Samina Siddique Vs Abdul Ghaffar Razzaq etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No. 13547 of 2026

Samina Siddique versus Abdul Ghaffar Razzaq and 2 others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 17.09.2026 Petitioner by: Mr. Shahzad Mehmood Butt, Advocate Respondent No. 1 by: Messrs. Chaudhry Abdul Majeed, Chaudhry Zahid Majeed and Umar Daraz Ch., Advocates.

In attendance: Mr. Qamar Zaman Qureshi, Additional Advocate General, Punjab, M/s. Syed Ali Allow-u-Din, Shehryar Farhan Beg, Shujaat Umar Pirzada, Abdullah Haroon, Ali Asghar Mian, Faisal Anwar Minhas, Abdul Manan Sipra, Dr.

Muhammad Azeem Raja, Syed Ali Raza, M. Kashif Habib Sheikh, Ch. Imtiazullah Warraich and Ms.Musarrat Rehman, Advocates.

Mr. Qamar Hanif Ramay, Assistant Attorney General for Pakistan, Ms. Uzma Razzaq Khan, Ms. Uzma Zaki, Ms.

Samina Nighat Chughtai, M/s. Ch. Muhammad Naseer, M. Saeed Bin Nauman, Barrister Shahid Masood Khan, Saqib Yasin, Syed Hassan Abbas Raza, Muhammad Afzal, Ijaz Ahmad and Basit Waheed Wattoo, Advocates.

MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR, J. The plaintiff-petitioner, Samina Siddique, (‘the petitioner’) feeling aggrieved has filed the instant petition to challenge order dated 27.01.2026 (‘impugned order’) passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, whereby by allowing the revision petition filed by the defendant-respondent No. 1, Abdul Ghaffar Razzak (‘Respondent’), the suit for possession of property through pre-emption filed by petitioner against the said respondent has been dismissed as barred by limitation and failing to deposit one third of the sale price (“Zar-e-Soim”) within 30 days.

2.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Appellate Court has dismissed the suit for pre-emption on the ground of limitation without considering that while attesting sale mutations notice was not issued by the Attesting Officer and therefore, question of suit being within or beyond limitation prescribed in Section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (‘the Act’) could not

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have been determined summarily as it was a mix question of law and fact. Adds that even the other ground of late deposit of zar-e-soim was not fatal to the petitioner’s suit as the Appellate Court had not required the Petitioner as Plaintiff to deposit the same by or before any specific date.

3.On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent has controverted the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and defended the impugned order by claiming that the suit clearly was barred by limitation of four months prescribed by law and the petitioner has not deposited zar-e-soim within 30 days of filing of suit as required by Section 24 of the Act, therefore the suit had rightly been dismissed by the learned Appellate Court.

4.Brief background of this case is that the petitioner filed a suit for possession of property through pre-emption by claiming that the respondent had surreptitiously purchased suit property from the original owners for total sale consideration of Rs.3,86,26,000/- through two sale mutations No.2871 and 2872, both dated 21.11.2024, for separate portions of land, each individually measuring 31K-2m-136sq.ft., and valuing Rs.1,93,13,000/-, details of which are mentioned in the plaint. It is claimed that the revenue officer never affixed notice of attestation of said mutations. The petitioner came to know about the sale mutations on 16.05.2026 at 10.00 a.m. and immediately made talb-i-muwathibat at the spot. On the next day i.e. 17.05.2026 notices of talb-i-ishhad were dispatched to the respondent in presence of witnesses through registered post AD. Thereafter the petitioner on 24.06.2026 filed the suit to pre-empt property. The respondent entered appearance and raised objections relating to the suit being barred by limitation and failure to deposit Zar-e-Soim within time, etc. The petitioner on 16.10.2025 without any specific order from the court deposited Zar-e-Soim amounting to Rs.1,28,75,333/- in the treasury.

