Muhammad Qasim vs Umar Khan

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

LAHORE HIGH COURT

RAWALPINDI BENCH RAWALPINDI

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.654 of 2025

Muhammad Qasim vs. Umar Khan

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing: 08.10.2026 Petitioner by: Malik Saleem Iqbal Samair, Advocate.

Respondent: Proceeded against ex-parte on

Anwaar Hussain, J. Through this civil revision, the petitioner has challenged order dated 08.09.2025 passed by the Additional District Judge, Jand (“the Trial Court”), whereby his right to seek leave to defend a summary suit instituted under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”) was closed.

2.Brief facts of the case are that the respondent instituted a suit, under Order XXXVII Rules 1 and 2, CPC, for recovery of money on the basis of a cheque. Upon service of summons, the petitioner appeared before the Trial Court on 20.08.2025, and acknowledged his appearance by affixing his thumb impression. The matter was adjourned to 27.08.2025 with a direction to the petitioner to file an application for leave to defend. On that date, learned counsel appeared on his behalf, filed his power of attorney and sought further time, whereupon the matter was adjourned to 08.09.2025. Even on that date, no application was filed and another request for adjournment was made, which the Trial Court declined through the impugned order.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner, relying upon Adamjee Insurance Company Limited v. Techno International and others (2025 SCMR 756), contends that the prescribed period of ten days for seeking

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leave to defend is procedural and ought not to defeat the petitioner’s substantive right to contest the suit. Adds that the Trial Court itself granted successive adjournments without cautioning the petitioner that failure to file the application would entail closure of his right to appear and defend. Conversely, the respondent has already been proceeded against ex-parte, vide order dated 23.09.2026.

4.Arguments heard. Record perused.

5.The question requiring determination by this Court is whether adjournments granted by the Trial Court, without expressly cautioning the defendant about the consequences of default, can extend the statutory period for seeking leave to defend a summary suit. The answer lies in the distinction between the Court’s discretion to grant leave and the defendant’s obligation to seek it within the period prescribed by law.

6.Article 159 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (“Act”) prescribes ten days for seeking leave to appear and defend a suit under Order XXXVII, CPC. This requirement is integral to the summary procedure, which permits a defendant to contest the claim upon obtaining leave in accordance with law. The statutory period cannot be treated as suspended merely because the Trial Court grants an adjournment. An adjournment regulates the progress of proceedings; it does not, without lawful extension or condonation, enlarge a period fixed by the Act. Nor does the obligation to comply with the law depend upon a warning from the Court. To hold otherwise would make the operation of limitation contingent upon routine adjournment orders rather than the statutory scheme itself.

7.The record is clear. The petitioner appeared on 20.08.2025 and was expressly directed to file the application for leave to appear and defend. On 27.08.2025, counsel entered appearance on behalf of the petitioner and obtained further time until 08.09.2025. Yet no application

C.R. No.654 of 2025

was filed even on that date. The petitioner thus had notice of the proceedings, knowledge of the requirement to seek leave and the assistance of counsel of his choice. The absence of a further cautionary order could neither suspend limitation nor furnish, by itself, sufficient cause for non-compliance.

8.The law nevertheless recognises that delay may be condoned upon sufficient cause being established in accordance with Section 5 of the Act, read with Order XXXVII, Rule 3(3), CPC. The distinction is material: expiry of the prescribed period does not, by itself, preclude the Court from entertaining an otherwise maintainable request for condonation of delay; equally, an extension of time cannot be presumed merely because adjournments were granted or the Trial Court did not expressly caution the defendant about the consequences of non- compliance with the timeline provided to file leave to defend. In the present case, no application seeking condonation of delay was filed, nor was any sufficient cause for the omission placed before the Trial Court or this Court. The petitioner sought further time without first laying the legal foundation for enlargement of the prescribed period. In case reported as Waqas Mahmood v. Bilal Mir (2026 CLC 794), the Islamabad High Court disapproved condonation of delay in seeking leave to defend without a proper application and establishing sufficient cause, to explain delay of each day.

9.The reliance upon Adamjee Insurance Company Limited supra is also misplaced. That judgment concerns the exercise of judicial discretion in granting conditional or unconditional leave where applications for leave to defend had been filed and were before the Court for consideration. The Supreme Court of Pakistan explained that such discretion must be exercised upon the facts disclosed in support of the proposed defence, without prematurely deciding its merits. The present

C.R. No.654 of 2025

controversy arises at an anterior stage: despite repeated opportunities, no application for leave was filed at all. The discretion to grant leave upon a disclosed defence cannot be equated with a power to dispense with the statutory requirement of seeking that leave, within time. The cited judgment, therefore, does not advance the petitioner’s case. The statutory period for invoking that mechanism cannot be rendered inconsequential by successive requests for adjournment.

10.The petitioner was afforded opportunities to seek leave, yet neither filed the requisite application nor invoked the jurisdiction for condonation of delay by disclosing sufficient cause. The Trial Court, therefore, committed no illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. Consequently, this civil revision, being devoid of merit, is dismissed.

(ANWAAR HUSSAIN)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

Judge Maqsood*