Atta Ul Mohsan vs Hasham Ali etc.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Civil Revision No.904/2014.

Ata ul Mohsin Versus Hashim Ali, etc.

Date of Hearing 05.10.2026.

Petitioner by Mian Abdul Qudous and Mr. Arshad Ali Mahar, Advocates.

Respondents M/s Abbas Ali Chadhar, Mazhar Iqbal Babar Chadhar, Hunnain Abbas Chadhar, Afzaal Bhatti and Sana Khan, Advocates.

AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD, J:- Through this

consolidated judgment, instant Civil Revision as well as the connected cases, detailed below, involve similar question of law, therefore, are decided together.

i)R.S.A. No. 198 of 2010.

(Ata ul Mohsin v. Qasim Ali, etc.)

ii)Civil Revision No.1888/2012 (Atta-ul-Mohsin v. Mohammad Yaseen, etc.)

iii)R.S.A. No. 67 of 2014 (Ata ul Mohsin v. Sher Alam (deceased) through legal heris, etc.

iv)Civil Revision No.2885/2014 (Abdul Ghaffar v. Khalil Ahmad, etc.)

v)Civil Revision No.2886/2014 (Abdul Ghaffar v. Riasat Ali, etc.)

2.The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption. After conducting a full- fledged trial, the learned trial Court partially decreed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 15.12.2010. Feeling aggrieved, both parties

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preferred their separate appeals. The learned lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner, whereas the appeal filed by the respondents was allowed vide consolidated judgment and decrees dated 23.12.2013, whereby the suit of the petitioner was consequently dismissed.

The facts of Regular Second Appeal No.198/2010 are that the appellant instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption. After contest and upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court partially decreed the suit to the extent of one-half of the suit property vide judgment and decree dated 13.07.2009. Both parties, being dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, preferred separate appeals. The learned lower appellate Court dismissed both the appeals vide judgment and decrees dated 30.06.2010. Being aggrieved, the appellant/plaintiff preferred the instant Regular Second Appeal.

The facts of Civil Revision No.1888/2012 are that the petitioner instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption. After recording the evidence of the parties and affording them an opportunity of hearing, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 15.05.2010. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal, which also met the same fate and was dismissed by the learned appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 09.04.2012. Being dissatisfied with the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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The facts of Regular Second Appeal No.67/2014 are that the appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit for possession by way of pre- emption. After conducting a full-fledged trial, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 30.10.2012. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal, which too was dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 23.12.2013. Being dissatisfied with the judgments and decrees of the Courts below, the appellant-plaintiff preferred the instant Regular Second Appeal.

The facts of Civil Revision No.2885/2014 are that the petitioners/plaintiffs instituted a suit for possession by way of pre- emption, which, after contest, was dismissed by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 25.09.2012. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners/plaintiffs preferred an appeal, which was dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 14.05.2014. Being dissatisfied with the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the petitioners have filed the instant civil revision.

The facts of Civil Revision No.2886/2014 are that the petitioner/plaintiff instituted a suit for possession by way of pre-emption.

After conducting a full-fledged trial, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 25.09.2012. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal, which also met the same fate and was dismissed by the learned lower appellate Court vide judgment and decree dated 14.05.2014. Being dissatisfied with the concurrent judgments and

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decrees of the Courts below, the petitioner has invoked the revisional jurisdiction of this Court.

3.In all the connected cases, the petitioners/appellants were non-suited principally on the ground that, while sitting alone and upon receiving information from the informer regarding the sale of the suit property, the plaintiffs announced their claim of pre-emption. The learned Courts below held that the Talb-i-Muwathibat had not been performed in accordance with law, as the said demand had not been made in a Majlis. Relying upon the judgment reported as “Mutali v. Khizar Hayat and 6 others” (PLD 2012 Lahore 1), the learned Courts below formed the view that the requirement of Talb-i-Muwathibat had not been duly fulfilled, as no Majlis existed at the time when the demand was made.

However, the civil revisions and Regular Second Appeals were admitted for regular hearing in view of the dictum laid down by this Court in “Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Mian Abdul Karim (deceased) through LRs” (PLJ 2014 Lahore 16). Since divergent views had emerged with regard to the question as to what constitutes a Majlis within the contemplation of Section 13(1) of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 (the “Pre-emption Act”), for the purpose of making the jumping demand of Talb-i-Muwathibat, the matter was initially referred, vide order dated 24.03.2014, to the Hon’ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Division Bench to resolve the conflicting views expressed by different learned Single Benches.

