Raja Shahid Vs The State etc

Stereo HCJDA-38

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Crl. Appeal No.27357 of 2024 Raja Shahid vs The State, etc.

JUDGMENT

Dates of hearing 09.09.2026, 22.09.2026 & 28.09.2026. Accused/appellant Hafiz Israr-ul-Haq and Farhan Tariq Butt, by: Advocates.

State by: Mr. Muhammad Irfan Sadiq Tarrar, Prosecutor General, Punjab, with Dr. Usman Iqbal, Deputy Prosecutor General.

Dr. Muhammad Amjad, Director General, Punjab Forensic Science Authority (PFSA), with Hammad, Section Supervisor AV Department, PFSA, Sabir Saqlain, legal Advisor, Huma Rizvi, Forensic Scientist, and Arslan Nawaz, Law Officer, PFSA.

Ms. Asmat Parveen, District Public Prosecutor.

Ms. Noshe Malik Deputy Prosecutor General.

Ms. Sheeba Qaiser, ASC as amicus curiae.

Mr. Naveed Umar Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutor General as amicus curiae.

Complainant by: Sardar Rashid Shakeel and Ch. Sajid Ali Bul, Advocates.

MUHAMMAD AMJAD RAFIQ, J:- On March 30, 2024, the Additional Sessions Judge in Lahore convicted Raja Shahid under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 (“PPC”) in case FIR No.2162/2022 dated 19.09.2022 registered under Sections 302, 394, 34, 109 PPC (Police Station Mughalpura), sentencing him to imprisonment for life as Ta’zir. He was also ordered to pay Rs.300,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs under Section 544A of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (“Cr.P.C.”), with an additional six months of simple imprisonment in default and was granted the benefit of Section 382B Cr.P.C. His co-accused, Arab Nabi alias Arif Khan, Naseeb Dolat Shah alias Billu Pathan, and Irfan alias Malang, were acquitted of all charges.

The titled criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused/appellant to assail his above conviction and sentence.

2.According to the prosecution, on September 18, 2022, Arif Pathan and Billu Pathan picked up the victim, Rana Muhammad Naeem Qaiser, from his house on a motorcycle. As they traveled a short distance, in front of house of Raja shahid where Raja Zahid Ali raised a lalkara calling for the victim's death, prompting Raja Shahid Ali to shoot repeatedly Naeem Qaiser in the head, proving fatal. Following the shooting, the co-accused fled, and Raja Shahid along with an unknown escaped with the victim's motorcycle, mobile phone, and purse, driven by a motive rooted in a previous altercation between the victim and Raja Shahid on September 15, 2022.

3.Following the investigation, a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. was submitted to the trial court, where the accused were formally charge-sheeted. They denied the charges and claimed trial. The prosecution presented its evidence, following which the appellant was examined under Section 342 Cr.P.C. He chose neither to testify on oath as required under Section 340(2) Cr.P.C. nor to produce any defence evidence, concluding the trial and leading to his aforementioned conviction and sentence.

4.Learned Counsel (s) for the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to substantiate the charge and that the eyewitnesses were not actually present at the scene. Furthermore, while a video of the incident was played in Court, it was done merely with controlled frames of court’s choice rather than being formally proved through relevant witnesses as required for documentary evidence. Counsel contended that the appellant's facial features are not discernible in the video, and that the footage actually serves to establish the absence of the alleged eyewitnesses from the scene of the occurrence.

The District Public Prosecutor stated that the trial court noted the absence of the witnesses within the video frames and that the appellant was never formally confronted with the video during the trial.

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Furthermore, the State acknowledged that the visibility of the appellant's facial features in the footage is very weak. However, the prosecution maintained that despite these gaps in the video evidence, the eyewitness testimonies should be independently evaluated to establish their actual presence at the scene, which formed the basis of the trial court's conviction.

5.Heard. Record perused.

6.While the learned trial Court appears to have accepted the presence of the prosecution witnesses at the place of occurrence and, on that basis, recorded the conviction of the accused/appellant, the video footage produced and played before the trial court presents a fundamentally different narrative. The said footage was specifically confronted to the complainant during cross-examination with controlled questions; however, neither the complainant nor any of the other prosecution witnesses could be seen anywhere in the video throughout the relevant period. The only person who appeared at a later stage was a young girl who arrived after the incident had concluded and merely observed the dead body of the deceased when all alleged assailants had already departed from the scene. Although it was suggested to the complainant that the said girl was his daughter, he denied the suggestion.

In these circumstances, the pivotal question arises as to how the learned trial Court could have safely relied upon the ocular account of the prosecution witnesses and convicted the accused/appellant when the very video evidence, an independent piece of contemporaneous evidence, failed to establish their presence at the scene of occurrence. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that where objective and scientific evidence contradicts the ocular version, the Court is under a legal obligation to examine such inconsistency with utmost caution and to extend the benefit of doubt where the prosecution case becomes doubtful. Furthermore, the video lacked sufficient facial detail and clarity, the learned trial Court neither undertook any judicial comparison of the body structure, gait, facial features, or any other distinguishing characteristics of the persons appearing in the video with those of the Page 3 of 30

accused/appellant, nor was the accused/appellant specifically confronted with the incriminating contents of the footage in the manner required by law so as to enable him to furnish an effective explanation. Instead, only a general and omnibus question was put to him in his statement recorded under Section 342 Cr.P.C. i.e. “What do you say about the video evidence?” Such a vague and non-specific confrontation falls short of the mandatory requirement that every material piece of incriminating evidence must be separately and fairly put to the accused before it can be relied upon against him.

7.The circumstances of the case, therefore, cast a solemn duty upon this Court, in the interest of substantial justice, to ensure that all legal requirements are fully satisfied before affirming a conviction carrying serious penal consequences. To achieve this objective, the Court may exercise its lawful powers to seek clarification from the prosecution witnesses and the accused/appellant, record additional evidence, obtain expert forensic assistance for identification of the persons appearing in the footage, or direct enhancement and scientific examination of the video footage so that its evidentiary value may be accurately assessed. Unless such deficiencies are addressed, reliance upon the impugned conviction would be contrary to the settled principles governing proof beyond reasonable doubt and the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial. Having reviewed the video evidence at the request of the learned prosecutor, this Court found it imperative to seek specialized legal assistance to ensure a just resolution. Accordingly, the Court issued the following order:"

09.09.2026. Hafiz Israr ul Haq, Advocate for the appellant. Ms. Asmat Parveen, District Public Prosecutor.

Sardar Rashid Shakeel, Advocate for the complainant.

