Fahad Anwar Vs Muhammad Nawaz etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Criminal Appeal No.51144 of 2026 (Fahad Anwar v. Muhammad Nawaz, etc.)

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 18.09.2026

Appellant by: Mr. Ghulam Abbas, Advocate.

State by: Mr. Rana Tassawar Ali Khan, Additional Prosecutor General with Javed Sub Inspector.

Respondent No.2 Mr. Azeem Akram, Advocate.

and 3 by:

Amicus Curiae: Mr. Anjum Abbas Surbana, Barrister Haider Rasool Mirza and Barrister Raham Zafar, Advocates.

MUHAMMAD JAWAD ZAFAR, J.: Through this criminal appeal, filed under Section 417(2-A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (“Code” or “Cr.P.C”), Fahad Anwar (“appellant”) has impugned the judgment dated 07.07.2026 (“impugned judgment””) passed by the learned Magistrate Section-30, Model Town Courts, District Lahore (“trial court”) arising out of crime report bearing No.1916 of 2021, dated 03.10.2021, for offences under Sections 337-A(i), 337-L(ii), 354, 506 read with Section 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (“PPC”), registered with Police Station Ichra (“crime report” or “FIR”) whereby the learned trial court acquitted the respondents No.2 and 3 of the charge leveled against them.

2.Learned counsel for the appellant/informant contends that the impugned judgment is illegal and unsustainable in law as the entire prosecution evidence was recorded without framing a charge, in violation of the mandatory sequence prescribed by the Code, and that

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the charge framed after the close of the prosecution evidence could not validate the proceedings already conducted. He maintains that the evidence recorded before the framing of the charge has no legal sanctity, so that the trial stands vitiated. According to him, once the charge was framed, the learned trial Court was bound to proceed with the trial afresh, and it erred in dismissing the informant's application for a de novo trial. He further submits that since the application was dismissed and the final judgment was pronounced on the very same day, the informant was left with no opportunity to challenge the dismissal of the application independently.

3.Conversely, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 supported the impugned judgment. He contends that the belated framing of the charge was, at most, a curable irregularity. According to his submissions, it neither vitiated the trial nor rendered the evidence already recorded a nullity. The respondents remained present and represented throughout the trial, and the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined in their presence. The informant has not shown that the belated framing of the charge caused any prejudice to the prosecution. He points out that the objection was raised only after the entire evidence had been recorded. According to him, the prayer for a de novo trial is merely an attempt to secure a second opportunity to fill the lacunae in the prosecution case. He further submits that the respondents were acquitted on a proper appraisal of the evidence, that an acquittal carries a double presumption of innocence, and that no ground for interference is made out. He accordingly prays for dismissal of the appeal.

4.In view of the importance of the legal question involved, this Court appointed amici curiae to assist it. I have also heard the learned amici curiae, Mr. Anjum Abbas Surbana, Advocate, Barrister Haider Rasool Mirza, Advocate, and Barrister Rahim Zafar, Advocate, who were present in Court and addressed detailed submissions on the effect of the belated framing of a charge and the circumstances in which a de

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novo trial may be ordered. Mr. Anjum Abbas Surbana, Advocate, also submitted a written research note that surveys the relevant provisions of the Code and the case law on the subject, which has been of considerable assistance to the Court. I place on record my appreciation for the sincere efforts, time and research that all three learned amici curiae devoted to assisting the Court.

5.Arguments heard and record, including the impugned judgment, perused.

6.Before examining the effect of the belated framing of the charge by the learned trial Court, it is appropriate to consider the legal significance and purpose of framing a charge. A charge is the formal and precise statement of the accusation which an accused is called upon to answer at the trial. It identifies the offence alleged against him, specifies the essential facts constituting that offence, and defines the scope of the controversy which the Court is required to adjudicate. It is not a mere procedural formality but an important safeguard, forming part of the statutory scheme of a fair criminal trial.

7.The legislative scheme appears from Chapter XIX of the Code, comprising sections 221 to 240 of the Code. Section 221 of the Code requires the charge to state the offence, together with the law and section(s) of the law against which it is said to have been committed. Sections 222 and 223 of the Code require such particulars of time, place, person and manner as are sufficient "to give the accused notice of the matter with which he is charged". The Code also fixes the stage at which the charge is to be framed. In a trial before a Magistrate, such as the present one, section 242 of the Code requires that when the accused appears or is brought before the Court, a formal charge shall be framed relating to the offence of which he is accused, and he shall be asked whether he admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged. If he admits the offence, the Court may proceed under section 243 of the Code. Only if he does not admit it then the Court proceeds, under section 244 of the Code, to hear the

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prosecution and take the evidence produced in support of the charge. Sections 265-D, 265-E and 265-F of the Code make corresponding provision for trials before a Court of Sessions: the charge is framed in writing, read and explained to the accused, and his plea recorded, before the prosecution evidence is taken. Under either procedure, the sequence contemplated by the Code is the same. The accusation is first formulated by the Court, the accused is then called upon to plead to it, and the prosecution evidence is recorded thereafter in support of it.

