Allah Wasaya & 8 Others Vs Muhammad Hanif etc

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,

LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P.No.48656 of 2026 (Allah Wasaya etc. vs. Hameedan Bibi and others ) W.P.No.48651 of 2026 (Allah Wasaya etc. vs. Muhammad Hanif and others )

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 18.09.2026.

Petitioners by: M/s Ch.Irshad Ullah Chattha, Ch.Muhammad Asif Chattha, Muhammad Jamil, Advocates.

State by: Syed Faisal Raza Bukhari, Assistant Advocate General Respondent No.1 by: Mr.Muhammad Nadeem Mehar, Advocate.

Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, J. By way of this single judgment, I propose to decide the above-titled writ petitions filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, as common questions of law and facts are involved.

The petitioners have prayed for holding in abeyance the proceedings in case F.I.Rs. No.997/2026, 996/2026, both dated 20.07.2026, for offences under sections 420, 468 and 471, P.P.C. registered at Police Station B-Division, Kasur, lodged at the instance of Hameedan Bibi (respondent No.1 in W.P.No.48656 of 2026) and Muhammad Hanif (respondent No.1 in W.P.No.48651/2026) till the decision of the civil suits.

2.As would appear in the sequel, the controversy herein is essentially a legal question which does not require the factual matrix in detail, however, some necessary facts are being

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mentioned as to understand the background. The sum total of both the above said F.I.Rs is that Hameedan Bibi (respondent No.1 in W.P.No.48656 of 2026) and Muhammad Hanif (respondent No.1 in W.P.No.48651/2026) are spouses, they are senior citizens, aged 66 and 70. The couple is issueless; her husband has no brothers or sisters and has been suffering from a prolonged illness. About one year ago, he suffered a paralysis attack and has been under continuous medical treatment. Due to their old age, poverty, and her husband's illness, the petitioners, being their relatives and trusted persons, had been taking her husband to the hospital for his treatment. Her husband gifted 24 Kanals of agricultural land in her favor through Gift Deed No. 6514-2025-087 dated 21.08.2025. It is alleged that the petitioners in connivance with each other planned to usurp the property of the aforesaid respondents/complainants through fraud, deception and forgery by way of obtaining thumb impressions on papers on the pretext for registration of the names of the respondents/complainants in the "Maryam Nawaz Sharif Ramzan Rashan Program etc.". It is alleged that the said documents were used for the preparation of bogus agreements to sell regarding the landed property owned by the respondents/complainants along with receipts showing payments of Rupees 15 million and 19 million in cash to the respondents/complainants whereas nominal amounts had been shown as balance sale consideration to be paid at the time of formal transfer by way of sale deeds etc. It is alleged that the respondents/complainants came to know about the above said documents when they received summons/notices from the civil courts where the petitioners filed civil suits for possession through specific performance.

3.The main argument as articulated by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the criminal proceedings in pursuance of

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the above F.I.Rs are liable to be held in abeyance because the agreements to sell and the receipts forming the subject-matter of the aforesaid F.I.Rs and civil suits are the same. He has placed reliance upon section 195(1)(c) read with section 476 of The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.). In addition to the above, the learned counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the principle of law enunciated by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in cases titled as “Muhammad Akbar v. The State” (PLD 1968 SC 281) and “Salman Ashraf versus Additional District Judge, Lahore and others” (2023 SCMR 1292).

4.Learned AAG and learned counsel for the private respondents, have opposed the prayer.

5.In order to appreciate the first contention by the learned counsel for the petitioner, section 195(1)(c) Cr.P.C. is reproduced hereunder:-

195.(1) No Court shall take cognizance: -- (a).....

(b).....

(c)Prosecution for certain offences relating to documents given in evidence; Of any offence described in Section 463 or punishable under Section 471, Section 475 or Section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate.

(2)In Clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1), the term "Court" includes a Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but does not include a Registrar or sub-Registrar under the Registration Act, 1908.

(3)For the purposes of this section, a Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the appealable decrees or sentences of such former Court, or in the case of a Civil Court from whose decrees no appeal, ordinarily lies, to the principal Court having ordinary, original civil jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such Civil Court, is situate: Provided that—

(a)where appeals lie to more than one Court, the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the Court to which such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate; and (b) where appeals tie to a Civil and also to a Revenue Court, such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the Civil or Revenue Court according to the nature of the case

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or proceeding in connection with which the offence is alleged to have been committed.

(4)The provisions of sub-section (1), with reference to the offenses named therein, apply also to criminal conspiracies to commit such offenses and to the abetment of such offenses, and attempts to commit them.

