Muhammad Ahsan vs Fazal Kareem etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT

RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDI

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P No.1728/2024

Muhammad Ahsan Versus Fazal Kareem etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing 21.09.2026 Petitioner By: Mr. Shoukat Mehmood Satti, Advocate alongwith Syed Irfan Ullah Shah, Advocate Respondent No.1 Mr. Tasleem Abbasi, Advocate By:

Anwaar Hussain J: This petition raises the following question for determination:

Whether proof of ownership by a person seeking ejectment under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (“Act”) necessarily establishes the relationship of landlord and tenant with the person in possession, or whether the presumption arising from ownership remains open to rebuttal by evidence demonstrating that the possession originated, and continued, in a character other than tenancy?

2.Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner filed an ejectment petition against respondent No.1 (“the respondent”), claiming that his father had purchased the rented premises from Malik Khan and subsequently transferred the same in favour of the petitioner through registered sale deed bearing document No.10475, executed on 17.03.2021. It was further pleaded that the respondent had been

inducted as tenant in the disputed premises through tenancy agreement dated 11.12.2019.

3.The respondent contested the ejectment petition and categorically denied the relationship of landlord and tenant. His case was that his father had entered into an agreement to sell dated 06.03.1979 with Malik Khan several decades earlier in respect of property forming part of a joint khata, whereafter a residential house was constructed thereon and the respondent and his family remained in possession thereof. He further disputed the voluntary execution of the tenancy agreement dated 11.12.2019 and alleged that the same had been procured from him through coercion. In this regard, he also relied upon a complaint made to the Police Authorities. Leave to contest was granted, issues were framed and the parties led their respective evidence. The Rent Tribunal accepted the ejectment petition through final order dated 07.12.2023. The Appellate Court below, however, on reappraisal of the evidence, reversed the said findings through impugned judgment dated 26.04.2024 and dismissed the ejectment petition. Hence, this constitutional petition.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the Appellate Court below failed to appreciate that the petitioner holds a registered sale deed in respect of the disputed property, whereas the respondent merely relies upon an unregistered agreement to sell, which neither creates nor transfers title in immovable property. Adds that once the petitioner established his title through a registered instrument, he was to be treated as landlord and the respondent, being in occupation without any title document, was presumed to be tenant. Reliance is placed upon cases reported as Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique and 2 others (PLD 2007 SC 45); Mrs. Azra Riaz v. Additional District Judge and others (2021 CLC 623); and Zafar Iqbal and another v.

Syed Riaz Hussain Shah and others (2025 SCMR 690). It is further contended that the utility connections installed at the premises stand in the names of the petitioner’s sister and brother-in-law, which circumstance also supports the petitioner’s claim.

5.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned judgment. He contends that notwithstanding the registered sale deed, the petitioner was required to establish the foundational relationship of landlord and tenant. Adds that the respondent and his family have been residing in the disputed premises for decades and produced birth certificates, school leaving certificates, nikahnama(s) and other public documents reflecting the premises as their address from periods much prior to the alleged tenancy dated 11.12.2019. Further contends that the tenancy agreement relied upon by the petitioner was procured through force and coercion, regarding which the respondent had approached the Police Authorities, though the proceedings were not pursued after institution of the ejectment petition.

6.Arguments heard. Record perused.

7.The distinction between title to property and the juridical character of possession lies at the heart of the controversy. There can be no cavil with the proposition that an agreement to sell, by itself, does not confer title in immovable property and that a registered conveyance carries substantial legal and evidentiary value. Equally settled is the principle enunciated in case of Shajar Islam supra and followed in case of Azra Riaz supra that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, ownership furnishes a basis to presume the owner to be landlord and the person occupying the premises to be tenant. The Supreme Court has recently reiterated the principle in case of Zafar

Iqbal supra. The qualification—“in the absence of evidence to the contrary”—is, however, integral to the rule. To detach the presumption from that qualification would convert a rebuttable evidentiary inference into an irrebuttable rule of law. Ownership may explain who holds title; it does not invariably explain how another person entered into, or continues in, possession. The two inquiries may overlap, but they are not interchangeable.

8.Case of Zafar Iqbal supra itself illustrates the distinction. After noticing the presumption arising from ownership, the Supreme Court proceeded to examine whether the disputed tenancy agreement stood established on the standard of preponderance of probability. The presumption, therefore, provides a starting point where the relationship is disputed; it does not bring the inquiry to an end. Once evidence to the contrary is produced, the Court must examine the entire record to determine the true character of possession. This distinction assumes particular importance in rent proceedings. The Rent Tribunal does not exercise plenary jurisdiction to determine competing titles to immovable property. Its jurisdiction is founded upon the relationship contemplated by the Act. A person may have a better title than the occupant and yet fail, in a particular proceeding, to establish that the latter occupies the premises as his tenant. The remedy flowing from title and the remedy flowing from tenancy need not necessarily be the same.

