Commissioner Inland Revenue Vs MS Zain Enterprises

Stereo.HCJDA.38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Sales Tax Reference No.3018/2023 Commissioner Inland Revenue Vs. M/s Zain Enterprises etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing 08-10-2026 M/s Abdul Muqtadir Khan, Ms. Riaz Begum, Ms. Asma Hamid, Malik Muhammad Ali Awan, Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Mian Mahmood Rashid, Naeem Khan, Ahmad Sibtain Fazli, Shahzad Ahmad Cheema, Muhammad Khalid Ch., Muhammad Sohaib Aziz, Ms. Foziya Bukhsh, Rana Muhammad Mehtab, Sardar Masood Raza Qizalbash, Sheikh Aqeel Ahmad, Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Adeel Shahid Karim, Barrister Ahmad Pervaiz, Barrister Ahad Asif Ali, Barrister Shahjahan Khan, Tabassum Ali, Ms. Samar Afzal, Asad Abbas Raza, Murad Ali Khan Marwat, Imran Rasool, Muhammad Yahya Johar, Muhammad Bilal Munir, Muhammad Ali Raza, Ali Haider Shah Applicants by Zulfiqar, Waseem Ahmad Malik, Hafiz Muhammad Imran, Ahmed Hassan, Asif Imran Awan, Irfan Jahngir Wattoo, Muhammad Mahmood Khan, Barrister Haris Azmat, Umer Sharif, M. Awais Kamboh, Sardar Jawahar Nazir Chattha, Usman Ali, Barrister Ahtasham Mukhtar, Mohsin Ali, Aitzaz Aslam Ch., Sarmad Sattar, Shahmeer Ubaid, Samra Malik, Deeba Mirza, Samar Masood Soofi, Barrister Hamza Shahid Buttar, Saad Amir, Mahum Shahzad Laun, Mian Shahzeb Quddoos, Barrister Raja Abdul Qadeer, Aftab Maqsood, Ch. Muhammad Yasin Zahid, Mustafa Khalid, Akmal Raza, Waseem Ahsan, Ahmad Hassan, Muhammad Anwar Khan and Barrister Muhammad Nauman Khan, Advocates.

M/s Raza Imtiaz Siddiqui, Barrister Sheharyar Kasuri, Sajid Ijaz Hotiana, Waseem Ahmad Respondents by Malik, Rana Muhammad Afzal, Farhan Shahzad, Khalid Gulzar, Shoaib Hassan Butt, Syed Moazzam Raheel, H.M. Majid Siddiqi,

M. Ibarheem Hassan, Muhammad Shabbir Hussain, Syed Ali Imran Rizvi, Shahid Sarwar Chahil, Raza Ahmad Cheema, Muhammad Azhar Siddique, Muhammad Shoaib Rashid, Ahmad Farooq Meer, Muhammad Shaban, Mian Muhammad Arshad Iqbal, Rana Ahmad Khan, Muhammad Naeem Munawar, Rana Adeel Anjum, Ghulam Akbar Khosa, Ahmad Nawaz Khurram, M. Mansha Sukhera, Mian Adnan Yousaf, Barrister Usman Khalil, Rai Amer Ijaz Kharal, Rana Muhammad Mehtab, Salman Mansoor, Muhammad Akram Nizami, Mian Abdul Salam Sajid, Muhammad Ali Malik, Sultan Mahmood, Zulfiqar Ali Shah, Shahmeer Naveed Arshad, Zahid Ateeq Ch., Shahid Pervez Jami, Zaheer ud Din Babar, Abuzar Hussain, Barrister Hassan Akhtar, Asim Ikram Bhutta, Muhammad Bashir Mailk, Hasnain Naveed Raja, Hashim Aslam Butt, Asad Tariq, Malik Kashif Rafique Rajwana, Majid Jehangir, Syed Abid Raza Kazami, Ch. Muhammad Tarique, Hassan Maqsood Ahmad Aujla, Tahir Mahmood Ahmad Khokhar, Muhammad Kamran, Farhan Dawood Khan, Muhammad Asif Chattah, Rubeel Raza Bhatti, Waseem Abbas, Raja Hamza Anwar, Rashid Khan, Sikandar Ali, Arfan Ahmad, Khubaib Ahmad, Rana Intizar Hussain, Muhammad Zain Shabbir, Barrister Isha Shahid Bilal, Zafar Pervaiz, Hammad-ul-Hassan, Qari Zubaid Rasool, Rashid Khan and Ayesha Khan, Advocates.

