Ghulam Rasool Vs Muhammad Asghar etc

Form No.HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P.No.52981 of 2026 Ghulam Rasool Asim vs . Muhammad Asghar etc Sr. Date of order/ Order with Signature of Judge, and that of parties or counsel, where necessary. No. of order/ proceedings proceedings

15.09.2026. Maher Sohail Zafar Sipra, Advocate for the petitioner. Barrister Hashim Javed, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab on Court’s call.

Through the instant constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (“the Constitution”), the petitioner has called in question orders dated 17.04.2025 and 20.10.2025 passed by the Authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, Faisalabad (West) (“the Authority”). Vide order dated 17.04.2025, the Authority partially allowed the claim preferred by respondent No.1 and directed the petitioner, under Section 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (“the Act”), to pay an amount of Rs.912,688/- within thirty days. Subsequently, the review application preferred by the petitioner was dismissed vide order dated

2.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned orders have been passed without recording evidence, without proper appreciation of the material available on the record, and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It is argued that the petitioner was not afforded an adequate opportunity to substantiate its defence. On these premises, it has been prayed that the impugned orders be set aside and the matter be remanded to the Authority for a fresh decision after affording the parties an opportunity to lead evidence.

3.I have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and have examined the available record with his assistance.

4.The record reflects that respondent No.2, being the Authority duly appointed under the Act, adjudicated upon the claim of respondent No.1 and, after hearing the parties and examining the material produced before it, passed the order dated 17.04.2025, whereby the claim was partially allowed and the petitioner was directed to pay Rs.912,688/- to respondent No.1 under Section 15(3) of the Act.

5.Section 17 of the Act specifically provides a statutory right of appeal against a direction made under Section 15(3). Thus, if the petitioner was aggrieved by the determination of the Authority, whether on account of alleged misreading or non-reading of the record, failure to record evidence, erroneous determination of wages, procedural irregularity, or any other error affecting the order, the appropriate remedy available to it was to invoke the appellate jurisdiction provided by the statute.

6.Admittedly, the petitioner did not avail the remedy of appeal within the period prescribed under Section 17 of the Act. Instead, after a considerable lapse of time, it filed a review application before the same Authority on 02.09.2025, which was dismissed vide order dated

7.Significantly, the Act does not confer any general power of review upon the Authority in respect of an order passed after hearing the parties. It is a settled principle that the power of review is not an inherent power, it must be conferred expressly by statute. In the absence of such statutory conferment, a quasi-judicial or statutory authority cannot rehear and review its final determination merely because one of the parties seeks reconsideration thereof.

8.That Rule 8 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937 also does not advance the case of the petitioner. The relevant Rule reads as follows:

“8. Appearance of parties.—(1) If the application is entertained, the Authority shall call upon the employer by a notice in Form E to appear before him on a specified date together with all relevant documents and witnesses, if any, and shall inform the applicant of the date so specified.

(2)If the employer or his representative fails to appear on the specified date, the Authority may proceed to hear and determine the application ex parte.

(3)If the applicant fails to appear on the specified date, the Authority may dismiss the application:

Provided that an order passed under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3) may be set aside and the application reheard on good cause being shown within one month of the date of the said order, notice being served on the opposite party of the date fixed for rehearing.”

9.From plain reading of Rule 8 shows that the power contemplated thereunder is confined to setting aside an ex parte order or an order of dismissal for non-appearance, subject to fulfillment of the conditions prescribed therein. It is not a substantive power of review against an order passed on merits after hearing the parties. In the present case, the order dated 17.04.2025 was not an ex parte order, rather, it was passed after participation of the parties and consideration of the record. The petitioner, therefore, could not invoke Rule 8 as a substitute for the statutory appeal.

10.It is equally well settled that where a statute creates a right and simultaneously provides a complete mechanism for redressal of grievances arising out of the exercise of jurisdiction under that statute, ordinarily such statutory remedy must first be exhausted before invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. The jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is discretionary and extraordinary in nature and is not intended to operate as a substitute for a statutory appeal, particularly where disputed questions of fact, appreciation of evidence, or correctness of findings recorded by the competent forum are involved. In the judgment reported as Syed MATCH COMPANY LTD., through Managing Director v. AUTHORITY UNDER PAYMENT OF WAGES ACT and others (2003 SCMR 1493), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, while considering proceedings arising under the Payment of Wages Act, deprecated the tendency to bypass the appellate remedy available under Section 17 of the Act and directly invoke the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court observed, inter alia, that a first appeal is a continuation of the original proceedings and that factual controversies requiring appraisal of the record are appropriately resolved by the appellate forum. It was further emphasized that the Payment of Wages Act is a beneficial legislation and its provisions must be construed in a manner that advances, rather than frustrates, the statutory remedy provided thereunder. The relevant extract from the judgment is reproduced as under: - “8. These are not the cases of lack of complete jurisdiction nor could be termed as mala fide. First appeal is a continuation of and factual controversy can only be resolved after sifting brought on record. It is not the discretion of a party to the provisions of appeal and file Constitutional petition instead. if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the claim of the respondents was on higher side, yet, for this reason alone it could not be asserted that the respondent No.1 had no jurisdiction in the matter. In various cases, this Court has discouraged, the tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute and to press into service Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. It is, however, true that in certain cases resort to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court instead of availing remedy provided under the statute, may be just but no, such material is available on record for ignoring the remedy provided under section 17 of the Act. It is noted that Payment of Wages Act is primarily a beneficial legislation and has been enacted to provide relief to the workers, as such, it could not be construed otherwise. Such construction could not be placed upon its provisions, which directly or indirectly nullify the object of its legislation. Remedial statutes shall always be construed in a manner to advance the remedy, as provided in the statute not in a manner to defeat the legislative intendment. The Writ Petitions in these cases were filed to defeat the proviso (a) of subsection (1) of section 17 of the Act quoted above.