9.Viewed thus, the registered sale deed relied upon by the petitioner and the agreement to sell produced by the respondent could not simply be placed on opposite sides of a scale to determine which conferred the better title. Such adjudication lay beyond the scope of the proceedings before the Rent Tribunal. The respondent’s agreement to sell did not have to confer title in order to possess evidentiary

relevance. It formed part of his explanation as to the origin and character of his family’s possession and was required to be considered with the remaining evidence while determining whether that pre- existing possession subsequently assumed the character of tenancy on 11.12.2019. The documentary evidence assumes significance in this context. Birth certificates dated 25.04.1992 (Exh.R5), 31.12.1998 (Exh.R6), 22.01.1984 (Exh.R7), 04.06.1989 (Exh.R8) and domicile certificate dated 10.02.2010 (Exh.R9), nikahnama(s) and other public documents reflect possession of the respondent and his family at the disputed premises from periods considerably preceding the alleged tenancy. These documents do not establish ownership of the disputed premises, but that is not the purpose for which they are relevant. They tend to show residence and possession, of the respondent over disputed premises, long before the tenancy now asserted by the petitioner is stated to have commenced. The real question was, therefore, whether such pre-existing possession was shown to have undergone a juridical change and become possession as a tenant on

10.An important circumstance emerges from the petitioner’s own evidence. A suggestion was put to the respondent that he had been allowed to reside in the disputed premises at the request of Raja Chan Baig, admittedly the petitioner’s brother-in-law ()بہنوئی. The suggestion is difficult to reconcile with the pleaded case that the respondent occupied the premises pursuant to the written tenancy. It points, instead, towards permissive occupation having an origin independent of the tenancy now set up. It is neither necessary nor appropriate in these proceedings to determine whether such possession constituted a licence or any other juridical species of possession. What matters is that the petitioner’s own suggestion weakens the factual assertion that the respondent’s occupation was

referrable to the alleged tenancy. If possession is otherwise permissive but not that of a tenant, the remedy for its recovery lies before the appropriate forum and cannot be obtained merely by describing the occupant as a tenant.

11.The history and identification of the property provide further context. The sale deed relied upon by the petitioner was registered on 17.03.2021 and describes its subject matter as a plot, whereas the evidence depicts residential construction and utility connections predating that conveyance. No finding upon the validity of the registered sale deed is either necessary or permissible in these proceedings. The chronology is relevant only because it bears upon the petitioner’s assertion regarding the identity of the premises and the character of the respondent’s possession. The record further reflects that Malik Khan was the vendor through whom both sides trace their respective narratives: the respondent relies upon the agreement to sell allegedly executed by him in favour of the respondent’s father, while the petitioner traces the registered transactions concerning his father and sister to the same person. The Appellate Court below examined this aspect while determining whether the property occupied by the respondent was in fact the same property covered by the instruments relied upon by the petitioner. Its reasoning is reflected in the following passage:

“13. ...To find an answer above said quarries (sic) I have meticulously read the available record and observed that Muhammad Yousaf father of the appellant purchased a plot measuring 5 marlas vide registered sale deed Ex.A6 dated 01.06.1980 with the following description thereof:

East Plot of Mst. Shamim un Nisa (sister of respondent/landlord) West Plot of the vendor (Malik Khan) North Public Street South Plot of one Hakim

The sale deed No.10475 dated 17.03.2021 Ex.A3 executed in favour of the appellant also find the same description. Thus the above mentioned description of the land measuring 5 marlas as given in both above said sale deeds makes it clear that the vendor of respondent/landlord had three plots one was sold to Mst. Shamim un Nisa on the very day of execution of the sale deed Ex.A6, other to the appellant/tenant vide sale deed Ex.A3 and third one was still available with the vendor Malik Khan on the Western side of the plot of the respondent/landlord. According to the alleged agreement to sell dated 06.03.1979 (Ex R12), the said Malik Khan agreed to sell his plot measuring 5 marlas to Nazir Ahmed (RW-2) father of the appellant with the following description”

East A plot of the vendor.

West A house North House of one Altaf South A public thoroughfare/street.

Comparative reading of both the sale deeds Ex.A3, Ex.A6 and agreement to sell Ex.R12 suggest the property in possession of the appellant as mentioned in the agreement Ex.R12 is different from that of the appellant as described in the sale deeds Ex.A3 and Ex.A6 which factum could not be properly appreciated rather ignored by the learned Special Judge (Rent).”

