Nizam Ud Din vs Khursheed Begum

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH

MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.1122-D of 2018

Nizam-ud-Din (deceased) through LRs, etc.

Versus Mst. Khursheed Begum, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 12.10.2026.

Petitioners by: Syed Tajammal Hussain Bukhari, Advocate.

Respondents by: Syed Hammad Raza Bukhari (for respondent No.1) Mr. Khalil ur Rehman Mayo, Advocate (for respondents No.2 to 13).

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- Through instant revision petition, petitioners have assailed the judgments and decrees dated 12.10.2011 and 29.06.2018, passed by learned Civil Judge and Addl. District Judge, Multan, respectively, whereby the suit for possession and declaration filed by the respondent No.1, was concurrently decreed.

2.Respondent No.1 sued Nizam-ud-Din, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, in respect of a house measuring 08 Marlas 221⁄2 yards, bearing property No.566-67, Ward No.8 (full description is given in headnote of the plaint), Tehsil & District Multan. Her case is that Malik Sajawal, the original owner of 25 marlas, sold 20 marlas to Ghaus Bakhsh and 05 marlas to Rajan Shah through registered sale deed No.634 dated 17.04.1956. In 1958, Rajan Shah sold his 05 marlas to Muhammad Ramzan, father of Ghaus Bakhsh, through registered sale deed No.1143. The property devolved upon Ghaus Bakhsh and, after his death, respondent No.1 purchased 08 Marlas 221⁄2 yards from his widow, Mst.

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Salima Begum, and the other legal heirs through registered sale deed No.9295 dated 21.11.1995. Out of that house, the petitioners’ predecessor occupied 06 marlas as a tenant, first of Muhammad Ramzan under a rent deed dated 01.06.1986 and then of Mst. Salima Begum under a rent deed dated 23.04.1988, registered with the Excise and Taxation Office. After her purchase, respondent No.1 served notices dated 08.12.1995 and 02.01.1996 under section 13-A of the Rent Restriction Ordinance and then instituted an ejectment petition, while the petitioners’ predecessor filed a suit for declaration. On the statements of the parties, the ejectment petition was adjourned sine die on 08.10.1996, and respondent No.1 thereafter filed the present suit. The petitioners’ predecessor contested it through a written statement. After recording evidence, the learned trial Court decreed the suit on 12.10.2011, and the learned appellate Court maintained the decree on 29.06.2018. Hence, this revision petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the suit property forms part of Abadi Deh and could not lawfully be transferred through a registered sale deed or mutation. He further submits that the suit was barred under Order XIII Rule 1 CPC and by limitation. He contends that the learned Courts below failed to appreciate the relevant legal provisions and material aspects of the case, thereby rendering the impugned judgments and decrees unsustainable.

4.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned judgments and decrees and submits that the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are based on the evidence available on the record and call for no interference.

5.Arguments heard. Available record perused.

6.The following questions arise for determination: (i) whether respondent No.1 established a better title to the suit property in the face of the plea that it forms part of Abadi Deh, the competing chains of title and the unregistered receipt (Exh. D.8); (ii) whether the suit property has been properly identified; (iii) whether the suit was maintainable before the Civil Court; and (iv) whether the suit was barred by limitation or the

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petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest had acquired a right by adverse possession.

A. TITLE OF RESPONDENT NO.1

7.The principal contention of the petitioners is that the suit property forms part of Abadi Deh and was not transferable through a registered sale deed or mutation. The burden of establishing the factual and legal basis of this objection rested upon the petitioners, who asserted the existence of such a restriction, in terms of Article 117 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984. However, no notification, revenue entry or other admissible material has been identified to establish that the suit property was subject to a legal prohibition on transfer. Conversely, the Fard Jus Malkiyat (Exh. P.5), the PT-1 record (Exh. P.14) and the municipal record relating to Property No.566-67/W.8 show that the property falls within municipal limits and is assessed to property tax. Although municipal inclusion and assessment to tax do not, by themselves, establish ownership or transferability, the petitioners’ mere assertion of a legal restriction, unsupported by relevant evidence, is insufficient to displace the documentary chain of title relied upon by respondent No.1. Moreover, the petitioners’ own case rests upon a receipt of 1965 purporting to transfer the same property. Their reliance upon that document sits uneasily with their contention that the property was legally incapable of transfer.