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The Hon’ble Chief Justice thereafter referred the matter to a Division Bench. The said Division Bench rendered its judgment in “Muhammad Riaz through Special Attorney v. Ghulam Hussain through Legal Heirs”, subsequently reported in 2016 YLR 56 and endorsed the view taken in Ghulam Muhammad’s case (PLJ 2014 Lahore 16).

Subsequently, vide order dated 11.03.2026, the matter was again referred to the Hon’ble Chief Justice by the another Division Bench of this Court for constitution of a Larger Bench on the aforesaid question, inter alia, on the ground that the view expressed in Ghulam Muhammad’s case (PLJ 2014 Lahore 16) had not been adequately addressed and that, in order to conclusively settle the controversy, consideration by a Larger Bench was warranted.

Consequently, the above-mentioned cases were placed before the Larger Bench for determination of the question so formulated.

The Larger Bench of this Court, vide order dated 14.04.2026 passed in the above titled Civil Revision No.904/2014, while taking into consideration the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Appeal No.179 of 2016, reported as “Amanullah v. Muhammad Shareef Khan” (2024 SCMR 430), answered the question referred for determination. Upon pronouncement of the decision by the Larger Bench, the matters were remitted to the learned Single Bench for adjudication of the individual cases in the light of their respective facts and circumstances. Resultantly, the titled civil revision, along with the

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connected cases mentioned in paragraph No.1 of this judgment, has been entrusted to this Court for decision.

4.I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have carefully perused the record, as well as the case law cited at the Bar, with their able assistance.

5.As noticed hereinbefore, the facts of all the connected cases are substantially similar, as the plaintiffs were non-suited on the ground that they performed Talb-i-Muwathibat while not being seated in a Majlis. The learned Single Bench of this Court, while dealing with the matter in Mutali’s case (PLD 2012 Lahore 1), observed in paragraphs 9 to 12 as under:-

“9. The word used in explanation are "in the sitting or meeting (Majlis)". Words of English language "sitting" or "meeting" are used in this provision of law, the "meeting" has further been clarified by the word of Urdu language "Majlis" these words denotes the intention of law maker. The word sitting in the above provision of law as per Oxford English Dictionary means "a period of time when a group of people serve a meal". In Chamber 21st Century Dictionary it means "an act or state of being seated".

10.In Black Law Dictionary 18th Edition it means "a Court sitting, a session of appellate court".

11.The word "meeting" as defined in Black Law Dictionary "the gathering of people to discuss or act on matters having common interest". In Oxford Dictionary "an assembly of people for a period, especially for formal discussion and organized event and instance of people meeting". In Chambers Dictionary "the act of coming together an assembly for gathering at a pre-arranged time usually to discuss specific topic". The word Majlis is the word of Urdu. In Feroze-ul-Lughat published by Feroz Sons Limited, the word Majlis means:--

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مجمع ۔ سبھا ۔ وہ جگہ جہاں آدمیوں- جلسه- بزم- "بیٹھنے کی جگہ ۔ انجمن " مجلس- سبھا ۔ کمیٹی ۔ خوشی کا جلسہ- محفل- کا گروہ جمع ہو۔ انجمن

12.The word "sitting" or "meeting" used in this provision of law is of an important significance. It shows that the jumping demand should be before the persons, the meeting, sitting and Majlis means a group of persons not a single person. The reason for mentioning the above word is obvious that right of pre-emption is mostly exercised in villages where most of the sale are under threat of pre- emptor and residences in village are not like cities and the village people used to assemble at one given place commonly known as "Chopal" where the village people sit together and decide their local problems, the law maker wants that jumping demand should be before group of people who may all know the demand of pre-emptor. It is an established principle of law that right of pre-emption is a weak right and it should be proved through a clear and primary direct evidence. It is a feeble right and as such its existence and enforcement require strict proof. The intention of legislature shows that "Talb-i-Muwathibat" should be before a group of persons and not before single person and at least before two persons before whom the informer informs about the sale. A single person does not constitute sitting, meeting or Majlis. In the present case admittedly the petitioner was alone when according to him the informer informed him about the pre-empted sale. P.W.3 came subsequently. The petitioner has failed to prove that he announced his jumping demand in a meeting or before Majlis. The petitioner allegedly announced to exercise his right of pre-emption before the informer and as such the requirement of section 13 of Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991 has not been proved. The learned appellate Court has rightly came to the conclusion that petitioner has failed to prove Talb according to law. Reliance is placed on Abdul Kareem v. Mst. Jannat Bibi (2005 SCMR 1228), Qaisar Mansoor Malik v. Mst. Jhando through Legal Heirs and 13 others (2004 YLR 537), Abdul Karim Khan v. Asif Ali Khan and others (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 137).”

