Nauman Ahmad Vs Senior Civil Judge etc

Form HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

W.P. No.49019 of 2026 Nauman Ahmad Versus Senior Civil Judge (Family Division) Faisalabad, etc.

S.No.of order/ Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge, and that of parties or Proceeding Proceeding counsel, where necessary 06.10.2026 Mr. Javed Iqbal Bhatti, Advocate for petitioner. Mr. Waheed Alam, Assistant Advocate-General, Punjab, with Zarar Haider Bhatti, Consultant A.G. Office and Mr. Rubeel Raza Bhatti, Advocate for the respondents.

This Constitutional Petition assails orders dated 13.09.2025, passed by respondent No.1 in exercise of powers under the provisions of Punjab Protection of Women against Violence Act, 2016 (“The Act”) and 16.07.2026 by respondent No.2, whereby petitioner’s appeal was dismissed. Order dated 13.09.2025 is a composite order, covering the protection, residence and monetary matters.

2.At the outset, it is pertinent to define the scope of this order, which is restricted to the determination of the extent of application of Chapter XXII of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code 1898 (the ‘Code’); context being sub-section

(4)of section 4 of the Act, which provision reads as:-

“The Court shall finally decide the complaint within ninety days from the date of the receipt of the complaint, as nearly as possible, under

Chapter XXII of the Code relating to the summary trials”.

3.Factual narrative, bare minimum, is that respondent No.1 submitted complaint in terms of section 4 of the Act. In terms of section 6 of the Act, subject to the conditions prescribed and requirements enlisted, Court is empowered to pass interim order as it deem fit – there is no reference to passing of interim order in the text of order dated 13.09.2025; nonetheless, factum of interim order, existence and legality thereof are not subject of adjudication. It appears from the text of order dated 13.09.2025 that report from District Women Protection Officer, Women Protection Centre, Faisalabad (‘DWPO’) was solicited and it was submitted on 12.09.2025.

Evidently, respondent No.1 while passing composite order 13.09.2025 has considered the contents of report of DWPO, besides considering other material. This act of consideration of the report, without extending opportunity(ies) to the petitioner to raise objections to the contents thereof, is the primary grievance.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner sought indulgence on the premise that in wake of remedy of appeal provided in terms of section 22 of the

Act, section 264 of the Code is attracted and respondent No.1 was obligated to record substance of the evidence before passing protection order.

5.Conversely, learned counsel for respondents No.5 to 7, submits that order of protection was not passed, simplicitor, on the basis of report of DWPO but other material, comprising of social media messages, material showing hacking of social media accounts, CCTV camera recordings, USB with audio recordings, Whatsapp messages and pictures, etc. was considered.

Learned law officer submits that while passing order dated 13.09.2025 option of conducting summary trial was left open if terms of protection order are violated.

6.Heard.

7.I take up the issue of option of holding a summary trial, as argued by learned law officer.

Argument does not appreciate distinctive character of sections 4 and 21 of the Act, which cater for different situations. Section 21 of the Act provides for cognizance of offences under the Act – inter alia sections 18, 19 and 20 of the Act

elaborates incidences of offences under the Act – upon complaint by DWPO. Section 4 of the Act provides for an opportunity to lodge complaint to an aggrieved person, which in this case were respondents No.5 to 7, which brough complaint in the first place. Therefore, option of invoking section 21 of the Act has nothing to do with the passing of protection orders under sections 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the context of lis under reference.

There is another conspicuous distinction between the expressions employed in section 21 and sub- section (4) of section 4 of the Act, with reference to the adoption of procedure for summary trial. In terms of sub-section (2) of section 21 of the Act the Court shall conduct the trial of an offence under the Act in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XXII of the Code relating to the summary trials. However, requirement of following procedure for summary trials has been qualified by the expression “as nearly as possible”, which apparently gives the Court discretion to adapt the procedural requirements; to the extent necessary, workable and possible – [context is always the peculiar facts of each and every case] or dispense therewith, depending that how far the procedural

compliance is practicable or doable, in the circumstances encountered. There is no doubt that judicial discretion extended cannot be claimed as ground to justify any compromise qua the essential features of right to defend – circumstances where departure from the procedural mandate has the effect of causing prejudice to the accused or negating parameters of right to defend.

8.In view of the above, the expression ‘as nearly as possible’ confers discretion on the Court to ensure balance between adaptation or dispensation of procedural requirements of summary trial but without compromising on irreducible core of the right to defend the allegations attributed in complaint under section 4 of the Act. This is the non-derogable minimum, which reiterates the mandate of Article 10-A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, in the letter and spirit.

9.Upon construing the interpretative scheme and construction of scope of sub-section (4) of section 4 of the Act it falls to see application thereof to the facts of the case at hand. Without affecting the probative value or admissibility of

the material considered by the respondent No.1 and referred to in paragraph 8 of the order, it is apparent that no opportunity was extended to the petitioner to cross examine the author of the report / opinion or least object to contents of the report of DWPO, which specific report has influenced opinion formation. There is nothing on record to show any opportunity allowed to object to or tender any explanation qua material otherwise perused before passing of protection order. Hence, the order passed has affected / prejudiced right to defend of the petitioner.

Appellate Court also failed to appreciate apparent prejudice caused. Report of DWPO shall not be treated as an unimpeachable truth but same shall be subjected to a scrutiny, critical evaluation and confrontation.

Another issue was the extent of adoption of procedural requirements for summary trial. This determination is fraught with complexities and it is appropriate to show restraint, leaving the discretion with the Court to decide the limits and constraints, depending on the facts of each case, without comprising the threshold requirement, which is the right to defend. Right to defend has

been compromised in terms of orders assailed. It is essential to highlight distinction between sub- section (2) of section 21 and subsection (4) of the Act, former suggests application of Chapter XXII of the Code without any qualification and latter was ring-fenced by qualification – as nearly as possible -, hence qualification prescribed with reference to latter scenario calls for due deference, when question of strict application of section 264 of the Code is raised.

10.In view of the aforesaid, this petition is allowed and orders assailed are set aside – while observing that interim order, if any passed, shall continue to hold the field. Matter is remanded to respondent No.1, before whom complaint of respondents No.5 to 7 shall be deemed pending.

Respondent No.1 shall decide the complaint afresh in light of the reasoning of this order.

(Asim Hafeez) Judge.

Approved for reporting.

Judge.

A.D. Mian*