Allah Ditta vs The State etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT

BAHAWALPUR BENCH, BAHAWALPUR

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Criminal Appeal No.607-J of 2022 (Allah Dita v. The State, etc.)

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 08.10.2026.

Appellant by: Mr. Tahir Rasool, Advocates.

State by: Mr. Zafar Iqbal Soomro, Deputy District Prosecutor.

Complainant by: Abid Hussain, son of complainant, in person.

SYED FARHAD ALI SHAH, J.: Allah Ditta (‘appellant’) was tried under Section 302, PPC, on allegations of committing qatl-i-amd of Mst. Shehnaz Bibi, by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kehror Pacca, District Lodhran (‘trial Court’) in case FIR No.430/2014, dated 10.12.2014, registered at police station Dhanote, Tehsil Kehror Pacca, Fistrict Lodhran (Ex.PH/1). Vide judgment dated 25.10.2022, the trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302(b), PPC, and sentenced him to imprisonment for life as ta’zir, and further directed him to pay compensation of Rs.200,000/-, under Section 544- A, Cr.P.C, to legal heirs of Mst. Shehnaz Bibi; in default whereof, he would undergo further simple imprisonment for 6 months. Benefit of Section 382-B, Cr.P.C, was extended to the appellant (‘impugned judgment’).

2.Through criminal appeal No.607-J of 2022, the appellant has assailed the conviction and sentence imposed on him vide the impugned judgment.

3.The prosecution’s case, according to complainant Atta Muhammad (PW-4), is that on 10.12.2014 at about 09/10:00 a.m., he along with his daughter-in-law Mst. Shehnaz Bibi, Maqsood Mai (PW-6) and Muhammad Zameer Hussain (PW-5) were present in their house when someone knocked at the door. Mst. Shehnaz Bibi went to check and found the appellant standing,

armed with churri (P-4). The appellant raised lalkara that he would teach Mst. Shehnaz Bibi a lesson for insulting him and proceeded to inflict a churri (P-4) blow which landed on the left side of her chest. The complainant (PW-4) along with others tried to apprehend the appellant, but he threatened them with dire consequences while brandishing the churri(P-4), and thereafter decamped. Mst. Shehnaz Bibi succumbed to the injury at the spot (henceforth, the ‘deceased’). Motive behind the occurrence was ascribed to the deceased restraining the appellant from harassing him the day prior. Following her unnatural demise, complainant (PW-4) submitted a written application (Ex.PD), which led to the registration of FIR (Ex.PH/1).

4.The allegations levelled in the FIR (Ex.PH/1) were investigated by Akhtar Abbas S.I. (PW-10), who found the appellant involved in the alleged occurrence. Based thereon, police report under Section 173, Cr.P.C, was prepared and submitted with the trial Court which complied with all pre-trial procedures. After doing so, the appellant was indicted, against which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution, to prove its case, produced 11 witnesses and closed its evidence, whereas learned trial court also summoned Dr. Abdul Shakoor (CW-1). Subsequent thereto, appellant’s statement under Section 342, Cr.P.C, was recorded, wherein he refuted the allegations and professed his innocence. However, he neither opted to appear as his own witness under Section 340(2), Cr.P.C, nor produced defence evidence. On the conclusion of trial, as detailed hereinabove, the appellant was sentenced and convicted vide the impugned judgment. Hence, this criminal appeal.

5.Arguments heard. Record perused.

6.Re-appraisal of evidence provides that the incident took place on 10.12.2014 at about 09/10:00 a.m., whereas the FIR (Ex.PH/1) was lodged on the same day at 10:50 a.m. Based on the above, it appears that the FIR (Ex.PH/1) was lodged with spontaneity, however, deeper appreciation of surrounding evidence discloses an entirely different picture. For instance, according to the inquest report (Ex.PG), the police became aware qua Mst. Shehnaz Bibi’s unnatural demise on 10.12.2014 at 10 a.m., yet despite that no FIR was lodged until the lapse of another 50 minutes. Likewise, the prosecution has failed to produce any evidence with regards to the complainant (PW-4) or

