Ghulam Mustafa vs The State etc.

Form No: HCJD/C-121.

Order Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT

BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Criminal Miscellaneous No.4042-Q of 2026 (Ghulam Mustafa. v. The State, etc.)

ORDER

S.No. of Date of Order with signatures of Judge, and that of parties or order/ order/ counsel, where necessary proceeding proceeding

09.10.2026 Malik Muhammad Altaf Nawaz, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Zafar Iqbal Soomro, DDP, on Court’s call.

Ghulam Mustafa (‘petitioner’) has invoked this Court's inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C, through instant criminal miscellaneous petition, and seeks the following relief:

“In view of above, it is most respectfully prayed that by accepting this petition, impugned order dated 29.09.2026 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur and impugned order dated 17.12.2024 passed by learned Magistrate Section-30, Bahawalpur may kindly be set aside and declared to be illegal, void ab-initio, without lawful authority and without jurisdiction, consequently the application under section 516-A Cr.P.C filed by the respondent No. 3 (Nadia Bibi) may graciously be dismissed with costs and the order dated 28.02.2025 passed by the learned Magistrate Section-30, Bahawalpur with regard to acceptance of application under section 516-A Cr.P.C filed by the petitioner may graciously be upheld, to secure the ends of justice.”

2.A wade through the record provides that a motorcycle bearing registration No.ACX-6835, Engine No. R952667 and Chassis No. EB-35368 (hereinafter, the ‘vehicle’), was taken into possession by the police in connection with case FIR No.776/2024, registered under Sections 302 and 34, PPC, at police station Saddar, Bahawalpur. After its seizure,

Mst. Nadia Bibi, widow of the deceased applied before the learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur, for superdari of the vehicle on the plea that she was its owner. After deliberation, and taking into consideration that factum of Mst. Nadia Bibi being the widow of the deceased, who is stated to have owned the motorcycle in question as per original registration file and relevant documents pertaining to the vehicle, as well as the fact that she was in possession of the said original record, the learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur, allowed her application vide order dated 17.12.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner, without disclosing the subsistence or existence of the earlier order, approached the Magistrate and filed his application for the release of the vehicle in his favour on an interim basis. This application was allowed by the learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur, vide order dated 28.02.2025. Thereafter, the matter reached the learned Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur, who passed order dated 29.09.2026 against the petitioner. Hence, this petition against both, order dated 29.09.2026, passed by learned Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur, and order dated 17.12.2024, passed by learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur.

3.Arguments head. Record perused.

4.The statutory framework governing the grant or refusal of superdari is contained in Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, which empowers a criminal Court, during an inquiry or trial, to pass “such order as it thinks fit” with regards to the custody of any property produced before it in respect of which an offence appears to have been committed or which property appears to have been utilized in the commission of an offence. The same Section further empowers the Court to direct the sale or disposal of such property after recording such evidence as it considers necessary in instances where the property is subject to natural or speedy decay.1 The term Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed v. SHO PS Kohsar (2024 PCr.LJ 113 Islamabad) and Muhammad Ajmal v. The State (2025 MLD 533 Balochistan).

superdari finds no express mention in the Cr.P.C, but it is a judicially developed terms commonly used by the Courts to denote the grant of interim custody or disposal of case property pending conclusion of the investigation, inquiry or trial, in exercise of its powers under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C. Simply put, the Courts use these terminologies, i.e., “interim custody”, “interim disposal” and superdari, interchangeably because all of them denote the same thing in legal parlance.2 This arrangement, of releasing the property is on interim basis and always subject to final disposal of the property in terms of Sections 517 and 523, Cr.P.C, at the conclusion of trial.

5.The general parameters for determining whether superdari is supposed to be granted or refused are that:

a. There must be an investigation, inquiry or trial; b. The property must be the subject matter or an instrument having some connection with the offence being inquired into, investigated or tried; and, c. The property must be seized and taken into custody by the police and produced before the Court along with its seizure report.

