Touqeer Asif Vs Ex-Officio JOPASJ etc.

Form No: HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Writ Petition No.52466 of 2026.

Tauqeer Asif. Versus Addl. Sessions Judge, etc.

S. No. of Date of order/ Order with signature of Judge, and that of order/ Proceeding Parties or counsel, where necessary Proceeding

09.10.2026. Mr. Amjad Iqbal Khan, Advocate for the petitioner. Ms. Samia Khalid, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab, with Shoukat Ali S.I.

Khwaja Umaiz, Advocate for respondent No.4.

Through this Constitution Petition, the petitioner has called in question the legality and validity of order dated 29.08.2026 passed by the learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, whereby an application filed by respondent No.4 under Sections 22-A/22-B, Cr.P.C., seeking registration of a First Information Report (F.I.R.), was disposed of with a direction to the Station House Officer (S.H.O.) concerned to record the version of respondent No.4 and proceed further in accordance with law if a cognizable offence was made out.

2.Police report has been submitted. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and the learned Law Officer and have examined the available record with their assistance.

3.Briefly, the allegations levelled by respondent No.4 against the petitioner, an official of the Punjab Enforcement and Regulatory Authority (PERA), are that the petitioner, accompanied by eight to ten unidentified PERA officials, subjected him to physical torture, forcibly took him in a vehicle to Police Station Ferozwala and, after some time, shifted him to an undisclosed place, where he was allegedly stripped naked and subjected to further torture. It is further

alleged that the accused recorded a video of the incident, snatched Rs.25,200/- from his pocket and threatened him with dire consequences if he disclosed the occurrence to anyone. Respondent No.4 claims to have sustained injuries during the incident and relies upon a medico-legal certificate issued by a hospital in support of his allegations.

4.The learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace, upon consideration of the application, directed the S.H.O. concerned to record the version of respondent No.4 and proceed further in accordance with law if a cognizable offence was made out. The petitioner has assailed the said order principally on the ground that the Punjab Enforcement and Regulation Act, 2024 (the “Act”), provides a special statutory mechanism for dealing with complaints and offences relating to PERA officials, thereby excluding recourse to the ordinary procedure prescribed under Section 154, Cr.P.C.

5.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order is without lawful authority and coram non judice. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court in "Muhammad Kamran v. Ex-Officio Justice of Peace and seven others" (Writ Petition No.6909 of 2026, 2026 LHC 4390). It is argued that Sections 16, 49 and 53 of the Act constitute a comprehensive statutory framework for redressal of grievances arising from the conduct of PERA officials, including the procedure for dealing with criminal allegations against them. According to learned counsel, therefore, the ordinary criminal process under Section 154, Cr.P.C., is unavailable, and respondent No.4 must pursue the remedies specifically provided under the Act.

6.I have considered the submissions advanced by learned counsel in the light of the statutory framework and the judgment relied upon. The controversy, in essence, concerns the scope and operation of the special mechanism established under the Act and whether its existence excludes the application of the general criminal law to

every cognizable offence allegedly committed by a PERA official. The question must be examined with due regard to the object of the Act, the language of its relevant provisions and the nature of the alleged conduct.

7.The preamble of the Act reflects the legislative object of establishing an overarching provincial enforcement mechanism, promoting effective coordination and cooperation among existing regulatory agencies, addressing gaps and overlapping jurisdictions, and ensuring uniformity and efficiency in the enforcement of special laws throughout the Province. The Act is, thus, directed towards strengthening and streamlining the existing enforcement framework. Its object, as reflected in the preamble, does not, by itself, indicate an intention to displace the entire body of existing legislation governing criminal conduct or to render inoperative the powers conferred upon competent authorities under other laws.

8.It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that the preamble may assist in ascertaining the legislative purpose, but it cannot override the clear language of an operative provision. Equally, an implied repeal or exclusion of an existing law is not ordinarily to be inferred in the absence of a clear legislative intention or an irreconcilable inconsistency between the enactments. The relevant provisions must, therefore, be construed harmoniously, so far as their language permits, giving effect to the special procedure prescribed by the Act without extending its operation beyond the scope contemplated by the legislature.

9.Consequently, the mere enactment of a special statutory framework for regulating enforcement functions and addressing misconduct by PERA officials does not, without more, establish that every criminal act allegedly committed by such an official is immune from the operation of the general criminal law. The decisive consideration remains whether the alleged conduct falls within the offences and procedure specifically governed by the Act or

independently attracts the penal provisions of another applicable enactment.

10.In Muhammad Kamran’s case (supra), this Court examined the statutory scheme in the context of allegations relating to offences falling within the penal framework of the Act. Having regard to the special procedure prescribed by the legislature, the Court held that the ordinary procedure under Section 154, Cr.P.C., was not available in respect of offences punishable under the Act and directed the aggrieved party to avail the remedies provided by Sections 16, 49 and 53 thereof.

11.The principle laid down in the said judgment must be understood in the context of the statutory provisions considered therein and the nature of the allegations forming the subject matter of that case. It cannot be extended, without examining the legal character of the alleged conduct, to every offence allegedly committed by a PERA official, irrespective of whether the alleged act falls within the penal framework of the Act or independently constitutes an offence under the general criminal law. The judgment, therefore, requires the special procedure to be respected in matters falling within its scope; it does not dispense with the need to determine the applicability of the relevant statutory provisions to the facts of each case.