(5)Where a complaint has been made under sub-section (1) clause (a), by a public servant, any authority to which such public servant is subordinate may order the withdrawal of the complaint and, if it does so, it shall forward a copy of such order to the Court, and upon receipt thereof by the Court, no further proceedings shall be taken on the complaint.”

The scope and extent of a bar in terms of section 195 (1)(c) Cr.PC has been well elaborately explained by Justice Fazal Karim (as his lordship then was) in 1Muhammad Shafi’s case, he while speaking for the full Bench of this Court traced the legislative history of Section 195 Cr.P.C. and after using various recognized tools of interpretation of statutes to find out legislative intent, held as under:-

25.Section 195, subsection (1), clause (c) and section 476, in their present form, were enacted in 1923. As was said in the report of the Select Committee. which drafted the bill: "In our view section 195 should bar the cognizance by any Court of offences of this nature except upon such complaint, while the procedure to be followed when the Court desires to prosecute should be prescribed by section 476." The two sections were, therefore, intended to be complementary to each other and must, therefore, be read together. As we have seen, the expression "in, or in relation to" occurs in clause (b) of section 195 (1), but does not occur in clause (c) thereof. But in section 476, subsection (1), the expression 'in or in relation to' has been used in relation to all the offences mentioned in both the clauses. Section 476, subsection (1), is, therefore, what is called ' the legislative interpretation of clause (c) of section 195 (1). It makes it transparently clear that both in the case of clause (b) and clause (c) the offences must have been committed in or in relation to the proceedings in Court. Section 476-A of the Muhammad Shafi vs. Deputy Superintendent of Police (Malik Gul Nawaz), Narowal and 5 others (PLD 1992 Lahore 178)

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Code of Criminal Procedure, which, in its present form, was enacted in 1972, puts the matter beyond doubt by providing: “if the Court in any case considers that the person accused of any of the offences referred to in section 476, subsection (1), and committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding before it, should not be tried under that section, such Court may forward the case to a Court having jurisdiction". (The underlining is mine).

The express use of the words "before it" in this section seems to me to be a clear and unmistakable evidence of the legislature itself having adopted and approved the view which had committed itself to the learned Judges -Kushal Pal Singh's and La1jibhai Somabhai's cases and which I have respectfully adopted.

26.1 am, therefore, of the view that the word "party" in the expression "when such offences alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court" in clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 195, must derive its colour and content from its context, and am in respectful agreement with the learned Judges who take the view that the word "party" must mean a party, who was a party to the proceedings before the Court at the time when the offence of forgery was committed.

27.On two well-established principles, the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. must be construed strictly. First, the proper place for the determination of a person's guilt or innocence is a criminal and not a Civil Court or Revenue Court. But section 195 read with section 476 of the Cr.P.C. empowers the Courts, other than the Criminal Courts also to try the guilt or innocence of persons. This is, therefore, a provision, which deprives the ordinary Criminal Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction, and should be on the principle illustrated by Anisminic Ltd. v. Foreign Compensation Commission (1969) 2 A.C. 147 construed strictly. Secondly section 195 is an exception to the general rule that any person may set the criminal law in motion, its consequence being to take away the right of redress of persons. The rule that governs such provision is well-stated in Maxwell at page 251:

"Statutes which encroach on the rights of subjects whether as regards person or property, are subject to a strict construction

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in the same way as penal Acts. It is a recognized rule that they should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights, and if there is any ambiguity the construction which is in favour of the freedom of the individual should be adopted."

As the two interpretations of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. are so evenly balanced, the one that does not deprive the ordinary Criminal Courts of their ordinary jurisdiction and persons of the right of redress must be adopted. On that view of the matter also, the view that clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. does not apply to cases in which the forgery was committed before the institution of a suit or other proceedings in which the forged document is produced or given in evidence should, in my opinion, be preferred.

28.Justice would be a simple matter, says Plato, if men were simple. One does not have to strain one's imagination to conjure up extreme cases to demonstrate that men are not simple and that on the view contended for by the petitioners, the provisions of clause (c) of section 195, subsection (1), are liable to be grossly abused by unscrupulous persons. One of the cases before us, Cr.Misc.2129/B/90, itself provides a striking illustration. The complainant, Muhammad Safdar, had let his shop to Ghulam Sabir. The latter made default in the payment of rent and Muhammad Safdar instituted an eviction petition under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, before Rent Controller, Lahore. The Rent Controller made an eviction order. The tenant’s appeal before the District Court failed on 2-7-1989 and the tenant was directed to hand over vacant possession of the shop to Muhammad Safdar by 2-9-1990. Against the District Court's order, the tenant filed a writ petition; that too was dismissed and the tenant was allowed time to vacate the shop till 30-3-1990. There was then a petition before the Supreme Court, which was dismissed on 29-11-1989. After having suffered all that ordeal and having obtained the eviction order at such great expense, Muhammad Safdar must have thought that his troubles were at an end. But that was not to be, for in so thinking, he had not taken into account the ingenuity of men. He filed