From the above, it is evident that the property must be used in the offence, or an offence appears to have been committed in respect of it, or it was stolen and recovered, or it is itself evidence. Where it fails to meet the aforementioned criteria, it would not be a valid case property and its seizure would automatically be unlawful.3 Once this criteria is fulfilled, the property becomes case property and the person seeking superdari must establish a prima facie case regarding their entitlement to the possession of such property, supported by reliable and indisputable documentary evidence of ownership, including, where applicable, the registration certificate, purchase invoice or other documents evidencing Abdul Rasheed v. ASJ (PLD 2022 Lah. 271).

Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed v. SHO PS Kohsar (2024 PCr.LJ 113 Islamabad), Muhammad Ajmal v. The State (2025 MLD 533 Balochistan) and Abdul Rasheed v. ASJ (PLD 2022 Lah.

a lawful claim. Reliance is placed on Ahsan Ali Dawach v. The State (2025 SCMR 1041).

6.When there is no rival claimant, the ordinary course is to entrust the property to the person from whom it was recovered, or to the person who prima facie establishes a lawful entitlement to its possession, unless compelling circumstances warrant a different course. However, where competing claims are advanced, the Court is required to undertake a summary assessment of the available material and determine which party has the better prima facie right to possession, without entering into a conclusive adjudication of title. In this regard, registration in the claimant’s name, possession of the original documents and the circumstances surrounding the recovery of the vehicle constitute relevant considerations.

7.It is equally settled that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, the Court is required to determine the entitlement of a party to interim possession of the property rather than adjudicate the question of its final ownership, which falls within the domain of the competent civil Court.4 Further, the entire exercise of discretion in proceedings under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, must conform to the requirements of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and must be reasonable, just and fair. The underlying object of Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, in seizure of motor-vehicle cases is to prevent valuable property from remaining exposed to deterioration and depreciation during the pendency of criminal proceedings. The Courts have consistently observed that continued retention of a vehicle, where such retention serves no legitimate evidentiary purpose, may unnecessarily prejudice a person whose involvement in the alleged offence has not been established, and withholding the custody of property without sufficient justification offends Articles 23 Mehtar Yousaf v. The State (PLD 2004 Pesh. 91) and Munir Ahmad v. Barkhurdar (1992

SCMR 1454).

and 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973.5 At the same time, the grant of superdari is subject to appropriate safeguards to ensure the preservation and production of the property whenever required by the trial Court. Such safeguards may include execution of a bond, with or without surety, equivalent to the value of the property; an undertaking not to alter its condition materially and to produce it as and when directed; and an appropriate intimation to the registering authority restricting its transfer. It is further clarified that the grant of interim custody neither prejudices the merits of the criminal proceedings nor operates as an acquittal of the accused or an exemption from the process of law.

8.It is, therefore, evident that the jurisdiction under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, is discretionary in nature and must be exercised judicially, on the basis of the material available on record and the established principles governing interim custody. The Court is required to examine the nature of the property, its connection with the alleged offence, the claimant’s prima facie entitlement to possession, the authenticity of the documents relied upon, the existence of rival claims and the circumstances in which the property was seized. At the same time, it is the solemn duty of the Court, in its jurisdiction under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, to observe the conduct of the parties and to satisfy itself whether any litigant has invoked the said jurisdiction of the Court with clean hands or otherwise because the Court is not to sit as a mere silent spectator in instances where any party invokes jurisdiction under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, and thereby tries to gain an undue advantage. The jurisdiction of the Court is to protect the personal property rights of citizens under Articles 23 and 24, Constitution, as well as the victims of such sinister designs, and where any foul play is palpably evident, the Court is to hold its hand from granting superdari Ahsan Ali Dawach v. The State (2025 SCMR 1041).

because the jurisdiction under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, operates is discretionary in its nature and character. The above view finds support from the law laid down in Muhammad Akmal Shah v. D.S.P. (2004 PCr.LJ 1 Lahore), wherein it was held that the petitioner had approached the Court with unclean hands, with a sinister background; therefore, he was not entitled to the discretionary relief and the petition is liable to be dismissed on this ground as well.

