Hafiz Niaz Akbar etc. vs Malik Janbaz Khan etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT AT LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.3328 of 2014

Hafiz Niaz Akbar Versus Malik Janbaz Khan and another

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 16.09.2026.

Petitioners by: M/s. Ch. Asad Jahangir, Rao Fazal-ur- Rehman, Mian Abdul Sattar and Ch. Zahid Imran, Advocates.

Respondents by: Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gilaani and Zubaira Bashir, Advocates for respondent No.1.

Ch. Muhammad Jawad Yaqoob, Additional Advocate General, Punjab for respondent No.2.

HASSAN NAWAZ MAKHDOOM, J.- Through the instant civil revision, filed under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“C.P.C.”), the petitioners, being legal heirs of Malik Ali Akbar, original defendant No.1, have called in question the judgment and decree dated 07.01.2011, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Sargodha/“trial Court”, whereby the suit for declaration instituted by respondent No.1/plaintiff was decreed, as well as the judgment and decree dated 11.10.2014, rendered by the learned Additional District Judge, Sargodha/“appellate court”, whereby the appeal preferred by the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners was dismissed and the findings of the learned Trial Court were maintained.

2.The controversy pertains to the estate of Dost Muhammad, who died on 24.12.1969. He had two wives, Mst. Sahib Khatoon and Mst. Jannat Khatoon, from whom he had a daughter, Mst. Salah Khatoon, and a son, Malik Ali Akbar, respectively. Respondent No.1, being the son of Mst. Salah Khatoon, claims through the former branch, whereas the petitioners are successors of Malik Ali Akbar. The pedigree table being substantially admitted, the dispute essentially concerns whether the branch of Mst. Sahib Khatoon stood excluded from inheritance on account of her alleged prior

divorce and the alleged gift made by Dost Muhammad in favour of Ali Akbar.

3.Briefly, the facts are that the respondent No.1/plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration on 12.04.1999, asserting that Mst. Sahib Khatoon continued to be the lawful wife of Dost Muhammad until his death and that she, followed by Mst. Salah Khatoon, was entitled to inherit from his estate in accordance with Muslim Personal Law. He questioned various revenue entries whereby, according to him, his predecessors had unlawfully been deprived of their inheritance. In particular, challenge was laid to Mutation No.204 dated 06.02.1962, concerning an alleged gift in favour of Ali Akbar, besides Mutation No.89 dated 11.06.1967, Mutation No.1241 dated 30.06.1970, Mutation No.1706 dated 30.06.1970 and Mutation No.2818 dated 30.06.1970, relating to properties situated in different revenue estates. The plaintiff pleaded, in substance, that the entries operating to the exclusion of his branch were illegal, fraudulent and ineffective against his inheritance rights. The defence, on the other hand, rested principally upon the alleged gift made by Dost Muhammad in favour of Ali Akbar and upon the assertion that Mst. Sahib Khatoon had already been divorced and was, therefore, not entitled to inherit from Dost Muhammad at the time of his death.

4.The suit was contested by Malik Ali Akbar and Mst. Jannat Khatoon through a joint written statement. Apart from raising preliminary objections regarding limitation, cause of action and maintainability, they asserted that the property covered by Mutation No.204 had validly been gifted by Dost Muhammad to Ali Akbar in the year 1962 and, consequently, did not form part of the estate of Dost Muhammad upon his death. It was further maintained that Mst. Sahib Khatoon had been divorced long before the death of Dost Muhammad and, therefore, neither she nor the branch claiming through her could assert any inheritance claim in his estate. Another limb of the defence was that the transactions and mutations had remained unchallenged for decades and that neither Mst. Sahib Khatoon nor Mst. Salah Khatoon had questioned them during their respective lifetimes.