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an execution petition and when the Bailiff went to the spot to deliver possession, he was shown a stay order by the Civil Court. Muhammad Safdar then learnt, and must indeed have learnt to his great shock and surprise, that on the basis of an agreement of sale dated 23-8-1989, Ishfaq Ahmad, petitioner, in Cr.Misc. No.2129/B/90, claimed to have purchased the shop from him, Muhammad Safdar, for Rs.1,00,000; that he had paid Rs.30,000 also to the tenant and that the tenant had placed him in possession of the shop. Muhammad Safdar learnt also that Ishfaq Ahmad had instituted a suit for the specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 23-8-1989 and that it was in that suit that the execution of the eviction order had been stayed. As, according to him, the agreement of sale dated 23-8-1989 was a forged document and it had been forged to deprive him of his hard earned eviction order, which had been upheld up to the Supreme Court, and the suit for specific performance was a clever device to deprive him of the fruit of the eviction order, he rightly felt aggrieved and lodged an F.I.R. under sections 420, 468, 471 etc. of the P.P.C. It is obvious that the principal ground urged by Ishfaq Ahmad for the grant of pre-arrest bail was that as the agreement of sale dated 23-8-1989 had been produced in his suit for specific performance, clause (c) of section 195, subsection (1), applied and the police had jurisdiction neither to register the case nor to investigate it. The facts speak for themselves. It is plain that if the agreement of sale dated 23-8-1989 is in fact, a forged document, then to hold the provisions of section 195 of the Cr.P.C. applicable would be to encourage fraud and forgery and to allow the Civil Courts to be used as a place for the protection of criminals.

6.Again, in Rashid Javed’s case, this court, while following the above ratio as also the judgments by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, held as under:- Bare reading of the afore quoted provisions of section 195(1)(c) of Cr.P.C. reveals that the same deals only with taking of cognizance of an offence by the Court and it does not place any embargo upon reporting of alleged forgery to the police for Rashid Javed and another vs. The State and 3 others (2015 P Cr.LJ 1115)

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registration of FIR with regard to conducting of investigation in respect of such an allegation. The said provision therefore does not impose any prohibition on registration of any criminal case. It is so held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of (i) Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan and others v. Mian Asim Fareed and others (2006 SCMR 483) and (ii) Muhammad Nazir v. Fazal Karim and others (PLD 2012 Supreme Court 892).

“It is established by now that section 195(1)(c), Cr.P.C. is not applicable to the cases in which forgery was allegedly committed before the institution of the suit or other proceedings in which the forged document was produced or given in evidence. It is so held in the case of Muhammad Shafi (supra). In such cases police is bound to register the case in terms of section 154 Cr.P.C. without permission of any court if such statement of complainant discloses any cognizable offence. Provisions of section 195(1)(c) and 476(1), Cr.P.C. do not create any bar to set in motion the process of registration of criminal case where the forgery was allegedly committed before the institution, of the suit in which forged document was given in evidence.”

7.Now it would be fair to comment upon, the second reliance by the learned counsel for the petitioners i.e. ratio of Muhammad Akbar’s case, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereunder:- “Normally it is true that criminal proceedings should not be postponed pending the disposal of Civil litigation connected with the same subject-matter. But where it is clear that the criminal liability is dependent upon the result of the Civil litigation or is so intimately connected with it that there is a danger of grave injustice being done in the case if there be a conflict of decision between the Civil Court and the Criminal Court. In such event it is equally clear that the Criminal Court has not only the right to but should also stay its hands until the Civil litigation is disposed of, for, it is not desirable that when the title to the property itself is in dispute, the Criminal Courts should give a finding in respect of the same question.” It is pertinent to mention here that the above principle of law was enunciated on the following facts:- From the above recital of facts it will appear that the suit for the dissolution of the partnership has not been finally disposed of as yet. Even the second suit for declaration and Muhammad Akbar vs. (1) The State (PLD 1968 Supreme Court 281)