8.The primary object of framing a charge is to protect the accused from being tried or convicted upon an accusation of which he had no adequate notice. The charge enables him to understand the precise case against him and to decide whether to plead guilty or claim trial. It allows him to cross-examine the prosecution witnesses in an informed manner, to determine the nature of his defence and, ultimately, to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in his statement under section 342 of the Code. The requirement also serves the administration of criminal justice by defining the issues which fall for determination. The principle that no person shall be called upon to answer an accusation of which he has not been informed now forms part of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan (“the Constitution”).

While insisting upon the charge, the Code also provides for the consequences of non-compliance. In the provisions governing the effect of such defects, the legislature has made the consequence depend upon whether a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. Section 225 of the Code provides that no error or omission in stating the offence or its particulars shall be regarded as material "unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission, and it has occasioned a failure of justice".

The Code itself recognizes that the charge on which an

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accused is finally tried may take its shape only at a late stage. Section 227 of the Code empowers the Court to alter or add to any charge "at any time before judgment is pronounced", that is, even after the entire evidence has been recorded. When that power is exercised, the Code does not require the trial to begin afresh. Section 228 of the Code permits the Court to proceed with the trial as if the altered or added charge had been the original one, provided this is not likely to prejudice the accused in his defence or the prosecutor in the conduct of the case. Section 231 of the Code enables either party to recall or re-summon any witness already examined and to examine him with reference to the alteration or addition. Although these provisions govern the alteration of an existing charge rather than the belated framing of a charge for the first time, they nevertheless reveal the legislative approach. Where the accusation on which the trial is finally to be decided is settled after the evidence has been recorded, the Code provides for the recall of witnesses where necessary. It does not require the evidence already recorded to be set aside or the trial to begin afresh.

Section 232(1) of the Code confines the remedy of a new trial, on account of the absence of or an error in a charge, to cases where the appellate or revisional Court is of the opinion that "any person convicted of an offence was misled in his defence". That provision confers no corresponding remedy upon the prosecution against an accused who has been acquitted. Section 535 of the Code provides that no finding or sentence shall be deemed invalid merely because no charge was framed, unless a failure of justice "has in fact been occasioned thereby". Consequently, a recommencement of the trial is directed only where such a failure of justice is found. Section 537 of the Code provides that no finding, sentence or order shall be reversed or altered on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge, in other proceedings during trial, or in the mode of trial, unless it "has in fact occasioned a failure of justice". Its explanation requires the court, in making that determination, to have regard to whether "the

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objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings". In this scheme, the recording of evidence before the framing of the charge falls to be treated as an irregularity within the meaning of section 537 of the Code. This is particularly so where the accused raises no objection to it, and where the charge, when eventually framed, discloses no new facts or circumstances beyond the case on which the prosecution has already led its evidence.

9.The superior Courts have consistently applied these provisions. In "S.A.K. Rehmani v. The State" (2005 SCMR 364), the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan recognized that an omission in a charge is not necessarily material unless the accused was in fact misled in his defence or a failure of justice resulted. Where he has been so misled, the appropriate remedy may include remand with a direction to amend the charge. In "M. Younus Habib v. The State" (PLD 2006 SC 153), the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that errors or omissions in the charge are not material "unless the accused was in fact misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice". It further held that, before recording such a finding, the Court must consider whether the objection could and should have been raised earlier. In "Noor Hassan v. The State" (PLD 1961 FC 175), the Honourable Federal Court of Pakistan, following the Privy Council in "Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-Emperor" ((1947) 74 IA 65), held that the distinction between an illegality and an irregularity under the Code is one of degree rather than of kind. In "Wazir Bat Khan v. The State" (1980 PCr.LJ 292), the Honourable Peshawar High Court explained that section 535 of the Code deals with cases where no charge has been framed at all, and that "it is for the Court to decide in each case whether the defect in the charge has misled the accused or has occasioned a failure of justice".