5.Out of the divergent pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court framed the following issues on 16.10.2003:-

“1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to inherit the property of his predecessor-in-interest, amounting to 17/48 share, from the land fully mentioned in the prayer clause? OPP

2.Whether the entries in the names of the defendants, exceeding their legal shares, are based on fraud, against law and facts, without notice to the plaintiff, inoperative against his rights and liable to be set aside? OPP

3.Whether Gift Mutation No.204 dated 06.02.1962, in respect of land measuring 346 Kanals situated in Chak No.29/N.B., Sargodha, and the Will Deed/ Wasiyatnama dated 03.12.1969 are the outcome of fraud and forgery, null and void, and liable to be set aside? OPP

4.Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for declaration as prayed for? OPP

5.Whether the suit is time-barred? OPD

6.Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file the suit?

OPD

7.Whether the suit is not maintainable in its present form?

OPD

8.Whether the suit is false and frivolous and the defendants are entitled to special costs of Rs.25,000/- from the plaintiff? OPD

9.Relief.”

The parties thereafter led their respective oral as well as documentary evidence. Respondent No.1 appeared as PW-1 and produced documentary evidence marked as Ex.P1 to Ex.P16. Malik Ali Akbar entered the witness- box as DW-1, while documentary evidence was also tendered from the side of the defendants. The learned Trial Court, after appraisal of the evidence, decreed the suit on 07.01.2011, declaring Mutations Nos.204, 89, 10341, 4708 and 2818 illegal and inoperative against the rights of the plaintiff. The appeal preferred by Ali Akbar was dismissed by the appellate court on 11.10.2014. Hence, the present civil revision

6.Learned counsel for the petitioners assailed the concurrent judgments and decrees primarily on the grounds that the suit, being rested on allegations of fraud, forgery and collusion, was deficient in the requisite particulars contemplated by Order VI, Rule 4, C.P.C., and that respondent No.1 neither pleaded nor proved the circumstances and date of discovery necessary to invoke section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1908, for which reliance has principally been placed upon Mst. Rabia Gula and others v. Muhammad Janan and others (2022 SCMR 1009); that the suit instituted on 12.04.1999, seeking to challenge transactions effected way back in years 1962 to 1970, was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908 particularly when the persons directly affected had not questioned those transactions during their lifetimes. Further reliance placed on Haji

Muhammad Yunis (deceased) through legal heirs and others v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others (2022 SCMR 1282) and Mst. Faheeman Begum (deceased) through L.Rs. and others v. Islam-ud-Din (deceased) through L.Rs. and others (2023 SCMR 1402); that Mutation No.204 dated 06.02.1962, coupled with the Will Deed dated 03.12.1969, could not have been displaced merely on the basis of general allegations of fraud, particularly when Ali Akbar was a minor at the time of the alleged gift by his father and the requirements of acceptance and delivery of possession were, therefore, required to be appreciated in that context, for which Sikandar Hayat and another v. Sughran Bibi and others (2020 SCMR 214) has been relied upon; that the presumption attached to an official act could not be rebutted without cogent evidence and, once fraud and collusion were attributed to the revenue functionaries, the concerned officials were necessary parties to the proceedings; and that the (alleged) divorce of Mst. Sahib Khatoon, which reportedly occurred in 1921, could not be evaluated against requirements subsequently introduced by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. On the cumulative strength of these submissions and the other precedents cited at the bar, learned counsel maintained that the concurrent findings suffer from material misreading and non-reading of the record and erroneous application of the law governing fraud, limitation and gift, and accordingly prayed that the judgments and decrees of the Courts below be set aside and the suit instituted by respondent No.1 be dismissed.

7.Conversely, learned counsel for respondent No.1 supported the impugned judgments and decrees, contending that the pedigree is admitted and that Mst. Sahib Khatoon continued to be recognized as the wife/legal heir of Dost Muhammad, there being no independent evidence of the alleged divorce except a recital in the Will. Reference has been made to Ex.P2, Ex.P9 and Ex.P13, as well as the relevant inheritance mutations, to show continued recognition of her branch in the revenue record. It is further argued that Mutation No.204, being merely a fiscal entry, could not by itself establish the alleged gift and, once the transaction was specifically disputed, the burden rested upon its beneficiary to prove the same through independent and satisfactory evidence. Reliance, inter alia, has been placed upon Peer Bakhsh through LRs and others v. Mst. Khanzadi and others (2016 SCMR 1417) and Muhammad Nawaz and others v. Sakina Bibi and