In the present case, video evidence available on the record was sought by the learned Prosecutor to be examined in open Court. Learned counsel for the accused/appellant raised no objection to the request made by the learned Prosecutor. Accordingly, the parcel containing the USB was de-sealed, and the video footage was played and examined in open Court, whereafter the USB was re-sealed. Upon examination, it was observed that the occurrence relating to the murder of the deceased had been captured by a CCTV camera Page 4 of 30

installed in the street at the crime scene. The footage, to some extent, depicts the manner in which the occurrence took place and also shows the persons who allegedly fired upon the deceased; however, their facial features are not discernible. The learned Trial Court also noticed this aspect of the video evidence in its judgment. However, neither was the accused/appellant confronted with the said video evidence nor was the Investigating Officer directed to explain the circumstances surrounding the place of occurrence, including the location and house of the accused/appellant. The video footage, notwithstanding the fact that it captures the episode of the murder of the deceased, constitutes an important piece of evidence and, therefore, cannot be disregarded or allowed to escape judicial scrutiny, therefore, in order to properly appreciate the evidentiary value, admissibility, mode of appreciation, and legal consequences of the aforesaid video evidence, certain questions of law arise for consideration and require authoritative determination. Accordingly, the following questions are framed for assistance of the Court and for assessing the evidentiary value of the video evidence and its appropriate use in the adjudication of the case:

1.What is the minimum legal requirement for admissibility of PFSA-certified untampered CCTV footage from a privately installed local camera?

2.If the trial court, after playing the footage in open court, fails to confront the accused or witnesses for clarification, can the appellate court resume proceedings by calling them?

3.If done, would it amount to taking additional evidence under Section 428 Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 or merely an inquiry enabling the court to treat it as evidence for verdict on observed facts?

4.If the footage lacks clear facial features of the accused, can it be pixel-enhanced by expert re-examination in open court (Trial or High Court), and if not, what alternative exists?

5.For confirming allied facts in the video, can the court inspect the crime scene and interview locals under Section 539B Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, and may it delegate this function to a commission?

6.If video evidence excludes witnesses from the crime scene, can conviction rest solely on video by rejecting their testimony, especially after the 2023 amendment to Article 164 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984?

The questions formulated above involve intricate and important questions concerning the admissibility, authentication, appreciation, forensic enhancement, and evidentiary use of electronic and video evidence, as well as the scope of the Court's powers at the trial and appellate stages. The assistance of learned counsel having expertise in the relevant fields would, therefore, facilitate the Court in arriving at an appropriate determination. Accordingly, Ms. Sheeba Qaiser, Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan, and Mr. Muhammad Naveed Umar Bhatti, learned Deputy Prosecutor General, Punjab, are appointed as amici curiae to assist the Court on the aforesaid questions of law. Let notices also be issued to the learned Prosecutor General, Punjab, and the Director Page 5 of 30

General, Punjab Forensic Science Authority (PFSA), who shall join the proceedings and assist the Court, particularly on the questions falling within their respective areas of expertise. Relist on Submissions by the amici curiae

8.Prosecutor General Punjab, Mr. Irfan Sadiq Tarar, urged that the Court should have directly confronted both the prosecution witnesses and the accused with the video footage to clarify identities and facts. Citing “BABAR RASOOL through Special Attorney versus ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SARGODHA and 2 others” (2024 YLR 265), he maintained that summoning them for visual clarification does not constitute recording fresh evidence under Section 428 Cr.P.C. unless new, unresolved testimony is strictly required. Furthermore, referencing “WASEEM HASSAN KHAN versus The STATE and another” (2026 SCMR 308), he emphasized that while appellate courts can record such evidence themselves or direct a subordinate court to do so, they are barred from disposing of an appeal by simply remanding the case for that purpose.

8.1. Addressing the admissibility of private CCTV footage, he noted that under “ISHTIAQ AHMED MIRZA and 2 others versus FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN and others” (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 675), such recordings must clear a stringent two-fold test: proving their source and acquisition method, alongside forensic confirmation of zero tampering (Ahmad Omar Sheikh, 2021 SCMR 873; Zahir Zakir Jaffar, PLD 2026 SC 251). Once satisfied, the footage stands as authenticated primary evidence.

8.2. Turning to judicial powers, he emphasized via “ASFANDYAR and another versus KAMRAN and another” (2016 SCMR 2084) that a court's authority to conduct a local inspection is strictly personal and non-delegable. Finally, invoking the "silent witness theory" under Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 [“ZAHIR ZAKIR JAFFAR and 3 others versus The STATE and others” (PLD 2026 Supreme Court 251)], video remains a valid form of circumstantial Page 6 of 30

evidence. However, following “MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and another versus The STATE” (2025 SCMR 1742), if an accused's facial features are indistinguishable and enhancement fails, the court is legally bound to discard the video from consideration.

9.Dr. Muhammad Amjad, Director General of the Punjab Forensic Science Authority, explained in his written submissions that forensic enhancement is strictly limited to revealing details already present in the original recording, rather than generating new information. To achieve this, the PFSA relies on a suite of established techniques: adjusting contrast, brightness, gamma, and histogram equalization to uncover faint features; applying super-resolution to upgrade low-resolution visuals; utilizing sharpening and deconvolution to counteract motion or defocus blur; deploying noise reduction to clean grainy footage; using resampling and interpolation for enlargement; and executing frame averaging across multiple matching frames to optimize signal-to-noise ratios.

9.1. He further submitted that digital forensic procedures, such as image enhancement, pixel interpolation, and frame extraction, cannot be effectively or appropriately conducted in an open courtroom. Such complex examinations demand specialized equipment, validated scientific methodologies, controlled laboratory conditions, meticulous documentation, and strict adherence to standard operating procedures to preserve digital integrity. Consequently, this work must be performed within a controlled forensic environment, with the final enhanced output subsequently presented to the Court. He emphasized that the forensic analyst’s role is strictly confined to explaining their findings, methodologies, and limitations, rather than undertaking digital processing live during court proceedings.

9.2. He further opined that when facial features in video evidence are indistinct or of insufficient quality, the Court can evaluate a suspect's identity and involvement through a diverse range of alternative forensic and investigative methods. These include forensic facial comparison via morphological analysis, clothing and accessory comparison, Page 7 of 30

voice or audio comparison and speaker identification, behavioural and contextual analysis, mobile forensic examination of digital communications, DNA profiling, latent fingerprint examination, and polygraph examination as an investigative aid, all of which are fully available at the PFSA.

9.3. Additionally, alternative avenues include familiar-witness recognition, GPS and location-based evidence derived from call detail records and cell-site data, and direct comparison by the Court itself when image quality permits. However, he noted that certain advanced techniques, specifically gait analysis, photogrammetry for height comparison, and general body morphology and physical characteristics analysis, are currently beyond the PFSA's available capabilities.