Thereafter another Single Judge of this Court in Ghulam Muhammad’s case (PLJ 2014 Lahore 16=2014 YLR 774) had taken a different view in para 8, which is as under:-

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“8. It is vehemently argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that as per averments in the plaint Talab-e- Muwathibat was made by the pre-emptor in the presence of informer only and no third person in the said meeting was present and that presence of alleged informer and pre- emptor does not constitute lawful sitting or meeting (Majlis) as envisaged under Section 13(1) of the Act ibid. I am afraid learned counsel for the petitioners is misconceived. The word 'meeting' is defined in Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary New 8th Edition as "a situation in which two or more people meet together because they have arranged it or by chance". In the said Dictionary the word 'sitting' is defined as "a period of time that a person spends sitting and doing an activity". The words sitting or meeting (Majlis) used in Section 13(1) Explanation I of the Act ibid do not require a group of more than two persons. Bare reading of the provision of Section 13(1) Explanation I of the Act ibid makes it crystal clear that law did not require physical presence of any witness-besides the informer and the pre-emptor at the time of performance of Talab-e-Muwathibat. Meeting of informer and pre-emptor comprising two persons is sufficient within the meanings of sitting or meeting (Majlis) to perform Talab-e-Muwathibat in terms of Section 13(2) of the Act ibid. Needless to say that requirement of Talab-e-Muwathibat is immediate (jumping) demand by the pre-emptor without delay on receiving information of the impugned sale. It does not require assembling or gathering of more than two persons. Certainly pre-emptor is not required to make any resort to collect a group of more than two persons to make Talab-e- Muwathibat after receiving knowledge of the impugned sale from the informer. Needless to say that in the provision of Section 13 of the Act ibid the scheme of legislation has prescribed the presence of two truthful witnesses at the stage of making of Talab-e-Ishhad and not at the stage of Talab-e-Muwathibat. In the attending circumstances, argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in this case Talab-e-Muwathibat was not performed in a lawful manner is devoid of any force and thus repelled.”

After constitution of the Division Bench as referred by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, the learned Division Bench of this Court in Muhammad Riaz’s case (2016 YLR 56) held:

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“4. In our view when a person gains knowledge of sale by any person, to whom we term as informer, this meeting of pre-emptor with informer is meeting (Majlis) in the light of explanation I to Section 13 of the Punjab Pre- emption Act, 1991, announcement of intention to pre- empt the sale by pre-emptor in the presence of informer alone is sufficient compliance of Talb-i-Muwathebat. Furthermore we are of the view that the person even gaining knowledge on telephonic conversation through the informer if announces his intention to exercise his right to pre-empt the sale and a person who gains knowledge of sale through any means including a message through cell phone etc. if confirms his intention to pre-empt the sale through his reply to informer, this is sufficient compliance of Talb-e-Muwathebat. His knowledge through telephonic conversation or any other means will be meeting with the informer in the sense mentioned in explanation 1 of section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. We have also gone through the judgment reported as 2014 YLR 774 "Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Mian Abdul Karim through L.Rs” wherein sitting and meeting have been defined, it has been held that "sitting" and "meeting" mentioned in section 13(1) does not require presence of more than two persons. In this view of the matter, we do not agree with the meaning given to "sitting" and "meeting" (Majlis) mentioned in explanation 1 of section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991 in the judgment reported as PLD 2012 Lahore 1 “Mutali v. Khizar Hayat and 6 others".

6.The learned Full Bench when the matter was referred by the Hon’ble Chief Justice in the light of observations made by the Division Bench of this Court through order dated 11.03.2026 after reproducing the relevant paras of Amanullah’s case (2024 SCMR 430) observed as under:

“4. Article 189 of the Constitution embodies the constitutional doctrine of stare decisis. It mandates that every decision of the Supreme Court, to the extent that it decides a question of law or enunciates a principle of law, is binding upon all other Courts. Thus, the ratio decidendi of a Supreme Court judgment constitutes binding precedent. Every High Court and subordinate Courts are

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constitutionally bound to follow the law declared by the Supreme Court.1

5.As the point of law as to what constitutes a 'Majlis' under the provisions contained in Section 13(1) of the Pre- emption Act has conclusively and authoritatively been settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in 'Amanullah' case2 supra which has the binding effect on this Court in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution, therefore, there is no need to further dilate upon the legal issue raised in this and the connected Civil Revision Petitions.”