10.The Supreme Court of India construed the same provisions of the Code of 1898 in "Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh" (AIR 1956 SC 116), a decision of five learned Judges. It

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held that criminal procedure is designed to advance the ends of justice and not to defeat them through technicalities. It further held that the object of a charge is to give the accused notice of the accusation he has to meet. It follows that, under the scheme of the Code, an error in the charge, or even a complete failure to frame a charge, is a curable irregularity. Such a defect does not vitiate the trial unless it has caused prejudice resulting in a failure of justice. It also observed that where a charge is altered or framed at the end of the trial, the trial "need not proceed de novo", provided neither side is prejudiced.

That approach was recently reaffirmed in "Sandeep Yadav v. Satish and others" (2026 INSC 301). There, a High Court had directed a fresh trial because the charge had not been properly signed and framed at the outset, although the trial had substantially progressed. The Supreme Court of India set that direction aside and restored the trial court's order to proceed on the evidence already recorded. It held that the defect was, at best, a curable irregularity, since no failure of justice or prejudice had been demonstrated. In reaching that conclusion, the Court drew upon a consistent line of authority. "Main Pal v. State of Haryana" (2010 INSC 577) emphasized that the object of a charge is to give the accused clear notice of the case he must meet. In "Rafiq Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh" (2011 INSC 546) and "Dinesh Seth v. State of NCT of Delhi" (2008 INSC 940), it was held that neither the failure to frame a charge nor a defect in it vitiates a trial by itself. The question in each case is whether the accused was in fact prejudiced. "Soundarajan v. State" (2023 INSC 377) held that the conduct of the defence, and particularly the cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, may show from the record itself that the accused understood the case against him and suffered no prejudice. "State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhooraji" (2001 INSC 393) cautioned superior Courts against setting aside trials on account of procedural errors unless a failure of justice has occurred.

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On the question of retrial specifically, the Supreme Court in Sandeep Yadav relied upon "Ajay Kumar Ghoshal v. State of Bihar" (AIR 2017 SC 804). That case held that a de novo trial may be ordered only in exceptional cases, such as where the trial was without jurisdiction, where a serious illegality meant that there was no real trial at all, or where a party was prevented without fault from leading material evidence. Ajay Kumar Ghoshal in turn approved the caution expressed in "Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra" (AIR 1963 SC 1531) that a retrial is not to be used to wipe the slate clean or to afford an opportunity of rectifying infirmities in the case. "Nasib Singh v. State of Punjab" (2021 INSC 642) likewise held that a retrial is an exceptional remedy, meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice and not to answer minor or curable procedural defects. Although it was the accused who sought a fresh trial in Sandeep Yadav, the principle that a retrial may be ordered only upon demonstrated prejudice applies equally where it is sought by the prosecution or the informant.

11.The distinction between a defect relating to the charge and the complete absence of a charge for a distinct offence on which an accused is convicted cannot, however, be overlooked. In "Arbab Khan v. The State" (2010 SCMR 755), a conviction was held unsustainable because no charge had been framed for the offence, no evidence had been recorded on its ingredients, and no point for determination had been framed. In "Shabeer Ali v. The State" (2025 SCMR 802), the complete omission to frame a charge for a distinct offence, together with the failure to put the accusation to the accused under section 342 of the Code, was held to be a material illegality. In both cases the accused had been convicted of an offence of which he had no notice and which he had no opportunity to meet. That is precisely the mischief against which sections 225, 232 and 535 of the Code guard. Neither judgment lays down that every departure from the sequence prescribed by the Code renders the evidence a nullity, whatever its consequences, or that an acquittal may be set aside at the instance of the prosecution where the accusation on which the accused were tried

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remained the same throughout.

12.Turning to the present case, the record shows that the learned trial Court did not frame the charge at the stage contemplated by the Code, and proceeded to record the prosecution evidence. When this was pointed out by learned counsel for the informant, the charge was framed on 03.07.2026, by which time the prosecution had concluded its evidence. The informant's application for a de novo trial was declined. On the same day, judgment was pronounced acquitting the respondents on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The course adopted by the learned trial Court was plainly contrary to the sequence contemplated by the Code. A criminal trial cannot be allowed to proceed in an undefined field, with the accusation crystallized only after the evidence intended to establish it has been recorded. If such a practice were sanctioned, the statutory requirement of framing a charge before the evidentiary stage would be rendered largely otiose. The lapse is accordingly deprecated. However the question remains whether it caused legally cognizable prejudice or occasioned a failure of justice requiring a de novo trial.