9.4. He referred the case of “The State of Tamil Nadu v. Ponnusamy & Others” (2026 INSC 507), wherein the Supreme Court of India held that gait analysis is strictly corroborative rather than conclusive, as it can indicate physical similarities but cannot establish absolute identity. The Court emphasized that expert opinions on gait must rest on reliable, independently admissible source material, requiring a verified chain of custody for the underlying footage and transparent scientific methods, while the final decision on identity remains exclusively within the domain of the Court. Furthermore, reliance was also placed on the decision of the Appeal (Criminal Division), England and Wales, in “Elroy Otis Otway and Regina” [2011] EWCA Crim 3, (2) wherein CCTV footage, although insufficient for facial identification, was considered suitable for gait analysis. The Court accepted expert comparison of features such as head position, shoulder alignment, arm movement, spinal posture, and gait width, holding that discernible patterns of movement may retain forensic value despite the absence of clear facial imagery. It was accordingly submitted that where CCTV footage preserves identifiable physical characteristics, a qualified expert may undertake forensic comparison and place the results before the Court.

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9.5. However, Mr. Hammad, Section Supervisor of the AV Department at PFSA, testified that the video in question had already been examined and could not be enhanced further due to the recording's distant perspective. He further noted that the agency currently lacks the capability to conduct gait and body morphology analysis, making any additional comparison impossible.

10.Ms. Sheeba Qaiser, learned amicus curiae, submitted that the admissibility, authenticity, probative value, and sufficiency of CCTV footage are entirely distinct legal considerations. While forensic certification establishes that a recording is untampered, it does not automatically prove its source, time, location, continuity, or the identity of the persons depicted.

10.1. Drawing upon Articles 46A, 59, 73, and 164 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order 1984, alongside established jurisprudence “IMTIAZ alias TAJ versus The STATE and others” (2018 SCMR 344); “QADDAN and others versus The STATE” (2017 SCMR 148); “MUHAMMAD NAWAZ and others versus The STATE and others” (2016 SCMR 267), she emphasized that any incriminating material must be formally put to the accused under Section 342 Cr.P.C. Consequently, confronting an accused with CCTV footage at the appellate stage must strictly adhere to the safeguards of Sections 342 and 428 Cr.P.C. She clarified that introducing fresh oral testimony, expert opinions, enhanced footage, metadata, or foundational material constitutes additional evidence under Section 428, whereas a mere replay of an already proven exhibit does not.

10.2. On technical enhancements, she noted that scientific clarification of existing footage is permissible if the original material is preserved, the process is transparently documented, and the expert remains available for cross-examination. However, enhancements cannot lawfully create or reconstruct facial features never captured by the camera, and AI-based reconstruction should not be relied upon for identification unless scientifically validated. While a court's own Page 9 of 30

observation can aid in appreciation, it cannot substitute expert testimony on technical matters.

10.3. Regarding local inspections under Section 539B Cr.P.C, she asserted that such inspections are strictly meant to understand existing evidence and cannot be converted into a fresh investigation. Courts cannot privately interview residents, gather unsworn statements, or use private conversations against either party. Any local witness possessing relevant information must be examined on oath under Section 540 or, at the appellate stage, via Section 428, ensuring full opportunity for cross-examination. Furthermore, reaffirming “ASFANDYAR and another versus KAMRAN and another” (2016 SCMR 2084), she stressed that the power of local inspection is personal to the Court and non-delegable.

10.4. Finally, addressing the evidentiary weight of CCTV footage, she submitted that where faces are indiscernible, footage can establish the occurrence, time, place, manner, and assailant movements, but cannot independently prove identity without reliable corroboration. Conversely, a witness should not be disbelieved merely for missing a camera frame unless the footage conclusively proves their presence was impossible. Citing “MUHAMMAD RAMZAN and another versus The STATE” (2025 SCMR 1742) and “FAZAL MEHMOOD and another versus The STATE through P.G. Sindh and another” (2026 SCMR 350), she concluded that a conviction can rest on CCTV footage alone only when it independently establishes identity and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; if it falls short of this standard, a conviction cannot be sustained.

11.Advancing comparative jurisprudence, Mr. Naveed Umar Bhatti, DPG and amicus curiae, submitted that under the legal frameworks of Pakistan, England, and India (Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 675), Castle v Cross [1984] 1 WLR 1372, R v Spiby (1990) 91 Cr App R 186, Kajala v Noble (1982) 75 Cr App R 149, R v Robson [1972] 1 WLR 651, Anvar P.V. v P.K. Basheer (2014) 10 SCC 473, Shafhi Mohammad v State of Himachal Page 10 of 30

Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801, Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal (2020) 7 SCC 1, Tomaso Bruno v State of UP (2015) 7 SCC 178), CCTV footage is fully admissible electronic evidence under Articles 164, 46A, and 78A of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984 and Section 3 of the Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002, provided it satisfies tests of source, continuity, forensic certification, and proper chain of custody. While India mandates strict proof of provenance via a Section 65B(4) certificate, Pakistan and England generally treat non-fatal custody defects as affecting weight rather than admissibility.

11.1. Addressing appellate procedure under Article 129(g), Section 94, and Section 428 Cr.P.C. alongside judicial authorities (Haji Jalat Khan v Habibullah (2010 SCMR 1009), Nawabzada Shah Zain Bugti v The State (PLD 2013 SC 160), R v Pendleton [2001] UKHL 66, R v Erskine [2009] EWCA Crim 1425, Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116, Nar Singh v State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCC 496, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793, Ahmad Omar Sheikh’s case (2021 SCMR 873), Waseem Hassan Khan’s case (2026 SCMR 308)), he maintained that courts can invoke Section 428 to cure omissions like un-confronted video evidence when attributable to the court, provided it remedies a lapse rather than filling tactical gaps. Under Article 59, disputed PFSA expert reports should ordinarily be proved through the analyst.

11.2. On technical boundaries (drawing on Article 164 QSO, Section 510 Cr.P.C., PACE 1984 Code D,1 Section 45 Indian Evidence Act, and cases including Parish v R (2021 EWCA Crim 1693), R v Turnbull [1977] QB 224, R v Dodson and Williams (1984) 79 Cr App R 220, AG's Reference No. 2 of 2002 [2002] EWCA Crim 2373, R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr App R 425, R v Clare and Peach [1995] 2 Cr App R 333, Malkhan Singh v State of Madhya Pradesh (2003) 5 SCC 746, State of Code D, is the statutory code of practice under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) that governs how police officers identify people during criminal investigations and maintain reliable criminal records)

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U.P. v Krishna Gopal AIR 1988 SC 2154, R v Hookway [1999] Crim LR 750), he stressed that video enhancement cannot create details absent from the original recording; if PFSA extraction limits are reached, courts cannot compel results, and unclear identifications require expert opinion and corroborative evidence with the benefit of doubt favoring the accused.

11.3. Regarding site inspections under Sections 539B and 561A Cr.P.C., Order XXVI CPC (by analogy), UK Criminal Procedure Rules 2020 & Criminal Justice Act 2003, Indian Sections 310 & 482 Indian Cr.P.C., and cases (Asfandyar (2016 SCMR 2084), R v Hunter [1985] 1 WLR 613), he argued they are meant solely to understand existing evidence, noting commission delegations are exceptional in South Asia and unknown in English procedure.