Mr. Asim Zafar, Legal Officer, PRA.

ABID AZIZ SHEIKH, J. This consolidated judgment shall also decide the connected Reference Applications, particulars whereof are set out in Appendixes 'A', 'B', & 'C' annexed hereto, as common questions of law arise therein, which are being adjudicated upon through this judgment.

2.In the First Set of Reference Applications, detailed in Appendix 'A', the Reference Applications were initially filed within the statutory period of limitation, however, certain office objections were raised thereon, and time was granted for their removal. Although the said objections were subsequently removed within the

time specified by the office, the statutory period of limitation had, by that time, already expired; consequently, respondents in the respective Reference Applications raised preliminary objections as to their maintainability on the ground of limitation. In Second Set of Reference Applications, detailed in Appendix 'B', the factual position is substantially similar to that of the cases mentioned in Appendix 'A', with the material distinction that the office objections were not removed within the time specifically granted by the office; rather, the objections were removed not only after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation but also beyond the time allowed by the office for their removal. Thus, in these cases, the question of limitation arises in the context of both the expiry of the statutory period and the failure to comply with the time granted for removal of office objections. In Third Set of Reference Applications, detailed in Appendix 'C', factual position is likewise substantially similar to that of the cases mentioned in Appendix 'A', however, the distinguishing feature of these cases is that the applicants have filed separate applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ("Limitation Act"), seeking condonation of delay. Accordingly, in addition to the question of limitation, the sufficiency of the grounds urged in support of the applications for condonation of delay also falls for consideration by this Court.

3.Learned counsel for the respondents submit that the legal question involved in the instant Reference Applications already stands settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil Petition No.41-L of 2026, titled "Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Al-Hamd Cotton Ginning Pressing Factory, Jhang", vide judgment dated 03.06.2026 (relevant Para-17). It is further submitted that the same legal position had earlier been settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in "Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others" (PLD 2020 SC 736) (Para-8 and 17 are relevant). Learned counsel contend that even where an office objection is of a trivial nature, the applicant is under an obligation to remove the same within the

stipulated period or to contest its validity by placing the matter before the Court in terms of Rule 9(ii) of Part-A(a), Chapter-1, Volume-V of the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, Lahore (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules"). It is argued that where an office objection is duly contested and ultimately found to be unwarranted and, consequently, overruled by the Court, the reference application would relate back to the date of its original presentation, however, where such objection is neither contested nor removed within the specified time, the mere fact that the reference application was initially presented within the statutory period of limitation would not, by itself, preserve limitation or confer upon the applicant an automatic extension of the statutory period prescribed for its institution. Learned counsel added that the time allowed by the office for removal of objections cannot be construed as extending or enlarging the period of limitation prescribed by the statute. Learned counsel contend that this precise aspect of the matter has been comprehensively dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Al-Hamd Cotton (supra), particularly in Paragraphs 18 to 20 of the judgment. It is further contended that in a number of connected Reference Applications, no application seeking condonation of delay has been filed. Even otherwise, according to learned counsel, in view of the settled legal position and the absence of any sufficient or plausible explanation for the delay, no case for condonation of delay is made out, particularly in those Reference Applications wherein the applications seeking such condonation have been filed subsequently at a highly belated stage. They maintain that the applicants cannot be permitted to circumvent the mandatory statutory requirements of limitation merely by relying upon the initial presentation of incomplete Reference Applications or the time subsequently allowed for removal of the office objections; consequently, all the Reference Applications are hopelessly barred by limitation and are liable to be dismissed.

