Amna Shahzadi Vs The State etc.

Form No.HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No. 71660/B/2025

Amna Shahzadi Vs The State and another

S.No. of Order/ Date of order/ Order with the signature of the Judge and that of parties or counsel, where Proceeding proceeding necessary

29.01.2026 Mr. Qasim Zia Ranjha, Advocate, with the Petitioner. Mr. Abdul Samad, Additional Prosecutor General, with Rafaqat/ASI.

Syed Husnain Haider Naqvi, Advocate, for the Complainant.

Tariq Saleem Sheikh, J. – The Complainant has established a chain of educational institutions under the name and style of Vital Group of Colleges, with campuses in various cities, including Daska. On 17.11.2024, he entered into an agreement with the Petitioner for the sale of 50% share in the Daska Campus for a total consideration of Rs. 8,000,000/-. The Petitioner paid Rs.2,500,000/- in cash and, for the remaining amount, issued three cheques: (i) Cheque No. 00020742 dated 23.01.2025 for Rs. 2,600,000/-, (ii) Cheque No. 00020741 dated 23.04.2025 for Rs. 2,600,000/-, and (iii) Cheque No. 00020744 dated 23.05.2025 for Rs. 300,000/-. Thereupon, the Complainant handed over management and control of the Daska Campus to the Petitioner. Subsequently, Cheque No. 00020741 was dishonoured, whereupon the Complainant lodged FIR No. 2260/2025 under section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (“PPC”), at Police Station Aroop, District Gujranwala. The Petitioner was arrested and, on 06.06.2025, when she was produced before the Area Magistrate, a compromise was effected. On that occasion, her sister deposited Rs. 500,000/- into the Complainant’s bank account and delivered him two cheques – Cheque No. 50733801 dated 10.07.2025 for Rs. 1,000,000/- and Cheque No. 50733803 dated 20.08.2025 for Rs. 1,100,000/- – towards payment of the remaining sum of Rs. 2,100,000/-. Cheque No. 50733803 was also dishonoured.

2.On 23.01.2025, the Complainant presented Cheque No.00020742, issued under the Sale Agreement dated 17.11.2024, for encashment, but it was dishonoured. At the Petitioner’s request, he presented it again on 18.03.2025, but it was once more dishonoured. Consequently, he lodged FIR No. 3035/2025 dated 19.06.2025 at Police Station Aroop under section 489-F PPC.

3.Through this application, the Petitioner seeks pre-arrest bail in case FIR No.3035/2025.

4.Mr. Qasim Zia Ranjha, Advocate, contends that the present case arises out of a business transaction between the parties and that the Complainant is using the criminal process to pressurize the Petitioner to make payment. He submits that the Complainant has not brought any material on the record to show that Cheque No. 00020742 was issued with dishonest intention, which, according to him, is an essential ingredient of an offence under section 489-F PPC. He further argues that, where the underlying transaction is the same, multiple FIRs cannot be registered. In the present case, FIR No. 2260/2025 had already been lodged in respect of Cheque No. 00020741 issued under the Sale Agreement dated 17.11.2024. He maintains that the subsequent registration of FIR No. 3035/2025 in respect of another cheque issued under the same transaction is not competent in law and amounts to an abuse of process. He, therefore, prays that the Petitioner be admitted to pre-arrest bail.

5.Mr. Abdul Samad, Additional Prosecutor General, assisted by the Complainant’s counsel, has opposed this application. He argues that merely because the transaction between the parties is of a commercial nature, it does not bar the application of section 489-F PPC where a cheque is dishonoured. He further submits that the present FIR pertains to a cheque distinct from the one that formed the basis of FIR No. 2260/2025 and thus relates to a separate offence. He maintains that the Petitioner has failed to make out a case of mala fide or ulterior motive on the part of the Complainant or the police, which is the sine qua non for the grant of pre-arrest bail. He, therefore, prays that this application be dismissed.

6.Arguments heard. Record perused.