11.4. Finally, relying on Zahir Zakir Jaffar v The State (PLD 2026 SC 251), R v Fowden and White [1982] Crim LR 588, R v Grimer [1982] Crim LR 674, Vadivelu Thevar v State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614, and preceding authorities, he concluded that authenticated video of adequate quality may alone sustain a conviction without eyewitnesses. However, because video is restricted to the camera's field of view, an eyewitness's absence from a frame does not automatically discredit them, and their credibility must be assessed on conventional standards.

Discussions on issues

12.With the diverse perspectives of all stakeholders carefully heard and placed on record, our inquiry must naturally take its first step by examining the foundational bedrock of digital evidence in our legal landscape. To properly weigh what follows, we must first turn our gaze to the text of Article 164 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, viewing it side by side, both as it originally stood and as it was transformed by the legislative amendments of 2023:

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Before amendment After amendment

164.Production of evidence that has

164.Production of evidence that has become available because of modern become available because of modern devices or information system etc.— In devices or information system etc.— such cases as the Court may consider Depending on the nature of case and appropriate, the Court may allow to be circumstances, the Court may, if deem produced any evidence that may haveappropriate, allow to be produced any become available because of modern evidence or witnesses recorded by the devices or techniques. Court through the modern devices or techniques including video call, viber, Provided that conviction on the basis of skype, imo, whatsapp, facebook modern devices or techniques may be messenger, line caller and video lawful.

conference, etc.

Under the old version of Article 164, the law provided that “the Court may allow to be produced any evidence that may have become available because of modern devices or techniques.” The provision, therefore, directly contemplated the admissibility of evidence made available through modern technology. After the 2023 amendment, however, the Article now provides that “the Court may allow to be produced any evidence or witnesses recorded by the Court through modern devices or techniques.” The amended language appears to shift the focus from the admissibility of technology-generated evidence to the recording of evidence or witnesses by the Court through such technology.

12.1. Thus, material evidence available on mobile phones, CDs, USBs, CCTV systems, or online applications does not, on the present wording, automatically attain evidentiary status merely because it exists in electronic form. The inclusion of modern techniques such as video calls, Viber, Skype, IMO, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, Line, and video conferencing further suggests that statements or evidence recorded through these means must first be recorded by the Court before being produced at trial. This creates a two-stage process: first, the evidence or statement must be judicially recorded at the pre-trial stage; and second, it may thereafter be produced before the trial Court as admissible evidence.

12.2. While the recording of statements and confessions by Magistrates is not unfamiliar to our criminal justice system, extending such a requirement to evidence already available through modern Page 13 of 30

devices may unnecessarily complicate its admissibility. It may also require the Magistrate who recorded the material to appear as an additional witness to authenticate what has already been captured through technological means. This is particularly problematic where established safeguards already exist for determining the authenticity and integrity of digital and video evidence.

12.3. Accordingly, Article 164, in its present form, does not directly render admissible evidence that becomes available through modern devices and techniques. Rather, it now operates primarily as a procedural provision enabling the recording of evidence through modern devices and techniques, rather than as a substantive provision concerning the evidentiary worth or admissibility of such material.

12.4. Following the amendment to Article 164 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order 1984, evidence generated through modern devices and techniques is treated strictly as documentary evidence rather than physical or real evidence. Consequently, such material qualifies as an electronic document, the legal recognition and admissibility of which are already established under the Electronic Transactions Ordinance 2002 as under;

3.Legal recognition of electronic forms. — No document, record, information, communication or transaction shall be denied legal recognition, admissibility, effect, validity, proof or enforceability on the ground that it is in electronic form and has not been attested by any witness.

(Emphasis supplied) Section 2 (o) of the Electronic Transaction Ordinance 2002 defines information as under;

“information” includes text, message, data, voice, sound, database, video, signals, software, computer programs, codes including object code and source code;

Thus, by virtue of Article 73 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, a document shall not be denied the status of primary evidence solely for the reason that it was generated, sent, received or stored in electronic form if the automated information system was in working order at all material times and, for the purposes hereof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it shall be presumed that the automated information Page 14 of 30

system was in working order at all material times. Whereas an information system means;

“An electronic system for creating, generating, sending, receiving, storing, reproducing, displaying, recording or processing information” (Section 2(p) of Electronic Transaction Order 2002). Thus, all statement in the form of electronic documents generated, received or recorded by an automated information system while it is in working order, are relevant facts. (Article 46A of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order Requirement of authentication

13.Under Article 78A of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, where it is alleged that an electronic document has been generated, wholly or partly, by a person through the use of an information system, and such allegation is denied, the application of a security procedure to the electronic document must be proved. This provision underscores the importance of establishing the authenticity of electronic evidence where its genuineness is disputed.

13.1. Accordingly, video footage, being documentary evidence, shall be produced before the Court through the testimony of a relevant witness. Where necessary, the footage shall be put to the relevant witnesses for their explanation regarding the identity of the suspect or accused, or any other relevant circumstance, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, including Article 22, where attracted. The footage shall also be put to the accused at the appropriate stage of the proceedings where relevant, including during the recording of his statement under Section 342 Cr.P.C., to afford him an opportunity to explain any incriminating visual material or circumstances appearing therein.

13.2. Furthermore, the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Ishtiaq Ahmad Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan” (PLD 2019 Supreme Court 675) shall be followed by the Court, particularly where the authenticity or genuineness of the video footage is disputed. In such circumstances, the requirements of Article 78A, including proof of the application of the requisite security procedure, shall be duly addressed, Page 15 of 30

subject to the applicability of the provision to the electronic evidence in question.

Cure by appellate Court

14.Where the trial Court fails to follow the requisite procedure for formalizing the admissibility of video evidence, the appellate Court may cure such procedural omission by summoning the relevant witnesses and the accused for recording additional evidence, where legally permissible. However, mere clarification of facts depicted in video footage already admitted into evidence does not constitute additional evidence under Section 428 Cr.P.C.; rather, it is an inquiry intended to clarify the facts observed and facilitate an informed adjudication. Conversely, where video footage was available but neither collected by the police nor brought on record, the appellate Court may, in exercise of its powers under Sections 428, 94 and 540 Cr.P.C., summon the electronic document and relevant witnesses, record the evidence itself, or direct a Magistrate or Court of Session to record it and transmit the same for appellate determination in accordance with law. Where necessary for tracing and securing such evidence, the appellate Court may also issue a search warrant under Section 96 Cr.P.C.

