Safdar Hussain etc. vs Adj etc.

Stereo.HCJDA 38.

Judgment Sheet

LAHORE HIGH COURT

RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDI

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

S.A.O. No.01 of 2026

Safdar Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs.

Versus Umar Farooq

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing 21.09.2026 Appellants by: Mr. Muhammad Amir Butt, Advocate. Respondent by: Mr. Arif Riaz Butt, Advocate.

MIRZA VIQAS RAUF, J. This appeal in terms of Section 15(6) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as “Ordinance”) assails the vires of the judgment and decree dated 20th February, 2018, whereby the learned Additional District Judge, Chakwal, while dismissing the appeal, preferred by Safdar Hussain predecessor-in-interest of appellants No.1A to 1D (hereinafter referred to as “appellant”), affirmed the judgment and decree dated 13th December, 2008, passed by learned Civil Judge Class-III/Rent Controller, Chakwal.

2.It would not be out of context to mention here that the learned Rent Tribunal, Chakwal, while deciding the ejectment application, termed its decision as judgment and decree but in fact the Ordinance only recognizes the term ‘final order’ for the said purpose.

3.Facts, in brief, forming background of this Second Appeal against Order are that the respondent namely Umer Farooq, claiming himself to be the landlord of shop forming part of Khasra No.2235,

Khata Khatuni No.697/1186 for the year 1999-2000, situated on road side Talagang Road, near Rescue-15, Chakwal, (hereinafter referred to as “demised premises”), moved an application to learned Civil Judge/Rent Controller, seeking eviction of the appellant on multiple grounds mentioned therein. The ejectment application was, however, resisted by the appellant through a written reply wherein he denied existence of relationship of landlord and tenant asserting that one Ch. Shabbir Ahmad is the landlord of the demised premises under whom he is occupying the same as tenant. In the light of respective stances of the parties, the learned Rent Controller framed multiple issues and then recorded evidence of both the sides. On completion of the evidence, the ejectment application was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 13th December, 2008, whereunder the appellant was directed to vacate the demised premises within two months from the passing of the judgment. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before Additional District Judge, Chakwal, but remained unsuccessful as his appeal was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 20th February, 2018, hence, this Second Appeal against Order in terms of Section 15(6) of the Ordinance.

4.Learned counsel for the appellant contended that there exists no relationship of landlord and tenant interse appellant and the respondent. Learned counsel added that the respondent, in the circumstances, was bound to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant by leading cogent and convincing evidence but he failed to do so. It is argued with vehemence that overwhelming material is available on the record to establish that Ch. Shabbir Ahmad is the landlord of the appellant but it is discarded without assigning any lawful reasoning. Learned counsel submitted that the learned Rent Controller as well as the first appellate court have grossly misread the evidence while reaching at a concurrent conclusion.

5.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondent resisted this appeal with the contentions that scope of second appeal is limited and

the appellant has badly failed to point out any material illegality in the concurrent findings of the two courts.

6.Heard. Record perused.

7.The ejectment application was filed by the respondent while invoking the provisions of the Ordinance as it was in vogue at that time, though subsequently the same was repealed with the promulgation of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. Notwithstanding its repeal, the proceedings pending in terms thereof were to be conducted in accord with the provisions of the Ordinance and even the appeal against order under the Ordinance was to be preferred in accordance with the provisions thereof, as is provided in Section 35 of the Act, ibid. Section 15 of the Ordinance deals with the remedy of appeal, which initially though provided one appeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller, however, through the amendment introduced by the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1991, (Act-III of 1991), sub-section (6) was added in Section 15 to the following effect:-

(6). In the case of “non-residential building”, a person aggrieved by an order passed on appeal by the appellate authority may, within 30 days from the date of the said order, prefer an appeal in writing to the High Court.

Explanation. An appeal under this sub-section shall be heard and determined as an appeal from an appellate order under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the provisions of Part VI of the First Schedule to the said Code relating to appeals shall, with such modifications as the context may require, apply to such proceedings.

8.It thus clearly manifests that initially against the order of Rent Controller passed in the proceedings under the Ordinance, only one right of appeal was available, however, with the introduction of sub- section (6) in Section 15 through Act-III of 1991 in case of non- residential building, right of second appeal was also bestowed to the aggrieved person. It would not be out of context to mention here that initially the appellant challenged the impugned judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Chakwal, through

constitutional petition No.1217 of 2018 but on application of the appellant, the same was converted into Second Appeal against Order vide order dated 9th September, 2025.

