Dr. Syed Aftab Naqvi & 15 Other vs Fop etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH,

MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P No.10972 of 2025

Dr. Syed Aftab Naqvi & others Versus Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Science & Technology, Islamabad & others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 07.10.2026 Petitioners by: Mr. Muhammad Yafis Naveed Hashmi, Advocate.

Respondents by: Mr. Adeel Ahmad Qaiser, Advocate for respondents No.2 to 6.

Ch. Muhammad Shahzad Aslam, Deputy Attorney General.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- Through the instant petition, the petitioners have called in question the order dated 11.12.2024 passed by the Engineering Accreditation Board (“EAB”) of the Pakistan Engineering Council (“PEC”), whereby their requests for registration as Registered Engineers were declined.

2.The record reflects that, in its 37th meeting held on 12.03.1996, the Council of the PEC approved a policy under which candidates possessing advanced postgraduate qualifications could be considered for registration as engineers even without a four-year B.Sc. Engineering degree, subject to fulfilment of the prescribed conditions, including possession of M.Sc. and Ph.D. qualifications spanning at least four academic years in aggregate. The petitioners assert that they pursued and acquired their respective qualifications while this policy remained in force and that their educational choices were guided by the prevailing regulatory framework. Subsequently, on 23.11.2010, the Engineering Accreditation & Qualification Equivalence Committee adopted a decision making an accredited four-year B.Sc. Engineering

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degree a mandatory requirement for registration, purportedly with effect from 10.05.2010. The petitioners maintain that the subsequent decision was neither published in the Official Gazette nor otherwise duly notified or communicated to the universities, educational institutions or candidates who had proceeded with their studies under the earlier policy. The respondents have not produced material establishing lawful promulgation of the subsequent requirement or identifying any statutory provision authorising its retrospective application to qualifications pursued under the previous regulatory regime. The petitioners had earlier approached this Court, which, vide order dated 22.05.2024 passed in W.P. No.475/2022, directed the PEC to reconsider their cases in the light of the findings recorded by the learned Federal Ombudsman in the matter of Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed. However, instead of addressing the material considerations arising from the earlier policy and the Ombudsman’s findings, the EAB reiterated its reliance upon the 2010 requirement and, through the impugned order, again declined registration. During the pendency of the present proceedings, the PEC registered Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed on 16.06.2025, notwithstanding the petitioners’ assertion that his qualifications and circumstances are materially similar to theirs.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the impugned order is unlawful, discriminatory and contrary to the direction issued by this Court on 22.05.2024. He submits that the respondents have failed to demonstrate that the 2010 requirement was lawfully promulgated or that it could retrospectively disqualify candidates who had pursued their postgraduate qualifications under the 1996 policy. He further argues that the subsequent registration of Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed, without any legally relevant distinction being identified between his case and those of the petitioners, renders the refusal of their registration discriminatory and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution. He further submits that reliance upon Maula Bux Shaikh and others v. Chief Minister Sindh and others (2018 SCMR 2098) and the Washington Accord is stated to be misplaced, as neither provides a

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lawful basis for the retrospective application of the disputed requirement in the circumstances of the present case. Learned counsel accordingly seeks setting aside of the impugned order and a direction for registration of the petitioners.

4.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents relies upon section 2(xxvii), read with sections 10 to 13 of the Pakistan Engineering Council Act, 1976 (“the Act”), and submits that registration is governed by the statutory qualifications prescribed under the Act and its Schedules. He maintains that the PEC, as a specialised regulatory body, is competent to prescribe and enforce academic and professional standards, and that Courts ordinarily exercise restraint in matters involving technical and professional qualifications. The respondents, therefore, support the impugned order on the ground that an accredited undergraduate engineering qualification is a requirement for registration.

5.Arguments heard. Available record perused.

6.The controversy raises questions concerning the lawful application of a subsequently introduced professional qualification requirement, the protection of legitimate expectations arising from an established regulatory policy, the constitutional guarantee of equality, and compliance with an earlier judicial direction. The further question is whether, in the circumstances established on the record, this Court should finally determine the petitioners’ entitlement to registration or remit the matter to the PEC for another round of consideration.