any of the purported eye-witnesses making any call at Rescue 1122, for saving the deceased’s life, or at Police 15 number for intimating the police about the occurrence. The prosecution evidence is silent as to how, when, and by whom, the police were informed regarding the incident. Further appraisal of the inquest report (Ex.PG) provides that neither any case FIR, nor the place from where the corpse was recovered, mentioned therein. Additionally, the time of death according to police papers is written in the post-mortem examination report (Ex.PF) as 10:00 a.m., whereas the dead body was received in the mortuary at 2:30 p.m., and complete police papers at 03:00 p.m. After receiving the police papers, Dr. Mumtaz Kamal, Women Medical Officer (PW-8), conducted the autopsy at 03:00 p.m., after an inordinate delay of 5 hours, which delay, evidently, was caused due to non-furnishing the complete police papers on time. Therefore, the delay of 5 hours in conducting the post-mortem examination makes it crystal clear that until such moment, the prosecution story was still in its embryonic stage and the FIR was lodged ante-timed. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Ali v The State (2021 YLR 138 Lahore) and Muhammad Azam v The State (PLJ 2020 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1053). The above circumstance, read conjointly, post-mortem examination was conducted, the prosecution story was still in its embryonic stage, after due deliberation and consultation because the prosecution eye-witnesses were not present at the spot at the relevant time, nor had they witnessed the occurrence. Considering the above deliberation, the delay in conducting a post-mortem examination becomes indicative of the fact that, till such time, the requisite documents had not been prepared, and that the intervening time duration was consumed in consultation and in procuring and planting eye-witnesses for the purpose of concocting a false prosecution narrative prior to preparation of the police papers necessary for conducting the post-mortem examination, thereby casting serious skepticism upon the veracity of the prosecution’s case. In the case reported as Muhammad alias Ahmad v. The State (2025 SCMR 2052), where post-mortem was conducted with a delay of five and half hours, it was observed by the Honorable Supreme Court that: “7. ...As per statement of Dr. Atta Muhammad Hafiz (PW.4), he received the dead body of Ghulam Mustafa deceased at THQ Hospital Yazman at 02:00 p.m., i.e. 1 hour and 30 minutes after the occurrence. The post-mortem was conducted at 04:00 p.m., only after the necessary police documents were provided to him at 03:00 p.m. The inordinate delay in the preparation and

transmission of police papers coupled with the failure to shift the dead body of the deceased promptly to the hospital or police station, creates serious doubt about the presence of the alleged eye- witnesses at the scene at the relevant time...”

7.Generally, delayed post-mortem examination lends credence to the hypothesis that the ocular account witnesses were not present at the venue of occurrence at the time the incident took place. Therefore, the testimonies of the ocular account witnesses were meticulously examined. The ocular account was furnished by complainant Atta Muhammad (PW-4), Muhammad Zameer Hussain (PW-5) and Mst. Maqsood Mai (PW-6) (collectively referred to as the ‘ocular account witnesses’). The narration of events deposed by the ocular account witnesses before the trial Court appears to be highly improbable and inconsistent with the normal course of human conduct, which this Court can evaluate by virtue of Article 129, QSO. As alluded to hereinabove, neither the complainant (PW-4) nor the eyewitnesses (PW-5 & PW-6) called the local police at 15 number to intimate them regarding commission of offence, nor did they call Rescue 1122 to save the deceased’s life. It is equally implausible that, despite the presence of ocular account witnesses at the scene, the appellant, who was outnumbered, managed to make good his escape without being apprehended or even effectively chased by such close relatives. It also does not appeal to a prudent mind as to why the appellant would spare the said witnesses so that they can, at a later date, testify in Court against him in order to secure his conviction. The noted narration of events makes the conduct of the ocular account witnesses at a variance with the normal course of human conduct. 1 Further, their testimonies unveil that Muhammad Zameer Hussain (PW-5) was resident of a place situated 3/4 kilometers away from the place of occurrence, while Mst. Maqsood Mai (PW-6) was residing at a distance of 10/12 kilometers from there. Considering the above, the said witnesses were required to satisfactorily establish their presence at the place of occurrence, being chance witnesses. In Mst. Sughra Begum v. Qaiser Pervez (2015 SCMR 1142), the Honorable Supreme Court held that:

“A chance witness, in legal parlance is the one who claims that he was present on the crime spot at the fateful time, albeit, his presence there was a sheer chance as in the ordinary course of Iftikhar Ahmad v. The State (2026 SCMR 674) and Ghulam Sarwar Ghangro v. The State (2026

SCMR 251).

business, place of residence and normal course of events, he was not supposed to be present on the spot but at a place where he resides, carries on business or runs day to day life affairs. It is in this context that the testimony of chance witness, ordinarily, is not accepted unless justifiable reasons are shown to establish his presence at the crime scene at the relevant time. In normal course, the presumption under the law would operate about his absence from the crime spot. True that in rare cases, the testimony of chance witness may be relied upon, provided some convincing explanations appealing to prudent mind for his presence on the crime spot are put forth, when the occurrence took place otherwise, his testimony would fall within the category of suspect evidence and cannot be accepted without a pinch of salt.”

Therefore, the depositions of the ocular account witnesses were perused to ascertain if the said witnesses had offered any explanation. To this end, the disclosure made by Muhammad Zameer Hussain (PW-5) is relevant and the same is reproduced for ready-reference, as follows:

“Atta Muhammad Complainant is my cousin. Maqsood Mai PW is also my relative. Shehnaz Mai deceased was wife of my nephew.... My house is adjacent to house of Atta Muhamamd. I on my own came in the house of Shehnaz Bibi on the day of occurrence. I reached the house of Shehnaz Bibi at about 07:30 a.m. I came on foot. I had breakfast in the house of Shehnaz Bibi while sitting in the courtyard. At the time of occurrence, I, Maqsood Mai, Atta Muhammad and Shahnaz Mai were present in the courtyard.”

The aforementioned portion of Muhammad Zameer Hussain’s (PW-5) cross- examination provides that he and complainant Atta Muhammad (PW-4) were next door neighbours and not residents of the house of occurrence, as well as the fact that no cogent reason appealing to a prudent mind for visiting the deceased’s house on the fateful day has been mentioned by him. This is of paramount importance considering that in the ordinary course of their life, such witnesses were expected to be at work. Furthermore, the column titled “Body Identified By” in the post-mortem examination report (Ex.PF) is also blank and no ocular account witness is mentioned therein, which further negates the presence of ocular account witnesses at the house where the offence allegedly took place. As such, the testimonies of three prosecution ocular account witnesses cannot be safely relied upon, as they were chance witnesses who had failed to offer plausible, convincing and confidence inspiring explanation to establish the presence at the place of incident, thereby casting doubt on their

allegation of having witnessed the occurrence and, consequently, undermining their credibility as eyewitnesses, leaving this Court to conclude that the entire episode of how Mst. Shehnaz Bibi lost her life remained unwitnessed. Reliance is placed on Mir Muhammad Alias Kuraro v. The State (2026 SCMR 1409) and Rasheed Ahmad alias Sheeda v. The State (2026 SCMR 798). In Rasheed Ahmad alias Sheeda v. The State (2026 SCMR 798), the Honourable Supreme Court held that since the eyewitnesses were not residents of the place where the occurrence took place and they had not given any reason for their presence at the spot at the relevant time, therefore, they were chance witnesses and it was not safe to rely upon their evidence. These circumstances inevitably tremors the whole edifice of the prosecution case, reasonably hypothesizing their absence at the scene of the crime. Reliance is placed on Adbul Latif v. Noor Zaman (2021 SCMR 1428) and Pervaiz alias Irfan v. The State (2026 PCr.LJ 134 Lahore). Therefore, this Court has no doubt in its mind that the prosecution case against the appellant is doubtful and the possibility of false implication cannot be ruled out.