Mode of recording evidence by High Court

15.Under the Cr.P.C. when recording additional evidence under Section 428(4), the process is governed by the rules outlined in Chapter XXV (which covers sections relating to the mode of taking and recording evidence in inquiries and trials). At the end of Chapter XXV is Section 365, which deals specifically with the recording of evidence in the High Court. It reads as under;

365.Record of evidence in High Court. Every High Court shall from time to time, by general rule prescribe the manner in which evidence shall be taken down in cases coming before the Court, and the evidence shall be taken down in accordance with such rule.

Lahore High Court, Lahore has framed the requisite rules which are incorporated in High Court Rules & Orders Volume V: CHAPTER 4 (Special Procedure) Part-I (CRIMINAL) PART A SPECIAL RULES OF PROCEDURE IN CRIMINAL CASES as under;

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1.In original trials, in proceedings taken under section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, upon the hearing of an appeal or a revision petition, and in any other criminal proceedings coming before one or more Judges, the Judge or one of the Judges shall make a memorandum in Urdu or English of the substance of the evidence of each witness as the examination proceeds:**01 Provided that, by direction of a Judge, the evidence may be taken down in shorthand by an officer of the Court, or other person specially appointed for that purpose. The transcript of the shorthand shall be corrected and signed by the Judges or one of them and shall then be placed on the record.

2.The evidence shall ordinarily be recorded in narrative form, and shall be signed by the Judge or one of the Judges and placed with the record.

As per above rules, Judge/Judges of High Court either shall make memorandum of the substance of evidence, or evidence may be taken down in shorthand by an officer of Court. First method means, a concise, summarized note compiled by the judge capturing the core essence, material points, or "substance" of what a witness states, rather than a full word-for-word account. Whereas second method, refers to the formal, comprehensive documentation of a witness’s deposition statement as it is given in court. This distinction is also reflected in Sections 264 and 355 Cr.P.C., governing summary and other specified proceedings before Magistrates, as contrasted with Sections 356 and 357 Cr.P.C., which provide for the recording of evidence in trials before Courts of Session and other specified courts. Section 358 further reinforces this distinction by permitting a Magistrate, in cases governed by Section 355, to record a witness’s evidence in the manner prescribed by Section 356. Conceptually, recording only the substance of evidence is more summary and judge-led in character, whereas taking down the evidence facilitates the fuller presentation of testimony by the parties within the adversarial process. However, Section 365 Cr.P.C. empowers the High Court to frame rules governing the manner of recording evidence. Accordingly, subject to the applicable High Court rules, a High Court Judge may either prepare a memorandum of the substance of the evidence or have the evidence taken down in shorthand by an officer of the Court.

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Pixel enhancement

16.If the footage lacks clear facial features of the accused, it can surely be pixel-enhanced by expert re-examination which could be in the following forms;

• Contrast / brightness / gamma adjustment (adjusts mid-tone brightness for natural-looking images) and histogram equalization (expands pixel intensity range) to reveal faint picture features.

• Super-resolution (enhances low-resolution images into high-resolution ones).

• Sharpening and deconvolution (restores details lost through filtering) to reduce blur from motion or defocus (within limits). • Noise reduction to clean grainy footage.

• Resampling/interpolation to enlarge an image for display. • Frame averaging when multiple frames of the same screen exist to improve signal noise.

Though such activity could be done in open court yet forensic examination involving image enhancement, pixel interpolation, frame extraction, and related digital processing requires specialized equipment, validated methodologies, controlled laboratory conditions, proper documentation, and adherence to prescribed SOPs. Such examination should therefore be conducted in an appropriate forensic laboratory to ensure the integrity, reproducibility, and quality control of the analysis. Upon completion of the forensic analysis, the processed material may be played or presented before the trial Court or the High court.

Comparison by Court & Alternate methods

16.1. Where the image quality allows, the court may directly compare the video with the accused in open court, without needing an expert. This called a ‘Trier-of-fact comparison’. In this respect “Parish and Anor v. R” [2021] EWCA Crim 1693, is referred as under;

The two appellants were convicted before a jury of conspiracy to commit grievous bodily harm with intent and of possessing firearms with intent to endanger life, arising from a gunfight after a party in London. There was no direct eyewitness identification of the appellants; the prosecution relied on CCTV footage together with circumstantial evidence. On appeal it was argued that the trial judge misdirected the jury on the use of the footage for identification, because it was not clear enough to identify anyone. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals. It held that although the faces were not clearly visible in parts of the footage, other features were sufficiently distinct — clothing, distinctive logos and the way the persons moved and behaved — and that the jury could compare Page 18 of 30

these with the appellants, provided they were directed to weigh both similarities and differences. The identification was also supported by other evidence, such as phone records and the appellants’ own admissions about their movements. The Court followed R v Dodson and Williams (1984) 79 Cr App R 220 and Attorney General’s Reference (No. 2 of 2002) [2002] EWCA Crim 2373.

(Emphasis supplied)

The Court may, by analogy with Article 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, undertake a comparison of the images depicted in video footage with the accused or relevant witnesses to ascertain their identity. Where Article 84 empowers the Court to compare handwriting, signatures or fingerprints with admitted or proved specimens, its underlying rationale may be invoked, where legally permissible, to facilitate the identification of persons appearing in electronic visual evidence. The Court should not hesitate to undertake such an exercise where it may dispel ambiguity concerning identity. However, where visual identification remains inconclusive and enhancement of the video pixels proves ineffective, the Court may direct an expert of the Punjab Forensic Science Authority (“PFSA”) to employ appropriate forensic techniques to establish the identity of the accused or witnesses, including the following methods:

(1)Forensic facial comparison, (2) Gait analysis, (3) Clothing and accessory comparison, (4) Photogrammetry analysis, (5) Body morphology and physical characteristics, (6) Behavioural and contextual analysis, (7) Voice or audio analysis.

16.2. Information provided to this court by PFSA shows that some of above techniques are not available in PFSA. The Government of the Punjab is directed to take necessary measures to ensure that the PFSA, being a state-of-the-art forensic laboratory and a vital component of the criminal justice system, is equipped with all requisite facilities and technologies for forensic examination and identification of persons appearing in video footage, including the techniques referred to above and any other scientifically recognized methods. Until such facilities become available, where considered necessary by the Court, the relevant video evidence may be referred to a competent international forensic laboratory, at the expense of the parties, subject to applicable law and appropriate safeguards concerning the integrity, security and Page 19 of 30

chain of custody of the evidence. The Government shall take appropriate steps to strengthen the forensic capacity of the PFSA so that the administration of criminal justice is not impeded by the non- availability of essential forensic techniques within the country.

