Muhammad Shahid vs State etc.

Stereo:HCJDA-38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,

MULTAN BENCH, MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No. 2908-M of 2025

Muhammad Shahid Versus The State, etc.

S. No. of Date of Order with signature of Judge, and that of order/ order/ Proceeding Parties or counsel, where necessary Proceeding 21.09.2026 Mr. Khalil-ur-Rehman Meo, advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Naveed Ejaz, DDPP with Zafar Abbas, Assistant Director, ACE,D.G. Khan & Hadayat Hussain, Inspector. Mr. Ali Akbar Zahid, advocate for respondents No.4 to Through this petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Cr.P.C.), the petitioner seeks to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this Court for setting aside the orders dated 26.02.2025 and 24.03.2025, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge (Criminal Division), Dera Ghazi Khan, and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dera Ghazi Khan, respectively. By the former order, the learned Senior Civil Judge (Criminal Division), Dera Ghazi Khan dismissed the petitioner's application seeking consigning of the kalandra relating to the alleged offence under Section 182 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (PPC), to the record room, while the latter order upheld that decision by dismissing the petitioner's revision petition.

2.Briefly, the petitioner submitted an application to the Director, Anti-Corruption Establishment, Dera Ghazi Khan, seeking registration of a criminal case against respondents Nos. 2 to 6 regarding certain discrepancies in the property-tax record pertaining to the names and CNIC particulars of his sisters, Khalida Parveen and Khalida Sultana. As reflected in the inquiry report dated 13.05.2024, the entry in Form

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PT-1 had been made by the Excise Department on the basis of the CNIC provided to it and was subsequently corrected upon the petitioner's objection. The inquiry officer observed that Form PT-1 is maintained for property-tax assessment and collection and does not constitute proof of ownership.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.The question for consideration before this court is whether the inquiry report and the opinion recorded by the Inquiry Officer, on the basis of which the kalandra was prepared, disclose the commission of an offence under section 182, P.P.C.? The legality of the proceedings must, therefore, be examined in the light of the statutory ingredients of the alleged offence and the actual findings recorded in the inquiry report.

5.The jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is undoubtedly extraordinary and is to be exercised with circumspection. Yet, it is equally settled that the provision exists to prevent abuse of the process of any Court and otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In “Aurangzaib Alamgir v. Muhammad Sajid and others, (PLD 2025 Supreme Court 53), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has defined the abuse of process and elaborated the Section 561-A Cr.P.C, the relevant extract of which is reproduced as under:- “Likewise, Section 265-K, Cr.P.C., as provided in Chapter XXIIA (Trials before High Courts and Courts of Session), has also vested in the Court the powers to acquit the accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it considers that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence. However, according to the judicial consensus and unanimity matured on the characteristics of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., it is well- established that the inherent jurisdiction so conferred is curative in nature.

7.In fact, the expression “abuse of process” used under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., connotes an unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings or process which also includes the presence of ulterior motives for activating the process for unjustified arrest or groundless

criminal prosecution. The essential purposefulness of this doctrine is to foster and safeguard the judicial system, ensuring that it is not misused or blemished. This terminology can be comprehended as an acuity that if a Court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it may terminate the prosecution if an abuse of process is floating on the surface on record”.

Jowitt’s Dictionary of Law (John Burke, Vol. 1) at Page 16

Abuse of Process: Actions manifestly frivolous or brought against good faith will be stayed as an abuse of the process of the court (Edmunds v. Att.-Gen. (1878) 47 L.J.Ch. 345). Under R.S.C., Ord. 18, r. 19, the court may order to be struck out or amended any pleading or the indorsement of any writ on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence or is scandalous, vexatious or may prejudice a fair trial or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court and may order the action to be stayed or dismissed or judgment entered accordingly. The rule applies to an originating summons or petition.

Aiyar’s Judicial Dictionary (1988, 10th Edition, at Page Abuse of Process: Improper use of a regular legal process by which an unfair advantage is obtained by a party to a suit”.

