispensable. While the authorized officer is required to seize relevant evidence, including medicines being administered, the provision states that he “may also record statements of the patients and or their attendants.” The use of “may” makes such statements discretionary and not a mandatory requirement. Their absence, therefore, could not invalidate the proceedings where other material evidence was available.

13.The evidentiary position is further reinforced by the legal effect of an admission. Black's Law Dictionary, Tenth Edition, page 56, defines “admission” as “any statement or assertion made by a party to a case and offered against that party; an acknowledgment that the facts are true.” The Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Divisional Superintendent Postal Services Faisalabad and others v. Khalid Mahmood and others.” (2023 SCMR 354) has observed in paragraph 9 thereof that a clear and unambiguous admission may conclude the controversy without further evidence. In the case of “Muhammad Ahmad v. District Judge, Pakpattan, etc.” (2025 LHC

3687), this court has held that "submission of affidavit and acceptance of allegations constitutes an admission, which can be used against petitioner in absence of any exception pleaded."

14.The competence of the Hearing Committee to impose the fine under Section 28 of the PHC has also been questioned. The issue, therefore, requires determination in the light of the statutory scheme governing the constitution and functioning of the Commission and its Competent Authority.

Section 28(1) of the PHC Act provides:

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, the Commission may, for contravention of a provision of this Act, rules or regulations, impose fine which may extend to five hundred thousand rupees in accordance with the provisions of this Act, keeping in view the gravity of offence.”

Section 40 of PHC Act empowers the Commission to make regulations for carrying out the purposes of the Act. In exercise of the said power, the PHC Quackery Regulations were framed. Regulation 2(c) thereof defines “Competent Authority” as follows:

“Competent Authority” means such Committee(s) comprising of one or more member(s), as nominated by the Commission from within its staff, not below the rank of Deputy Director, and authorized by the Commission, from time to time, to take necessary action under the provisions of the Act, any Regulations and in particular these Regulations, to tackle the menace of Quackery and also to pass such orders, including but not limited to interim orders, as deemed necessary, on complaints and/or Reports submitted before the Commission and exercise all or any such powers as provided for in the Act, including but not limited to sealing of such Healthcare Establishment(s) where quackery is being practiced in any form whatsoever, to ensure that quackery is stopped and eradicated in all its forms and manifestations.”

Regulation 7 of PHC Quackery Regulations provides the mechanism for proceedings against quacks and empowers the Competent Authority to pass appropriate orders, including imposition of fine. For ease of reference Regulation 7(4) of PHC Quackery Regulations is reproduced as under:

“Any person who is proved to be responsible and or involved in the act of quackery or who is proved to be practicing as quack(s) at any

particular Health Establishment, the Committee shall impose a fine upon such person, which may extend up to five hundred thousand rupees, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case...”

(bold and underlining supplied for emphasis)

A conjoint reading of Section 28(1), Section 40 of PHC Act and Regulations 2(c) and 7 of PHC Quackery Regulations makes it evident that the power vested in the Commission to impose a fine is exercisable through the Competent Authority constituted and authorized under the Regulations.

15.The question is also no longer res integra. In Muhammad Ahmad (supra), this Court held that the Hearing Committee, being the Competent Authority constituted under the Regulations 2016, is competent to exercise the powers of the Commission, including the power to impose fine under Section 28 of the PHC Act. The same position was reiterated in “Munir Ahmad etc. v. District Judge, Attock etc” (2025 LHC 4882). The contrary view expressed in “Muhammad Tariq Javed v. Punjab Healthcare Commission and others” (2024 LHC 5323), upon which reliance has been placed by respondent No. 2, no longer holds the field, as the said judgment was subsequently overturned by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in “Punjab Healthcare Commission and another v. Muhammad Tariq Javed and others” (Civil Petition No.5355 of 2024). Therefore, the objection to the competence of the Hearing Committee to impose the fine is without legal basis.

16.There is yet another material circumstance which appears to have escaped due consideration by the learned Appellate Court. Respondent No.2 deposited the amount of fine, i.e., Rs.300,000/-, on 06.08.2021, during the pendency of the appeal. In “Punjab Healthcare Commission v. District and Sessions Judge, Faisalabad, etc” (W.P. No.61047 of 2019), this Court has held that where the amount of fine had been deposited without protest, the appeal could not thereafter be pursued. The legal effect of the deposit of the fine by respondent No.2 was, therefore, a material aspect requiring consideration by the learned Appellate Court. Its failure to advert to this aspect, when viewed in conjunction with the misreading and non-reading of the material discussed above, further renders the impugned judgment legally unsustainable.

17.For the foregoing reasons, the instant petition is allowed. Consequently, the impugned judgment dated 19.01.2022 passed by the learned District Judge is set aside, and the order dated 22.06.2021 passed by the Hearing Committee of the Punjab Healthcare Commission is restored. All pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

18.No order as to costs.

(MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL)

JUDGE

ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT on 14.09.2026.

JUDGE.

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

JUDGE.

Javed Malik*