13.So far as the accused are concerned, the requirement of a charge exists chiefly for their protection. Its breach may leave an accused uncertain of the offence he must answer, unable to direct his cross-examination to its ingredients, and exposed to conviction upon an accusation of which he was never formally told. Had the respondents been convicted, the question of a new trial under section 232(1) of the Code or section 535(2) of the Code would have called for careful examination. The respondents, however, were present and represented throughout. The prosecution witnesses were cross- examined on their behalf, and the case ended in their acquittal. It has not been shown that the charge eventually framed introduced any materially different accusation. The principal prejudice against which the requirement guards, namely conviction upon an accusation of which the accused had no notice, did not materialize. An acquitted

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accused cannot be said to have been misled in his defence, since his defence succeeded; it is for this reason that section 232(1) of the Code speaks only of a person convicted. A safeguard designed for the protection of the accused cannot be turned against them by the opposite party, to deprive them of an acquittal and expose them to a second trial.

14.The position of the prosecution requires separate consideration. The absence of a charge before evidence is recorded may, in an appropriate case, prejudice the prosecution as well, as section 228 of the Code itself recognizes. That may happen where the charge subsequently framed contains ingredients which were not the subject of the evidence already recorded. It may happen where material witnesses were not examined on an ingredient that did not form part of the formally stated accusation. It may also happen where the facts and circumstances of the case change materially after the charge has been framed. For example, where an accused is charged under section 324 PPC with an attempt to commit qatl-i-amd and the injured dies during the trial after the framing of the charge, the charge is altered or added to under section 302 PPC. The accusation has then changed in substance. The prosecution must now establish ingredients, such as the death and its cause, which were not the subject of the evidence already recorded. If it is not allowed to recall or re-examine its witnesses, or the trial is not recommenced where the circumstances so require, its case may be seriously prejudiced.

15.Prejudice, however, cannot be presumed merely from the existence of the lapse. It must be shown to have produced a concrete consequence affecting the prosecution's ability to prove the accusation. The prosecution always knows its own case, having set it out in the FIR, the report under section 173 of the Code or the complaint, and having chosen and produced its own witnesses. During the course of arguments in this appeal, learned counsel for the appellant/informant was afforded full opportunity to show what

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prejudice, if any, had been caused to the prosecution by the belated framing of the charge, and what evidence, if any, the prosecution had been unable to lead on that account, but he failed to do so. He could not identify any ingredient of the charge that remained unproved, any witness whose evidence needed to be recorded afresh, or any material evidence that could not be brought on record because of the belated framing of the charge; his submission rested entirely on the irregularity itself, not on any consequence flowing from it. Resultantly, the record shows that the charge, when framed, did not introduce any accusation different from the factual case on which the prosecution had already led its evidence. The application before the learned trial Court did not seek the recall of any particular witness; it sought only a wholesale re-recording of the entire evidence. The prosecution was thus afforded, and availed itself of, the opportunity to present its entire case. The Explanation to section 537 of the Code also weighs against the appellant. Although represented by counsel throughout, the informant raised the objection only after the entire prosecution evidence had been recorded, when it could and should have been raised at the outset. Evidence recorded before the framing of the charge does not, therefore, become a nullity merely because of that sequence; its legal effect is to be judged by the statutory test of failure of justice under sections 535 and 537 of the Code. As no failure of justice has been shown, a de novo trial would serve only to give the prosecution a second opportunity to repair the deficiencies found in its case. The order dismissing the informant's application for a de novo trial has, in any event, merged into the final judgment and has been examined in this appeal; its dismissal occasioned no failure of justice.

16.Having held that the belated framing of the charge does not, by itself, vitiate the trial or warrant a de novo trial, I now turn to the merits of the instant appeal against acquittal.

17.It is observed that the foremost object of the administration of

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criminal justice is to punish offenders, to deter crime and to maintain law and order in society. It is therefore the duty of the State to bring to justice those who contravene the law of the land, including its penal laws. The evidence relied upon for this purpose may be ocular or circumstantial, direct or indirect. In every case, however, the onerous duty lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, here respondents No. 2 and 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and where such doubt exists, its benefit must go to the accused. The probative value of evidence depends largely upon the facts of each case. The Court is bound to assess the trustworthiness of the witnesses, to identify and resolve inconsistencies and contradictions in their evidence, and to consider whether the ocular account finds corroboration in the other evidence before reaching its conclusion. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt places a heavy burden upon the prosecution. It must satisfy the Court of the guilt of the accused on reasonable grounds, to the exclusion of any reasonable doubt, before a verdict of guilt can be returned. That standard is considerably higher than the standard applied in civil cases, which are decided on a preponderance of probability.