5.Through two separate orders passed by the trial court on 21.10.2021, firstly, the objection raised by the respondent that plaint of the pre-emption suit was liable to be rejected as the same was barred by limitation was repelled to be decided along with other issues after recording evidence and secondly, the application for grant of interim relief filed by the petitioner was dismissed and issues, including limitation and late payment of Zar-e-Soim, were framed. The order dated 21.10.2021 passed by the learned trial court whereby the objection of the respondent was repelled is reproduced hereunder:-

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‘The defendant in his written statement has raised a preliminary objection that the present suit is barred by limitation and, therefore, liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the parties have been heard on the said plea. Whether the suit is within limitation or otherwise is a mixed question of law and fact which requires evidence for proper determination. At this stage, without recording evidence, it cannot be conclusively decided that the suit is barred by limitation. Accordingly, the plea of limitation raised by the defendant is hereby repelled at this stage, and the same shall be decided along with other issue after recording evidence. This order be annexed with the main file.’

6.The respondent challenged the said order by filing revision petition, which was contested by the petitioner whereafter the same was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and the suit filed by the petitioner has been dismissed by holding the same as barred by limitation and also for failure to make payment of Zar-e-Soim within time. The operative portion of the said order is reproduced below for clarity:

‘First of all, I want to take up the contention of the petitioner/defendant regarding the limitation. According to plaint the respondent/plaintiff brought his suit for possession through pre-emption on the basis of mutation No.2871 dated 21.11.2024 and mutation No. 2872 dated 21.11.2024. The said suit was moved on 24.06.2025. This clearly shows that the respondent brought her suit after 05 months of the attestation of the mutations dated 21.11.2024. According to section 30 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, "The period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption is only four months from the attestation of the mutation.". The limitation of only 04 months has been fixed to enforce the right of pre-emption after attestation of the mutation. In this way, the suit of the respondent/plaintiff was clearly time barred.

7.Now, I take up the matter regarding deposit of Zar-e-Soam. According to record, the suit was instituted by the plaintiff/respondent on 24.06.2025, however, Zare-Soam was deposited on 16.10.2025. In this way, it is clear that Zar-e-Soam was also deposited after about 04 months of the institution of the suit. According to section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991, the time for deposit of Zar-e-Soam is fixed as 30 days after filing of the suit. It has clearly been mentioned in the section 24 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 that time period of 30 days shall not be extended beyond 30 days of the filing of the suit. As discussed above, Zar-e-Soam, in the instant suit was deposited after passage of about 04 months, so, the suit for pre-emption was not proceedable.”

7.The petitioner contends that the Appellate Court has dismissed the suit for pre-emption on the ground of limitation without considering that at the time of attestation of sale mutation notice was not issued by the Attesting Officer and the limitation to file the suit would start from the date of knowledge i.e. 16.05.2025

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instead of from 21.11.2024, the date when the mutation was entered in the record, therefore, question of limitation prescribed in Section 30 of the Act could not have been determined summarily which is a mix question of law and fact, and for its determination requires recording of evidence. It has also been argued with reference to principles laid down in case titled Malik Tariq Mahmood and others versus Ghulam Ahmed and others (PLD 2017 SC 674) that the ground of deposit of Zar-e-Soim beyond period of thirty days from filing of suit was not fatal to the petitioner’s case since the Appellate Court in terms of Section 24 of Act, had not required the petitioner as plaintiff to deposit Zar-e-Soim in the court/treasury by fixing timeframe for the said purpose and the petitioner had on her own deposited the same in court/treasury. On the other hand learned counsel for respondent has controverted the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner and defended the impugned order by claiming that the suit clearly was barred by limitation and the petitioner has not deposited Zar-e-Soim within 30 days of filing of suit as required by Section 24 of the Act, therefore, the suit had rightly been dismissed by the learned Appellate Court.

8.The question whether the suit was filed within prescribed limitation goes to the root of the matter and the same is being taken up first. In order to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties relating to the question of limitation, Sections 30 and 31 of the Act are relevant, which are reproduced below for clarity: “30. Limitation.– The period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of pre-emption under this Act shall be four months from the date–

(a)of the registration of the sale deed;

(b)of the attestation of the mutation, if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale deed;

(c)on which the vendee takes physical possession of the property if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale deed or a mutation; or (d) of knowledge by the pre-emptor, if the sale is not covered under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) or paragraph (c).

31.Notice.– (1) The Officer registering the sale deed or attesting the mutation of a sale shall, within two weeks of the registration or attestation, as the case may be, give public notice in respect of such registration or attestation.