4.Learned counsel for the applicants advanced submissions on two distinct limbs. Firstly, it is contended that where a reference application is initially presented before the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the office objections raised thereon are removed within the time provided by the office, the date of institution of such reference application would relate back to the date of its original presentation, consequently, no delay can be attributed to the applicants in filling the Reference Applications. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon "Muhammad Faisal v. Commissioner Inland Revenue" (2025 SCMR 930), "Province of Punjab v. Babar Ali" (2026 PLC (C.S.) 470), "Abdul Rasheed v. Manzoor Ahmad" (PLD 2007 SC 287) and "Muhammad Ahmad v. Muhammad Ali" (PLD 1996 Lahore 158). It is further contended that the case law relied upon by the respondents are distinguishable and have no application to the facts and circumstances of the present cases, inasmuch as, in those cases, there was an inordinate delay on the part of the concerned litigants in removing the office objections beyond the time provided by the office, whereas no such circumstance exists in the cases falling within the first limb of the applicants’ argument. Secondly, learned counsel submit that in a number of cases, the applicants have also filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay, if any, occasioned in filing the Reference Applications, if at all, the Reference Applications were filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. In this regard, learned counsel specifically emphasized the Explanation to Section 5 of the Limitation Act and contend that the applicants were bona fide misled by the prevailing office practice as well as the case law on the subject, which led them to believe that once a reference application had been presented within the prescribed period of limitation, its institution would be reckoned from the date of such presentation, notwithstanding the raising of office objections and their subsequent removal thereof. It is argued that even the office

proceeded on the understanding that once a reference application had been presented within the prescribed period, the raising and subsequent removal of office objections would not alter the date of its institution. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the office report submitted in ITR Nos.84383 and 84387 of 2017 (Annexure 'A' to C.M. No.1/2026 in STR No.3018 of 2023). Further submitted that the case law referred above were also capable of creating a bona fide impression in the minds of the applicants that their Reference Applications, once presented within limitation, would continue to be treated as having been instituted within the prescribed period, notwithstanding the raising of office objections and subsequent removal thereof. It is also contended that, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present cases, the applicants ought not to suffer on account of any act, omission or practice attributable to the Court or its office, particularly in view of the well-settled principle that an act of the Court shall prejudice no one. According to the learned counsel, such circumstances constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay within the contemplation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, particularly in view of the law laid down in "Faqir Muhammad v. Khursheed Bibi and others" (2024 SCMR 107). It is further contended that, in the cases where delay has occurred, the same is only of a few days and is neither deliberate nor contumacious. In support thereof, reliance has been placed upon "Shazia Munawar v. Punjab Public Service Commission through Secretary, Lahore" (PLD 2010 Lahore 160). Learned counsel also relied upon "East and West Steamship Company v. Queensland Insurance Co. Ltd." (PLD 1961 (W.P.) Karachi 317) to contend that a practice consistently prevailing in the Courts, whereby a litigant is bona fide induced to adopt a particular course of action, may constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. It is next contended that Rule 9-A of the Rules casts a mandatory obligation upon the office to proceed strictly in the manner prescribed therein, and that any failure on the

part of the office to adhere to the said requirement cannot be permitted to operate to the prejudice of a litigant who has acted bona fide and with due diligence. Such non-compliance, according to learned counsel, furnishes an additional ground for condonation of delay. In support of this submission, reliance has been placed upon "Justice Tariq Mehmood Jahangiri, Judge, Islamabad High Court v. Mian Dawood, Advocate High Court and others" (PLD 2026 SC 81). Learned counsel also drew attention to the prescribed format of the objection sheet contained in Objection Memorandum, Appendix I(a)(Civil), Volume V of the Rules, wherein removal of office objections is expressly stated to be "subject to limitation". It is submitted that no such stipulation was incorporated in the objection sheets placed on the record of the present cases and the omission of this material qualification further reinforced the bona fide impression of the applicants that removal of the office objections was governed by the time granted by the office and was not independently required to be effected within the statutory period of limitation; therefore, the applicants, having acted in accordance with the time allowed by the office and the practice prevailing at the relevant time, cannot be penalized for any ambiguity or omission attributable to the office. Lastly, learned counsel placed reliance upon "Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. v. Lawari and 4 others" (PLD 2000 SC 94) to contend that where a litigant and his/ her counsel have acted with due care and caution, and their conduct does not smack negligence, such circumstances may constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay; therefore, the Reference Applications falling within the first category be treated as having been instituted on the dates of their original presentation, whereas, in the remaining cases, the delay, if any, be condoned upon acceptance of the applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

5.We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record with their able assistance.