others (2020 SCMR 1021). As regards limitation, learned counsel maintained, on the strength of Ghulam Ali and 2 others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (PLD 1990 SC 1) and Noor Din (deceased) through LRs. v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others (2023 SCMR 1928), that an erroneous revenue entry does not by itself extinguish inheritance rights and that limitation in such matters depends upon knowledge, unequivocal repudiation, acquiescence, relinquishment and creation of third-party rights, none of which, according to him, has been established in the present case. It is lastly submitted that the concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below are based upon appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence and do not warrant interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction merely because another view of the evidence may be possible.

8.Arguments heard. Record perused.

9.The submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the parties have considerably narrowed down the scope of the controversy. The controversy, therefore, turns upon whether Mutation No.204 validly evidences the alleged gift; whether Mst. Sahib Khatoon had been divorced prior to the death of Dost Muhammad; whether the suit was barred by limitation in view of the alleged prior knowledge of respondent No.1’s predecessors; and whether the plea of fraud was sufficiently pleaded and proved. These questions are, therefore, to be considered within the settled parameters governing the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C., more so when the findings of the two Courts below are concurrent.

10.Before adverting to the merits of the controversy, it is pertinent to keep in view the scope of jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Revisional jurisdiction is essentially supervisory and does not provide another forum for reappraisal of evidence as in an appeal. The concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below may be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction only upon demonstration of a jurisdictional defect, material irregularity, perversity, or material misreading or non-reading of the evidence having a bearing on the outcome of the case. Thus, where the findings are reasonably supported by the record, a different possible view of the evidence, by itself, furnishes no ground for interference in revision.

11.The validity of the alleged gift recorded through Mutation No.204 dated 06.02.1962 is of considerable significance, for if the property had

validly been gifted by Dost Muhammad to Ali Akbar during his lifetime, it would not have constituted part of his estate available for inheritance upon his death. The material question, therefore, is not the competence of Dost Muhammad to make a gift in favour of his son, but whether the alleged gift was proved through legally admissible and satisfactory evidence. A mutation is essentially a fiscal entry maintained for revenue purposes and, notwithstanding its evidentiary value, does not by itself create, confer or extinguish title in the property. It is well settled that where the transaction forming the basis of such mutation is specifically disputed, the beneficiary cannot ordinarily rely upon the mutation alone to establish title, but is required to prove the underlying transaction through independent and legally admissible evidence. The requirement assumes greater significance where the transaction is relied upon to exclude a natural heir or an entire branch of legal heirs from succession.

12.The record reflects that Malik Ali Akbar appeared as DW-1 in support of the alleged gift. However, as concurrently noticed by both the Courts below, no witness to the original transaction was produced, nor was any independent evidence brought on record to establish the making of the gift or the circumstances attending its execution. The defence, in substance, rested upon Mutation No.204 and its antiquity. The principles enunciated in Peer Bakhsh and Muhammad Nawaz’s case (supra), relied upon by respondent No.1, draw a clear distinction between proof of a mutation and proof of the transaction underlying it. A mutation may lend corroboration to a transaction otherwise established through evidence, but cannot, by itself, substitute proof of the transaction when its very factum is specifically disputed. In these circumstances, the concurrent finding of the Courts below that the defendants failed to establish the alleged gift through satisfactory evidence neither suffers from perversity nor reflects any material misreading or non- reading of the record.

13.The plea founded upon the minority of Ali Akbar also merits consideration. Learned counsel for the petitioners is correct to the extent that a gift made by a father in favour of his minor child stands on a different footing, particularly with regard to acceptance and delivery of possession. The principle recognized in Sikandar Hayat’s case (supra), however, relates primarily to the manner in which these essential requirements may be satisfied in the case of a minor donee and does not dispense with proof of the

gift itself. The tender age of the donee cannot, perse, establish that the donor had in fact made the alleged gift. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the petitioners to prove the factum of gift through credible and legally admissible evidence. In the absence of such proof, the mere circumstance that Ali Akbar was a minor at the relevant time could not cure the deficiency in establishing the underlying transaction.