7.Two questions arise for determination. The first is whether the ingredients of the offence under section 489-F PPC are prima facie made out against the Petitioner. The second is whether, on the facts of this case, the registration of FIR No. 3035/2025 constitutes an impermissible fragmentation of criminal proceedings arising out of one composite transaction. Both questions bear on whether the Petitioner is entitled to pre-arrest bail.

8.Section 489-F in its present form was inserted in the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, by the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 2002. It reads as follows:

489-F. Dishonestly issuing a cheque. – Whoever dishonestly issues a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfillment of an obligation which is dishonoured on presentation, shall be punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both, unless he can establish, for which the burden of proof shall rest on him, that he had made arrangements with his bank to ensure that the cheque would be honoured and that the bank was at fault in not honouring the cheque.

9.A bare perusal of section 489-F PPC shows that every dishonour of a cheque may not constitute an offence. This provision is attracted when the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) the cheque was issued, (ii) the cheque was issued with a dishonest intention, (iii) the cheque was for the repayment of a loan or fulfilment of a financial obligation, and (iv) the cheque was dishonoured on presentation.1 In Muhammad Sultan v. The State (2010 SCMR 806), the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that “fulfilment of an obligation” is a broad term, which includes lawful agreements, contracts, services, promises, or any act that binds a person to a particular performance. In Malik Safdar Ali v. Syed Khalid Ali and others (PLD 2012 Sindh 464), the Sindh High Court stated that the offence under section 489-F PPC must be distinguished from the one under section 420 PPC. It explained that section 420 PPC generally deals with fraud, cheating, and deception, whereas section 489-F PPC creates a separate offence when fraud or cheating is perpetrated using a cheque. It may, however, be added that, in an appropriate case, sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC may also be See: Muhammad Sultan v. The State (2010 SCMR 806), Mian Allah Ditta v. The State and others (2013 SCMR 51), Muhammad Anwar v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1567), Ali Anwar Paracha v. The State and another (2024 SCMR 1596).

attracted if their respective statutory ingredients are independently established.

10.A comparative reference to Indian law may also be useful at this stage. In India, section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, criminalizes the dishonour of cheques. In Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel [2021] 11 S.C.R. 432, the Supreme Court of India (SCI) held that an offence under section 138 is quasi-criminal in nature, in that it arises from a civil wrong but attracts criminal sanctions. The Court further observed that the object of the provision is to provide security to creditors and foster confidence in the country’s banking system.

11.There is an important distinction between India’s section 138, supra, and section 489-F PPC. The Indian provision does not expressly make dishonesty an ingredient of the offence, whereas under section 489-F PPC mens rea is fundamental, as is evident from the word “dishonestly.” In common parlance, dishonesty means “to act without honesty”. It is used to describe “a lack of integrity, cheating, lying, or deliberately withholding information or being intentionally deceptive, knave, perfidious, corrupt, or treacherous.”2 Section 24 PPC provides its statutory definition. It states that “whoever does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do that thing ‘dishonestly’.”

12.In Ahmed Shakeel Bhatti and others v. The State and others (2023 SCMR 1), the complainant sought cancellation of the pre- arrest bail of the accused, alleging a lack of commercial integrity. The Supreme Court of Pakistan dismissed his application inter alia with the following observations:

“... commercial integrity is an ethical standard which would require evidence for establishing its absence in the conduct of an accused to a degree that constitutes dishonesty by him within the meaning of section 489-F PPC. In the facts of the present case, such an assessment can be made at the trial to evaluate whether any improper benefit, if at all, has been derived by the respondent on account of the stoppage of payment of his cheque which was wrongful. This aspect of the matter cannot be determined at the bail stage in the present case. As dishonesty is an ingredient of the offence under section 489-F of the PPC, therefore, the cancellation of pre-arrest bail can be ordered in the instant case if the element of See: Hayat Kimya Pakistan (Private) Limited v. Humair Yusuf and others (2024 CLD 326).

dishonesty is presently indicated from the conduct of the respondent. Evidentiary material to such effect is lacking on record at the present stage. Indeed, if evidence on the point is brought at the trial, the finding thereon will depend on the significance and materiality of the obligation claimed by the respondent to have been breached by the petitioner under the terms of the bargain between the parties.”