6.Insofar as Reference Applications mentioned in Appendix 'A' are concerned, the record reveals that although the said Reference Applications were initially filed within the statutory period of limitation, certain objections were raised by the office upon scrutiny thereof, and time was granted for their removal. However, the said objections were removed within the time specified by the office, albeit after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. In these circumstances, the pivotal question of law requiring determination is whether the Reference Applications at hand, notwithstanding their initial presentation within the limitation, can be regarded as having been validly instituted when the office objections were removed after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. This legal question is no longer res integra, having been already authoritatively set at rest by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Al-Hamd Cotton 1 , wherein while placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Asad Ali2, it has been held that where the objections raised by the office are of such a nature as to render the institution of proceedings legally defective or incompetent, the mere presentation of such proceedings within the statutory period of limitation does not, by itself, constitute valid institution in the eye of law. Such proceedings cannot be treated as having been validly instituted unless the defects are removed within the time specified by the office, provided that the statutory period of limitation has not already expired. The Supreme Court of Pakistan further emphasized that proceedings which, on account of material defects, were incapable of constituting valid institution within the statutory period of limitation cannot subsequently acquire such validity merely by removal of the defects after the expiry thereof. Thus, the initial presentation of a legally deficient Civil Petition No.41-L of 2026, titled "Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Al-Hamd Cotton Ginning Pressing Factory, Jhang"

"Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others" (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 736)

reference application cannot, by itself, be relied upon to circumvent or extend the statutory period of limitation. For convenience, the relevant portion of the judgment rendered in case of Al-Hamd Cotton is reproduced hereunder:- "17. Having settled the governing principles of precedent, the Court proceeded to formulate the substantive rule applicable to cases of delayed re-filing. It held that where the objections raised by the office are of such a nature as to render the institution of the proceedings legally deficient or incompetent, the proceedings cannot be treated as validly instituted unless those deficiencies are removed within the period specified by the office, unless the statutory time survives." Earlier, a similar finding in the case of Asad Ali (supra) was also set out as below:- "17. In cases in which certain objections are raised by the office which rendered the institution of the case in itself invalid or incompetent should be held to be time- barred unless the objections or deficiencies pointed out by the office are met within the time specified by the office in this regard which in turn should be within the limitation period prescribed by the law. It is trite law that what cannot be done directly can also not be allowed to be done indirectly. If what is filed within the limitation period cannot be said to be a valid appeal, in the presence of deficiencies/objections pointed out by the office, it should be held to be hit by limitation if the objections/deficiencies are remedied beyond the period of limitation."

In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and the settled principles of law enunciated therein, the Reference Applications mentioned in Appendix 'A' are held to be barred by limitation.

7.The same legal position is equally applicable to Reference Applications mentioned in Appendix 'B'. Although these Reference Applications were initially presented within the statutory period of limitation, the office raised certain objections thereon and granted time for their removal; however, the applicants failed to remove the said objections within the statutory period of limitation or within

the time provided by the office for removal thereof. Consequently, mere presentation of a Reference Application within the prescribed period of limitation does not, by itself, constitute valid institution where the defects affecting its legal competence remain uncured beyond the permissible period because subsequent removal of such objections, after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation, cannot, by itself, confer retrospective validity upon the defective institution of the Reference Applications or extend the statutory period of limitation. Accordingly, the Reference Applications mentioned in Appendix 'B' are also held to be barred by limitation.

8.Now, coming to the third set of the Reference Applications mentioned in Appendix 'C', which are accompanied by applications (also mentioned in Appendix 'C') seeking condonation of delay. Perusal of the applications filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act reveals that more or less identical grounds have been urged in all such applications.

9.The pivotal question which, thus, arises for determination is whether, while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court may condone the delay in instituting or re-filing of substantive proceedings on the basis of applications seeking such condonation, which were themselves filed after an inordinate and unexplained lapse of time, without disclosing any sufficient cause for the delay sought to be condoned. Significantly, the Reference Applications were instituted in the year 2023, whereas the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act were filed only in the year 2026, almost three years thereafter. None of these applications specifies the exact period of delay occasioned in re-filing the Reference Applications, nor does any of them furnishes a cogent, plausible or satisfactory explanation covering the relevant period. Even the considerable lapse of time in seeking condonation of delay has remained wholly unexplained. Instead, the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act are founded upon vague and general assertions and are stated to have

