Mehr Muhammad Baqir Vs NAB through Dy PGA etc

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P.No.7729 of 2023 (Mehar Muhammad Baqar v. NAB etc. )

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 30.09.2026.

Petitioner by: Syed Abur Rehman, Advocate.

Respondents by: Mr.Sadaqat Mahmood Butt, Special Prosecutor for NAB.

Muhammad Amjad Pervaiz, J. Through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution), the petitioner has called in question the legality of the order dated 21.10.2022, with the following prayer:- “Under these circumstances, it is, therefore, respectfully prayed that by accepting this writ petition, the impugned order dated 21.10.2022 may graciously be set aside and consequently the order for imposing fine of Rs.2 million to the petitioner is against law and facts and the same be declared illegal, for the sake of justice or to do complete justice to save the administration of justice.”

2.Brief facts giving rise to the instant petition are that the National Accountability Bureau (hereinafter referred to as NAB) filed Reference No.06/2001 against the petitioner on allegations of corruption and assets beyond known sources of income worth Rs.1,14,90,313/-. He was initially convicted under Section 10 read with Section 9(a)(v) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as NAO), vide judgment dated 28.07.2001, and sentenced to five years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1 million, with further rigorous imprisonment for one year in default of payment thereof, besides confiscation of certain properties. This Court, vide order dated 09.12.2002, accepted his appeal and remanded the matter to the learned trial

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Court with a direction to afford the alleged benamidars an opportunity of hearing. Upon remand, the learned Accountability Court, after affording the benamidars an opportunity of hearing, again convicted the petitioner vide judgment dated 24.07.2003 and sentenced him to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.10 million, with further rigorous imprisonment for two and a half years in default thereof. The petitioner challenged his conviction through Criminal Appeal No.1574 of 2003, which a learned Division Bench of this Court decided vide judgment dated 20.02.2006. The operative part thereof is reproduced hereunder:

“However, we find that previously before his case was remanded for hearing of Benamidars, the appellant was sentenced to five years imprisonment and to a fine of Rs.10,00,000/- with direction that his property in Chak No.72/RB, measuring 100-Kanals and 3-Marlas be confiscated. But the trial Court, later on, altered the sentence to 10 years R.I and fine to Rs.1,00,00,000/-. Why has there been such an increase in the quantum of fine? This was not explained by the learned counsel for the NAB.” We also feel that the appellant did suffer the rigor of trial quite for long. We, therefore, feel it will appropriate that he was sentenced to four years R.I and to a fine of Rs.20,00,000/- or in lieu thereof to suffer S.I. for one year. Benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C is given to him.”

The petitioner assailed the aforesaid judgment by filing a petition for leave to appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was subsequently dismissed as withdrawn. Consequently, the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner attained finality. The petitioner did not pay the aforesaid fine and, instead, underwent the imprisonment awarded in default thereof. It further transpires from the record that the petitioner subsequently approached this Court through W.P.No.2580/2006, seeking the following relief:

“In view of the above submissions, it is humbly prayed that by accepting this writ petition to declare the Letter Endst. No.JB/G- I/10379-10409 dated 11.3.2003 illegal, void, perverse, unwarranted, without lawful authority, and against law. Further prayed that the Respondent No.1 may graciously be directed to release the petitioner from his illegal custody, for the sake of justice or to do complete justice to save the administration of justice.”

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It is pertinent to note that, as per the memo of the aforesaid writ petition, the same was directed only against the Superintendent, Central Jail, Faisalabad and the Inspector General of Prisons, and NAB was not arrayed as a respondent therein. Moreover, the legal questions involved herein, particularly those relating to the subsisting liability to pay the fine or the competence of proceedings under Section 33-E of the NAO, were neither raised nor adjudicated upon therein. A learned Single Judge of this Court disposed of the said writ petition vide order dated 08.05.2006. The relevant portion thereof is reproduced hereunder:

“Petitioner has since been released from custody; therefore, there is no need to pass any specific order for the release of the petitioner from the prison. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that petitioner deposited fine and also underwent period of imprisonment in lieu of non payment of fine and period of imprisonment should be recalculated by giving benefit of remissions earned by him in accordance with law and as such a direction might be issued to the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Faisalabad.” Petitioner may obtain a requisite certificate from a Prison Authorities with regard to period of imprisonment undergone by him. In case he is of the view that he has over spent his time, he can claim refund of fine or proportionate amount thereof from the concerned authorities.”