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injunction is not concluded, for, no final adjudication has yet been made of the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. The motor bus, with respect to which the offence of theft is alleged to have been committed, is admittedly registered in the name of the partnership firm. It is clear, therefore, that the ownership of the vehicle is in serious dispute. Though the father of the complainant claims that it was he who had purchased the vehicle, the vehicle, it being seen, was treated as an asset of the partnership firm and was registered in the name of the firm. Thus until its ownership is decided, it cannot be said that it had been wrongfully taken away from the possession of Mulla Abdul Karim. Now this question of ownership of the vehicle is itself sub judice. Its fate will depend upon the final decree in the suit for dissolution of partnership. If it is awarded to Mulla Abdul Karim then and only then will his ownership be established. It cannot, therefore, be said that the subject‐matter of the dispute in the criminal litigation is not dependent upon the decision in the civil litigation. If it is found to be an asset of the partnership then a managing co‐partner has the right to retain possession of it until the civil Court takes it away from him. By merely forcibly taking it away from the custody of another partner he cannot be said to have committed theft of it, for, such taking away would, in the circumstances, be in assertion of a bona fide claim of right. In these circumstances the question arises as to whether the learned Judge of the High Court had exercised his discretion rightly in staying the criminal proceedings until the question of title had itself been decided in the pending Civil litigation.”

The ratio of Muhammad Akbar’s case was examined by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in 4Syed Mohammad Ahmad’s case, the relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereunder:- “In PLD 1968 SC 281 this Court did not lay down any invariable principle that whenever the subject- matter of the two proceedings are the same, the criminal proceedings should be postponed pending the disposal of the civil litigation. On the contrary, the Court said. “Normally it is true that criminal proceedings should not be postponed pending the disposal of civil litigation connected with the same subject-matter...”

8.So far as the reliance upon Salman Ashraf’s case, by learned counsel for the petitioners is concerned, it has also not disturbed the above ratio; rather, both the above cases, i.e., Muhammad Akbar and Syed Muhammad Ahmad, have been Syed Mohammad Ahmad vs. The State (1972 SCMR 85)

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cited with approval. The cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners are distinguishable on both law and facts as in both the cases, civil and criminal actions were pending before courts, hence, the same do not support the prayer for holding the proceedings of the above said F.I.Rs in abeyance at this stage.

9.Now at this juncture, it is necessary to cite the basic rule of criminal cases as laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in a well-known case of 5Ghulam Muhammad. Its relevant portion is as under:- “...if, in fact, an offence had been committed justice required that it should be enquired into and tried. If the respondents are not guilty they have a right to be declared as honourably acquitted by a competent Court. On the other hand, if the evidence against the respondents discloses a prima facie case then justice clearly requires that the trial should proceed according to law. The mere fact that a long period has expired-sine the initiation of proceedings is no ground for quashing the criminal proceeding. The inherent jurisdiction given by section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is not an alternative jurisdiction or an additional jurisdiction but it is a jurisdiction preserved in the interest of justice to redress grievances for which no other procedure is available or have been provided by the code itself.”

10.The afore-stated view and principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in other cases as well, which came before it through the jurisdiction of the High Court other than section 561-A, Cr.P.C. They included revisional and writ jurisdictions. See Abdur Rehman Bajwa v. Sultan and 9 others, PLD 1981 SC 522, and Abdul Aleem v. Special Judge (Customs), Lahore 1982 SCMR 73. The case of Abdul Aleem had arisen out of a similar case. A learned Special Judge/Customs, notwithstanding the legal objections raised by the accused regarding the competency of the criminal proceedings before him, formally charged the accused. A criminal revision filed by him, having Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan (PLD 1967 SC 317) A.Habib Ahmed vs. M.K.G. Scott Christian and 5 others (PLD 1992 Supreme Court

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been dismissed, he sought relief for quashment of the criminal case through a Writ Petition, and the same had to be dismissed mainly on the ground that the High Court would not “in its discretionary jurisdiction short circuit the normal procedure of trial as provided by law”. This Court refused to grant leave to appeal. It was observed as follows:- “We are of the view that the approach of the learned Single Judge in the High Court in refusing to deflect the normal course of a criminal case through exercise of writ jurisdiction is not only salutary but also in accord with the principles laid down by this Court in Ghulam Muhammad v. Muzammal Khan and 4 others PLD 1967 SC 317, although the case dealt with therein...”

11.There is a plethora of judgments on the issue as to whether criminal proceedings may continue or sustain when civil suits on the same subject are pending before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Some of which are cited below with relevant extracts:-

Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem’s case;

“We have given our anxious consideration to the contention of the learned counsel of the parties and perused the record. The contention of learned counsel for the respondent that the dispute between the parties is of a civil nature has no force in view of the law laid down by this Court in Ahmad Saeed v. The State 1996 SCMR 186. It is also settled law that criminal proceedings are not barred by the presence of civil proceedings and that civil and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Reference can be made to the following cases:--- Talab Hussain v. Anar Gul Khan and 4 others 1993 SCMR 2177 and Deputy Inspector-General of Police v. Anees-ur- Rehman Khan PLD 1985 SC 134.