13.The Supreme Court thus drew a distinction between the final determination of dishonest intention, which must await the trial, and a prima facie assessment of whether such intention is indicated from the conduct of the accused, which remains relevant at the bail stage.

14.It must, nevertheless, be kept in view that section 489-F PPC is not to be invoked merely as a means of exerting pressure for the recovery of money. Its application depends upon the fulfilment of its statutory ingredients, particularly the existence of a loan or financial obligation and the element of dishonesty. In Syed Basit Hyder Taqvi v. The State (PLD 2026 SC 75), the Supreme Court held that section 489-F PPC serves as a safeguard against fraud and must not be used as a substitute for civil remedies. It further emphasized that mens rea, namely, dishonest intention, must be established before penal consequences may follow.

15.Given the above, where a cheque issued towards repayment of a loan or fulfilment of an obligation is dishonoured on presentation, the court must carefully examine the transaction in question and the surrounding circumstances. In Malik Safdar Ali v. Syed Khalid Ali and others (PLD 2012 Sindh 464), the Court held that whether a cheque was issued dishonestly must be determined in light of the “facts culminating in [its] issuance.” Where the cheque is not backed by any “meaningful transaction” creating a genuine and enforceable obligation, its dishonour may not attract criminal liability, as the absence of such obligation may negate the element of fraud or dishonesty. Similarly, in Muhammad Anwar and others v. The State and others (2019 PCr.LJ 1244), it was held that the offence under section 489-F PPC comprises two essential elements: dishonesty as the mens rea and the issuance of a cheque towards repayment of a loan or fulfilment of an obligation as the actus reus. Both must co-exist and be established to sustain a conviction; the mere presence of one, in the

absence of the other, is insufficient. The court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the nature of the transaction, the timing of the cheque, and the existence or otherwise of an enforceable obligation at the relevant time.3

16.Applying the above principles to the present case, it is not disputed that FIR No. 2260/2025 had already been lodged in respect of Cheque No. 00020741, which was also issued under the Sale Agreement dated 17.11.2024. It is equally not disputed that the Petitioner was arrested in that case and, upon her production before the Area Magistrate on 06.06.2025, Rs. 500,000/- was deposited in the Complainant’s bank account and two further cheques amounting to Rs. 2,100,000/- were issued towards the remaining amount. Cheque No. 00020742, which forms the subject matter of the present FIR, had allegedly been dishonoured earlier, first on 23.01.2025 and again on 18.03.2025. Yet no criminal proceedings in respect of this cheque were initiated until 19.06.2025, that is, after the earlier FIR had already been lodged and the Petitioner had been arrested therein. This sequence is significant. It prima facie suggests that the criminal process is being invoked, not to address a distinct offence, but to exert pressure for the recovery of money, which is not the purpose for which section 489-F PPC was enacted.

17.Mr. Ranjha’s next contention is that, where the transaction is the same, multiple FIRs cannot be registered. In support of this submission, he has relied upon Hamid Khan v. The State and others (2022 MLD 31). In that case, the petitioner and the complainant were business partners. Their partnership was dissolved under an agreement whereby the petitioner undertook to pay a settled amount. In discharge of this liability, he issued three post-dated cheques, all of which were later dishonoured. The complainant lodged an FIR under section 489-F PPC on the basis of one cheque and, after a year, got a second FIR registered based on another cheque from the same series. The petitioner approached the High Court for quashing of the second FIR on the ground that it arose out of the same transaction. The High Court, Also see: Major Anwar-ul-Haq v. The State (PLD 2005 Lahore 607), Naseeb Gul v. Amir Jan and another (2013 PCr.LJ 175), Muzaffar Ahmad v. The State and others (2021 PCr.LJ 1393), Hayat Kimya Pakistan (Private) Limited v. Humair Yusuf and others (2024 CLD 326).

invoking by analogy the principle underlying Order II Rule 2 CPC, emphasized that a party must bring forward the whole of his claim arising out of one transaction. The complainant’s deliberate omission to include all the cheques in the first FIR was treated as procedurally improper and contrary to fairness, transparency, and propriety. It was further stated that the complainant is obliged to place the complete set of allegations and relevant details before the Investigating Officer, who is correspondingly duty-bound to ascertain the truth of the allegations, their background, and the entire factual matrix. Such an approach enables the court to reach a just conclusion.