Local Inspection

17.The question whether a local inspection of the crime scene and examination of local residents could be undertaken under Section 539B Cr.P.C. to verify facts corroborative of video evidence, and whether such functions could be delegated to a commission, was addressed by all concerned with reference to “Asfandyar and another v. Kamran and another” (2016 SCMR 2084). It was contended that although Section 539B Cr.P.C. empowers the Court to conduct a local inspection, but such power cannot be delegated to any person or commission. However, such power, can also be exercised at appellate stage by the High Court. In this respect learned Prosecutor General has referred a case from Indian jurisdiction reported as “STATE OF UTTAR PARDESH v. HET RAM & ORS” [1976] 3 S.C.R 319 wherein High Court Judge went with Government Advocate and respondents’ counsel to a place where there was no artificial light at about 7:30 p.m., for the purpose of appreciating the veracity of evidence of PW-2 & PW-3 in identifying the respondents in darkness. Finding that under the circumstances noticed by them, it was difficult to recognize a person, High Court disbelieved the evidence of such witnesses and acquitted the respondents. It was however solicited that if such power cannot be delegated to any person or commission then what alternative course consistent with law is available.

Alternate to local inspection

17.1. Mr. Naveed Umar Bhatti, learned Deputy Prosecutor General, proposed two possible avenues: first, directing the investigating officer to undertake further investigation or re-inspection of the crime scene, a power available to the appellate Court in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction; and second, invoking the inherent jurisdiction under Section 561A Cr.P.C. to appoint a local commission, by analogy with Order XXVI CPC, for on-site verification of relevant facts. The latter course, however, Page 20 of 30

must be adopted sparingly, for recorded reasons, and with due regard to the fact that appointment of a commission is not an expressly codified mechanism of criminal procedure and its application in criminal proceedings presents distinct legal considerations.

17.2. I find the approach suggested by the learned DPG persuasive. Although the High Court, while exercising its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973 cannot ordinarily assume control over or interfere with the investigation, its position is materially different when it acts as an appellate Court and a Court of criminal jurisdiction. In such capacity, it may exercise its appellate powers under Section 423 Cr.P.C., as applicable, to order further inquiry, and invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561A Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of the process of the Court, secure the ends of justice, or give effect to an order under the Code.

17.3. The scheme of the Cr.P.C. itself recognizes the importance of local inquiry and independent verification of facts. Chapters X and XII contemplate local inquiry in matters concerning public nuisance and disputes relating to immovable property, while if under section 157 police does not conduct investigation following the receipt of information relating to the commission of an offence, concerned Magistrate under section 159 Cr.P.C. can order for an inquiry or investigation. The Code further recognizes, in appropriate circumstances, the need for judicial intervention where the ordinary investigative process fails to serve the ends of justice.

17.4. Consequently, where the failure of the police to collect material evidence or verify relevant circumstances threatens to frustrate a just decision in a criminal appeal, the High Court, acting in its appellate and criminal jurisdiction, may consider directing further investigation or, in an appropriate case, appointing a person or commission to inspect the crime scene and ascertain relevant facts for the Court’s assistance. Such recourse must remain exceptional, be supported by express reasons, and conform to the applicable law. It must not be confused with an impermissible delegation of the Court’s own function under Section 539B Cr.P.C., nor Page 21 of 30

should it be used to circumvent the safeguards governing criminal investigation or the evaluation of evidence.

Conviction solely on the basis of video evidence

18.The exclusion or absence of prosecution witnesses (PWs) from the crime scene in video footage does not, by itself, preclude conviction solely on the basis of such footage, nor does it necessarily render their testimony liable to rejection. The question may be answered in the affirmative, particularly in view of the 2023 amendment to Article 164 of the Qanun- e-Shahadat Order 1984, that video clip now being a documentary evidence, read with the doctrine of the silent witness, as fortified by the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Zahir Zakir Jaffar and 3 others v. The State and others” (PLD 2026 Supreme Court 251). A judgment from American jurisdiction titled “United States v. Albert R. Harris, Yeoman Seaman U.S. Navy, Crim. Appeal. No. 98-1951 decided on September 24, 2001 explains, to ensure video evidence is admissible, it is sufficient for an expert witness to testify about how the footage was recorded, stored, and retrieved from the device, provided there is also proof that the information system was operational at the time:

The "Silent Witness' Theory of Authentication; Generally, a photograph is admitted into evidence as "a graphic portrayal of oral testimony, and becomes admissible only when a witness has testified that it is a correct and accurate representation of relevant facts personally observed by the witness." "McCormick on Evidence”. The "silent witness" theory of authentication has allowed photographs to substantively "speak for themselves" after being authenticated by evidence that supports the reliability of the process or system that produced the photographs. The threshold case for automated camera evidence is United States V. Taylor, 530 F.2d 639, 641-42 (5th Cir. 1976). In that case, footage recording a robbery that was taken after bank employees were locked in the bank vault was admitted, despite the fact that no one could testify as to the events shown. Rather, witnesses testified about "the manner in which the film was installed in the camera, how the camera was activated, the fact that the film was removed immediately after the robbery, the chain of its possession, and the fact that it was properly developed and contact prints made from it." The federal circuits that have examined the issue have followed this "silent witness" approach. United States v. Bynum, 567 F.2d 1167 (1st Cir. 1978); Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Clayton, 643 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Gordon, 548 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1977); Diane M. Allen, Annotation, Admissibility of Visual Recording of Event or Matter Giving Rise to Litigation or Prosecution, 41 A.L.R. 4th 812 (1985 & Supp. 2000). The "silent witness" theory was supported in Harris, 53 MJ at 520: United States v. Howell, 16 MJ 1003, Page 22 of 30

1005-06 (ACMR 1983); United States v. Reichart, 31 MJ 521 (ACMR Evidence of operability requires that when the photographs were retrieved the information system was in operation. This level of detail about the process of video monitoring, notation of time and date, and storage of the tapes meets the authentication requirement of "describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result." Mil. R. Evid. Testimony as to the technical operation of the video camera on the day in question was unnecessary, just as testimony from the actual camera operator or an expert in photography is unnecessary in order to admit a photograph. United States v. Hobbs, 403 F.2d 977, 978 (6th Cir. 1968) (noting that photographs are well-accepted evidence and that expert testimony on the process is unnecessary).

A concept of admissibility of log book is also in place to authenticate the recordings of videos as a regular business activity, which is known as business records exception.

United States v. Allison, 49 MJ 54, (1998). Mil. R. Evid. 803(6) prevents the exclusion as hearsay of a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information of the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.

A writing is admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 803(6) if two foundational facts are proved: (1) the writing is made or transmitted by a person with knowledge at or near the time of the incident recorded, and (2) the record is kept in the course of regularly conducted business activity.... These facts must be proved through the testimony of the custodian of the records or other qualified witness, though not necessarily the declarant. The record will not be admissible, however, if These facts the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

United States v. Miller, 771 F.2d 1219, 1237 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted); see United States v. Casey, 45 MJ 623, 626 (NM Ct. Crim. App. 1996).