been filed merely "out of abundant caution", whilst the applicants have consistently maintained that the Reference Applications were instituted within the prescribed period of limitation. Although the mere filing of an application for condonation of delay by way of abundant caution does not, in itself, constitute an admission that the proceedings are barred by limitation, such a qualified stance cannot absolve the applicants of their obligation to establish "sufficient cause" for the delay, once condonation thereof is sought. The expression "sufficient cause" necessarily requires disclosure of material facts and circumstances reasonably explaining the delay, and mere general assertions, unsupported by specific particulars or satisfactory explanation, cannot satisfy the statutory requirement. The plea of abundant caution cannot be permitted to substitute the statutory requirement of establishing sufficient cause, nor can it dispense with the obligation to explain the material period of delay.

10.It may further be observed that the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act to any proceeding depends upon the nature of such proceeding and the statutory scheme governing the same. Article 181 of the First Schedule to the Act ibid prescribes a period of three years for applications in respect of which no specific period of limitation has otherwise been prescribed. Although the said Article may not, by itself, prescribe an independent period of limitation for an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the principle underlying the law of limitation nevertheless underscores the necessity of due diligence, vigilance and promptness in pursuing legal remedies. Viewed in this context, the conduct of the applicants, who filed applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act after a lapse of approximately three years from the institution of the Reference Applications, is difficult to appreciate and cannot be overlooked. Although the mere belated filing of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the absence of any prescribed period of limitation for such an application, may not constitute an independent ground for its

rejection, the unexplained inaction is undoubtedly a relevant circumstance in assessing the bona fides, diligence and conduct of the applicants. Such prolonged inaction, in absence of any plausible and satisfactory explanation, raises a serious question regarding the bona fides and diligence of the applicants and they cannot claim condonation as a matter of right merely by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, because mere belated invocation of Section 5 ibid cannot dispense with the legal obligation to satisfactorily explain the delay sought to be condoned.

11.Learned counsel for the applicants have sought to invoke the Explanation to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, contending that the Department was misled by the prevailing practice whereby initial presentation of a reference within the prescribed period of limitation was understood to constitute sufficient compliance with the law, notwithstanding its subsequent re-filing after removal of office objections. This contention is misconceived and devoid of merit. The Explanation to Section 5 ibid contemplates a situation where a litigant has been misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period of limitation. The expression "practice" must be construed in the context of ejusdem generis expressions "order" and "judgment" of the High Court, and cannot be extended to encompass a mere assumption, subjective understanding or misconception regarding the procedure for removal of office objections and subsequent re- filing of a Reference Application. In the instant cases, no specific order or judgment of this Court has been identified, nor has the existence of any established practice of the High Court been substantiated, which could reasonably have misled the applicants in the manner alleged. More importantly, admittedly, the applicants presented the Reference Applications within the prescribed period of limitation, which itself demonstrates that they were neither misled nor under any misconception in ascertaining or computing the said period. The controversy, therefore, does not pertain to any

erroneous ascertainment or computation of limitation but rather to the applicants' failure to remove the office objections and re-file the Reference Applications within the time allowed. Mere reliance upon an alleged office practice, without establishing its existence, applicability and direct causal nexus with the delay in question, cannot constitute sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

12.In this regard, reference may also be made to the judgment rendered in "Krishna Kumar Khemka and another v. Jagadish Narayana Bhan and others" (AIR 1971 Calcutta 322), wherein it was held that a plea of having been misled by conflicting judicial pronouncements loses its force once the legal position has been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court. It was also held that any uncertainty or confusion arising from earlier conflicting judicial decisions ceases to furnish a valid justification for inaction or non-compliance with the law once the controversy has been conclusively resolved by the Supreme Court. The principle enunciated in the aforesaid judgment is squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present cases, inasmuch as, once the legal position stood authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court in the case of Asad Ali (supra), reliance upon any earlier divergence of judicial opinion could neither constitute a sufficient cause nor furnish a legally sustainable justification for the applicants' failure to act in accordance with the settled position of law. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced hereunder:- "We shall now proceed to consider the petitioner's contention based on the Explanation to S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Explanation prescribes that the fact that the appellant or applicant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period of limitation may be sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5. Relying on this provision in the Explanation to Section 5, counsel for the petitioner contended that having regard" to the decisions in AIR 1970 AIR 1966 Pat 1 (FB), AIR 1965 Cal 217 Orissa 116. and AIR 1970