8.The documentary chain relied upon by respondent No.1 originates from Malik Sajawal and proceeds through registered sale deeds No.634 dated 17.04.1956 and No.1143 executed in 1958, followed by the devolution of the property upon Ghaus Bakhsh and his legal heirs. Respondent No.1 claims through registered sale deed No.9295 dated 21.11.1995. In contrast, the petitioners rely upon an unregistered sale receipt dated 10.11.1965 (Exh. D.8), allegedly executed by Rajan Shah. The record, however, shows that Rajan Shah had already transferred his 05 Marlas through registered sale deed No.1143 in 1958. Consequently, the principle nemo dat quod non habet applies: a person cannot convey a title that he no longer possesses. On the documentary record presented,

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Rajan Shah could not confer upon the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest a better title than he himself retained.

9.Exh. D.8 is also deficient in law. Under section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of tangible immovable property of the prescribed value can be effected only through a registered instrument, while a contract for sale does not, by itself, create an interest in or charge upon the property. Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 prescribes compulsory registration for instruments falling within its scope, and section 49 restricts the legal effect of an instrument that requires registration but remains unregistered. Accordingly, an unregistered receipt purporting to effect a sale cannot, by itself, transfer ownership of the immovable property. Reference may be made to Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Mst. Baseerat and others (2017 SCMR 367). The legal effect of a registered conveyance and the limits of revisional interference with concurrent findings were also considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in Muhammad Ahmed Shaikh and others v. Shabbir Ahmed (2025 SCMR 1670). The principles emerging from these authorities reinforce the distinction between a registered instrument conveying title in accordance with law and an unregistered document that, by itself, cannot effect a transfer of ownership. Even if Exh. D.8 were assumed to be genuine, it would not establish ownership in favour of the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest. Furthermore, the subsequent execution of registered rent deeds in 1986 and 1988 in favour of the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest by persons claiming through the competing chain of title materially undermines the assertion that ownership had already been acquired under the receipt of 1965. These documents are relevant both to the competing claims of title and to the plea of adverse possession, which is considered separately below.

B. IDENTITY OF THE SUIT PROPERTY

10.The petitioners contend that the property in their possession is distinct from the property purchased by respondent No.1 through registered sale deed No.9295/1 (Exh. P.2). The record, however, does not support this contention. In their earlier suit for declaration (Exh. P.8), the

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petitioners themselves referred to Property No.566-67/W.8. The cross- examination of witnesses from their side also contains admissions regarding the common property number, the contiguity of the properties and the electricity connection that remained in the name of Ghaus Bakhsh for a considerable period. In this regard, Umar Gul v. Dr. Hafiza Akhtar and others (2025 SCMR 544) reiterates that utility bills, by themselves, do not establish ownership of immovable property. In the present case, the electricity connection is relied upon only as corroborative material concerning the identity and historical use of the property, and not as an independent source of title. These admissions, considered alongside the title documents, property description and municipal record, support the conclusion that the parties were referring to the same property. The petitioners have not produced sufficient evidence to displace that conclusion. The concurrent finding of the learned Courts below on the identity of the suit property, therefore, does not call for interference.

C. MAINTAINABILITY OF THE SUIT

11.The record indicates that the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest entered into possession as a tenant under registered rent deeds. Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 embodies the principle that a tenant of immovable property cannot, during the continuance of the tenancy, deny that the landlord had title to the property at the commencement of the tenancy. Reference may be made to Muhammad Iqbal Haider and another v. Vth Rent Controller/Senior Civil Judge, Karachi Central and others (2009 SCMR 1396). The Honourable Supreme Court, in Nawab Khan and another v. Muhammad Yousaf and others (2026 SCMR 717), reiterated that a tenant who continues to retain possession under the tenancy cannot, during its continuance, deny the landlord’s title merely by asserting a subsequent claim of ownership. The principle is founded upon Article 115 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, and prevents a tenant from approbating and reprobating simultaneously. In the present case, the rent deeds executed in 1986 and 1988 are, therefore, material evidence against the petitioners’

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predecessor-in-interest’s assertion that he had acquired ownership under the receipt of 1965. Where a bona fide question of title arises that cannot be determined by the Rent Controller in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, the Civil Court remains competent to adjudicate the question of title and, where established, grant consequential relief. Reference may be made to Rehmatullah v. Ali Muhammad and another (1983 SCMR 1064) and Afzal Ahmad Qureshi v. Mursaleen (2001 SCMR 1434). The earlier ejectment proceedings, which were adjourned sine die on the statements of the parties, did not, in the circumstances of this case, extinguish respondent No.1’s civil remedy. The suit was, therefore, maintainable before the Civil Court.