14.The fact that Mutation No.204 and the Will dated 03.12.1969 were executed several decades ago does not, by itself, establish the correctness of the transactions reflected therein. Any presumption available to an old document primarily concerns its due execution and authenticity and does not necessarily extend to the truth of its recitals. The exclusion of natural heirs from their lawful inheritance on the strength of such documents cannot rest merely upon the recitals contained therein; the transaction forming its basis must be affirmatively established through cogent and reliable evidence. The Courts below, therefore, committed no error in declining to regard the age of these documents as sufficient proof of the transactions, asserted by the petitioners.

15.The alleged divorce of Mst. Sahib Khatoon constitutes another material aspect of the controversy. The petitioners primarily rely upon a recital contained in the Will dated 03.12.1969, according to which Dost Muhammad had divorced her in the year 1921. In this regard, the reasoning adopted by the Courts below requires some qualification. An alleged divorce stated to have taken place in 1921 cannot be tested on the touchstone of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, which was promulgated about four decades later. Consequently, non-service of notice upon the Chairman or absence of any certificate or other formality contemplated by the Ordinance could not, render ineffective a divorce allegedly pronounced prior to its enactment. The material question, therefore, is not compliance with the subsequent statutory regime, but whether the alleged divorce of 1921 was proved through credible and legally admissible evidence.

16.The foregoing legal position, however, does not sustain the petitioners’ plea, as the real question is whether the alleged divorce of Mst. Sahib Khatoon in 1921 was proved on the record. The Will dated 03.12.1969 contains only a recital of a divorce purportedly effected nearly five decades ago, whereas neither the written talaq referred to therein nor any contemporaneous evidence substantiating such divorce was produced. The

revenue record examined by the Courts below also does not support the plea of an earlier divorce. Mutation No.89 initially acknowledged both Mst. Sahib Khatoon and Mst. Jannat Khatoon as widows/legal heirs of Dost Muhammad, with Mst. Sahib Khatoon being excluded only subsequently upon review of the mutation. Similarly, the inheritance record relating to the property situated at Kamalia, District Toba Tek Singh, also recognized the branch of Mst. Sahib Khatoon. Although such revenue entries cannot, in isolation, conclusively determine the marital status, yet they constitute relevant circumstances which, when considered alongside the absence of any contemporaneous proof of divorce, lend support to the concurrent conclusion reached by the Courts below in the judgments impugned herein.

17.The Courts below were, thus, confronted with two competing sets of documentary material: on the one hand, the recital contained in the Will dated 03.12.1969, referring to an alleged divorce of Mst. Sahib Khatoon in 1921 and, on the other, the subsequent revenue record wherein she continued to be acknowledged as a widow/legal heir of Dost Muhammad, notwithstanding the alleged divorce said to have taken place several decades ago. In the absence of any independent or contemporaneous evidence establishing the alleged divorce, the preference accorded by both the Courts to the latter material cannot be termed arbitrary or perverse. Mere possibility of another view does not furnish a ground for revisional interference when the concurrent conclusion is reasonably supported by the evidence on record.

18.The plea of limitation also requires careful consideration. The proposition that no limitation runs against inheritance cannot be applied as an inflexible rule irrespective of the facts of a particular case. Although inheritance devolves upon the legal heirs immediately upon death of the propositus and an erroneous revenue entry, being primarily fiscal in nature, does not by itself extinguish the substantive right of an heir; a claim founded upon inheritance is not altogether immune from the law of limitation. The question has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances, including the knowledge of the claimant or his predecessor regarding an adverse assertion of title, unequivocal denial of the inheritance right, acquiescence or relinquishment, subsequent alienation of the property, and creation of third-party rights. A mere passage of time, may not defeat an inheritance claim; however, prolonged inaction accompanied by circumstances demonstrating conscious abandonment, acquiescence, or

acceptance of an adverse title may entail legal consequences. The principle enunciated in Noor Din’s case (supra), relied upon by learned counsel for respondent No.1, also requires the question of limitation in inheritance matters to be determined on the peculiar facts and attending circumstances of each case rather than by application of an absolute proposition.