9.As the appellant denied the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant, so, in order to set the controversy at rest, certain issues were framed by the Rent Controller but, to my mind, issue No.2 is most relevant, which reads as under:-

2.Whether there is no relationship of landlord and tenant and existing between the petitioner and respondent? OPR

In order to appreciate the fact as to whether the respondent succeeded in establishing relationship of landlord and tenant with the appellant, it would be apposite to mention here that the respondent purchased the demised premises from Mst. Saeeda Afsar and Mst. Fareeda Afsar through registered Sale Deed No.1325 dated 13th July, 2005 whereafter he became owner/landlord of the same. On the contrary, it is the claim of the appellant that the demised premises was owned by Ch. Shabbir Ahmad, who rented out the same to him and he is his tenant. It evinces from the record that Ch. Shabbir Ahmad instituted a suit for declaration and injunction seeking cancellation of the sale deed effected in favour of the respondent before learned Civil Judge Class-I, Chakwal. The suit was tried and finally decided vide judgment and decree dated 2nd January, 2012 whereby claim of Ch. Shabbir Ahmad with regard to declaration was awarded but the sale deed effected in favour of the respondent was kept intact. The respondent though challenged the said judgment through an appeal before learned District Judge Chakwal but remained unsuccessful as it was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 24th January, 2013. It is thus an admitted position on the record that Ch. Shabbir Ahmad was though declared as owner of the property, subject matter of that suit, but the registered Sale Deed executed in favour of the respondent was also kept intact and as a result, he attained the status of a co- owner. It is trite law that a co-owner can file an ejectment application against the tenant without impleading the other co-owner. Guidance

to this effect can be sought from the case of KHALIQUE AHMED vs ABDUL GHANI AND ANOTHER (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 214) wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan held as under:- That there were three other co-owners of the leased premises had, in law, no effect on the competence of the application for ejectment. A suit for possession can be brought by all the co-owners jointly. It is open, however, to one of them also to sue for possession, but he must join the other co-owners as defendants and the decree will be for joint possession and not in favour of the plaintiff only. Unlike, that a suit for ejectment can be filed by one of the co-owners without joining the others as defendants. This is the difference between an action for possession and an action for ejectment. If this clear distinction was kept in view, certificate of fitness under clause 10 of the Letters Patent would not have been granted, nor the appeal admitted to hearing by the Division Bench.

In the case of Abdul Ghani vs ABRAR HUSSAIN (1999 SCMR 348), it was held as under:-

...It seems to be a well-settled proposition of law that a co-owner can file ejectment proceedings against a tenant without impleading his co-owners under the Rent Laws whereas a suit for possession cannot be filed without impleading all the co-owners.

Same view was also taken in the case of MUHAMMAD HANIF and another vs. MUHAMMAD JAMIL TURK and 5 others (2002 SCMR 429).

After having an overview of the principles laid down in aforenoted judgments, I am of the candid opinion that when once it is established on record that the respondent became the co-owner, he was competent to file the ejectment application.

10.Furthermore, it clearly evinces from the record that after decision of the ejectment application, the appellant filed an appeal before Additional District Judge, Chakwal and during its pendency,

Ch. Shabbir Ahmad moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908) asserting that he is proper and necessary party to the ejectment proceedings as he is owner of the demised premises and rented out the same to the appellant. The said application was resisted by the respondent. The application was, ultimately dismissed through the order dated 4th July, 2009, passed by Additional District Judge, Chakwal and admittedly, the said order attained finality upto the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The appellant though rested his whole claim upon the status of Ch. Shabbir Ahmad but did not make any effort to examine Ch. Shabbir Ahmed in support of his stance, which give rise a negative inference against him.

11.The scope of Second Appeal against Order is always limited. An appeal in terms of sub-section (6) of Section 15 of the Ordinance always be treated as an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (V of 1908). The appellant was, thus, required to demonstrate that the concurrent findings are contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or that there is a substantial error or defect in the procedure effecting the merits of the case but no such infirmity is pointed out by the appellant. Resultantly, this Second Appeal against Order fails and is dismissed with no order as to costs. Office to remit the record accordingly.

(MIRZA VIQAS RAUF)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

M.Sajid*