Abdul Hameed etc. vs Dildar Balouch etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH,

MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.595-D of 2026

Abdul Hameed & another

Versus

Dildar Baloch & another

J U D G M E N The

Date of hearing: 29.09.2026.

Petitioners by: M/s. Malik Ali Muhammad Dhol and Sajjad Hussain, Advocates .

Respondents by: Mr. Muhammad Abdul Qayyum Baat, Advocate.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.:- Through this civil revision petition, petitioners have called in question the legality and propriety of the orders and decrees dated 27.11.2024 and 24.05.2025, passed by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan, respectively, whereby their suit for recovery of Rs.1,00,00,000/- on account of damages and defamation for malicious prosecution, was concurrently dismissed being not maintainable.

2.Briefly, the petitioners instituted a suit claiming damages on account of alleged malicious prosecution, injury to reputation, mental and physical agony, loss of business and legal expenses. They alleged that the respondents procured registration of FIR No.649/2015 under Sections 452, 427, 148 and 149 PPC at Police Station Kot Chutta, Dera Ghazi Khan. The said FIR was subsequently recommended for cancellation and the cancellation report was accepted by the learned Area Magistrate on 14.06.2016. The criminal revision filed by respondent No.1 against the cancellation was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan on 06.03.2017. Thereafter,

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respondent No.1 instituted a private complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C. containing allegations under Sections 427, 452, 506-B, 337- F(ii), 337-A(ii), 148 and 149 PPC. The petitioners faced trial in the said complaint and were acquitted vide judgment dated 19.09.2023. The damages claimed by the petitioners comprised Rs.50,00,000/- for injury to reputation, Rs.35,00,000/- for mental torture and physical agony, Rs.13,00,000/- for loss of business and Rs.2,00,000/- towards legal assistance. The respondents filed their written statement. The learned Trial Court, instead of framing issues and recording evidence, proceeded to hear the matter on maintainability and dismissed the suit on the ground that the petitioners had been acquitted on benefit of doubt and, therefore, their alleged acquittal was not an “honourable acquittal” sufficient to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. The learned appellate Court substantially adopted the same reasoning and dismissed the appeal. Hence, instant revision petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the learned Courts below fell into a fundamental error in treating the suit as one founded exclusively upon malicious prosecution and in dismissing the entire claim without framing issues or recording evidence. He argues that the criminal proceedings relied upon by the learned Courts below were themselves incorrectly identified, as FIR No.649/2015 had been cancelled in 2016, whereas the acquittal dated 19.09.2023 related to the subsequent private complaint. He further contends that acquittal on benefit of doubt is not, in law, an absolute bar to a civil action for malicious prosecution; rather, the plaintiff is required to establish the necessary ingredients of the tort through evidence. He also submits that the claims relating to reputation, mental and physical agony, loss of business and legal expenses could not have been discarded merely by referring to the nature of the criminal acquittal. In support, he has referred to Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi (PLD 1990 Supreme Court 28), Dr. Muhammad Islam v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Food, Agriculture, Livestock and Cooperative Department, Peshawar and 2 others (1998 SCMR 1993), Muhammad Yousaf v.

C.R. No.595-D of 2026

Abdul Qayyum (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 478) and Muhammad Hussain v. Imtiaz Ahmed and another (2025 MLD 60).

4.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents supports the concurrent decisions and submits that the petitioners failed to establish absence of reasonable and probable cause, malice or any actionable damage. He argues that acquittal on benefit of doubt does not by itself establish malicious prosecution. In support, he has referred to Rab Nawaz v. Mubri Khan and others (2019 PCr.LJ 894).

5.Arguments heard. Available record perused.