19.In the present case, no material has been brought on record to show that Mst. Sahib Khatoon or Mst. Salah Khatoon ever expressly relinquished, alienated or otherwise surrendered the inheritance claimed through Dost Muhammad. Likewise, no bona fide third-party rights are shown to have intervened on the strength of the impugned revenue entries. On the contrary, the revenue record does not demonstrate that their branch remained consistently excluded from the inheritance. The branch represented by respondent No.1 continued to receive recognition in certain inheritance proceedings, including those relating to the property situated at Toba Tek Singh. Mutation No.89 is also significant in this regard, as Mst. Sahib Khatoon was initially recorded amongst the legal heirs of Dost Muhammad and were excluded only subsequently upon review. These circumstances are material to the question of limitation, as they do not establish any clear and unequivocal relinquishment or abandonment of inheritance rights by the predecessors of respondent No.1. The Courts below, therefore, were justified in holding that the passage of time, in the absence of any proved relinquishment, acquiescence or creation of third-party rights, was insufficient to defeat the claim, and such concurrent conclusion cannot be said to suffer from any perversity or material irregularity.

20.The argument that Mst. Sahib Khatoon and Mst. Salah Khatoon themselves did not institute proceedings during their lifetimes also does not, without more, extinguish the inheritance. A right which has lawfully devolved upon an heir and has neither been surrendered nor otherwise extinguished in accordance with law is itself capable of devolving upon that heir’s successors. The demise of the originally deprived heir does not, by its own force, validate an otherwise unlawful exclusion from inheritance. Of course, the successor takes the right subject to all lawful defences, which had matured against the predecessor, including limitation where applicable; but, in the present case, the Courts below found no proved relinquishment, unequivocal repudiation followed by acquiescence, or intervening third-party rights sufficient to defeat the claim. The mere fact that the suit was brought

by the next generation, therefore, does not furnish a ground for revisional interference.

21.The plea of limitation also needs to be considered in the context of the alleged gift of 1962. If the petitioners had succeeded in establishing that Dost Muhammad had validly gifted the property during his lifetime, such property would have ceased to form part of his estate and no right of inheritance therein could have accrued upon his death. In that situation, the challenge to the gift would have required independent examination with reference to the date of the transaction, knowledge thereof and the applicable law of limitation. The position in the present case is, however, materially different, as both the Courts below have concurrently found that the very transaction of gift was not proved. The plea of limitation cannot, in such circumstances, make good the deficiency in proof of the transaction itself. The continued existence of a revenue entry over a considerable period cannot, by itself, confer substantive validity upon an underlying transaction that has otherwise remained unproved.

22.The objection rested upon the alleged absence of specific particulars of fraud, as contemplated by Order VI Rule 4, C.P.C., also requires consideration in its proper perspective. There can be no cavil with the settled principle that fraud, being a serious allegation, must be specifically pleaded and established through cogent evidence, and that vague or general assertions ordinarily do not satisfy the requirement of law. The controversy in the present case, however, does not rest exclusively upon proof of any fraudulent act personally attributable to Malik Ali Akbar. Respondent No.1 had specifically challenged the mutations whereby his branch was (allegedly) deprived of its inheritance and had also disputed the very transactions and circumstances, including the alleged gift and divorce, upon which the petitioners’ purported claim to exclusive title was founded. The parties were, therefore, fully aware of the nature of the controversy; specific issues were framed in that regard and both sides were afforded opportunity to lead evidence. More importantly, the concurrent findings of the Courts below rest substantially upon the failure of the petitioners/defendants to prove the alleged gift and to satisfactorily establish the alleged divorce of Mst.Sahib Khatoon. These findings furnished an independent basis for holding the impugned revenue entries ineffective against the inheritance rights of respondent No.1 and do

not necessarily depend upon proof of fraud personally committed by any particular individual.