12.Similarly, the utility connections have to be appreciated in the same evidentiary setting. Admittedly, they stand neither in the name of Malik Khan nor in the name of the petitioner or his father. They are in the names of the petitioner’s sister and brother-in-law, who reside in the adjoining property, which also traces its transaction to Malik Khan. The respondent explained that the assistance of sister and brother-in-law of the petitioner had been obtained for securing the connections because his father claimed the property under an agreement to sell and connections could not be installed on the basis of said agreement. Whether that explanation establishes any proprietary right in favour of the respondent is beside the point.

The material question is whether the utility record affirmatively proves induction of the respondent as tenant in the year 2019. It does not. The Appellate Court below dealt with the circumstance in the following terms:

“14. ...Though the electricity meter installed on the alleged rented premises is in the name of Mst. Shamim un Nisa (sister of the respondent/landlord) and the water connection in the name of one Raja Chan Baig (husband of said Mst. Shamim un Nisa) but the installation of said utility connections in itself are not sufficient to establish the possession of the appellant over the alleged rented premises especially when Mst. Shamim un Nisa is also owner of a plot measuring 5 marlas situated on the Eastern side of the plot of said vendor (subject matter of the agreement to sell (Ex.R12).”

13.Moreover, the tenancy agreement dated 11.12.2019 was itself specifically disputed by the respondent on the allegation that it had been obtained through force and coercion. The record also reflects that he approached the Police Authorities with such grievance. The complaint does not, by its mere existence, prove the truth of the allegation and is not being treated as such. Its relevance is contextual: it shows that the document asserted as the source of tenancy was disputed and that the challenge was not raised for the first time in the ejectment proceedings. Section 34 of the Act excludes strict application of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 to proceedings before the Rent Tribunal, but the adjudication of disputed facts must nevertheless remain informed by rational principles governing relevance and evidentiary weight. The tenancy agreement, therefore, could not be assessed in isolation from the circumstances preceding and attending its alleged execution. The governing standard remained preponderance of probability.

14.The evidentiary picture may now be brought together. The respondent produced documentary material reflecting residence of his family at the premises long before 11.12.2019; the history of construction and utility connections was inconsistent with treating his occupation as originating with the alleged tenancy; the tenancy agreement was specifically disputed and had also generated a complaint to the Police Authorities; and, significantly, the petitioner himself suggested during evidence that the respondent had been allowed to reside there at the request of Raja Chan Baig. Added to this was the question of identity of the property arising from the description contained in the respective documents. These circumstances constituted “evidence to the contrary” within the very rule upon which the petitioner relies. The presumption arising from ownership, therefore, could no longer decide the controversy by itself. The petitioner had to establish, on a preponderance of probability, that notwithstanding the antecedent history and character of the respondent’s possession, a landlord-tenant relationship came into existence on 11.12.2019. The evidence did not satisfactorily establish that juridical transition.

15.The Rent Tribunal fell into error by substantially reducing the controversy to the comparative legal efficacy of a registered sale deed and an unregistered agreement to sell. That comparison could answer a question of title; it could not, by itself, answer the jurisdictional question whether the respondent was the petitioner’s tenant. The Appellate Court below corrected that error by examining the origin, duration and character of possession, the identity of the property and the evidence surrounding the asserted tenancy.

16.The question framed at the outset is, therefore, answered in the negative. Proof of ownership may, in the absence of evidence to the

contrary, raise a presumption relevant to the relationship of landlord and tenant, but it does not create an irrebuttable equation between ownership and tenancy relationship, or between license/occupation and tenancy. Where credible evidence points to a different origin and character of possession, the asserted tenancy must independently withstand scrutiny on the applicable standard of proof.

17.In constitutional jurisdiction, the petitioner must demonstrate a jurisdictional defect, material illegality, or misreading or non-reading of material evidence in the impugned judgment. No such defect has been established. On the contrary, the Appellate Court below addressed the evidence which went to the foundation of the Rent Tribunal’s jurisdiction and reached a conclusion reasonably supported by the record.

18.Consequently, this petition, being devoid of merit, is dismissed and judgment dated 26.04.2024 passed by the Appellate Court below is maintained. It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are confined to determination of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and shall not prejudice the claim of either party regarding title, possession or any other proprietary right, which may be agitated before the competent forum and determined independently in accordance with law.

(ANWAAR HUSSAIN)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

Judge

Announced in Open Court on 21.09.2026, dictated on the same date, however, finalized on 29.09.2026.

Akram