(2)The notice under sub-section (1) shall be deemed to have been sufficiently given if it is displayed on the main entrance of a mosque and on any other public place of the village or place where the property is situated.

(3)The charges for the notice under sub-section (2) shall be recovered from the vendee by the Officer registering the sale or attesting the mutation, as the case may be, at the time of such registration or attestation.

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9.Admittedly, the suit land was sold through two different sale mutations entered in the revenue record on 21.11.2024. In terms of Section 30(b) of the Act, suit for possession through pre-emption is to be filed latest by the end of 4 months of attestation of said mutations, which was to expire on 21.03.2025. The petitioner claims that suit could not be filed within said timeframe as the suit property had been sold surreptitiously and no notice of the same was issued by the revenue officer in terms of Section 31 of the Act, consequently she had no notice about transfer of property and she attained knowledge of sale on 16.05.2025 at 10:00 a.m. while she was available at the suit land and she immediately made Talb-i-Muwathibat at the spot followed by notice of Talb-i-Ishhad on 17.05.2026 in the presence of witnesses, whereafter suit was filed on 24.06.2026, which suit from the date of knowledge is claimed by the petitioner to be within limitation of four months required for filing the same.

10.As it has been claimed that the period of limitation was to commence from the date of knowledge and not from the date of mutation, it is important to note here that date of commencement of period of limitation of four months in terms of Section 30 of the Act is provided in its paragraph (a) as the date of registration of the sale deed; (b) as the date of attestation of the mutation, if the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale deed; (c) as the date on which the vendee takes physical possession of the property under the sale, in cases where the sale is made otherwise than through a registered sale deed or a mutation; or (d) as the date of knowledge by the pre-emptor in cases where the sale has been made otherwise than modes provided under paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) or paragraph (c). In view thereof, in the present case as sale was made through attestation of mutation, paragraph (b) of Section 30 was attracted whereas other paragraphs of Section 30 of the Act would have no application, consequently, the limitation for filing the suit in terms of paragraph (b) of Section 30 of the Act commenced on 21.11.2024, when the mutation was attested. The limitation for filing the suit for pre-emption in terms paragraph (d) of Section 30 would commence from the date of knowledge only when the property was not sold through registered sale deed or attestation of mutation and in other cases when the vendee had not taken physical possession of the property in furtherance of sale. In view thereof, in terms of section 30 of the Act, which is a self-executing provision of law, the date of

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attestation of mutation in the instant case was the date of commencement of period of limitation and said limitation could not be extended beyond four months of attestation of mutation merely because the petitioner did not timely attain the knowledge of sale. Reliance in this behalf may be placed on principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Inayat versus Altaf Ali and others (2005 SCMR 1123), wherein it has been held that limitation to file suit for possession through pre- emption would start to run from the date of attestation of mutation and not from the previous date on which the patwari has entered the same in the record, especially when possession had not delivered on the date when patwari made entry in record. The relevant portion of judgment is reproduced below:

“It would be appropriate to mention here that mutation was entered by Patwari on 28‐3‐1974 while the same was sanctioned on 21‐10‐1974. The learned Courts below have rightly stated that the limitation would start in this case from the date of attestation of mutation i.e. 21‐10‐1974 as no date of change of possession was mentioned in the mutation. Admittedly, the sale in this case took place on 21‐10‐1974, the day on which the mutation was attested. None of the witnesses has stated that the possession was taken at the time of entry of mutation on 28‐3‐1974 (Exh.B1).”

11.The question that next arises is that in cases where notice is not issued by the attesting officer in terms of Section 31 of the Act, whether the limitation period would stand extended or would commence from the date of knowledge. Bare reading of Section 31 shows that it neither changes the date of commencement of period of limitation nor purports to enhance limitation for filing the suit, rather it merely provides that the officer registering the sale deed or attesting the mutation of a sale is required to give public notice in respect of such registration or attestation within two weeks of the registration or attestation, as the case may be. The said notice shall be deemed to have been sufficiently given if it is displayed on the main entrance of a mosque and on any other public place of the village or place where the property is situated. Hence the provisions of Section 31 of the Act, which do not relate to limitation for filing the suit for pre-emption, do not support the contention of the petitioner for seeking time beyond the period of limitation provided under section 30 of the Act and the petitioner was required to file the suit for possession of pre-emption within limitation period of four months from the date of attestation of mutation and not from the date of knowledge. Reliance in this behalf may be placed on Qasim Ali versus Rehmatullah (2005 SCMR 1926), wherein it is mentioned that in case where sale is made through