Cal 443, he was misled in computing the period and therefore it should be held that there was sufficient cause for not presenting the Memorandum of Review within time. It seems to us that this contention of counsel for the petitioner is without any merit or substance. Whatever controversy or conflict there might have been, with regard to the meaning of the Explanation to Section 12, it was clearly set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in A. D. Partha Sarathy's case, AIR 1966 SC 38 (supra). The observations of the Supreme Court quoted above leave no room for any ground for a prospective appellant to contend that he was misled in computing the prescribed period in filing a Memorandum of Appeal or Review by reason of the conflicting decisions of the different High Courts to which I have referred earlier. In that view of the matter we hold that there was no sufficient cause for the petitioner in not presenting the Memorandum of Review to the Registrar of this Court within the time prescribed by Article 124 of the 'Limitation Act, 1963."

13.In addition to above, the contention that the applicants were misled by the prevailing office practice is also devoid of merit because in none of the cases did the office purport to condone or extend the statutory period of limitation; rather, the Appendix I(a)(Civil) to Volume 5 of the Rules expressly provides that the removal of the office objections shall be subject to limitation. When the relevant Rules expressly made the removal of office objections subject to limitation, the applicants could not legitimately presume that the time allowed by the office would operate to enlarge the statutory period, as such plea neither furnishes a lawful justification for the delay nor constitutes sufficient cause for its condonation. The time allowed by the office for removal of objections was merely procedural in nature, and could neither be construed as an extension of the statutory period of limitation nor confer upon the applicants any right contrary to the express provisions of the law. In similar situation, the Supreme Court of Pakistan in "Khushi Muhammad through R.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others" (PLD 2016 SC 872) held that the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit has no application where a litigant approaches a

wrong forum, notwithstanding that the appeal is entertained by the office of the Court or even by the Court itself and is admitted for regular hearing, because mere entertainment of such proceedings does not, by itself, furnish a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In the aforesaid judgment, case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (supra), upon which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the applicants, was also discussed.

14.The next contention raised on behalf of the applicants is that they and their counsel acted with due care and caution, and that their conduct does not smack of negligence, hence, sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands established, is equally devoid of merit. Admittedly, in all these Reference Applications, the applicants had the benefit of the entire statutory period of limitation; however, they opted to file their respective Reference Applications at the fag end of the statutory period of limitation, and that too in a totally incomplete state. Resultantly, the office raised objections thereon, which were ultimately removed only after the statutory period of limitation. No doubt, whether a litigant has acted diligently and with due care and caution is a question to be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of each case, however, a person may be said to have acted diligently when, having acquainted himself with all relevant facts and circumstances, he has taken all reasonable steps and obvious precautions which a prudent person, exercising ordinary care and caution, would have taken in a similar situation. In the present cases, when the Reference Applications were filed on the penultimate day in a totally incomplete state, the applicants could reasonably have anticipated that the office would raise objections thereto. Nevertheless, they chose to present the Reference Applications in such a deficient state and subsequently sought to avail themselves of the time allowed for removal of the office objections, thereby attempting, in effect, to extend the statutory period of limitation, which is impermissible under the law.

15.The situation might have been different, and the applicants’ conduct could have been regarded as diligent, had the Reference Applications been filed complete in all material respects and the office subsequently raised some unforeseen objection of a minor, technical or trivial nature. However, in none of the cases under consideration were the office objections of such a nature; rather, the deficiencies were substantial as the office expressly recorded that Reference Applications were "totally incomplete". Significantly, none of the applicants challenged the said objections by placing the matters before the Court under Rule 9(ii) of the Rules on the ground that the objections were unwarranted or frivolous. Instead, the applicants accepted the objections and ultimately removed them, albeit after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation. The above entire course of conduct, viewed in its proper perspective, indicates that the procedure prescribed for removal of office objections was sought to be employed as a device to circumvent the statutory bar of limitation. Such a course cannot be permitted, particularly when the applicants had ample opportunity to institute complete Reference Applications within the prescribed period but failed to do so. A litigant cannot be permitted to derive an advantage from his own omission or lack of diligence, nor can the procedural indulgence afforded for removal of office objections be converted into a means of defeating the substantive requirements of the law of limitation.