8.Regarding the medical evidence produced by the prosecution in the shape of Dr. Mumtaz Kamal, Women Medical Officer’s (PW-8), testimony and post-mortem examination report (Ex.PF) prepared by him. This Court has independently scrutinized the deposition of Dr. Mumtaz Kamal, Women Medical Officer (PW-8), who “Stated that on 10.12.2021, I was posted as W.M.O at ThQ Hospital Kehror Pacca. On the same day, I conducted postmortem of the dead body of Shehnaz Bibi...”. This part of her testimony is at a variance and in stark derogation of the date of occurrence as mentioned by the ocular account witnesses, according to whom the incident transpired in the year 2014. To counter this defect, it was argued by the Deputy District Prosecutor that the date is a typographical error. The contention was examined in light of the statutory framework governing recording of testimonies. Section 265-F of the Code governs the production of prosecution evidence, whereas the evidence of each witness so produced is to be recorded in terms of Sections 356 to 360 of the Code. These provisions of Cr.P.C are to be read together with the self-explanatory rules contained in Part B, Chapter 24, Volume III, of the Rules and Orders of the Lahore High Court, as well as Articles 132 and 133, QSO, which Articles provide that the examination-in-chief of a witness is to be recorded first, followed by cross-examination, and thereafter the witness can

be recalled and re-examined only for the limited purpose of explaining matters introduced during cross-examination, as per Article 133(3), QSO. Once the testimony of a prosecution witness is recorded, it is read over to the witness in terms of Section 360, Cr.P.C, and where the witness denies the correctness of any part thereof, or points out to a clerical mistake, the same may be corrected by the trial judge. The purpose of Section 360, Cr.P.C, was examined in Muhammad Bakhsh v. The State (2012 YLR 112), by the Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar, present Justice of Honourable Supreme Court. His lordship authoritatively held that:- “The object of the above provision to obtain an accurate record from the witness of what he really means to say and to give him an opportunity of correcting the words which the Sessions Judge or his clerk has taken down. Before a deposition is closed, the evidence must be read over to the witness, enabling him to protect himself against any inaccuracy in the words taken down from his lips. It is not sufficient compliance with the section merely hand over to the witness his deposition so that he may read it over himself.”

Applying the above principles to the case in hand, the contention is devoid of any merit because the witness recorded her testimony and, after perusing the same, signed it. Had there been any defect or typographical error, the witness ought to have pointed it out when her evidence was read over to her, or filed an application under Section 360, Cr.P.C. for correction of the same. Having done neither, the discrepancy remains unexplained and cannot now be dismissed as a mere clerical slip.

9.It is also a matter of record that Dr. Mumtaz Kamal, Women Medical Officer (PW-8), further stated that “No Post mortem staining present...”, despite noting that according to the police papers, the time of death was 10:00 a.m., and the autopsy was conducted after 5 hours, at 03:00 p.m. This further dents the already frail prosecution case because as opined by Nirban Das et al, in Estimation of Time since Death from Rigor Mortis, Postmortem Staining, and Decomposition,2 the term postmortem staining is used to describe the purplish or reddish-purple regions of discolouration in the body's dependent areas that appear through the skin as a result of accumulated fluid blood in the vessels after death. In plethoric subjects, it often manifests 30 Das N, Chakraborty JS, Chakraborty PN. Estimation of time since death from rigor mortis, postmortem staining, and decomposition: an autopsy-based study in a tertiary care hospital, Tripura. SSR Inst Int J Life Sci. 2024; Vol. 10, Issue 6; p. 6455.

minutes–01 hour after death, however in anaemic subjects, it takes up to 04 hours. Over 06–10 hours, the patches progressively coalesce to produce a sizable area of reddish-purple discolouration.3 It begins as spotted patches that take 30 minutes–02 hours to develop, fully established into a sheet but is not fixed till 04 hours, becomes fully developed and fixed within 06–12 hours, and continues until putrefaction sets in.4 In light of the above medical jurisprudence, the postmortem staining ought to have been visible on the body of the deceased by the time the autopsy was conducted at 03:00 p.m., i.e., 5 hours after the purported time of death, even if the deceased is presumed to be anaemic, in which case it appears within 04 hours at the latest. The categorical statement of Dr. Mumtaz Kamal, Women Medical Officer (PW-8) that no postmortem staining was present is, therefore, irreconcilable with the time of death as deposed by the ocular account witnesses, as well as recorded in the police papers. This glaring inconsistency leaves two possibilities: either the death did not occur at 10:00 a.m. as claimed, but at a considerably later hour, or the time of death was incorrectly recorded in the police papers to bring the same in line with the narration of events disclosed by the prosecution's witnesses. Both possibilities strike at the root of the prosecution's case because in one instance, the occurrence did not take place at the time mentioned in the crime report, while in the other supports the conclusion reached hereinabove wherein it is stated that the FIR was lodged ante-timed because that the prosecution story was still taking shape when the autopsy was conducted. In either eventuality, the medical evidence, which even otherwise cannot disclose the assailants identity,5 does not corroborate the ocular account, but rather contradicts it. As such, it is of no help to the prosecution case.