7.Article 18 of the Constitution guarantees the right to enter upon any lawful profession or occupation, subject to qualifications prescribed by law. This right does not confer an unconditional entitlement to professional registration, nor does it prevent a competent regulator from introducing higher academic and professional standards in the public interest. It does, however, require that restrictions upon professional eligibility have a lawful foundation and be applied in a manner consistent with the governing legislation and constitutional guarantees. An administrative committee resolution cannot, merely by

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its adoption, amend the statutory scheme or impose a condition beyond the authority conferred by the parent enactment. Where a new qualification requirement is relied upon to defeat eligibility arising under an earlier regulatory framework, the authority must demonstrate its lawful source, scope and applicability to the persons concerned.

8.In the present case, although the respondents rely upon the Act and the qualifications reflected in its Schedules, they have not established that the statutory scheme was amended in 2010 so as to retrospectively disqualify persons who had pursued their postgraduate qualifications under the 1996 policy. Nor have they identified a statutory provision expressly authorising such retrospective operation. The distinction is material: the power to prescribe a new standard for future applicants does not, without lawful authority, necessarily include the power to alter retrospectively the regulatory consequences of educational qualifications pursued under an earlier policy. This principle is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence; as consistently held in Dr. Syed Sharaf Ali Shah and 2 others v. Province of Sindh and others (2009 SCMR 249), Government of KPK and others v. Khalid Mehmood (2012 SCMR 619), Muhammad Younas Khan and 15 others v. Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) through Managing Director and 4 others (2025 CLC 535) and Dr. Abdul Hanan and 3 others v. Province of Punjab through Chief Secretary and 25 others (2025 MLD 923), an executive notification, policy, or administrative decision can never operate retrospectively to impair or destroy vested rights acquired under the policy in field at the time the parties arranged their affairs or initiated their qualifications.

9.The principle of legal certainty requires public authorities to administer regulatory schemes in a predictable, consistent and lawful manner. Individuals who embark upon lengthy and specialized courses of study in reliance upon an established regulatory policy cannot claim that the policy will remain immutable forever. Nevertheless, where the authority subsequently changes its position, the consequences of that change must be assessed in accordance with law, particularly where the

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change is sought to be applied to persons whose educational choices were made under the earlier regime. This consideration is reinforced by the doctrine of legitimate expectation. Such expectation does not override an express statutory command or confer a right contrary to law. Its significance lies in requiring a public authority to act fairly and consistently where its established policy has induced persons to arrange their affairs on a particular understanding of the applicable regulatory requirements. In the instant case, the 1996 policy expressly contemplated consideration for registration of candidates possessing specified advanced postgraduate qualifications. The petitioners assert that they pursued their qualifications under that framework, and the respondents have not demonstrated a lawful basis for retrospectively depriving them of the benefit of the earlier policy. Nor have they identified transitional arrangements capable of reconciling the subsequent requirement with the position of candidates who had already embarked upon their studies. Likewise, in Zaman Akhtar Advocate v. The Chief Secretary, GOB, (Chairman BOD) and another (2024 MLD 1513), it was authoritatively ruled that where a candidate fulfills eligibility criteria based on a prevailing policy, a subsequent policy change cannot be given retrospective effect to prejudice the applicant under the doctrine of past and closed transactions.

10.The purported retrospective operation of the 2010 decision presents a further legal impediment. The decision was adopted on 23.11.2010 but was stated to take effect from 10.05.2010. The respondents have produced no satisfactory material establishing lawful promulgation of the requirement in a manner sufficient to bind the affected candidates, nor have they identified statutory authority permitting its retrospective application to their detriment. Publication or adequate notification of a substantive regulatory requirement is not an empty formality. It serves the principles of transparency, accessibility and fair notice, particularly where the requirement affects educational and professional decisions taken over a considerable period. A public authority cannot ordinarily impose an undisclosed or

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subsequently introduced condition upon past conduct in a manner that prejudicially changes its legal consequences, unless such retrospective operation is authorised by law. In the circumstances of the present case, the respondents have failed to establish that the disputed requirement could lawfully be invoked to disqualify the petitioners solely because they lacked the undergraduate qualification subsequently made mandatory. The impugned decision, to the extent that it rests upon such retrospective application, is consequently unsustainable.