16.It is pertinent to observe that the majority of the instant Reference Applications have been filed by the functionaries of Federal Board of Revenue. This gives rise to the question whether any special consideration, relaxation or preferential treatment can be extended to such applicants merely by virtue of their status as functionaries of a Government department. The answer to this question is emphatically in the negative. It is a settled principle of law that the Government and its functionaries stand on the same footing as ordinary litigants insofar as compliance with the

prescribed statutory period of limitation is concerned, and no special indulgence can be claimed merely on account of their official status. Rather, a public authority, particularly one entrusted with collection of revenue and equipped with a dedicated legal establishment, is expected to exercise great care, vigilance and diligence in pursuing the remedies available to it under the law. Mere administrative inaction, inadvertence, bureaucratic delays, movement of files, internal procedural requirements or an erroneous assumption regarding the prescribed period of limitation cannot, by themselves, constitute "sufficient cause" for condonation of delay. The party seeking such indulgence must specifically plead and satisfactorily establish circumstances which prevented it from approaching the competent forum within the prescribed period, notwithstanding the exercise of due care and diligence. The discretion vested in the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is required to be exercised judicially, having regard to the circumstances specifically pleaded and satisfactorily established, rather than on considerations of institutional status or the nature and magnitude of the public revenue involved. Any preferential treatment extended to Government departments in this regard would not only undermine the very object of the law of limitation, which is intended to ensure certainty and finality in legal proceedings, but would also offend the principle of equality before the law. In this respect, reference can conveniently be made to case "Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Finance Division Islamabad v. Farid Ullah and others" (2026 SCP 48 = PLD 2026 SC 376), which has recently been decided by Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan.

17.Examined cumulatively, the foregoing circumstances clearly demonstrate that the applicants have neither identified the precise period of delay for which condonation is sought nor furnished any

cogent, plausible or satisfactory explanation for such delay. The applications seeking condonation of delay are founded substantially upon vague and generalized assertions and reliance upon an alleged practice, the existence of which has not been satisfactorily established through any supporting material. Furthermore, the belated invocation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, after the lapse of approximately three years and only upon an objection regarding limitation being raised by the respondents, further undermines the applicants’ plea of bona fides and due diligence. In these circumstances, this Court is of the considered view that the applicants have failed to establish any sufficient cause warranting exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

18.The case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants are distinguishable and do not advance their case in the peculiar facts and circumstances of present matters. Consequently, the applications for condonation of delay filed in the Reference Applications mentioned in Appendix 'C' are devoid of merit and are, accordingly, dismissed.

19.For what has been discussed above, all the Reference Applications mentioned in Appendices 'A', 'B' and 'C' are dismissed being barred by time.

20.Office shall send a copy of this judgment, under seal of the Court, to the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue in terms of Section 47(2) of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 read with Section 133(8) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.

MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL ABID AZIZ SHEIKH

JUDGE JUDGE

Approved for Reporting

JUDGE JUDGE

Arsalan*

"APPENDIX-A"

TO JUDGMENT DATED 08-10-2026 IN STR NO.3018/2023

Sr. # Case No. Sr. # Case No.