The learned Full Bench of this Court based its findings on Amanullah’s case, therefore, it is better to reproduce the relevant paras, which are as under:-

“9. As noted above, talb-e-muwathibat is required to be made by a pre-emptor in the sitting or meeting (majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale, declaring his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. The terms 'sitting', 'meeting' and '(majlis)' are the keywords for fulfilling, conscientiously, the will of the legislature, which is deemed not to waste its words or to say anything in vain. Thus, a construction which attributes redundancy to the legislature cannot be accepted, except for compelling reasons. On the one hand it is not permissible to add words or to fill in a gap or lacuna in the law, and, on the other hand, an effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature [Ref: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P. Singh, Seventh Edition (At pages 58, 59 and 66)]. It is also a well-settled principle of construction that the words in a statute are designedly used, and an interpretation must be avoided, which would render the provision either nugatory or part thereof otiose [Ref: N.S. Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes (LexisNexis), Eleventh Edition (At pages 160-161)]. The intention of the legislature must be primarily ascertained from the language used. This obviously means, as a general rule, that the courts have no power to add to, or to “Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan through its President v. Federation of Pakistan, Islamabad and others” (PLD 2024 SC 1199), "Capital view Point Restaurant (La Montanai, Islamabad v. Capital Development Authority through Chairman, Islamabad and others" (2024 SCMR 2010). "Shahtaj Sugor Mills Ltd and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others” (2024 SCMR 1656) & "Muhammad Azam and others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Home Department and others” (2026 SCMR 769).

2024 SCMR 430.

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change, alter, or eliminate the words which the legislature has incorporated in a statute, not even in order to provide for certain contingencies which the legislature failed to meet, or to avoid hardship flowing from the language used, or to advance the remedy of the statute. But, as a rule of thumb, it should always be kept in mind that full effect should be given to every word of the statute, if at all possible; that the court should always seek to harmonize and make every part of the statute operative. In other words, no part of a statute, whether it be a sentence, clause, phrase, or word, should be considered as mere surplusage or as devoid of meaning, if it can possibly be avoided. Words may be disregarded only in order to conform with or to effectuate the legislative intent, and not to alter or change it [Ref: Crawford's Statutory Construction, 1998 Edition (At pages 337-338)].

10.So for all practical purposes, the courts, while dealing with and deciding cases involving the right of pre- emption, must consider, painstakingly and sequentially, the tendering of each of the demands or talbs to reach a just and proper conclusion. In other words, the court must determine whether the pre-emptor, before approaching the court of law, complied with all the requisite formalities at his end which are conditions precedent for the institution of a suit. The keywords, "meeting", "sitting", and the word "(majlis)" enclosed in parentheses brought into play under section 13 of the 1987 Act are defined in different lexicons as under:-

Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Volume 27 (At page 4)

A "meeting" is an assembling of a number of persons for purpose of discussing and acting upon some matter or matters in which they have a common interest. American Brass Co. v. Ansonia Brass Workers' Union or conduct of Local 445, Intern. Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers, 101 A.2d 291, 293, 140 Conn. 457

Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (Third Edition), Volume 3 (At page 2968)

"Meeting" defined. The coming together of persons generally for common purpose or common consultation. An assembly.

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Meeting, in 32 and 33 Vict. c. 19 S. 4 (Stannaries), does not apply to acts done by a single person, as the prima facie meaning of the words is "the coming together of more than one person." Sharp v. Dawes

(1876) 2 OBD 29.

"The word 'Meeting' implies a concurrence, or coming face to face, of at least two persons." [(per Coleridge, C.J., Sharpe v. Dawes, 46 LJQB 104) "The term "meeting" connotes coming together of persons for certain purposes. It is a gathering of persons with a specific object in view." D.D. Didolkar v. Nagpur University, AIR 1976 Bom 276, For a meeting there must be at least two persons. The word 'prima facie' connotes coming together of persons for certain purpose. Awadhoot v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 28, 30.

For a meeting there must be at least two persons. It means a gathering of persons with a specific object. (Awadhesi Kisan Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 Mah LJ 689).

Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Volume 39 (At page 460)

"Sitting" in English law means a session or term of court; usually plural. People v. Higgins, 16 N. V.S.2d 302, 310, 173 Misc. 96.

Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Sixth Edition), Volume I (At pages 1680 and 1742) Majlis: [Origin Arabic: place of session, from jalasa, be seated] An assembly for discussion, a council; the Parliament of any various N. African or Middle Eastern countries, esp. Iran. Also, a reception room.

Meeting: 1. A private or (now often) public gathering or assembly of people for entertainment, discussion, legislation, etc., an assembly of people, esp. the Society of Friends, for worship; a Non-conformist congregation, esp. of the Society of Friends. Also,

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the people attending a meeting, collectively. 4. The junction, intersection, confluence, etc., of two or more things.

Merriam-Webster Dictionary (Online)

Majlis (noun): a council, assembly, or tribunal in North Africa or southwestern Asia. specifically: a house of parliament. [Ref: https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/majlis]

Dictionary.com (Online)

Majlis. (in Islamic countries). A public audience held by a chieftain, monarch, or other ruler to listen to the requests of the petitioners. A house of parliament. Ref: https://www.dictionary. com/browse/majlis] Majlis, a cultural and social space, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (Online)

Majlis are 'sitting places' where community members gather to discuss local events and issues, exchange news, receive guests, socialize and be entertained. The Majlis is where the community gathers to resolve problems, pay condolences and hold wedding receptions. [Ref: https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/majlis- a-cultural-and-social-space-01076]

11.It is quite significant to note that the word "majlis" under Section 13 of the 1987 Act has been used in parentheses (brackets) in juxtaposition with the words "sitting" and "meeting". The purpose of putting words in parentheses is to complement, or generally illustrate, explain, define, amplify or add an additional piece of information to the whole. It is also delineated as an explanatory or qualifying clause, sentence, or paragraph, inserted in another sentence, or in the course of a longer passage, without being grammatically connected with it. Punctuation marks can at times be used as an aid in the construction or interpretation of sentences. When a statute is cautiously punctuated and there is no uncertainty as to its meaning, it should be given due weight, but it cannot be permitted to control or regulate the natural and ordinary

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meaning of a statute. If the word used in the statute visibly provides a clue as to the legislative intent behind the provision, then it ought to be interpreted in harmony with the legislative intent; however any punctuation mark which is lacking consistency may be overlooked and marginalized, and will not be acknowledged or allowed to regulate the plain meaning of the text. In the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. and others v. Jindal Exports Lid. and others ((2011) 8 SCC. 333), the Supreme Court of India has discussed the interpretative value of parentheses in the following terms:

"36. The use of round brackets for putting words in parenthesis is not very common in legislation and this reminds us of the painful lament by Meredith, J. of the Patna High Court, who in 1948 dealing with a case said that "the 1940 Act contains examples of bad drafting which it would be hard to beat".

37.According to the New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 edition, brackets are used to enclose words or figures so as to separate them from the context. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Seventh edition defines "bracket" to mean "either of a pair of marks, () placed around extra information in a piece of writing or part of a problem in mathematics". The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 edition gives the meaning and use of parenthesis as:

Parenthesis-noun (pl. parentheses) a word, clause, or sentence inserted as an explanation or afterthought into a passage which is grammatically complete without it, in writing usually marked off by brackets, dashes, or commas.

38.The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, Seventh edition, defines the meaning of parenthesis as:

a word, sentence, etc. that is added to a speech or piece of writing, especially in order to give extra information. In writing. it is separated from rest of the text using brackets, commas or dashes.

39.The Complete Plain Words by Sir Ernest Gowers, 1986 revised edition by Sidney Green Baum and

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Janet Whitcut, gives the purpose of parenthesis as follows:

The purpose of a parenthesis is ordinarily to insert an illustration, explanation, definition, or additional piece of information of any sort into a sentence that is logically and grammatically complete without it. A parenthesis may be marked off by commas, dashes or brackets. The degree of interruption of the main sentence may vary from the almost imperceptible one of explanatory words in apposition, to the violent one of a separate sentence complete in itself.

40.The Merriam Webster Online Dictionary defines parenthesis as follows:

1.an amplifying or explanatory word, phrase, or sentence inserted in a passage from which it is usually set off by punctuation b: a remark or passage that departs from the theme of a discourse: digression

2.interlude, interval

3.one or both of the curved marks () used in writing and printing to enclose a parenthetical expression or to group a symbolic unit in a logical or mathematical expression

41.The Law Lexicon, The Encyclopedic Law Dictionary by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 2000 edition, defines parenthesis as under:

Parenthesis. a parenthesis is defined to be an explanatory or qualifying clause, sentence, or paragraph, inserted in another sentence, or in course of a longer passage, without being grammatically connected with it. (Cent. Dist.)