Business records exception in Pakistan

19.In Pakistan, Explanations. 3 & 4 to Article 73 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat deals with admissibility of video evidence as document and also requires operability of information system. The concept of the business records exception, also recognized under provisions such as Article 46(2) and Article 48 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, supports the Page 23 of 30

admissibility of system log books maintained in the regular course of business to authenticate video recordings which are as under;

(2)Or is made in course of business.— When the statement was made by such person in the ordinary course of business, and in particular when it consists of any entry or memorandum made by him in books kept in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty; or of an acknowledgment written or signed by him of the receipt of money, goods, securities or property of any kind ; or of a document used in commerce written or signed by him; or of the date of a letter or other document usually dated, written or signed by him.

48.Entries in books of account when relevant.— Entries in books of accounts, regularly kept in the course of business, are relevant whenever they refer to a matter into which the Court has to enquire, but such statements shall not alone be sufficient evidence to charge any person with liability.

Thus, if a CCTV camera installed in a public office records video footage, and the office maintains corresponding system logs within an automated software application, the production of the electronic record, including metadata showing the date, time, and location, satisfies the statutory requirements for electronic documents. Under Article 46A and Article 73 (Explanations 3 and 4) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order 1984, such automated system data and output printouts are treated as relevant facts and primary evidence, provided it is established that the automated information system was in proper working order at all material times. Thus, video evidence, being a form of primary evidence, may independently sustain a conviction where it is authentic, reliable, and sufficiently conclusive to establish the guilt of the accused.

19.1. Nevertheless, the settled principles governing circumstantial evidence require that every material circumstance forming the chain of evidence be firmly established, that the circumstances cumulatively point unerringly towards the guilt of the accused, and that the chain remain complete, leaving no reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Accordingly, conviction on the basis of video footage alone is permissible only where its evidentiary quality is sufficient to identify the accused reliably, its integrity and authenticity are established, including, where disputed, through an appropriate PFSA report confirming that it has not been tampered with or edited, and the footage, considered alongside the Page 24 of 30

surrounding circumstances, excludes every reasonable possibility other than the guilt of the accused.

19.2. Conversely, where the facial features of the accused remain unidentifiable and the video pixels cannot be enhanced sufficiently to establish identity, the footage cannot lawfully bridge the evidentiary gap merely on the basis of suspicion or conjecture. In such circumstances, the benefit of doubt must extend to the accused, in accordance with the principle laid down by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in “Muhammad Ramzan and another v. The State” (2025 SCMR 1742). Thus, the decisive consideration is not the presence or absence of prosecution witnesses in the footage, but whether the video evidence, independently or in conjunction with other proved circumstances, forms an authentic, complete, and conclusive chain establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Case in hand

20.All concerned parties were in consensus that the witnesses and the accused could be summoned to confront them with the video evidence, either to seek clarification, record additional evidence, or, if necessary, conduct a spot inspection for the inquiry. Consequently, pursuant to the order dated 22.09.2026, the requisite legal process was issued. On 28.09.2026, prosecution witnesses Muhammad Munir (PW-06) and Rana Muhammad Nadeem (PW-07), along with the accused-appellant Raja Shahid, appeared before the court. The contents and visuals depicted in the video footage were as follows

The video opens with a man dressed in a black shalwar kameez riding up and stopping his motorcycle in front of a house on the left side of the street. He begins talking to someone, but the conversation is abruptly cut short. Suddenly, another man, also wearing a black shalwar kameez, emerges from the house holding a pistol and fires multiple shots at the motorcyclist. Struck by the gunfire, the victim collapses to the ground alongside his bike. The shooter, appearing entirely satisfied with his actions, calmly turns around and heads back inside the house.

Roughly forty to forty-five seconds pass before a second accomplice steps out of the house. This man, shorter in stature and wearing shirt and trousers, is also armed with a pistol. He approaches the fallen victim, examines his body, and points his weapon at him. Instead of shooting, he resorts to physical brutality, kicking the victim and striking him repeatedly with the butt of his pistol, before pacing menacingly around the street.

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Shortly after, the original gunman returns to the scene. He rifles through the dead body's pockets, takes his belongings, and drags the corpse away from the fallen motorcycle. The two attackers then right the bike, kick-start the engine, and flee the scene together, with the shorter accomplice riding pillion.

Throughout the ordeal, other individuals rush past on motorcycles in front of the house, and a man in white overalls, resembling a medical professional, leaves on a separate motorcycle with a companion. Meanwhile, a few women watch the horrifying events unfold from nearby rooftops, but out of fear, no one dares to approach the body.

After the attackers finally disappear down the street, an eerie quiet settle over the area. About three minutes later, a young girl walks into the frame, discovers the lifeless body, and cries out for help, eventually drawing a crowd of local women to the scene. Notably, throughout the entire video recording, none of the bystanders or witnesses are captured anywhere in the camera frame.

21.It was determined that the accused-appellant, Raja Shahid, who had not been confronted with the video evidence during the trial, should be called upon to provide specific clarifications. Should he refuse to answer or withhold information, the court will then determine whether to record additional evidence or seek further clarifications from the witnesses regarding the video footage.

Statement of accused/appellant

Rana Muhammad Naeem, the complainant, is my neighbour. Saeed's house sits on the right side of my house, while a Pathan family, whose name I do not know, resides on the left. A vacant plot or ground, rather than a house, stands directly in front of my house. You can see the railway line from my rooftop. Rana Munir (complainant) lives about three to five houses away from the front line of my house. If the complainant stands outside his house, two trees block his view of my house, even though the line is straight.

I understand the allegation against me. The deceased, the complainant’s son, Arif Pathan, and Billu Pathan are my friends because they are our neighbours. Raja Zahid Ali is my elder brother.

After viewing the video, I identified my house as the one on the left side of the street where two motorcycles are parked. A vacant plot sits in front of my house, and the corner house featuring two water tanks on the rooftop belongs to Rasheed, a retired railway employee. Irfan Malang is the man in the black shalwar kameez holding the pistol and firing. Irfan Malang likely knows Dr. Zain, who wears white overalls. I was ill, and the doctor had come to my house to administer a drip.

I, the accused and appellant, concede that I continued to kick the deceased after he fell to the ground because he had come there to quarrel. However, I maintain that I did not know the deceased had already sustained firearm injuries. Irfan Malang had come to my house to check on my health. Arif, Billu, and Irfan arrived together. I Page 26 of 30

acknowledge that the trial court played the video during the trial but did not ask me any questions about it.

The court acquitted Irfan Malang. According to Irfan, he lived in Ravi. Irfan is a direct friend of Billu and used to spend time at the location where my stand is situated.

In the light of above explanation, it is requisite to seek some clarification from the witnesses too

Statement of Rana Nadeem son of Rana Munir (PW-6) Rana Muhammad Naeem, the deceased, was my son. I nominated Raja Zahid for conspiracy, along with Raja Shahid, Arif Pathan, Billu Pathan, and one unknown accused.