18.In Hamid Khan, the Court also referred to sections 233, 234, and 235 Cr.P.C. Section 233 embodies the general rule that there should be a separate charge and a separate trial for each distinct offence, while sections 234 and 235 permit, in specified circumstances, more than one offence to be tried together. It reasoned that even where multiple offences are made out, if they are of the same kind and committed within a defined period, or arise out of the same transaction, they may be tried together in one trial. Read in that context, those provisions support the broader procedural principle that allegations arising from a single transaction should not be fragmented into successive criminal proceedings. The Court further observed that permitting multiple FIRs in such circumstances would encourage misuse of process, place an unnecessary burden on the prosecution and the courts, and create a risk of inconsistent results. It also drew support from Mst. Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595), in which the Supreme Court held that multiple FIRs in respect of the same occurrence are not permissible.

19.The reasoning in Hamid Khan, however, requires careful application in the present context. Sections 233 to 235 Cr.P.C. govern the joinder of charges and the conduct of trial; they do not by themselves determine the validity of an FIR, which is only the first information of a cognizable offence. Similarly, the analogy with Order II Rule 2 CPC, which bars the splitting of civil causes of action, cannot be applied directly in criminal proceedings, where liability is act-specific, and each completed offence is separately cognizable. The

anti-splitting principle is better understood as resting on the court’s duty to prevent misuse of the criminal process. Where a complainant, with full knowledge of multiple dishonoured cheques issued under one transaction, deliberately withholds some and uses them sequentially to keep the accused under sustained criminal pressure, the court may legitimately treat such conduct as an abuse of process. Sughran Bibi’s case is not directly applicable here, as the Supreme Court’s prohibition on multiple FIRs in that case was confined to the same occurrence. The present case involves different cheques and different dates of dishonour. Nevertheless, the underlying principle remains relevant: the criminal process must not be fragmented and invoked piecemeal in respect of what is, in substance, one composite grievance arising from a single transaction.

20.In the present case, the critical question is whether the allegations in the two FIRs can be said to arise out of the “same transaction”. The expression “same transaction” is not defined in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. It has, however, been judicially interpreted in several cases. In Babulal Chaukhani v. King-Emperor (65 I.A. 158), the Privy Council held that the determination of whether various acts form one transaction depends on the “accusations” made rather than the evidence or the outcome of the trial. In State of A.P. v. Cheemalapati Ganeswara Rao (AIR 1963 SC 1950), the SCI held that whether a series of acts forms the “same transaction” depends upon the facts of each case and that the relevant considerations include proximity of time or place, unity of purpose or design, continuity of action, and the connection between the acts. All these elements need not co-exist in every case. The decisive consideration is whether the acts are sufficiently connected with one another. A transaction may consist of a single act or a series of acts, but such acts must be linked by a common thread; if some stand independently without such a connection, they would constitute separate transactions.

21.In S.M.K. Alvi v. The Crown (PLD 1953 FC 189), the Federal Court ruled that acts committed at different times and locations may nonetheless constitute one transaction if unified by a common design, whereas acts occurring simultaneously and at the same place

may still form distinct transactions if unconnected in purpose. The decisive factor is the existence of a shared scheme or intent.

22.In Md. Mosaddar Hoque and Md. Abdul Rouf v. The State [PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 131], the Supreme Court observed that, since the term “transaction” is not defined in the Code, it is for the court to determine on the facts of each case whether a given set of acts constitutes the “same transaction.” The Court cautioned against stretching procedural rules to cover doubtful cases and held that the relevant tests include proximity of time and place, community of purpose or design, and continuity of action. Of these, community of purpose or design and continuity of action are the more significant elements in determining whether distinct acts form part of a single transaction. Proximity of time and place alone is insufficient.