6.Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. confers upon High Court inherent powers to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. These powers are very wide and can be exercised by the High Court at any time. Ordinarily High Court does not quash proceedings under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. unless trial Court exercises its power under section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. which are incidentally of the same nature and in a way akin to and co-related with quashment of proceedings as envisaged under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. In exceptional cases High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under section 561- A, Cr.P.C. without waiting for trial Court to pass orders under section 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. if the facts of the case so warrant to prevent abuse

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of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

7.In the present case the offence alleged against the petitioner is under Section 182, P.P.C., which provides:- “Whoever gives to any public servant any information which he knows or believes to be false, intending thereby to cause, or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby cause, such public servant

(a)to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts respecting which such information is given were known by him, or

(b)to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury or annoyance of any person, shall be punished...

The three illustrations appended to the provision make its nature still clearer:- “(a) A informs a Magistrate that Z, a police-officer, subordinate to such Magistrate, has been guilty of neglect of duty or misconduct, knowing such information to be false, and knowing it to be likely that the information will cause the Magistrate to dismiss Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(b)A falsely informs a public servant that Z has contraband salt in a secret place, knowing such information to be false, and knowing that it is likely that the consequence of the information will be a search of Z's premises, attended with annoyance to Z. A has committed the offence defined in this section.

(c)A falsely informs a policeman that he has been assaulted and robbed in the neighbourhood of a particular village. He does not mention the name of any person as one of his assailants, but knows it to be likely that in consequence of this information the police will make enquiries and institute searches in the village to the annoyance of the villagers or some of them.”

The provision, therefore, contains more than one distinct requirements. The prosecution must establish that information was given to a public servant; that the person giving it knew or believed it to be false; and that he acted with the intention, or knowledge of likelihood, specified in clauses (a) or

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(b). Mere incorrectness of information, standing alone, is not synonymous with the offence.

In “Zahoor Ahmed v. The State” (PLD 1975 Lahore 264), it has been held as under:- “In Sardar Khan v. Emperor A.I.R. 1930 Lah. 54, it was observed that to constitute an offence punishable under section 182 of the Penal Code, it is necessary that the information given should be which the accused person knows or believes to be false. It is not sufficient that he had reasons to believe it to be false or does not believe it to be true. There should have been positive knowledge or belief that it is false. In “Emperor v. Ramchandra Yeswant Adurkar 31 Bom. 204 it was held that it is necessary for the prosecution to prove, not merely the absence of reasonable or probable cause for giving the information, but a positive knowledge or belief of the falsity of the information given.”

Likewise, in “Zahoor Ahmed v. The State” (PLJ 1974 Cr.C. (Lah.) 548), same approach was adopted.

8.The same principle has recently been authoritatively explained by the Hon’able Supreme Court in “Ali Adnan Sheikha v. I.G. Police Sindh and others” (2026 SCMR 77). The Supreme Court distinguished between information which is not proved and information which is proved to be false, observing that information cannot simply be treated as false because the allegation ultimately failed or could not be established. The Court stated, in memorable terms that “such information can be termed as not proved and not false”. The judgment further emphasises that Section 182 cannot become a mechanism for converting every unsuccessful allegation into a criminal prosecution. Para 10 of judgment is reproduced as under:- “10. Having examined the aforesaid provisions of law we may now explain the scope of Section 182, P.P.C. which provides that if a complaint is laid before any public servant giving any information which he/she knows or believes to be false with an intention to cause or likely to cause, such public servant, to do or omit anything which such public servant ought not to do or omit if the true state of facts were known by him, or to use the lawful power of such public servant to the injury

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or annoyance of such person then such person shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months or with fine too which may extend to three thousand rupees or with both. It may be observed here that in case the information laid before the public servant with Bona fide belief and knowledge of it being true, the same cannot be termed as false unless it is proved in accordance with law through judicial proceedings. Such information can be termed as ‘not proved’ and not ‘false’ and, therefore, the same cannot attract the penal provision of Section 182, P.P.C. Suffice is to state that provision of Section 182, P.P.C. can only be initiated by the public servant before whom the false information was laid, which resulted in initiation of criminal proceedings and found to be false through judicial process, whereas, such penal provisions cannot be invoked in cases where the complainant could not prove the allegations by producing sufficient evidence or material in support of such allegation before the judicial forum.”