11.The matter also engages Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law. The constitutional requirement of equal treatment does not prohibit all distinctions; it prohibits differential treatment of persons similarly situated where the distinction lacks a lawful and rational basis. The record reflects that Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed was registered by the PEC on 16.06.2025, whereas the petitioners’ requests were declined on the basis of the disputed 2010 requirement. The petitioners rely upon the Ombudsman’s findings in his case, which this Court had expressly directed the PEC to consider. The respondents have not identified any material distinction in the qualifications or relevant circumstances of Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed and the petitioners that would justify extending the benefit of the earlier regulatory position to the former while withholding it from the latter. Nor have they established that his registration was unlawful or that the decision to register him was subsequently withdrawn or declared invalid. As underscored by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Khan Toti and others v. Government of NWFP through Secretary Finance and others (2016 SCMR 1206) and Ghulam Abbas Soomro v. The Province of Sindh and others (2024 SCMR 673), treating similarly situated individuals with sheer discrimination is hit by the prohibition against discrimination contained in Article 25 of the Constitution, and creating conflicting classes or differential treatment within the same category without rational justification runs afoul of constitutional equality guarantees. The principle that equality cannot be claimed in the perpetuation of an

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illegality is not attracted merely by invoking it in the abstract; the alleged illegality of the comparator’s registration must have a factual and legal foundation. No such foundation has been demonstrated in the present proceedings. Accordingly, the subsequent registration of Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed is a material circumstance that the respondents were bound to address through a lawful and rational explanation. Their failure to identify a legally relevant distinction renders the differential treatment of the petitioners arbitrary and inconsistent with Article 25 of the Constitution.

12.The earlier order dated 22.05.2024 passed by this Court in W.P. No.475/2022 required the PEC to reconsider the petitioners’ cases in the light of the findings recorded by the learned Federal Ombudsman in Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed. The obligation to reconsider was substantive, not merely formal. It required the authority to engage with the relevant findings and determine whether they affected the legal and factual basis of the petitioners’ claims. Repetition of the same conclusion, without addressing the material considerations identified by the Court, cannot be treated as meaningful compliance with a judicial direction. The impugned order reiterates the 2010 requirement but does not adequately explain its lawful retrospective application, reconcile the petitioners’ reliance upon the 1996 policy, or distinguish their cases from that of Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed. It therefore fails to demonstrate that the reconsideration directed by this Court was undertaken in substance. A statutory authority is bound to comply with a judicial direction according to its true purport; it cannot render such direction ineffective by repeating its earlier position without addressing the matters that required reconsideration.

13.The respondents’ reliance upon the case of Maula Bux Shaikh supra, does not resolve the controversy in their favour. As presented before this Court, that case concerned in-service promotion of non- engineering employees and did not determine the eligibility of persons holding advanced postgraduate engineering qualifications for registration under the Act. It is, therefore, distinguishable on the

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question presently before this Court. Likewise, the Washington Accord, which concerns the international recognition and accreditation of engineering education programs, cannot by itself create a domestic statutory disqualification unless such consequence is founded upon the applicable law. International accreditation standards may inform the development of future professional requirements, but they do not dispense with the need for lawful authority, consistent application and compliance with constitutional guarantees.

14.The principle of judicial deference to expert regulatory bodies does not require a Court to uphold an order merely because it concerns a technical or professional matter. Such deference recognizes the value of specialized knowledge within the lawful sphere of the regulator’s authority; it does not immunize administrative action from review for want of jurisdiction, retrospective application unsupported by law, arbitrariness or unequal treatment. Where the defect lies not in the technical assessment of an academic qualification but in the legal authority to apply a requirement retrospectively and in the inconsistent treatment of similarly situated applicants, the issue falls squarely within the legitimate scope of judicial review.

15.The cumulative effect of the foregoing circumstances is decisive. The petitioners pursued their postgraduate qualifications under the 1996 policy; the respondents have failed to establish lawful authority for applying the subsequent requirement retrospectively to their detriment; the lawful promulgation and communication of that requirement have not been demonstrated; the petitioners’ cases were not reconsidered in meaningful compliance with the earlier judicial direction; and the PEC subsequently registered Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed without establishing any legally relevant distinction between his case and those of the petitioners. These are not merely technical deficiencies in the form of the impugned order. They go to the legal foundation and constitutional validity of the refusal of registration.

16.Consequently, this petition is allowed, and the impugned order dated 11.12.2024 passed by the Engineering Accreditation Board of the

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Pakistan Engineering Council is set aside. The respondents, particularly the PEC/EAB, are directed to register the petitioners as Registered Engineers on the same legal and regulatory basis as applied to Dr. Ayyaz Ahmed, subject only to the completion of such lawful documentary and administrative formalities as are equally applicable to similarly situated applicants. The disputed 2010 requirement shall not be applied retrospectively to deny the petitioners registration. The requisite process shall be completed within thirty (30) days of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, and a compliance report shall be submitted to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) within the same period.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Judge *Sultan*