11.The principle flowing from the aforesaid judgment applies with full force into the present case. The principal grievances raised by the petitioner relate to non-recording or improper appreciation of evidence, alleged procedural defects, and the correctness of the determination made by the Authority. These are matters which could conveniently and effectively have been examined by the appellate forum under Section 17 of the Act.

12.The rule requiring exhaustion of an alternate remedy is, of course, not absolute. Constitutional jurisdiction may exceptionally be exercised despite availability of another remedy where the impugned action is shown to be patently without jurisdiction, coram non judice, actuated by mala fides, or where there has been such a flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice that recourse to the alternate remedy would not constitute an equally efficacious remedy. However, the existence of an exception has to be demonstrated from the facts and circumstances of the particular case, a mere assertion that an order is illegal, without jurisdiction, or contrary to natural justice does not by itself attract constitutional jurisdiction.

13.In the present case, no material has been pointed out to show that the Authority inherently lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties. On the contrary, the order dated 17.04.2025 was passed by the Authority in exercise of the jurisdiction conferred upon it under Section 15 of the Act. Nor has any specific material been placed before this Court to establish mala fides, bias, or denial of hearing of such a nature as would render the entire proceedings void. The record, rather, indicates participation of the parties before the Authority.

14.Likewise, the contention that the order was passed without proper evidence or without due appreciation of the material on record essentially invites this Court to undertake a reappraisal of factual matters. Such an exercise, in the presence of a statutory appellate remedy, does not ordinarily fall within the scope of constitutional jurisdiction. The appellate forum is specifically equipped to examine whether the findings recorded by the Authority are supported by the record and whether any procedural irregularity has caused prejudice to a party.

15.The petitioner cannot improve its position by having first pursued a remedy of review which was not provided by law. Resort to an incompetent remedy does not, by itself, obliterate the statutory appellate mechanism or furnish a fresh cause for invoking the extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. A party cannot

ordinarily circumvent the remedy prescribed by the legislature by adopting a collateral procedure and thereafter seek constitutional interference on the basis of the failure of such procedure.

16.It is also noteworthy that the direction issued by the Authority under Section 15(3) was required to be complied with within the stipulated period. The petitioner neither availed the statutory appeal in the manner prescribed by law nor complied with the direction. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked merely to avoid the legal consequences flowing from failure to adopt the remedy expressly provided by the statute.

17.It is further evident from the record that the amount determined by the Authority as payable wages was never deposited by the petitioner. Instead of availing the statutory remedy of appeal in the manner prescribed under Section 17(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, the petitioner first chose to file a belated review application before the Authority, despite there being no general statutory remedy of review available against the original order. Upon dismissal of the said application, the petitioner has now invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, assailing not only the order passed on the review application but also the original order. Such a course cannot be permitted to defeat or circumvent the statutory scheme. A party cannot, by resorting to an incompetent or belated remedy, neutralize the consequences attached by law to its failure to avail the prescribed appellate remedy within the stipulated period and thereafter seek to reopen the original controversy through constitutional proceedings. In the absence of any exceptional circumstance warranting interference, such an attempt amounts to an impermissible bypass of the remedy provided by the statute and is not sustainable in law.

18.For the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the petitioner had an adequate and efficacious statutory remedy of appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 against the order dated 17.04.2025. No exceptional circumstance has been established which

may justify bypassing such remedy and invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The order dated 20.10.2025, whereby the review application was dismissed, also does not suffer from any jurisdictional defect, as no general statutory power of review was available to the Authority in the circumstances of the case.

19.Consequently, no case for interference in the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court is made out. The constitutional petition is, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.

(MALIK JAVID IQBAL WAINS)

JUDGE

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

JUDGE

SHARIF*