9.There is also a separate statutory safeguard contained in Section 195(1)(a), Cr.P.C., which provides:- “No Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Sections 172 to 187 of the Pakistan Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned, or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate.”

The provision is mandatory. It identifies the person competent to set the law in motion for an offence under Section 182, P.P.C. In “Ghulam Qadar v. The State” (PLJ 1990 Cr.C. (Lah.) 158), it has been held as under:- “I am only concerned to examine the effect of Section 195 Cr.P.C. in this quashment petition. Section 195(1) is as follows:

195(1) No Court shall take cognizance:

i. of any offence punishable under Section 172 to 180 of the Pakistan Penal Code, except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is subordinate.

Clause (a) of Section 195(1) Cr.P.C. came into consideration before the superior courts in a number of cases”.

In “Barhamdeo Singh v. Emperor” (AIR 1928 Patna 102) Division Bench of the Patna High Court

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held that the Magistrate who took the cognizance of the case on the complaint of Sub-Inspector of Barh had no power to do so under Section 195(1)(a) Cr.P.C. within the framework of Section 195. The same principle was highlighted in “Mahadeo v. Emperor” (AIR 1935 Nagpur 241). In this case it was held as under:- “...but the terms of S.195 are clear and these are that the Court has no jurisdiction unless a complaint is filed by the public servant to whom he is subordinate, i.e. under whose orders he is. It is not every officer of a superior rank who is entitled to give order to him, and I can find nothing in the Police Manual that suggests that a Prosecuting Inspector is entitled to give orders to a Sub- Inspector except in relation to a case that is being tried. I, therefore, hold that no complaint was filed in compliance with S.195, and that therefore, the Court had no jurisdiction to try the complaint”.

The same principle was reaffirmed in “Muhammad Waryam and three others v. The State” (1988 P.Cr.L.J. 1223).

10.After the perusal of section 195 Cr.P.C. and the case law cited above, I have no doubt in my mind that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under section 182 PPC unless and until a written complaint is filed by that public officer concerned or by an officer to whom such a public servant is subordinate. In the instant case, neither the complaint was filed by the Director Anti- corruption DG Khan nor it was filed by the officer, to whom he was subordinate.

In “Mian Zahid Sarfraz v. The State” (NLR 1989 Cr. 355), proceedings were likewise quashed where the complaint under section 182 had not been made by the competent public servant contemplated by Section 195. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ali Adnan Sheikha ,supra case has also reiterated the significance of Section 195 and made it clear that proceedings under section 182 cannot be initiated

through a route which circumvents the statutory requirement of a written complaint by the concerned public servant or competent superior.

11.Applying the above principles to the facts available on record, the essential ingredient of knowledge or belief that the information furnished was false is conspicuously absent. The petitioner had approached the Excise & Taxation Department for correction of the CNIC recorded against the property, asserting that the CNIC of Mst. Khalida Parveen had wrongly been entered in the UIPT record. Significantly, the departmental inquiry itself subsequently disclosed that the wrong CNIC had initially been entered and that, upon issuance of PT-13 notices and verification, the record in the UIPT system was amended. The department merely observed that the allegations levelled against it were “false and incorrect”; it did not establish that the petitioner, at the time of making the information, knew or believed it to be false. Rather, the departmental record lends support to the existence of an actual discrepancy in the record. Consequently, the information furnished by the petitioner cannot, on the material presently available, be converted into “false information” merely because his allegations against the department were not ultimately accepted.

12.Furthermore, the record does not disclose that the petitioner furnished the information with the requisite intention or knowledge as contemplated by clauses (a) or (b) of Section 182, P.P.C., namely, to cause the public servant to do or omit something which he ought not to do or to exercise his lawful power to the injury or annoyance of any person. His application was directed towards verification and

correction of the property-tax record, and the subsequent departmental proceedings themselves resulted in correction of the erroneous CNIC entry. The statutory ingredients of Section 182, therefore, are not attracted merely from the fact that the allegations made by the petitioner against the department were not substantiated. In these circumstances, continuation of the proceedings under Section 182, P.P.C. would amount to treating an allegation which was, at the most, not proved in the manner alleged by the department, as an allegation knowingly and deliberately false, which the law does not permit.