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registered sale deed, paragraph (a) of Section 30 of the Act was attracted and the date of registered sale-deed was terminus a quo for computing the limitation period. It was moreover held that the provisions of Section 30 of the Act operate proprio vogore and are independent of Section 31 of the Act and the period of limitation for filing the pre-emption suit is governed by Section 30 and not by section 31 of the Act.

12.In support of the aforementioned conclusion, it is pertinent to mention here that question of limitation in terms of Sections 30 and 31 of Act was considered by the Supreme Court in Mst. Kausar Parveen versus Muhammad Iqbal (PLD 2012 SC 760), wherein it has been held as under:

“4. We have examined both the judgments and have also applied our mind to the provisions of sections 30 and 31 of the Act. In our candid view, both these sections are independent of each other having no effect and impact on each other. Though it is mandated by section 31 of the Act that a public notice be issued in terms thereof, but by no stretch of interpretation this provision (Section 31) can be held to regulate and control the period of limitation prescribed by Section 30, which section in clear and unequivocal terms prescribes "the period of limitation for a suit to enforce a right of preemption under this Act shall be four months from the date--(a) of the registration of the sale-deed". If the intention of the legislature was to make the above period of limitation subject and subservient to the requirement of section 31, the legislature would have clearly indicated its intention by the use of appropriate expression and/or words in either of the two sections, such as, that subject to the issuance of a notice under section 31 the period of limitation shall be four months in the cases covered by subsections (a) and (b) of section 30. But, this is not so and, therefore, we cannot read into section 30 by implication or on the basis of any other rule of interpretation the provisions of section 31 and the requirement of notice as a condition precedent for computing the period of limitation and to hold that in the absence thereof (the notice), the date of knowledge shall be the starting point of four months limitation.

5.As regards the question about the effect and interaction of section 30(d) and the preceding clauses (a)(b)(c) thereto, it may be held that section 30 has four parts/components, each of which is a separate and independent provision in its self-contemplating different eventualities for the purpose of limitation of four months, the language in this context of all the clauses of the section are clear and unambiguous, section 30(d) is not an exception to clauses (a) to (c), rather it is a residual provision and would only come into play if none of the preceding clauses are applicable/attracted. But, where a case is covered by any specific earlier clause, clause (d) cannot be resorted to. In view of the above, this appeal has no merit and is accordingly dismissed.”

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13.Moreover while addressing the question of limitation, where property had been sold through mutation, in Muhammad Zahid versus Dr. Muhammad Ali (PLD 2014 SC 488), the Supreme Court has held that:

"6. It is correct that according to the entries in the daily diary maintained by the patwari, the appellant has been shown to have taken physical possession of the suit property under the sale, but for the purpose of reckoning limitation, the date of taking physical possession in terms of section 30(c) of the Act, would be relevant only when the sale has been made otherwise than through a registered sale deed or a mutation. Since the sale in this case has been admittedly made through a mutation, the period of limitation would be reckoned from the date of attestation of mutation. The argument of the learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellant that suit of the respondent is barred in view of the provision contained in section 30(c) of the Act, is, therefore, devoid of force."

14.The question that next arises is that what would be the purpose of Section 31 of the Act requiring issuance of notice of registration of sale deed and attestation of mutation, especially when it does not affect the period of limitation for filing the suit. To consider the said question reference may be made to judgment by this Court in Shoukat Hayat versus Liaquat Khan (2005 YLR 60 Lahore) wherein while discussing the provision of scope and impact of Sections 13, 30 and 31 of the Act, it has been held as under:- “7. I have anxiously considered the respective arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record, appended herewith. Undeniably, no notice in terms of section 31 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 has been issued by the concerned Revenue official and the argument that mutation by itself be considered as a notice to the public at large, is not only contrary to the provisions of Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 but if accepted, would make the provision of sections 13, 30 and 31 of the said Act, redundant. The respondent in his plaint has specifically denied notice of sale besides asserting that the mutation was stealthily got sanctioned and in view of these assertions and similar statement while in the witness-box, he cannot be assumed to have notice of the mutation and could not be expected to make Talb-i-Muwathibat on the date of mutation. In the case of Muhammad Ramzan (supra) the pre-emptor being a co-sharer had not claimed that he was not aware of sanctioning of mutation and had not denied its notice, thus, the view taken was that he will be presumed to have a notice but in the case in hand, facts are absolutely otherwise as observed above. Similarly ratio of other judgment relied by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the case in hand which proceed on its own circumstances.” (emphasis supplied)