Parenthesis is used to limit, qualify or restrict the meaning of the sentence with which it is connected, and it may be designated by the use of commas, or by a dash, or by curved lines or brackets [53 Fed.81

(83); 3C, CA 440]".

According to the law, talb-e-muwathibat is required to be made by a pre-emptor in the "sitting or meeting (Majlis)" in which he gains knowledge of the sale, and the purpose of

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highlighting the dictionary meaning of the words "sitting", "meeting" and "(majlis)" is to accentuate its significance as a pre-condition for complying with the requirements of talb-e-muwathibat, therefore, it is obligatory for the Court to diligently examine whether the pre-conditions of talb-e- muwathibat have been fulfilled before the tendering of talb- e-ishhad.”

7.Before further discussion it is appropriate to reproduce the text of Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act, which is as under:- “13. Demand of pre-emption.— (1) The right of pre- emption of a person shall be extinguished unless such person makes demands of pre-emption in the following orders, namely:-

(a)'Talb-i-Muwathibat';

(b)'Talb-i-Ishhad'; and

(c)'Talb-i-Khusumat'.

Explanation.— (1) ‘Talb-i-Muwathibať means immediate demand by a pre-emptor in the sitting or meeting (Majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale, declaring his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption.

Note. Any words indicative of intention to exercise the right of pre-emption are sufficient.

(II)'Talb-i-Ishhad" means demand by establishing evidence.

(III)'Talb-i-Khusumať means demand by filing a suit.

(2)When the fact of sale comes within the knowledge of a pre-emptor through any source, he shall make Talb-i-Muwathibat.

(3)Where a pre-emptor has made Talb-i-Muwathibat under subsection (2), he shall as soon thereafter as possible but not later than two weeks from the date of knowledge make Talb-i-Ishhad by sending a notice in writing attested by two truthful witnesses, under registered cover

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acknowledgement due, to the. vendee, confirming his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption:

Provided that in areas where owing to lack of post office facilities it is not possible for the pre-emptor to give registered what notice. he may make Talb-i-Ishhad in the presence of two truthful witnesses.

(4)Where a pre-emptor has satisfied the requirements of Talb-i-Muwathibat under subsection (2), and Talb-i-Ishhad under subsection (3) he shall make Talb- i-Khusumat in the Court of competent jurisdiction to enforce his right of pre-emption.”

8.When the provisions of Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act are read in juxtaposition with the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Amanullah’s case (2024 SCMR 430) and Full Bench of this Court, it becomes manifest that the demand of Talb-i- Muwathibat is required to be made by the pre-emptor in the sitting, meeting or Majlis in which he receives information regarding the sale of the pre-empted property, coupled with an immediate declaration of his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. Thus, the existence of a Majlis, in the sense of a gathering comprising more than one person, at the time when the information of sale is conveyed to the pre-emptor, constitutes an essential prerequisite for a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in its authoritative pronouncement, has expressly delineated the concept of Majlis as a gathering of more than one person; consequently, the requirement cannot be dispensed with where the statutory demand is sought to be established on the basis of information received from an informer.

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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9.In all the cases under consideration, it is an admitted position that the respective pre-emptors/plaintiffs were sitting alone when the informer conveyed to them the information regarding the sale of the pre-empted property. In such circumstances, the essential requirement of a Majlis was conspicuously absent. Since Talb-i- Muwathibat is required to be made in the very sitting, meeting or Majlis wherein the pre-emptor is present and in which the information of sale is received, the alleged demand made by a pre-emptor while sitting alone cannot, in law, constitute a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat merely joining of the informer to him. The requirement contemplates the presence of a gathering of more than one person before whom the pre-emptor, immediately upon receiving information of the sale, manifests his intention to exercise the right of pre-emption. Accordingly, the demand allegedly made by the plaintiffs in isolation, without the existence of such a Majlis, does not satisfy the mandatory statutory requirement.