23.This distinction assumes particular significance in view of the admitted fact that Malik Ali Akbar was a minor when Mutation No.204 was sanctioned. A distinction must be maintained between holding a mutation ineffective against the rights of the lawful heirs and attributing personal fraudulent conduct to the minor beneficiary thereof. Any finding of the latter nature would necessarily require independent and cogent evidentiary support. Any observation of the learned Trial Court suggestive of personal fraudulent conduct on the part of Malik Ali Akbar cannot be sustained, particularly when he was admittedly a minor at the relevant time. This, however, does not affect the ultimate decree, which essentially rests upon the failure of the defendants to prove the alleged gift forming the basis of their claim to exclusive title. Once the underlying transaction remained unproved, Mutation No.204 could not, by itself, operate to defeat the otherwise established inheritance rights of the branch represented by respondent No.1.

24.The objection concerning the parat Patwar of Mutation No.204 also does not materially affect the outcome of the case. The existence of the mutation itself was not in dispute; rather, the defendants relied upon it as the basis of the alleged gift in favour of Malik Ali Akbar. The material controversy, therefore, concerned proof of the transaction underlying the mutation and not merely the evidentiary status of the copy produced by respondent No.1. Even if the objection regarding admissibility or proof of the parat Patwar is accepted for the sake of argument, it would not relieve the defendants of the burden of establishing the gift affirmatively asserted by them as the source of their exclusive title. Undoubtedly, a plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case and not on the weakness of the defence; however, this principle does not dispense with the obligation of a party relying upon an affirmative transaction to prove that transaction through legally admissible and satisfactory evidence.

25.The objection regarding non-joinder of the concerned revenue officials or the Sub-Registrar also does not affect the maintainability of the suit. The controversy was essentially between rival claimants asserting competing rights of inheritance and title, while the Province through the Collector was already before the Court. No personal relief was claimed against any individual revenue functionary, nor was any decree sought to be

enforced against such official. The questions concerning the inheritance rights of respondent No.1 and the validity of the alleged gift relied upon by the petitioners could, therefore, be effectively and completely adjudicated in the presence of the parties asserting substantive rights in the property. The case law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners concerning impleadment of public officials in cases involving allegations of fraud or collusion against them have to be understood in the context of their own peculiar facts and cannot be applied irrespective of the nature of the controversy. In the present case, no prejudice or failure of justice has been shown to have resulted from the non-impleadment of any individual revenue official or the Sub-Registrar.

26.The objection founded upon Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C. is equally without merit. The object of the provision is to ensure that the first Appellate Court, being the final Court of fact, independently examines the material controversies and records reasons for the conclusions reached by it. The requirement is sufficiently met where the appellate judgment reflects due consideration and determination of the material issues in controversy, irrespective of its length, form, or separate formulation of points for determination. A perusal of the judgment dated 11.10.2014 shows that the learned Appellate Court duly considered the admitted pedigree table of the parties, the alleged gift and Mutation No.204, the plea of divorce, the Will, the relevant revenue record, as well as the question of limitation before affirming the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court. The reasons which prevailed with the learned Appellate Court in concurring with the findings of the learned Trial Court are sufficiently discernible from the judgment. No material controversy has been shown to have remained unaddressed so as to cause prejudice or miscarriage of justice. Dissatisfaction with the conclusions reached by the learned Appellate Court, by itself, cannot constitute non-compliance with Order XLI Rule 31, C.P.C.