12.In this regard, Sections 16, 49 and 53 of the Act address distinct aspects of the statutory framework. Section 16 provides a mechanism for representation against specified enforcement actions; Section 49 prescribes the procedure relating to offences punishable under the Act; and Section 53 provides a remedy by way of complaint against alleged misuse of authority by an officer or employee of PERA. These provisions must be given their due effect in matters governed by them. However, the existence of these remedies does not, by itself, justify treating every allegation of criminal violence or other independent criminal conduct as a matter exclusively

governed by the Act, without first determining the nature of the alleged offence and the applicability of the relevant penal provisions.

13.The distinction is between an allegation concerning the exercise or misuse of enforcement powers within the statutory framework and an allegation that the official has committed an independent criminal act attracting the general penal law. Although the two categories may, in a given case, overlap, the official status of the alleged perpetrator cannot, by itself, determine the applicable legal regime.

14.In the present case, the allegations are not confined to an assertion that the petitioner exceeded his authority in the course of an enforcement operation or that respondent No.4 suffered an adverse consequence arising from a particular enforcement measure, such as the imposition of a fine, confiscation, sealing of premises or removal of an encroachment. Rather, respondent No.4 alleges that he was forcibly taken to a police station, subsequently shifted to an undisclosed location, subjected to physical torture, stripped naked, videographed, deprived of money and threatened with dire consequences.

15.Taken at face value, and without expressing any opinion regarding their truthfulness, these allegations raise questions as to whether offences involving wrongful confinement, voluntarily causing hurt, criminal force, theft or other property-related offences, criminal intimidation or any other offence under the applicable law may have been committed. The precise nature of the alleged offences, their constituent ingredients and the applicability of the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (the “P.P.C.”), are matters to be examined by the competent authority in accordance with law.

16.At this stage, the allegations cannot be excluded from consideration merely because the persons accused of committing the alleged acts are officials of PERA. The

appropriate statutory procedure must be determined by reference to the substance of the allegations and the provisions applicable to the conduct complained of, rather than the official designation of the alleged perpetrators alone.

17.The medico-legal certificate relied upon by respondent No.4 is also a relevant circumstance requiring consideration. The certificate, by itself, neither establishes the identity of the person responsible for the alleged injuries nor conclusively determines the criminal liability of the petitioner or any other official. It may, however, constitute relevant material concerning the alleged infliction of bodily injuries, subject to its assessment alongside the other evidence available.

18.The circumstances in which the injuries were sustained, the identity of the persons allegedly responsible and the legal character of the alleged acts are matters for examination through the appropriate process of law. At this stage, it would be premature either to accept the allegations as established or to exclude them from consideration solely on the ground that the persons accused are public officials subject to a special regulatory enactment.

19.The distinction may further be illustrated by a situation in which an official, while purporting to discharge official functions, allegedly commits an act resulting in the death of a person. If the information discloses the ingredients of culpable homicide or another cognizable offence under the P.P.C., the mere fact that the alleged act occurred in the course of official functions would not, by itself, transform the matter into a grievance confined to an enforcement action. The applicable statutory provisions would have to be examined to determine whether the conduct constitutes an offence punishable under the Act, an independent offence under the general criminal law, or offences attracting both enactments, subject to the governing statutory provisions.

20.The example illustrates the broader principle that the applicability of a special statutory mechanism must be determined by reference to its scope and the legal character of the alleged conduct. Where the alleged offence falls within the penal framework of the Act, the special procedure prescribed therein, as explained in Muhammad Kamran (supra), must be followed. Where the information independently discloses an offence under the general criminal law, the applicability of the ordinary criminal process must likewise be assessed in accordance with the relevant statutory provisions. Neither the special Act nor the general criminal law can be applied in disregard of the governing legislative scheme.

21.Viewed in the above context, the impugned order does not suffer from the jurisdictional defect alleged by the petitioner. The learned Ex-Officio Justice of Peace has neither directed the automatic registration of an F.I.R. nor recorded any finding regarding the truthfulness of the allegations or the guilt of the petitioner. The direction is confined to recording the version of respondent No.4 and proceeding further in accordance with law if a cognizable offence is made out.

22.The order, in substance, requires the S.H.O. concerned to examine the information furnished and take such action as is warranted by the applicable law. It neither authorizes the police to disregard the special procedure prescribed under the Act in a matter falling within its scope nor dispenses with the statutory requirements governing the registration of an F.I.R. The direction must, therefore, be understood in its express terms: the competent authority is to proceed in accordance with law, having regard to the nature of the alleged conduct and the statutory framework applicable thereto.

23.In view of the foregoing discussion, the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner does not furnish a sufficient ground for setting aside the impugned

order. The objection to the jurisdiction of the learned Ex- Officio Justice of Peace, founded solely upon the petitioner's status as a PERA official and the existence of the statutory remedies under the Act, is not sustainable. Since the impugned order merely directs the S.H.O. concerned to record the version of respondent No.4 and proceed in accordance with law if a cognizable offence is disclosed, no ground for interference in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court has been made out.

24.For the foregoing reasons, this Constitution Petition is dismissed.

25.It is, however, clarified that the observations made herein are confined to the question of legality of the impugned order and shall not be construed as an expression of opinion on the truthfulness of the allegations, the culpability of the petitioner or the applicability of any particular penal provision. The competent authority shall independently examine the information and material available, determine the applicable statutory framework and proceed strictly in accordance with law, giving due effect to the relevant provisions of the Punjab Enforcement and Regulation Act, 2024, and the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, to the extent applicable to the facts of the case.

(MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID)

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

JUDGE

M. Arsalan*