It is also settled law that if, prima facie, an offence had been committed, the ordinary course of trial before the Court should not to be allowed to be deflected by resorting constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. By accepting the constitutional petition the High Court erred in law to short circuit the normal procedure of law as provided by law B while exercising equitable jurisdiction which is not in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in Habib Ahmed v. M.K.G. Scott Christian PLD 1992 SC 353.”

Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem vs. Muhammad Ashraf and others (2006 SCMR 1192)

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Seema Fareed’s case;

“It is well-settled that a criminal case must be allowed to proceed on its own merits and merely because civil proceedings relating to same transaction have been instituted it has never been considered to be a legal bar to the maintainability of criminal proceedings which can proceed concurrently because conviction for a criminal offence is altogether a different matter from the civil liability. While the spirit and purpose of criminal proceedings is to punish the offender for the commission of a crime the purpose behind the civil proceedings is to enforce civil rights arising out of contracts and in law both the proceedings can co- exist and proceed with simultaneously without any legal restriction.”

Muhammad Aslam’s case;

“The law is settled that there is no universal principle that whenever a civil suit and a criminal case involve similar or identical subject matters the proceedings before the criminal court must necessarily be stayed and a reference in this respect may be made to the cases of Syed Mohammad Ahmad v. The State (1972 SCMR 85), Muhammad Akbar v. The State and another (PLD 1968 SC 281), Soofi Muhammad Anwar v. Mst. Badshah Begum and 6 others (1999 SCMR 1475), M. Aslam Zaheer v. Ch. Shah Muhammad and another (2003 SCMR 1691), Rafique Bibi v. Muhammad Sharif and others (2006 SCMR 512), Haji Sardar Khalid Saleem v. Muhammad Ashraf and others (2006 SCMR 1192), Abdul Ahad v. Amjad Ali and others (PLD 2006 SC 771) and Seema Fareed and others v. The State and another

(2008 SCMR 839).

Abdul Ahad’s case;

“ There is now consensus of opinion that there is no invariable rule that a criminal proceeding should be stayed pending the decision of civil suit but the matter is one of discretion entirely. While exercising discretion the guiding principle should be to see as to whether the accused is likely to be prejudiced if the criminal proceedings are not stayed in case of dispute regarding title where it is difficult to draw a line between a bona fide claim and the criminal action.”

Seema Fareed and others vs. The State and another (2008 SCMR 839), Muhammad Aslam vs. The State and others (2017 SCMR 390) Abdul Ahad v. Amjad Ali and others (PLD 2006 Supreme Court 771)

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Qaiser Jabbar’s case:-

“14.....this Court declined to entertain the argument that pendency of a civil suit between the parties should bar the criminal prosecution under the 2005 Act. It reiterated that the existence of a civil dispute does not ipso facto nullify or suspend the jurisdiction of the criminal court, nor does it affect the maintainability of a complaint under the 2005 Act.

15.In view of the aforementioned, it follows that a complaint filed under the provisions of the 2005 Act is maintainable even where civil proceedings between the parties are ongoing. The dual-trace nature of civil and criminal liabilities permits both to proceed independently and simultaneously. Any summary dismissal of a criminal complaint solely on the ground of the existence of a pending civil dispute is legally untenable and contrary to the settled jurisdiction, unless the trial court comes to the conclusion that the complainant is abusing the process of the law or the filing of the complaint is a nefarious design to convert a civil dispute into a criminal one.

12.In view of the above principles of law enunciated from time to time, the legal position is crystal clear. This court cannot go into any controversy entailing factual inquiry. The above F.I.Rs are still at the stage of investigation, reports under section 173 Cr.P.C are yet to be submitted and it would be a matter of discretion entirely of the trial court to determine as to whether this is a case of bona fide claim and it should stay its hands until the civil litigation is disposed of. Hence, no action is called for by this Court in its constitutional jurisdiction at this stage.

13.For what has been discussed above, these petitions fail and are hereby dismissed being bereft of merit. Before parting with this judgment, it is made clear that the observations made hereinabove are confined to the legal questions involved in this Qaiser Jabbar vs. Syed Mati Ullah Shah and others (PLD 2026 Supreme Court 333)

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case and the same shall not prejudice the rights of either of the parties during the course of trial, both on the civil and criminal side.

(Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz) Judge This judgment has been pronounced on 18.09.2026 dictated, prepared and signed on 22.09.2026

M.J.Mehmood

Approved for reporting

Judge.