Bishop S Alam Khar vs Bishop Samuel Uzraya etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH,

MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

R.F.A. No.83 of 2021

Bishop S. Alam Khar Versus Bishop Samuel Uzraya & others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 14.09.2026.

Appellant by: Mr. Muhammad Iftikhar Sahi, Advocate. Respondents by: M/s Muhammad Ayub Gohar and Fayyaz Ahmad Khan Baloch, Advocates.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.:- Through this Regular First Appeal, the appellant/plaintiff has called in question the judgment and decree dated 23.02.2021 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Khanewal, whereby his suit for recovery of Rs.50,00,00,000/- (Rupees fifty crore), instituted under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance”), against the respondents/defendants, was dismissed.

2.Briefly stated, the appellant's case before the learned Trial Court was that respondent No.1, in league with respondents No.2 and 3, got printed and circulated defamatory material, including a proclamation/pamphlet, imputing dishonesty, moral turpitude and criminal conduct to the appellant, thereby lowering him in the estimation of right-thinking members of society and causing injury to his reputation, office and standing. On this basis, damages to the tune of Rs.50,00,00,000/- were claimed. The respondents contested the suit by denying authorship, publication and circulation of the alleged defamatory material and maintained that the statements attributed to them, to the extent made by them, were contained in or connected with judicial proceedings and were protected by the law relating to privilege. Objection was also taken regarding non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of notice under Section 8 of the Ordinance, want of necessary particulars regarding the date, time and

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place of the alleged publication, improper valuation, and suppression of material facts by the appellant. On the basis of the pleadings, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues:

ISSUES:

1.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to decree for recovery of rupees fifty crore on the grounds mentioned in the plaint as prayed for?

OPP

2.Whether the suit is not proceedable in view of Section 8 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002 as no notice was issued to defendants, hence, suit is liable to be dismissed? OPP 3. Whether the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed as no date and time has been mentioned in the plaint regarding the alleged occurrence hence, suit is liable to be dismissed? OPD

4.Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of action to file the suit, hence, liable to be dismissed? OPD

5.Whether the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 is not attracted against the defendants, hence, suit is liable to be dismissed?

OPD

6.Whether the proper court fee has not been affixed on the plaint, hence, suit is liable to be dismissed? OPD

7.Relief.

After recording the evidence of the parties, the learned Trial Court decided Issue No.1 against the appellant, holding that no nexus of authorship or circulation of the alleged defamatory material (Exh.P-

10)with respondents No.2 and 3 had been established. Issues No.2 and 3 were also decided against the appellant on the ground that the plaint did not disclose the specific date, time or place of publication, rendering the statutory notice under Section 8 defective and the limitation for the suit incalculable. Consequently, Issues No.4 and 5 were decided against the appellant, whereas Issue No.6 was decided in his favour. Issue No.7 was decided against the appellant, inter alia, on the basis of alleged suppression of material facts relating to previous litigation and eviction proceedings. Resultantly, the suit was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 23.02.2021, giving rise to the instant appeal.

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3.Learned counsel for the appellant contends that the learned Trial Court misread and failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence. He argues that the respondents did not effectively deny documents Exh.P-4, Exh.P-5, Exh.P-6 and Exh.P-10 and that, therefore, the contents thereof stood admitted. He further submits that the evidence of the appellant's witnesses remained unshaken on material aspects and that contradictions appearing in the statements of the respondents' witnesses were not properly considered. He adds that the proclamation/pamphlet allegedly affixed and circulated publicly was an extra-judicial publication and could not, merely because some of the allegations were also contained in judicial proceedings, be brought within the protection available to statements made before a Court. He has relied upon Imran Ahmad Khan Niazxi v. Mian Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif (2023 SCMR 636), Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Ysmeen and others (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 795) and Muhammad Adnan v. Salah-ud-Din (2025 SCMR 653).

4.On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents, while supporting the impugned judgment, submits that the appellant failed to establish the essential ingredients of actionable defamation, particularly the authorship and publication of the alleged defamatory material by the respondents. He contends that reliance upon Exh.P-10 does not establish any nexus between the said document and respondents No.2 and 3. He further argues that the statements relied upon by the appellant were substantially made in the course of litigation and were legally protected. He maintains that the notice relied upon by the appellant did not cure the fundamental defect arising from failure to establish when the alleged defamatory publications came to his notice or knowledge and whether the notice was served within the prescribed period.

5.We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record with their able assistance. Our determination on the issues is as follows:

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ISSUE NO.1

6.The principal question under Issue No.1 is whether the appellant succeeded in establishing an actionable publication attributable to the respondents. The burden squarely rested upon the appellant, as plaintiff, to prove the facts constituting his cause of action. In a claim founded upon defamation, the mere existence of allegedly defamatory words is not sufficient. The plaintiff must establish the publication complained of and its attribution to the person against whom damages are claimed. Where the alleged defamatory material is contained in a document, proof of the document's existence or contents does not, by itself, establish that the defendant authored, prepared, printed, circulated or otherwise caused its publication.