10.Once it is held that the requirement of Majlis is an essential and mandatory component of Talb-i-Muwathibat, the inevitable consequence is that the alleged demand made by each of the plaintiffs/appellants/petitioners, while sitting alone and upon receiving information of the sale from the informer, cannot be treated as a valid statutory demand within the contemplation of Section 13(1) of the Pre- emption Act. The defect is not merely technical or procedural in nature;

rather, it goes to the root of the right claimed by the plaintiffs, because

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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compliance with the successive demands prescribed by Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act is a condition precedent to the subsistence and enforcement of the right of pre-emption.

11.It is significant that the statute employs the expression “in the sitting or meeting (Majlis) in which he has come to know of the sale”. The legislative command, therefore, attaches the requirement of Majlis to the very occasion on which knowledge of the sale is acquired.

The Court cannot substitute a different occasion, subsequent gathering or later presence of another person for the statutory sitting or meeting in which the knowledge was acquired. Likewise, the Court cannot dilute the expression “sitting or meeting (Majlis)” by treating the solitary presence of the pre-emptor as sufficient, particularly when the authoritative interpretation placed upon the provision by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has settled the controversy.

12.The argument that the presence of the informer and the pre- emptor may itself constitute a Majlis is, in view of the law now authoritatively settled, no longer available. The Larger Bench has expressly taken note of the binding pronouncement in Amanullah’s case (2024 SCMR 430), and has held that the question regarding the meaning and scope of Majlis under Section 13(1) of the Pre-emption Act stands conclusively settled. This Court, being bound by the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 189 of the Constitution and a Full Bench judgment, is not at liberty to revive or prefer an earlier divergent

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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interpretation merely because such interpretation had previously been adopted by a Single Bench or a Division Bench.

13.The earlier judgments relied upon by the

plaintiffs/appellants/petitioners, including “Ghulam Muhammad and another v. Mian Abdul Karim through LRs” (PLJ 2014 Lahore 16 = 2014 YLR 774) and “Muhammad Riaz through Special Attorney v.

Ghulam Hussain through Legal Heirs” (2016 YLR 56), must, therefore, yield to the subsequent authoritative pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court followed by Full Bench of this Court. To the extent that the said judgments proceeded on an interpretation inconsistent with the law declared in Amanullah’s case, they cannot furnish a legal basis for granting relief in the present matters.

14.The principle is equally applicable to the cases where the plaintiffs seek to rely upon the fact that the demand was immediately announced after receiving information of the sale. Immediacy, though undoubtedly an essential feature of Talb-i-Muwathibat, cannot by itself cure the absence of another statutory requirement expressly incorporated in Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act. The requirement is not merely that the pre-emptor should make an immediate declaration; it is that such immediate declaration should be made in the sitting or meeting (Majlis) in which he receives knowledge of the sale. Thus, an immediate demand made in circumstances not constituting a Majlis does not become legally sufficient merely because it was made without delay.

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

Civil Revision No.1888/2012 R. S. A. No. 67 of 2014 Civil Revision No.2885/2014 Civil Revision No.2886/2014

15.The submission that a strict construction of Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act may operate harshly against a pre-emptor also cannot persuade this Court. The right of pre-emption is a statutory right and can be enforced only in the manner prescribed by the statute. The Court is required to give effect to the legislative language and cannot, under the guise of advancing the remedy or avoiding hardship, omit a condition expressly incorporated by the legislature. Where the legislature has prescribed the manner in which the right is to be asserted, substantial compliance cannot be substituted for compliance with a condition which goes to the very foundation of the claim.

16.Applying the above principles to the individual cases, it is apparent that no case has been made out for interference with the judgments and decrees impugned before this Court. In Civil Revision No.904/2014, the learned lower appellate Court correctly found that the requirement of Talb-i-Muwathibat had not been fulfilled because the petitioner was alone when informed of the sale and allegedly announced his intention to pre-empt. The subsequent presence of the informer, could not retrospectively convert the earlier solitary occasion into the statutory Majlis. Consequently, the conclusion of the learned appellate Court below calls for no interference.

17.In Regular Second Appeal No.198/2010, although the learned trial Court had partially decreed the suit to the extent of one-half

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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of the suit property, both parties preferred appeals and the learned appellate Court dismissed both appeals. Since the foundational requirement of a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat was not established in accordance with Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act, the partial decree could not confer upon the appellant a legally enforceable right contrary to the statutory scheme. The judgments and decrees of the learned Courts below to the extent of one half of the suit property are not sustainable, hence, the appellant’s suit is dismissed as a whole.