9.In this case, and at the cost of reiteration, Mst. Nadia Bibi (respondent No.3) had sought the superdari of the vehicle, which was taken into possession by the police officials of police station Saddar, Bahawalpur in connection with FIR No. 776/2024. Considering that she was the widow of the deceased, who was the owner of the vehicle, and that she possessed original registration file and relevant documents pertaining to the vehicle, the learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur, allowed her application vide order dated 17.12.2024. However, the petitioner subsequently approached the learned Magistrate and without disclosing the existence of the earlier order, which had neither been set aside nor otherwise displaced through lawful proceedings, obtained superdari of the same vehicle vide order dated 28.02.2025. The subsequent order, i.e., order dated 28.02.2025, was thus passed without due consideration of the earlier judicial determination concerning the custody of the very same property, resulting in two conflicting orders regarding its superdari. The earlier order was a material and relevant circumstance that should have been brought to the notice of the learned Magistrate, because its existence had direct bearing and implication on not only the maintainability but also the merits of the subsequent application filed by the petitioner. As such, the petitioner’s failure to disclose the subsisting judicial order dated 17.12.2024 deprived the learned Magistrate of an opportunity to examine the matter in its proper factual and procedural perspective, as well as

giving rise to two conflicting orders, which cannot be treated as a mere procedural irregularity. As alluded to hereinabove, the jurisdiction vested in the Court under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C, is discretionary in nature and must be exercised judicially, fairly and in accordance with law, and that a person seeking such relief is duty-bound to approach the Court with clean hands and disclose all material facts. Since the petitioner had withheld the existence of order dated 17.12.2024 from the learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur, as such he is a litigant approaching the Court with unclean hands and a sinister background. Therefore, he is not entitled to discretionary relief in terms of Section 516-A, Cr.P.C.

10.Furthermore, the comparative merits of the rival claims goes against the petitioner because respondent No.3 had produced and was in possession of the original registration file and relevant documents pertaining to the vehicle, thereby establishing a prima facie for interim custody in her favour; whereas the petitioner has not produced any documentary material of comparable evidentiary value to establish a superior right to interim possession. Although proceedings under Section 516-A, Cr.P.C., do not entail a conclusive determination of ownership, and the question of title, if disputed, remains open for adjudication by the competent forum, the Court is nevertheless required to determine which claimant has the better prima facie entitlement to interim custody on the basis of the material available on record. The existence of the earlier order dated 17.12.2024, coupled with the original registration documents in the possession of respondent No.3, as well as the petitioner’s failure of disclosing the existence of a subsisting judicial order at the time of filing his application for superdari and acquiring the subsequent order, are all sufficient factors for maintaining interim custody of the vehicle in favour of Mst. Nadia Bibi, subject to compliance with the conditions imposed by the competent

Court. The provisional nature of superdari does not authorise a litigant to circumvent an existing judicial order or obtain inconsistent orders concerning the same property through suppression of material facts. Consequently, the petitioner cannot be permitted to derive an advantage from his own ill will, nor has he established any lawful ground warranting interference with the impugned order dated 29.09.2026 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bahawalpur, which is free from any illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional defect warranting interference by this Court, or for that matter, any legal ground for setting aside order dated 17.12.2024, passed by the learned Magistrate, Bahawalpur.

11.For the foregoing reasons, no ground has been made out warranting the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Consequently, the instant petition, being devoid of merit, is accordingly dismissed in-limine. It is clarified that this order is strictly regarding the superdari of the vehicle, having no bearing on its question ownership, which shall remain open for determination by the competent forum to be decided in accordance with law.

(SYED FARHAD ALI SHAH)

JUDGE

Afzaal/*

Approved for Reporting

JUDGE