7.The learned Trial Court considered Exh.P-10, which according to the appellant contained the allegedly defamatory material, but found that no satisfactory nexus had been established between the said document and respondents No.2 and 3. The appellant has sought to overcome this finding principally by contending that the respondents did not specifically deny the document in cross-examination and, therefore, its contents ought to be treated as admitted. The submission, however, conflates proof of a document with proof of liability. Even where, in an appropriate case, the existence or contents of a document may be treated as admitted, such admission does not automatically establish the identity of its author, printer, publisher or circulator, nor does it establish that a particular defendant caused its dissemination to the public.

8.The same principle applies to the appellant's contention that his witnesses remained unshaken in cross-examination. The absence of an effective challenge to a particular aspect of testimony cannot relieve the plaintiff of the burden of proving the essential ingredients of his cause of action. The evidence has to be considered in its entirety and not in isolated fragments. Thus, even if the existence and contents of the allegedly defamatory material are accepted, the further and

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indispensable question remains whether the same was published or circulated by the respondents.

9.In the present case, the appellant has not been able to identify any reliable evidence which establishes that respondents No.2 and 3 authored, printed, circulated or otherwise caused the publication contained in Exh.P-10. Nor have the alleged contradictions in the evidence of the respondents' witnesses been shown to supply the missing link. A plaintiff cannot succeed merely because some weakness or inconsistency is found in the defence; he must establish his case on the strength of his own evidence.

10.The appellant has also alleged preparation and circulation of a proclamation/pamphlet in different cities. Such an allegation, if proved against a particular defendant, would stand on a different footing from a statement made in the course of judicial proceedings. The protection, if any, available to a statement made before a Court cannot automatically be extended to an independent publication made to persons outside the proceedings. However, this distinction does not assist the appellant unless he first establishes, through legally admissible and confidence-inspiring evidence, that the alleged extra- judicial publication was in fact made and circulated by the respondents. The necessary factual nexus has not been established.

11.Consequently, even upon an independent examination of the evidence, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any material misreading or non-reading of evidence by the learned Trial Court so as to warrant interference with its finding on Issue No.1. In the absence of proof that the alleged defamatory publication was attributable to the respondents, the claim for damages could not be sustained. Issue No.1 was, therefore, rightly answered against the appellant.

ISSUE NO.2

12.Section 8 of the Ordinance assumes independent significance. The statutory scheme requires a person intending to institute an action

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for defamation to serve upon the defendant a written notice within the period prescribed by the provision, specifying the defamatory matter complained of and notifying the intention to bring an action. Compliance with this statutory requirement has, therefore, to be established with reference to the particular publication forming the subject matter of the claim.

13.The appellant has relied upon legal notice dated 16.10.2017 and contends that the statutory requirement stood fulfilled. The mere production or assertion of having served a notice, however, does not conclude the matter. It is necessary to examine the publication complained of, the date on which it came to the appellant's notice or knowledge, the contents of the notice and the time within which it was served.

14.The learned Trial Court found that the plaint did not furnish the necessary particulars from which the date or dates of the alleged publications and the point in time when the defamatory matter came to the appellant's notice or knowledge could be determined. This omission assumes significance because compliance with the statutory period necessarily depends upon identification of the relevant publication and the date of its knowledge.

15.The appellant has not been able to demonstrate from the pleadings and evidence that the publications forming the subject matter of his claim were identified with sufficient particularity in the notice dated 16.10.2017 or that, in relation to the publication(s) relied upon, the notice was served within the prescribed period. The deficiency becomes more material because the appellant has relied upon different categories of material, including judicial documents and the alleged proclamation/pamphlet. The finding of the learned Trial Court on Issue No.2, therefore, does not suffer from any demonstrated misreading or non-reading of material evidence warranting interference.

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ISSUE NO.3

16.The finding on Issue No.3 has an independent evidentiary significance. A plaintiff alleging defamation is required to plead the publication complained of with sufficient particulars to enable a defendant to understand the precise case he is required to answer and to enable the Court to determine the relevant cause of action and its timing. Where multiple publications are alleged, such particulars assume greater importance. In the present case, the learned Trial Court found that the plaint did not disclose the specific date and time of the alleged occurrence/publication. The appellant has not pointed out any specific averment in the plaint, or any material evidence overlooked by the learned Trial Court, which supplies the particulars necessary for identifying the relevant publication and determining the statutory period. General assertions regarding circulation in different cities, without establishing when and by whom the alleged publication was made, do not satisfactorily resolve these foundational questions.