12.The procedural objections raised by the petitioners do not advance their case. Order XIII Rule 1 CPC concerns the production of documentary evidence at the prescribed stage of the proceedings; it does not, by itself, create a bar to the institution or maintainability of a suit. Moreover, the record does not indicate that a timely objection was raised to the admissibility of respondent No.1’s documents when they were tendered in evidence. If the petitioners intended to rely upon Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC, that provision concerns the withdrawal of suits and the institution of fresh suits in the circumstances specified therein. The ejectment petition was not withdrawn as a suit; rather, it was adjourned sine die on the statements of the parties. Nor did that proceeding determine the question of title now in issue. Accordingly, neither of the aforementioned provisions furnishes a basis for holding the present suit to be barred. In Sohail Islam v. Saadullah Khan (2026 SCMR 757), the Honourable Supreme Court considered the bar arising from the withdrawal of an earlier civil suit without permission to institute a fresh suit. The principle does not render the present suit barred, as the earlier proceeding was an ejectment petition that was adjourned sine die on the statements of the parties and was neither a civil suit withdrawn simpliciter nor a suit in which permission to institute fresh proceedings was refused.

C.R. No.1122-D of 2018

D. LIMITATION AND ADVERSE POSSESSION

13.The plea of limitation must be considered in light of the nature of the relief sought and the petitioners’ claim of adverse possession. Respondent No.1 acquired title through the registered sale deed dated 21.11.1995 and instituted the present suit on 17.06.2002. The petitioners’ claim that the suit was nevertheless time-barred substantially rests upon the assertion that their predecessor-in-interest had been in adverse possession since 1965. To establish adverse possession, the person asserting it must prove possession that was open, continuous and hostile to the true owner, accompanied by the requisite intention to possess adversely (animus possidendi), from an identifiable date and for the full statutory period. Mere long possession does not, by itself, establish such a claim. Possession originating as a tenancy is permissive and cannot become adverse unless the tenant unequivocally repudiates the landlord’s title and that repudiation is brought to the landlord’s knowledge. Here, the execution of rent deeds in 1986 and 1988 is inconsistent with the assertion that the petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest had been openly asserting hostile ownership since 1965. The petitioners have not established when or in what manner the alleged tenancy was repudiated, nor have they proved the requisite hostile possession for the statutory period. Their plea of adverse possession, therefore, fails. The objection as to limitation also cannot succeed merely on the basis of the unsubstantiated assertion of possession since 1965.

CONCLUSION

14.For the foregoing reasons, respondent No.1 has established a better title to the suit property through the documentary chain relied upon by her, while the petitioners have failed to establish a superior title, a legally sustainable restriction on transfer, misidentification of the suit property, or the pleaded bar of limitation or adverse possession. The concurrent findings recorded by the learned Courts below are supported by the evidence discussed above. The petitioners have not demonstrated any misreading or non-reading of material evidence, perversity, error of law or material irregularity warranting interference in the exercise of

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revisional jurisdiction under section 115 CPC. The limits of revisional jurisdiction were reiterated by the Honourable Supreme Court in Pir Shah Abdul Haq (deceased) through L.Rs. and another v. Muhammad Irfan and others (2026 SCMR 1019), wherein it was held that concurrent findings cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless they suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity or a material legal defect. Similarly, in Muhammad Ahmed Shaikh and others v. Shabbir Ahmed (2025 SCMR 1670), the Supreme Court disapproved interference with concurrent findings in the absence of a legally sustainable basis. In the present case, no such infirmity has been demonstrated.

15.Consequently, this revision petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

Judge

*Sultan / Waseem.*