1.TR (PRA) No.29959/2021 44. STR No.20654/2023 2. ITR No.5674/2023 45. STR No.20655/2023 3. ITR No.1822/2024 46. STR No.20657/2023 4. ITR No.9406/2024 47. STR No.13050/2023 5. ITR No.2716/2024 48. STR No.4695/2023 6. ETR No.19902/2023 49. STR No.5658/2023 7. ETR No.20649/2023 50. STR No.18810/2023 8. ETR No.20651/2023 51. STR No.6133/2023 9. CR No.79209/2022 52. STR No.5995/2023 10. CR No.74481/2023 53. STR No.16822/2023 11. CR No.75503/2023 54. STR No.16835/2023 12. CR No.81526/2023 55. STR No.16827/2023 13. CR No.26923/2023 56. STR No.16831/2023 14. CR No.29662/2023 57. STR No.16820/2023 15. CR No.63216/2023 58. STR No.6132/2023 16. CR No.62100/2023 59. STR No.57883/2023 17. CR No.75356/2023 60. STR No.13371/2023 18. STR No.73082/2022 61. STR No.19899/2023 19. STR No.73087/2022 62. STR No.19900/2023 20. STR No.77844/2022 63. STR No.19901/2023 21. STR No.77843/2022 64. STR No.13045/2023 22. STR No.78999/2022 65. STR No.13044/2023 23. STR No.81118/2022 66. STR No.13369/2023 24. STR No.81114/2022 67. STR No.13046/2023 25. STR No.16648/2023 68. STR No.20645/2023 26. STR No.1244/2023 69. STR No.19157/2023 27. STR No.39638/2022 70. STR No.20685/2023 28. STR No.79003/2022 71. STR No.15822/2023 29. STR No.76756/2022 72. STR No.19158/2023 30. STR No.73107/2022 73. STR No.14318/2023 31. STR No.78906/2022 74. STR No.18812/2023 32. STR No.6987/2023 75. STR No.20280/2023 33. STR No.6041/2023 76. STR No.15597/2023 34. STR No.6136/2023 77. STR No.15599/2023 35. STR No.13885/2023 78. STR No.13374/2023 36. STR No.22486/2023 79. STR No.13051/2023 37. STR No.24886/2023 80. STR No.13373/2023 38. STR No.26995/2023 81. STR No.13048/2023 39. STR No.28440/2023 82. STR No.9868/2023 40. STR No.27263/2023 83. STR No.13368/2023 41. STR No.29694/2023 84. STR No.19186/2023 42. STR No.29718/2023 85. STR No.57286/2023 43. STR No.29713/2023

MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL ABID AZIZ SHEIKH

JUDGE JUDGE

Arsalan*

"APPENDIX-B"

TO JUDGMENT DATED 08-10-2026 IN STR NO.3018/2023

Sr. # Case No.

1.CR No.8990/2024 2. CR No.39078/2019 3. ETR No.57678/2022 4. ETR No.206971/2018 5. ITR No.65983/2019 6. ITR No.8394/2019 7. ITR No.8397/2019 8. STR No.72317/2022 9. STR No.14305/2023 10. STR No.78934/2022 11. STR No.65984/2019 12. STR No.66056/2022 13. STR No.36826/2022 14. STR No.4705/2023 15. STR No.130006/2018 16. STR No.12506/2023 17. STR No.14315/2023 18. STR No.28620/2023

MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL ABID AZIZ SHEIKH

JUDGE JUDGE

Arsalan*

"APPENDIX-C"

TO JUDGMENT DATED 08-10-2026 IN STR NO.3018/2023

Sr. # Case Number & CM Number 1. TR (PRA) No.53954/2021 and C.M. No.3/2026 2. STR No.15589/2023 and C.M. No.2/2023 3. STR No.6072/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 4. STR No.16806/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 5. STR No.1261/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 6. STR No.16454/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 7. STR No.20278/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 8. STR No.13883/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 9. STR No.24888/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 10. STR No.32179/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 11. STR No.4414/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 12. STR No.78041/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 13. STR No.26395/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 14. STR No.26383/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 15. STR No.13052/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 16. STR No.73059/2022 and C.M. No.1/2026 17. STR No.75180/2022 and C.M. No.1/2026 18. STR No.253098/2018 and C.M. No.1/2026 19. STR No.9879/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 20. STR No.9881/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 21. STR No.2904/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 22. STR No.22484/2023 and C.M. No.2/2023 23. STR No.23765/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 24. STR No.23769/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 25. ITR No.8026/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 26. ITR No.1274/2024 and C.M. No.1/2026 27. ITR No.5841/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 28. ITR No.6969/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 29. ITR No.2901/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 30. ITR No.8366/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 31. ITR No.8362/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 32. ITR No.4955/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 33. ITR No.8363/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 34. ETR No.42124/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 35. ETR No.42129/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 36. ETR No.42127/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 37. ETR No.42125/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 38. ETR No.42130/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026 39. ETR No.9883/2023 and C.M. No.1/2026

MUNAWAR IQBAL DUGGAL ABID AZIZ SHEIKH

JUDGE JUDGE

Arsalan*