17.The finding on Issue No.3, therefore, cannot be characterized as perverse or based upon non-reading of evidence. It flows from the manner in which the cause of action was pleaded and materially affects the appellant's ability to establish the relevant publication as well as compliance with the statutory requirements. The finding is accordingly maintained.

ISSUE NO.4

18.While deciding Issue No.4, the learned Trial Court also referred to the appellant's conduct during cross-examination and concluded that material facts relating to previous litigation, adverse judgments and eviction proceedings had not been candidly disclosed. The appellant has challenged this aspect of the reasoning as irrelevant to his claim. We are of the view that concealment of a material fact, by itself, does not substitute for determination of the substantive ingredients of defamation, nor does every omission in pleadings necessarily extinguish a cause of action otherwise duly proved. Such

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conduct is, however, relevant to the assessment of credibility where the concealed proceedings are connected with the circumstances in which the alleged defamatory statements were made. In the present case, the matters referred to by the learned Trial Court emerged from the appellant's own testimony and concerned previous litigation and proceedings forming part of the background in which the alleged statements were said to have been made. The learned Trial Court was, therefore, entitled to take such matters into consideration while assessing the reliability of the appellant's version. Even if this aspect of the reasoning is treated as an additional consideration rather than an independent ground for dismissal, it does not affect the conclusion already reached on Issues No.1 to 3. The appellant has failed to demonstrate that the learned Trial Court's assessment of his testimony was wholly unsupported by the record. Issue No.4, therefore, calls for no interference.

ISSUE NO.5

19.The question whether the Ordinance is attracted to the statements complained of requires a distinction between different categories of publications. The appellant has relied upon statements and allegations contained in pleadings, applications, review proceedings and other judicial documents, while at the same time alleging that a proclamation/pamphlet was publicly affixed or circulated. These two categories cannot mechanically be placed in the same compartment. As regards statements made in judicial proceedings, the question of privilege has to be determined with reference to the nature and context of the particular statement, the proceeding in which it was made and the statutory or other legal protection attracted thereto. It would be too broad to hold that every statement made in every judicial proceeding automatically enjoys one uniform and unrestricted category of privilege. At the same time, statements made in the course of judicial proceedings may attract the protection recognized by law, depending upon the applicable principle and circumstances. The alleged proclamation/pamphlet, on the other

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hand, constitutes a distinct factual category. If it was independently printed, affixed or circulated to persons outside the judicial proceedings by a particular defendant, its legal character could not be determined merely by referring to allegations contained in pleadings or other court documents. However, as already held while deciding Issue No.1, the appellant has failed to establish the essential fact that such extra-judicial publication was authored, printed, circulated or otherwise caused by the respondents. Thus, even if the alleged proclamation/pamphlet is considered independently of the statements made in judicial proceedings, the appellant's claim cannot succeed in the absence of proof connecting that publication with the respondents. The learned Trial Court's reasoning regarding privilege could have been more carefully articulated by distinguishing the different categories of publications; nevertheless, such imperfection in articulation does not warrant reversal of the decree when the appellant has independently failed to establish the foundational fact of publication attributable to the respondents. Issue No.5, therefore, also does not call for interference.

ISSUE NO.6

20.Issue No.6 regarding court fee was decided in favour of the appellant by the learned Trial Court. The said finding has not been shown to adversely affect the impugned decree and, in any event, does not assist the appellant because the suit has failed on the substantive and statutory grounds discussed above.

21.Before parting with the matter, it may be observed that most of the grounds of appeal contain several general assertions that the impugned judgment is illegal, arbitrary, perverse and against the record. Such assertions, without identifying the particular evidence allegedly misread or ignored, cannot by themselves furnish a basis for reversal. The specific contentions concerning Exh.P-4, Exh.P-5, Exh.P-6 and Exh.P-10, the alleged admissions, contradictions in the respondents' evidence, the proclamation/pamphlet and the question of privilege have been considered in the foregoing discussion. None of

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these contentions establishes the essential nexus between the alleged defamatory publication and the respondents or otherwise demonstrates a material error affecting the result of the suit.

22.It follows from the foregoing discussion that the appellant failed to establish an actionable publication attributable to the respondents. He also failed to demonstrate compliance with the statutory requirement under Section 8 in relation to the particular publications complained of, while the pleadings did not furnish sufficient particulars for determining the relevant publication and the statutory period. The appellant has consequently failed to establish the legal and factual foundation necessary for recovery of damages under the Ordinance. For what has been discussed above, the appellant has failed to demonstrate any material misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity of findings, or error of law warranting interference with the impugned judgment and decree.

23.Consequently, this Regular First Appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 23.02.2021 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Khanewal, in Civil Suit No.45 of 2017 are maintained. There shall be no order as to costs.

(Sultan Tanvir Ahmad) (Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge Judge

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Judge Judge

*Sultan*