6.The controversy, at this stage, is whether the suit could lawfully have been dismissed at the threshold on the ground adopted by the learned Courts below. For this purpose, the nature and outcome of the criminal proceedings require clarification. The criminal record shows two distinct proceedings. FIR No.649/2015 did not culminate in acquittal of the petitioners. Its cancellation was accepted by the learned Area Magistrate on 14.06.2016 and the revision against such cancellation was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on 06.03.2017. The subsequent acquittal dated 19.09.2023 related to a separate private complaint instituted under Section 200, Cr.P.C. The premise in the impugned judgments that the petitioners had been acquitted in FIR No.649/2015 on benefit of doubt is, therefore, contrary to the criminal record and materially affects the basis on which the suit was held to be not maintainable. The appellate Court did not correct it. It adopted the same premise and did not address the distinction between the FIR and the private complaint.

7.As regards the subsequent private complaint, the fact that the petitioners were acquitted on benefit of doubt could not, by itself, render their civil action for malicious prosecution incompetent. In Zulfiqar Ahmed v. Muhammad Nadeem and 2 others (2024 MLD 1237), while considering a suit for damages founded upon malicious prosecution, the learned Sindh High Court held that the expression “honourable acquittal” is alien to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and that acquittal simpliciter, including acquittal on benefit of

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doubt, cannot be treated as a ground for denying the civil remedy. The principle is sound. An acquittal on benefit of doubt means that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It neither proves nor disproves that the prosecution was malicious. That question must be decided on evidence in the civil suit. The authority, however, also recognizes that acquittal by itself does not establish malicious prosecution. The plaintiff must plead and prove the essential ingredients of the tort, including prosecution by the defendant, termination in his favour, absence of reasonable and probable cause, malice and resulting damage. Thus, while the criminal result is relevant to the civil claim, it does not by itself determine the remaining ingredients of liability.

8.A distinction must, therefore, be drawn between maintainability and proof. A suit for malicious prosecution is a civil action in tort and, where the plaint contains the material facts constituting such cause of action, the question whether those facts can ultimately be proved is a matter for trial. In Zulfiqar Ahmed’s case (supra), the learned Court, in circumstances where the plaint contained the basic allegations constituting malicious prosecution, held that the question of proof would arise only after issues were framed and the parties were afforded an opportunity to lead evidence; the pleading itself was not a substitute for evidence. The same principle applies here. The petitioners specifically pleaded initiation and pursuit of criminal proceedings, their termination in their favour, absence of reasonable and probable cause, malice and consequential injury. Whether those allegations are established, and whether the petitioners are ultimately entitled to damages, are matters going to the merits of the claim and could not, on the facts of the present case, be converted into a question of threshold maintainability.

9.The existence of reasonable and probable cause, as well as the alleged malice, depends upon the circumstances attending the initiation and pursuit of the proceedings. Whether the material available to the respondents furnished a reasonable basis for setting the criminal law in

C.R. No.595-D of 2026

motion, whether the proceedings were actuated by an improper or collateral motive, and whether the alleged conduct caused legally compensable injury are matters requiring examination of the pleadings, circumstances and evidence. These questions cannot ordinarily be determined merely from the result of the criminal proceedings. The burden remains upon the petitioners to establish the ingredients of the alleged tort; however, that burden is one of proof at trial and not a condition precedent to the maintainability of the suit.

10.This distinction assumes particular significance in the present case. The petitioners pleaded the initiation and pursuit of criminal proceedings, their termination in their favour, absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice, besides injury to reputation, mental and physical agony, loss of business and legal expenses. Whether the alleged proceedings caused such injuries, whether the same are legally attributable to the respondents and whether the respondents' conduct possessed the character alleged by the petitioners are matters for adjudication on evidence. The learned Courts below were, therefore, required to examine the pleaded cause of action in its entirety rather than reducing the claim to the question whether the petitioners had obtained what was described as an “honourable” acquittal.

11.Viewed in this perspective, the present suit could not have been dismissed as “not maintainable” merely because the petitioners had been acquitted on benefit of doubt. No application under Order VII Rule 11, C.P.C. was before the learned Trial Court. More importantly, the disputed questions concerning reasonable and probable cause, malice, causation and damage were not matters capable of being finally determined without the evidentiary exercise contemplated by law. The learned Trial Court, instead of framing issues and affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence, effectively determined matters going to the merits of the claim. Such an approach conflated the requirement that the petitioners prove the ingredients of malicious prosecution with the altogether different question whether the plaint disclosed a cause of action.