After viewing the video, I confirmed that the occurrence took place in my residential street. Rasheed, a retired railway employee, owns the corner house. When we walk back from Rasheed's house, my house is the fourth one. The distance between my house and Rasheed's house is approximately 100 to 150 feet.

If I stand outside my house, I can see the entire street up to its end. To test my eyesight, the court directed me to step back and look at a policeman standing at the courtroom door, who was approximately 25 feet away. I could not read his nameplate, but I could see that he had a beard and wore a police uniform, which is correct.

My son was riding a motorcycle. Raja Shahid, the accused and appellant, is the man in the black shalwar kameez who shot my son. The shorter man wearing shirt and trousers who later came out and kicked the deceased is an unknown accomplice of Raja Shahid and the others. I admit that I do not appear in the video.

Statement of Rana Nadeem son of Rana Munir (PW-7) Rana Muhammad Munir is my father. I have appeared before the court regarding the case of my brother, Rana Muhammad Naeem. My father nominated Raja Shahid, Billu Pathan, Arif Pathan, and one unknown accused.

I cannot say whether my brother went with Billu Pathan. The incident occurred around 03:30 or 03:45 p.m. I run a mobile phone business at Hafeez Centre. The incident took place on a Sunday, which is why I was at home.

Two to three minutes after my brother left the house, I heard gunshots. When I stepped outside, I saw my brother lying on the ground. After firing, the accused and appellant, Raja Shahid, advanced toward me while brandishing his weapon. While Raja Shahid remained at the scene, I could not approach my brother. Once Shahid left, I returned to my house and called my cousin to bring a car to rescue him.

After my marriage in 2016, I began living separately from my father. My house sits about 500 meters away in another street.

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Upon viewing the video, I identified my younger brother as the person wearing black clothes on a motorcycle. Billo Pathan is the man talking to my brother, and Raja Shahid, dressed in black, is the man shooting at the deceased. Dr. Zain is the man wearing white clothes and carrying a leather bag.

I do not know the man who subsequently kicked the deceased while he was falling and remained at the scene in a threatening position; he was likely an accomplice of the other accused. I admit that I do not appear in the video clip.

22.The necessity for recording additional evidence does not arise, given that the accused explicitly admits his presence at the scene of the crime, albeit limiting his attribution to the role of kicking the victim, an individual already deceased as a result of firearm injuries inflicted by a co- accused. Despite the learned DPG's initial argument that the accused/appellant not only aimed but also fired a pistol shot at the deceased while he was lying on the ground, she conceded upon confronting the postmortem report, diagram, and medical testimony that no corresponding injuries existed. The medical evidence confirmed Injury No. 1 as an entry wound on the left side of the face over the left tragus (left ear), with its exit as Injury No. 2 just below the tragus of the right ear. Similarly, Injury No. 3 was an entry wound on the left cheek, with its exit as Injury No. 4 on the right side of the mouth, involving the upper and lower lips. These fatal shots were inflicted by the other co-accused while the victim was still on the motorcycle, leaving no medical proof of any subsequent shots fired at the deceased in a fallen position.

22.1. Upon evaluating the testimonies PW-6 and PW-7 under the premise that they were present in the street and observed the occurrence but remained constrained by fear, their positive identification of the accused becomes deeply questionable. Both witnesses are unanimous in asserting that the man in black clothes who fired the fatal shots was Raja Shahid, and they further maintain that Raja Shahid remained at the scene to threaten them and keep them at bay. However, this assertion is directly contradicted by objective video evidence, which establishes that the man in black clothes did not linger in a threatening posture. Furthermore, a significant contradiction emerges regarding the escape of the accused. The testimonies presented before the trial court state that Raja Shahid fled the scene while sitting as a pillion passenger (on the rear seat) of the Page 28 of 30

motorcycle. Conversely, a careful examination of the video footage reveals that the person occupying the rear seat during the escape was the shorter individual wearing shirt and trousers, rather than the primary shooter. From an evidentiary standpoint, and in light of Article 84 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order 1984, as well as the comparative principles articulated in the jurisprudence of Parish and Anor v. R [2021] EWCA Crim 1693, this Court possesses the legal competence to draw comparisons between visual representations in video evidence and the accused-appellant under the technique known as ‘trier-of-fact comparison’. Although the facial features of the assailant are not clearly discernible in the footage, the physical stature and height of the individual who kicked the fallen victim, lingered in a threatening posture and fled from the scene while sitting on the rear seat of motorcycle, bear a noticeable resemblance to the accused-appellant. Notwithstanding this visual consistency regarding height, the prosecution has failed to discharge its fundamental burden of proof to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the murder was committed by the accused-appellant. Established principles of criminal jurisprudence dictate that where facial identification is obscured or unidentifiable, it is legally unsafe to base a conviction solely upon a partial admission or a general physical similarity, in the absence of a formal expert facial recognition/comparison report or robust corroborative circumstantial evidence. Consequently, the prosecution's case against the appellant on the primary charge of murder remains unproven. In this respect cases reported as “Muhammad Ramzan and another v. The State” (2025 SCMR 1742); “Fazal Mehmood and another v. The State through PG. Sindh and another” (2026 SCMR 350) are referred.

23.For what has been discussed above, in the instant case the prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the accused/appellant beyond any shadow of doubt and it is trite that in order to extend benefit of doubt to an accused, it is not necessary that there should be several circumstances creating doubt, rather one reasonable doubt is sufficient to acquit an accused. Reliance is placed on the cases reported as “RASHEED AHMAD alias Seeda Versus The STATE” (2026 SCMR 798), “MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE and another Versus The STATE and others” Page 29 of 30

(2026 SCMR 783), “LAIQ SHAH Versus The STATE” (2026 SCMR 257), “MUSHTAQ AHMED Versus The STATE” (2026 SCMR 60), “MAQSOOD ALAM and another Versus The STATE and others” (2024 SCMR 156), “ABDUL QADEER Versus The STATE” (2024 SCMR 1146), “MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ BAIG and another Versus The STATE through Prosecutor General, Punjab, Lahore and another” (2024 SCMR 1191), “MUHAMMAD HASSAN and another Versus The STATE and others” (2024 SCMR 1427), “KHIAL MUHAMMAD Versus The STATE” (2024 SCMR 1490) and “MUHAMMAD IJAZ alias BILLA and another Versus The STATE and others” (2024 SCMR 1507). Consequently, the titled appeal is allowed, the conviction and sentence of the accused/appellant recorded by the learned trial Court vide judgment dated 30.03.2024 are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by extending him the benefit of doubt. Raja Shahid (accused/appellant), confined in Jail, shall be released forthwith if not required in any other case. The case property, if any, shall be disposed of in accordance with law and the record of the trial court be sent back immediately.

(Muhammad Amjad Rafiq) Judge Approved for reporting.

Judge

Signed on 16.10.2026

M. Umar*

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