18.It must also be kept in view that the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is narrow. An accused person is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved. Upon his acquittal by a Court of competent jurisdiction, that presumption is reinforced, so that he comes to enjoy a double presumption of innocence. In "Ghulam Sikandar and another v. Mamaraz Khan and others" (PLD 1985 SC 11), the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that in an appeal against acquittal, the Courts should not ordinarily interfere with the findings of the learned trial Court, and should give due weight to them. The same principle was recently reaffirmed in "Basharat Ali Chaudhry v. Sabir Ali, etc." (Criminal Petition No. 248-L of 2026), where it was held that an acquittal "cannot be interfered without any strong and exceptional reasons". In "Muhammad Inayat v. The State" (1998 SCMR 1854), the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan

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declined to disturb an acquittal which was based on convincing reasons and could not be termed perverse, fanciful, artificial, shocking or ridiculous. In "Mst. Sughra Begum and another v. Qaiser Pervez and others" (2015 SCMR 1142), it held that an acquitted accused earns twofold innocence. It further held that the standard for appreciating evidence in a case of acquittal is entirely different from that in a case of conviction, and that findings of acquittal are not to be disturbed merely because, on reappraisal, another view is possible. A judgment of acquittal, therefore, is interfered with only where it is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, passed in gross violation of law, or founded upon a misreading or non-reading of the evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The burden of displacing the double presumption of innocence which the respondents have earned lies heavily upon the prosecution.

19.With these principles in mind, I have carefully examined the impugned judgment and the evidence on record. The learned trial Court rightly observed that the informant, who appeared as PW-4, was admittedly not an eyewitness to the occurrence. His testimony rested upon what his sister and her husband had allegedly narrated to him. It was therefore hearsay and, in the absence of independent corroboration, incapable of establishing either the occurrence or the participation of the respondents in it. His credibility was further impaired by his admitted execution of a compromise affidavit. He subsequently alleged that the affidavit had been procured by coercion and that his thumb impression had been obtained forcibly. Yet he offered no explanation for his failure to lodge any contemporaneous complaint to that effect, or to seek cancellation of the affidavit.

The testimony of PW-2 is likewise materially weakened by her own admissions. Her position regarding the affidavits is contradictory. She did not hand over to the investigating agency the clothes allegedly torn during the occurrence. Neither she nor her husband contacted Police Helpline 15 immediately after the

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occurrence. She also admitted that PW-4 had appeared before the Court at her request.

The medical evidence, even if accepted, could at most establish the existence and nature of the injuries; it could not identify their author. This is particularly so when the prosecution failed to recover or produce the alleged weapon of offence.

The prosecution also withheld independent witnesses from the locality, although the occurrence is alleged to have taken place in a residential area, and offered no plausible explanation for doing so. This attracts the adverse inference contemplated by Article 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Moreover, the essential ingredients of criminal intimidation under section 506 PPC were not established. The prosecution failed to specify the threats allegedly uttered or the manner in which they were conveyed, and it brought no convincing evidence of the alarm or intention the law requires.

20.Viewed cumulatively, these deficiencies are not mere procedural irregularities but material infirmities going to the root of the prosecution case. The prosecution evidence does not meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is settled law that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind is sufficient to entitle the accused to its benefit, not as a matter of grace but as a matter of right, as held by the Supreme Court in "Tariq Pervez v. The State" (1995 SCMR 1345) and reiterated in "Ghulam Qadir and 2 others v. The State" (2008 SCMR 1221), "Muhammad Akram v. The State" (2009 SCMR 230), "Muhammad Zaman v. The State" (2014 SCMR 749) and "Muhammad Mansha v. The State" (2018 SCMR 772). The principle that it is better for several guilty persons to escape than for one innocent person to be convicted was affirmed in "Ayub Masih v. The State" (PLD 2002 SC 1048).

21.Apart from the above, the view taken by the learned trial Court is based on a proper appreciation of the evidence and is, at the very

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least, a reasonable view of it. Learned counsel for the appellant/informant has not pointed out any misreading or non-reading of the evidence, nor any perversity or illegality in the impugned judgment, which would justify interference with the double presumption of innocence that the respondents now enjoy.

22.For the foregoing reasons, the belated framing of the charge furnishes no ground to set aside the acquittal or to order a de novo trial, and the impugned judgment calls for no interference on the merits. Consequently, this appeal against acquittal is dismissed.

(MUHAMMAD JAWAD ZAFAR)

JUDGE

Approved for Reporting.

JUDGE

Ejaz*