15.Keeping in view what has been discussed in the judgment mentioned above, to consider purpose of Section 31, the provision of sections 13, 30 and 31 of the Act are to be considered together and in juxtaposition with each other. From

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reading of Section 13 of the Act it is clear when the fact of sale comes within the knowledge of pre-emptor through any source, he is required to make Talb-i- muwathibat by immediate demand in the sitting or meeting (Majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale, declaring his intention to exercise the right of pre- emption, any delay in making the said demand is fatal. The said demand has to be followed by Talb-i-Ishhad by sending notices as soon as possible but not later than fourteen days of making talb-i-Muwathibat followed by filing suit for possession of property through pre-emption within period of limitation prescribed in Section 30 of the Act. In this scenario the time of making Talb-i-Muwathibat is of paramount importance in filing the suit for pre-emption and for making such demand knowledge of sale is the starting point, which knowledge in most cases is received verbally through an informer. In view of the principles laid down in the judgment of Shoukat Hayat (supra), read with Sections 13, 30 and 31 of the Act, it is clear that although the suit has to be filed within 4 months from the date of registration of sale deed or attestation of mutation or taking over of the possession of land as the case may be, the time for making talb-i-muwathibat would be ascertained with reference to the knowledge of the pre-emptor and not from the date of sale as the pre-emptor is not expected to present at the time of sale, more so when it is surreptitiously made, hence, Section 31 of the Act makes it mandatory for the relevant officer to issue notice through modes provided in the said section so that all the concerned may attain knowledge of sale and the same would be helpful to the pre-emptor to make requisite demands/talabs. Needless to repeat that the same would still not enhance the period of limitation prescribed in Section 30 of the Act for filing the suit. As a necessary corollary it may be observed that if the pre-emptor obtains knowledge of sale on the date which is the last date for filing the suit for possession of property through pre-emption, he is required to make all the three demands i.e. Talb-i-Muwathibat (jumping demand to be made orally at the spot), Talb-i-Ishhad (demand through notice in writing attested by two witnesses) and Talb-i-Khusumat (filing suit for possession through pre-emption) on the same day and the pre-emptor could not in ordinary circumstances, subject to certain exceptions, one of which is discussed below, file the suit beyond the period of limitation.

16.In furtherance to what has been discussed above, it might happen that the petitioner obtains knowledge of sale beyond the period of limitation as has

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been claimed in the present suit. In that eventuality although the suit is already barred by limitation, the pre-emptor to lodge his claim has to immediately perform talb-i-muwathibat on the same date and immediately thereafter perform talb-i- ishhad and he is required to perform talb-i-khusumat by filing the suit without any further delay and while filing the suit seek exemption from limitation in terms of Order 7 Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, which is reproduced below: ‘Grounds of exemption from limitation law. Where the suit is instituted after the expiration of the period prescribed by the law of limitation, the plaint shall show the grounds upon which exemption from such law is claimed.’