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12.Nor could the entire claim be discarded merely by reference to the criminal result. The petitioners pleaded distinct heads of alleged injury, including reputational harm, mental and physical agony, loss of business and legal expenses. The entitlement, causal connection, legal recoverability and quantum of these claims are matters to be examined in accordance with law and on the basis of evidence. The failure to establish any particular head of damages may ultimately affect the relief granted, but cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, furnish a basis for non-suiting the petitioners before trial.

13.The procedural principle is reinforced by Zulfiqar Ahmed’s case (supra), where the summary rejection of a malicious-prosecution claim was held to be inappropriate when the plaint contained the material allegations constituting the cause of action, leaving their proof to the stage of trial. The same principle governs the present case, with the additional feature that the learned Courts below proceeded upon a materially incorrect understanding of the criminal record. Where the relevant facts are disputed and are capable of proof through oral and documentary evidence, the proper course is to frame appropriate issues and determine the same on evidence. The acquittal or cancellation of criminal proceedings may form part of that evidentiary inquiry, but cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, exhaust it.

14.The reliance placed by learned counsel for the respondents on Rab Nawaz v. Mubri Khan and others (2019 PCr.LJ 894) does not advance their case. That judgment concerned compensation under Section 250, Cr.P.C. and the procedure governing such compensation after acquittal; it did not determine the maintainability or proof of an independent civil action for malicious prosecution. The said authority is, therefore, distinguishable on its statutory setting and the question decided therein. Conversely, Zulfiqar Ahmed’s case (supra) directly addresses the procedural question arising here and recognizes that, where the plaint contains the basic ingredients of malicious prosecution, the question of their proof cannot ordinarily be determined summarily without framing issues and recording evidence.

C.R. No.595-D of 2026

15.The learned appellate Court also did not cure the above defects. The impugned appellate judgment substantially proceeded upon the same premise concerning the alleged acquittal in FIR No.649/2015 and did not adequately address the distinction between that FIR and the subsequent private complaint, the legal effect of the acquittal on benefit of doubt, or the factual questions concerning reasonable and probable cause, malice and damage. The concurrent nature of the findings cannot, by itself, preserve a conclusion founded upon a material misreading of the criminal record or upon determination of disputed matters without the evidence necessary for their adjudication.

16.It is necessary to keep the scope of the present revisional determination in its proper perspective. This Court is not called upon, at this stage, to decide whether the respondents in fact acted maliciously, whether reasonable and probable cause was absent, or whether the petitioners will ultimately establish the damages claimed. Those questions remain open for determination by the learned Trial Court on the basis of the pleadings and evidence. The present determination is confined to the proposition that the plaint disclosed a legally cognizable cause of action and could not lawfully have been dismissed as “not maintainable” on the grounds adopted by the learned Courts below. The principle stated in Zulfiqar Ahmed’s case (supra) that the question of proof arises after framing of issues and affording an opportunity to lead evidence is attracted to the present case. All defences available to the respondents, including limitation, absence of reasonable and probable cause, absence of malice, causation, legal recoverability, proof of damage and quantum, shall remain open for determination by the learned Trial Court in accordance with law.

17.For the foregoing reasons, the instant revision petition is allowed. Consequently, the concurrent orders and decrees dated 27.11.2024 and 24.05.2025 are set aside. The suit is restored to its original number. The learned Trial Court shall frame appropriate issues and proceed with the matter in accordance with law, affording both sides full opportunity to lead evidence. Nothing contained herein shall

C.R. No.595-D of 2026

prejudice either party on the merits. The learned Trial Court shall endeavour to conclude the proceedings preferably within six months from receipt of this judgment. The parties shall appear before the learned Trial Court on 13.10.2026.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Judge

*A.H.S.*