13.There is another relevant consideration. Before initiating proceedings for furnishing allegedly false information, particularly where the alleged falsity may arise from an error of record or a disputed factual circumstance, the person concerned ought to be afforded an opportunity to explain the circumstances in which the information was furnished. In “Jhammad Aslam v. Inspector General and others” (PLD 2001 Lahore 84), it was held as under:- “Viewed from another angle the impugned order also suffers from yet another illegality which is absence of a show-cause notice to the complainant against whom proceedings under section 182, P.P.C. are contemplated to be taken. Proceedings under section 182, P.P.C. are judicial in nature and envisaged, as discussed earlier a false information given to a public servant upon which he uses his powers to the detriment of an innocent person. In other words an act or omission has taken place for which the complainant has become blameworthy. Before a judicial action is taken in all fairness the subtleties of law require at least a show- cause notice asking from the complainant the reasons why he should not be proceeded against for which he should be given a chance to reply.”

The same principle was reiterated by this Court in “Shoaib Sohail v. Ex officio Justice of Peace

and others” (2023 LHC 6369), where it was observed that before action under Section 182, the person sought to be prosecuted should be served with a show-cause notice and afforded an opportunity to explain his position/defence.The record before this Court does not disclose a specific show-cause notice identifying with precision the particular information allegedly furnished falsely, explaining the basis on which it was said to be false, and confronting the petitioner with the allegation that he knew or believed it to be false. This circumstance is not being treated as an isolated technical ground; it assumes significance because the prosecution case otherwise lacks clear material demonstrating the requisite mens rea.

14.Whether there is sufficient material to put the petitioner on trial under Section 182, P.P.C. and whether the later correction of the official record, by itself, can make the information given by the petitioner “knowingly false”. The answer is no. The learned trial Court and the learned revisional Court took the view that this question could be decided only after recording evidence. Normally, disputed questions of fact are to be decided by the trial Court. But this does not mean that every case must necessarily go to trial. Under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C., this Court can stop proceedings where the material on record does not disclose an essential ingredient of the alleged offence.

15.In the present case, this Court is not required to decide any disputed question of fact. The departmental inquiry and the subsequent correction of the CNIC entry are already part of the record. These documents show that there was an error in the official record and that the entry was later corrected. However, there is nothing on record to show that the petitioner knew that the information given by him was false

when he made it. Section 182, P.P.C. is concerned with the state of mind of the person when the information is given. The fact that an official record was later corrected does not, by itself, prove that the person knew his information to be false. Otherwise, a person could be prosecuted under Section 182 merely because his information led to the correction of an official record. This would go beyond the language of the section.

16.The power under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. is extraordinary and must be used carefully. But it is available to prevent abuse of the process of the Court and to secure the ends of justice. Where the material on record shows that no offence is made out, the proceedings can be stopped at the initial stage. In the present case, the material on record does not show that the petitioner knew or believed that the information given by him was false. It also does not show the intention required under Section 182, P.P.C. The petitioner approached the department regarding an incorrect CNIC entry in the property-tax record. The departmental inquiry later resulted in correction of that entry. Therefore, the correction of the record cannot, by itself, prove that the petitioner had deliberately given false information.

17.In these circumstances, the essential ingredients of Section 182, P.P.C. are not made out. Continuation of the proceedings would serve no useful purpose. It would also amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The instant petition is, therefore, allowed. The proceedings under Section 182, P.P.C. pending against the petitioner before the learned trial Court are hereby quashed. The orders dated 26.02.2025 and 24.03.2025 passed by the learned Courts below are also set aside.

18.It is, however, expressly clarified that nothing contained in this order shall be construed as a determination of title, ownership, inheritance rights or any other civil right relating to the property in question. Nor shall the observations made herein prejudice any independent civil, departmental or other lawful proceedings concerning the property or the official record. The present order is confined solely to the question whether the material relied upon is sufficient in law to sustain criminal proceedings against the petitioner under Section 182, P.P.C.

(GHULAM SARWAR NIHUNG)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

Iftikhar