10.This Court has also noticed that the prosecution withheld the testimonies of the children of deceased Mst. Shehnaz Bibi, who were aged about 08 to 14 years, with the eldest daughter being aged about 14 years. This fact was admitted by the informant Ata Muhammad (PW-4) in his cross- examination, relevant extract is as follows:

Mukherjee JB. Textbook of Forensic Medicine & Toxicology 2nd ed. London: Arnold’s Publisher Vol., 1994; pp. 217-20.

Reddy KSN, Murty OP. The Essentials of Forensic Medicine & Toxicology. 33rd ed. New Delhi: The Health Sci Pub; 2014.

Akbar Ali v. The State (2007 SCMR 486).

“Mst.Shehnaz Bibi was having two sons and two daughters who were minors at the time of occurrence and were present in the house at the at time. One boy is grown up now but I do not know his age. No son and daughter of Shahnaz Bibi has been married. None of the children has come to given evidence today. Police did not record the statements of the said children.”

The withholding of children of the deceased who were residents of the house of occurrence attracts the adverse presumption of Article 129(g), QSO because it does not appeal to a prudent mind why the real children of the deceased would substitute the real assailant of their mother. This lends credence to the view that despite availability of best evidence with the prosecution, it did not produce the same because had said evidence been produced, the same would have gone against the prosecution narrative. Reliance is placed on Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State (2024 SCMR 1310) and Zunair Younas v. The State (PLD 2026 SC

11.The prosecution also relied on recovery of blood stained churri (P-

4)secured by Akhtar Abbas S.O. (PW-10) vide recovery memo (Ex.PB) on 19.12.2014, 4 days after arrest of appellant on 15.12.2014. The churri (P-4) was sent for forensic examination and according to the PFSA report (Ex.PM), the churri (P-4) did not match with the DNA profile of the deceased, and as such, is of no help to the prosecution. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Nadeem v. The State (2024 YLR 2521 Lahore) and Muhammad Amjad v. The State (2026 SCMR 921). Considering the above, the recovery of churri (P-4) is inconsequential.

12.The motive behind the occurrence was ascribed by the prosecution as the appellant harassing the deceased a day prior to the occurrence, in which incident, she restrained him, which allegedly provoked him to commit her murder. However, this alleged previous incident has not been substantiated through any independent or convincing evidence. No specific details of the alleged harassment and the circumstances in which the deceased allegedly restrained the appellant have been provided and there is no material available to suggest that the local police was ever informed regarding such occurrence. In other words, except bald statements, there is no material on record to substantiate the motive. Therefore, the motive is discarded. Reliance is placed on Sajjad v. The State (2026 SCMR 1483), wherein it was held that in a case

where the ocular account itself was beset with doubts, the failure to prove motive further eroded the veracity of the allegations against the appellant.

13.In light of the above discussion, the prosecution has failed to prove the charge against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. It is settled law that multiple infirmities are not required; even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind entitles the appellant to its benefit as a matter of right, and is sufficient to acquit. Reliance is placed on Ali Imran v. The State (2026 SCMR 1370) and Tariq Pervaiz v. The State (1995 SCMR

14.In consequence of the aforementioned discussion, criminal appeal No.607-J of 2022 of Allah Ditta appellant is allowed, the impugned judgment dated 25.10.2022, passed by trial Court, is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charge. If not required in any other case, the appellant is directed to be released forthwith. Any fine or compensation, if deposited, shall be dealt with in accordance with law. The case property shall be disposed of by the learned trial Court strictly in accordance with law.

(SYED FARHAD ALI SHAH)

JUDGE

This judgment was pronounced on 08.10.2026, dictated, prepared on 12.10.2026, and signed on 13.10.2026.

*Afzaal/*

Approved for Reporting

JUDGE