18.In Civil Revision No.1888/2012, the learned trial Court dismissed the suit after recording evidence and hearing the parties, and the learned appellate Court affirmed that determination. The concurrent findings demonstrate that the plaintiff failed to establish a valid Talb-i- Muwathibat. No misreading or non-reading of material evidence, nor any jurisdictional defect, has been demonstrated so as to justify exercise of revisional jurisdiction.

19.The same conclusion follows in Regular Second Appeal No.67/2014. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit after full-fledged trial and the learned appellate Court, upon independent appraisal of the matter, maintained the dismissal. Once the statutory condition precedent embodied in Section 13 remained unfulfilled, the dismissal of the suit was the necessary legal consequence. The appellant has not been able to point out any substantial question of law arising from the concurrent

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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judgments which could justify interference in second appellate jurisdiction.

20.Civil Revision Nos.2885/2014 and 2886/2014 stand on no different footing. In both matters, the suits for possession by way of pre- emption were dismissed by the learned trial Court and the respective appeals were also dismissed. The petitioners have failed to identify any illegality, material irregularity, jurisdictional defect or perversity in the concurrent findings of the Courts below. The revisional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be invoked merely to obtain a reappraisal of evidence or a different factual conclusion, particularly where the findings are consistent with the governing statutory provision and the binding interpretation thereof.

21.It is also well settled that a concurrent finding of fact, particularly one founded upon appreciation of evidence recorded by the trial Court and affirmed by the appellate Court, is not ordinarily open to interference in revisional jurisdiction unless the finding is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, based upon misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or otherwise suffers from an error of law or jurisdiction. No such infirmity has been established in any of the connected revisions. On the contrary, the findings of the Courts below are fully consistent with the legal position now conclusively settled by the Larger Bench in the light of Amanullah’s case.

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

Civil Revision No.1888/2012 R. S. A. No. 67 of 2014 Civil Revision No.2885/2014 Civil Revision No.2886/2014

22.Similarly, in the Regular Second Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is not that of a third Court of facts. Interference can be warranted only where a question of law contemplated by the applicable provisions governing second appeal arises for determination. In the present matters, the legal controversy concerning the expression Majlis has already been conclusively settled by the Larger Bench in conformity with the binding judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Once the admitted factual position is tested against that settled law, no legally sustainable ground remains which could warrant reversal of the judgments and decrees under challenge.

23.An additional consideration which reinforces the above conclusion is that the pre-emptors were required to establish compliance with the statutory sequence of demands before invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act expressly provides that the right of pre-emption shall be extinguished unless the demands are made in the prescribed order, namely, Talb-i-Muwathibat, Talb-i-Ishhad and Talb-i-Khusumat. Failure at the first stage consequently prevents the pre-emptor from deriving any enforceable right from the subsequent stages. The institution of a suit cannot cure an invalid or non-existent Talb-i-Muwathibat.

24.This Court is conscious that the conclusions reached herein may result in the loss of a substantive claim asserted by the plaintiffs/appellants/petitioners. Nevertheless, the Court cannot extend a

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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statutory right beyond the conditions imposed by the legislature. Equity and sympathy cannot prevail over an express statutory command, particularly where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has already authoritatively interpreted the provision and the Larger Bench of this Court has applied that interpretation to the precise controversy arising before it.

25.In view of the above, I find that the

plaintiffs/appellants/petitioners in all the connected matters failed to establish compliance with the mandatory requirement of Talb-i- Muwathibat under Section 13 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1991. The alleged declaration of intention, having been made while the respective pre-emptors were sitting alone and in the absence of a Majlis as contemplated by the statute and authoritatively interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, was legally insufficient. The subsequent proceedings could not revive or validate the extinguished right of pre- emption. Consequently, the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Courts below are found to be in accordance with law and do not suffer from any illegality, material irregularity, misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, or error of jurisdiction warranting interference by this Court. The conclusions reached by the learned Courts below are, in the circumstances, fully sustainable. Resultantly, Civil Revision No.904/2014, Civil Revision No.1888/2012, Regular Second Appeal No.67/2014, Civil Revision No.2885/2014 and Civil Revision

R. S. A. No. 198 of 2010.

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No.2886/2014 are all dismissed. Regular Second Appeal No.198/2010 is also dismissed by dismissing the appellant’s suit for possession through pre-emption as the requirement of a valid Talb-i-Muwathibat was not established in accordance with Section 13 of the Pre-emption Act, 1991.

No order as to costs.

(AHMAD NADEEM ARSHAD)

JUDGE

Announced in open Court on ______________.

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

Gull*