23.In Shahadat Khan and another v. Home Secretary to the Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1969 SC 158), the Supreme Court held that sections 234, 235, 236, and 239 Cr.P.C. are exceptions to the general rule in section 233, which requires a separate charge and trial for each distinct offence. These provisions are merely enabling and do not mandate a joint trial in every case. A joint trial may be declined where it is likely to confuse or prejudice an accused. The Court further held that whether unity of action and community of purpose exist in a given case is a question of fact to be determined on its circumstances. It must, however, be noted that Shahadat Khan was concerned with the conduct of the trial, not with the registration of FIRs. Its relevance here lies not in any rule regarding joint trial as such, but in its affirmation that community of purpose and unity of action are the controlling considerations in determining whether distinct acts form part of the same transaction.

24.In Khan Mohammad and others v. The State (1971 PCr.LJ 762), it was held that the following factors are relevant in determining whether multiple acts form a single transaction:

(i)proximity of time, (ii) proximity of place, (iii) whether the acts are causally related, (iv) whether they are related as principal and subsidiary acts, (v) community of purpose, and (vi) continuity of action. While proximity and causal links are relevant, the essential

elements are community of purpose and unity of action. Even if the different acts are connected with each other as “cause and effect”, it is not necessary that they should form part of the same transaction. If, however, “community of purpose” is present in the shape of a conspiracy, plan, scheme, or design, then the various offences committed in pursuance thereof shall be part of the same transaction even if they are widely separated in point of time or place of occurrence.

25.The above principles show that the question whether several acts form part of the same transaction is essentially one of substance, to be determined from the totality of the facts and not by applying any rigid or mechanical test. However, this does not mean that every dishonoured cheque issued under one agreement must necessarily be treated as part of the same transaction. The court must examine the substance of the dealings between the parties and determine whether successive FIRs truly arise from distinct and independent transactions or merely represent a piecemeal invocation of the criminal process in respect of one composite bargain.

26.In the present case, evidently, Cheque No. 00020742 did not arise out of a distinct or independent transaction. It was one of the three cheques admittedly issued by the Petitioner under the Sale Agreement dated 17.11.2024 towards the balance sale consideration for the Complainant’s 50% share in the Daska Campus. The Complainant, after receiving Rs. 2,500,000/- in cash and the said cheques, handed over the management and control of the campus to the Petitioner. Thus, prima facie, the cheque in question formed part of one composite bargain already acted upon by the parties, and the present FIR appears to split criminal proceedings in respect of cheques issued under that agreement.

27.The above view also finds support from Muhammad Atif v. The State (2025 PCr.LJ 1762). In that case, the complainant lodged an FIR under sections 420, 468, and 471 PPC, alleging that the petitioner had embezzled money entrusted to him for deposit against the complainant’s outstanding tax liability and had also prepared forged deposit slips. Subsequently, while in police custody and as part of an

arrangement to secure bail, the petitioner executed three cheques and paid some cash before the trial court, whereupon he was released. Those cheques were subsequently dishonoured, after which the complainant had three separate FIRs registered at different police stations. The High Court held that the cheques had been issued in instalments towards the same liability and, therefore, formed part of the same transaction. It further held that the registration of multiple FIRs on that basis was legally untenable, and that the proper course was to incorporate section 489-F PPC in the original FIR.

28.Hamid Khan, discussed earlier, also supports the conclusion reached here, though its reasoning requires the qualification noted in paragraph 19. In that case, following the dissolution of a partnership, multiple post-dated cheques were issued pursuant to a single agreement. Despite being in possession of the entire series, the complainant lodged an FIR under section 489-F PPC against one cheque and later got another FIR registered in respect of a different cheque arising out of the same financial arrangement. The Court held that, since all the cheques had a common origin and formed part of one transaction, the second FIR was impermissible as a misuse of the criminal process.

29.For the foregoing reasons, this application is accepted, and the interim pre-arrest bail granted to the Petitioner is confirmed, subject to her furnishing fresh bail bonds in the sum of Rs. 200,000/- with two sureties in the like amount to the satisfaction of the trial court.

(Tariq Saleem Sheikh) Judge Ahsan

Approved for reporting

Judge