17.A similar situation had arisen before this Court in Muhammad Ilyas versus Muhammad Bashir (PLD 2006 Lahore 365 = PLJ 2006 Lahore 642), wherein the matter before this Court was that sale of suit land was made on 10.12.2002 and the pre-emptor claimed to have obtained knowledge of the same on 19.06.2003 and filed pre-emption suit on 26.06.2006, which was obviously beyond the period of four months prescribed by Section 30 of the Act and this Court observed that the plaintiff of pre-emption suit to seek exemption from limitation has to show and state in the plaint the grounds upon which the exemption from limitation is claimed. The operative portion is reproduced below for clarity: “7. However despite the above, the question may arise, if by virtue of section 29 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the prescribed and conclusive period of four months can be extended, when the plaintiff has brought his case within the scope and purview of any of the sections 4, 9 to 18 or 22 of the law ibid. The answer to the above due to the clear and express language of section 29 is free from any difficulty. This section which is the part of the general law of the land on the subject of limitation, in unambiguous terms enunciates that it shall apply to the special or local laws, until and unless its applicability is expressly excluded. The Act 1991, which is a special law is silent about the exclusion of section 29, meaning thereby that the plaintiff in a pre-emption matter can take the benefit of the section if he has made out a case squarely falling within the provisions, mentioned therein. But before a plaintiff of a pre-emption cause can take benefit of the said section, he according to Order VII, Rule 6, C.P.C. has to show and state in the plaint the grounds upon which the exemption from the limitation is claimed; this is mandatory and foundational in nature, without which no structure of proof can be raised. The plaint of the instant case has been perused and it is found conspicuously lacking in this behalf. Not only that no ground of exemption on the basis of section 18 of the Limitation Act, which at the most was attracted to the petitioner's case, has been set out, rather without specifying as to when the cause of action has risen in favour of the plaintiff, it is mentioned

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""یہ کہ بناۓ واقعات مندرجہ باال سے بحق مدعی برخالف مدعا علیہ پیدا ہوئ ہے Therefore, I am of the considered view, that no case for the exclusion of the time from four months period was either claimed or set out by the petitioner on any count.”

18.In addition to what has been discussed above, the claim of the petitioner is that the sale was surreptitiously made and the notice in terms of Section 31 of the Act was not issued. Needless to mention that in somewhat similar situation, while discussing the case of exemption from limitation under Order VII Rule 6 of CPC on basis of concealment of sale in Jahana versus Sher Muhammad and others (PLD 1961 Lahore 1042), this Court held that where pre-emptor does not show that the vendors and the vendees had an intention to deceive him, mere concealment of sale subject to right of pre-emption does not imply fraud.

19.In the present case, the petitioner after expiry of limitation period for filing suit received knowledge of sale on 16.05.2024 and performed Talb-i- Muwathibat on the same day and on the very next day i.e. 17.05.2024 performed Talb-i-Ishhad, however, thereafter without any explanation given in the plaint waited till 24.06.2024 to file the suit. The petitioner although mentioned in the plaint that the sale had been surreptitiously made but has not in terms of Order VII Rule 6 CPC stated in the plaint that the same was done in order to deceive him to deprive him from exercising his right of pre-emption through concealment and fraud, and has not made any attempt to bring the same within the scope and purview of any of Sections 4, 9 to 18 or 22 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for claiming exemption from limitation on the said account, hence petitioner in the present circumstances of the case could not be allowed benefit of aforementioned Sections for exemption in limitation, especially of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which could be considered closest to his stance and in the said circumstances delay in filing the suit was fatal for his suit for possession through pre-emption.

20.In view of what has been discussed above the limitation in the instant case commenced from the date of attestation of mutation on 21.11.2024 and the suit for possession through pre-emption was required to be filed latest by 21.03.2026, which had not been done and exemption from limitation in view of Order VII rule 6 CPC has also not been claimed and in this view of the matter the question of limitation in the given circumstances could not be treated as a mixed

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question of law and fact to entitle the petitioner to lead evidence on the said aspect of the matter and the said question could be summarily decided in view of facts and circumstances of the instant case. The impugned order has not been shown to be suffering from any illegality or jurisdictional defect for this Court to warrant interference, hence the finding recorded by the appellate court to dismiss the suit by holding that suit for possession of property through pre-emption filed by the petitioner on 24.06.2025 was clearly barred by limitation is upheld.

21.As it has been held that the suit of the petitioner was clearly barred by limitation and had rightly been dismissed on the said account, no useful purpose would be served by discussing the question as to whether the amount of Zar-e- Soim was paid within time or not as whatever the decision of the said issue may be the same would not change conclusion reached by the court that suit was rightly dismissed as barred by limitation.

22.For what has been discussed above, instant civil revision being devoid of merits is dismissed. No orders as to costs.

(MUZAMIL AKHTAR SHABIR)

JUDGE

Naveed *

APPROVED FOR REPORTING