27.The reasoning adopted by the Courts below, however, calls for clarification on certain aspects. A claim to inheritance is not, in every circumstance, beyond the operation of the law of limitation; its applicability must be determined with reference to the nature of the adverse assertion, knowledge thereof, acquiescence, relinquishment and other relevant circumstances. Likewise, an alleged divorce of 1921 could not be rendered ineffective merely for want of compliance with the procedural requirements

subsequently introduced by the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. Similarly, the execution of a document shortly before the death of its executant, though a circumstance capable of consideration along with other evidence, cannot by itself furnish proof of fraud. These aspects, therefore, require the reasoning of the Courts below to be suitably qualified. Such qualification, however, does not affect the ultimate result, as the correctness of the impugned judgments is to be examined on the basis of their legal and evidentiary foundation as a whole and does not depend upon affirmation of every observation made or reason assigned therein.

28.The foregoing qualifications in certain aspects of the reasoning of the Courts below do not, however, affect the essential factual foundation of their concurrent judgments. The pedigree of the parties is admitted; the alleged gift forming the basis of Mutation No.204 was not established through independent and satisfactory evidence; and the alleged divorce of Mst. Sahib Khatoon also remained unproved. The revenue record, on the other hand, contains material reflecting recognition of her branch in the inheritance at different stages, while neither any clear and unequivocal relinquishment or abandonment of the inheritance rights of that branch nor the creation of intervening third-party rights has been established. These material aspects were examined by the learned Trial Court upon appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence and were thereafter independently considered by the learned first Appellate Court. The principal objections advanced by the petitioners have also been examined by this Court; however, no jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, material irregularity, perversity, or material misreading or non-reading of evidence having a bearing upon the ultimate outcome of the case has been demonstrated. The concurrent findings are, therefore, supported by relevant material available on the record and cannot be displaced merely because another view of the evidence may conceivably be possible.

29.The scope of interference with concurrent findings under section 115, C.P.C. is circumscribed by well-settled principles, as revisional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and does not permit this Court to undertake a fresh appraisal of evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions for those concurrently reached upon by the Courts below merely because another view may also be possible. Such findings may be disturbed only where they suffer from a jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity, perversity, or

material misreading or non-reading of evidence affecting the outcome of the case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan has recently reiterated this principle in Pir Shah Abdul Haq (deceased) through L.Rs. and another v. Muhammad Irfan and others (2026 SCMR 1019), observing as under:- “11. ... It is by now a settled principle of law that concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless such findings are shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence or are otherwise perverse or illegal. Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is not intended to convert the High Court into a third court of fact. ....

12.... the learned High Court, while exercising revisional jurisdiction under section 115 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, transgressed the settled limits of such jurisdiction by interfering with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by Trial Court and First Appellate Court without demonstrating any misreading or non-reading of evidence...”

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others (2010 SCMR 1630), Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others (PLD 2022 SC 353) and Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb (2024 SCMR 916), further emphasized that a revisional Court cannot substitute its own finding merely because another conclusion appears more plausible and that, where the facts have been duly examined by two Courts and both have reached the same conclusion on relevant evidence, revisiting such evidence merely to draw a different inference would offend the limited scope of section 115, C.P.C. and the principle of finality attached to concurrent findings. The case law relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioners proceeds on materially different facts and circumstances and, therefore, being distinguishable does not advance their case. It is well settled that a precedent is to be applied in the context of the factual background in which the legal principle was enunciated, and factual dissimilarities having a bearing on the controversy cannot be ignored. The matter must, therefore, be adjudicated in the light of its own peculiar facts and circumstances, by applying the relevant principles of law to the evidence available on the record. Accordingly, the concurrent findings call for no interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction.1 Abdul Hakeem v. Habibullah and 11 others (1997 SCMR 1139), Anwar Zaman and 5 others v. Bahadur Sher and others (2000 SCMR 431) and Abdullah and others v. Fateh Muhammad and others (2002 CLC 1295).

30.For the foregoing reasons, no case for interference with the concurrent judgments and decrees dated 07.01.2011 and 11.10.2014, passed by the learned Courts below, is made out under section 115, C.P.C. Consequently, the instant civil revision, being devoid of merit, is dismissed, with the parties left to bear their own costs. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

(Hassan Nawaz Makhdoom) Judge

Approved for reporting.

Judge Announced/dictated on 16.09.2026 and signed on 01.10.2026.

Iqbal