However, it is admitted on record that the petitioner did not pay the fine. Consequently, NAB issued a letter dated 16.11.2015 calling upon him to deposit the outstanding amount, but despite such demand, the petitioner failed to discharge his liability. NAB was, therefore, constrained to move an application under Section 33-E of the NAO before the learned Accountability Court. The said application was dismissed vide order dated 21.07.2017. NAB challenged the order through W.P.No.88281 of 2017, which a learned Division Bench of this Court allowed vide order dated 27.01.2022. The operative part thereof reads as under:

“After hearing the matter at some length, we find that the order assailed through this petition was passed prior to the law declared by the apex Court in the judgment reported as The State and others vs. Muhammad Kaleem Bhatti and others (2019 SCMR1321), thus, the impugned order dated 21.07.2017 is set aside. The application filed by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending. The parties shall be afforded an opportunity of being heard and the learned trial court shall

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decide the afore stated application in view of law declared by apex Court in above judgment. All concerned shall appear before the learned trial court on 10.02.2022.

2.Disposed of accordingly.”

The petitioner did not assail the aforesaid order before any competent forum; consequently, the same attained finality. Accordingly, the learned trial Court took up the pending application and, after affording the parties an opportunity of hearing, ultimately allowed it under Section 33-E of the NAO vide order dated 21.10.2022, which the petitioner has impugned through the instant petition.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order is contrary to law and facts. His principal contention is that NAB did not challenge the judgment dated 20.02.2006 passed by this Court in Criminal Appeal No.1574 of 2003, whereby this Court modified the sentence imposed on the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner not only underwent the substantive sentence but also the sentence awarded in default of payment of fine. According to learned counsel, since NAB did not assail the order dated 08.05.2006 passed in W.P.No.2580/2006, proceedings under Section 33-E of the NAO were not competent. He further contends that, in any event, proceedings under Section 33-E were not maintainable, being barred by limitation, and in support of his contention places reliance upon Section 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as P.P.C.) and Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.).

4.Conversely, learned Special Prosecutor for NAB has vehemently opposed the petition and defended the impugned order. He contends that the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner, as modified by this Court, attained finality after the petitioner withdrew his petition for leave to appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. According to him, the petitioner was under a subsisting legal obligation to pay the fine.

W.P.No.7729 of 2023

5.To better appreciate the controversy, it would be advantageous first to reproduce the relevant statutory provisions The Pakistan Penal Code, 1860:

53.Punishments.— The punishments to which offenders are liable under the provisions of this Code are,---— Firstly, Qisas ;

Secondly, Diyat ;

Thirdly, Arsh ;

Fourthly, Daman Fifthly, Ta’zir Sixthly, Death Seventhly, Imprisonment for life;

Eighthly, Imprisonment which is of two descriptions, namely:—

(i)Rigorous, i.e., with hard labour;

(ii)Simple;

Ninthly, Forfeiture of property;

Tenthly, Fine

64.Sentence of imprisonment for non-payment of fine.—In every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment as well as fine, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, whether with or without imprisonment.

and in every case of an offence punishable with imprisonment or fine, or with fine only, in which the offender is sentenced to a fine, it shall be competent to the Court which sentences such offender to direct by the sentence that, in default of payment of the fine, the offender shall suffer imprisonment for a certain term, which imprisonment shall be in excess of any other imprisonment to which he may have been sentenced or to which he may be liable under a commutation of a sentence.

65.Limit to imprisonment for non-payment of fine when imprisonment and fine awardable: The term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned in default of payment of a fine shall not exceed one-fourth of the term of imprisonment, which is the maximum fixed for the offence, if the offence be punishable with imprisonment as well as fine.

66.Description of imprisonment for non-payment of fine: The imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of a fine may be of any description to which the offender might have been sentenced for the offence.

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67.Imprisonment for non-payment of fine when offence punishable with fine only: If the offence be punishable with fine only, the imprisonment which the Court imposes in default of payment of the fine shall be simple, and the term for which the Court directs the offender to be imprisoned, in default of payment of fine, shall not exceed the following scale that is to say, for any term not exceeding two months when the amount of the fine shall not exceed fifty rupees, and for any term not exceeding four months when the amount shall not exceed, one hundred rupees, and for any term not exceeding six months in any other case.

68.Imprisonment to terminate on payment of fine: The imprisonment which is imposed in default of payment of a fine shall terminate whenever that fine is either paid or levied by process of law.

69.Termination of imprisonment on payment of proportional part of fine: If, before the expiration of the term of imprisonment fixed in default of payment, such a proportion of the fine be paid or levied that the term of imprisonment suffered in default of payment is not less than proportional to the part of the fine still unpaid, the imprisonment shall terminate.

Illustration A is sentenced to fine of one hundred rupees and to four months, imprisonment in default of payment. Here, seventy-five rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the expiration of one month of the imprisonment. A will be discharged as soon as the first month has expired, if seventy- five rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of the first month, or at any later time while A continues imprisonment. A will be immediately discharged if fifty rupees of the fine be paid or levied before the expiration of two months of the imprisonment; A will be discharged as soon as the two months are completed, if fifty rupees be paid or levied at the time of the expiration of those two months, or at any later time while A continues in imprisonment; A will be immediately discharged.

70.Fine leviable within six years, or during imprisonment; Death not to discharge property from liability: The fine or any part thereof which remains unpaid, may be levied at any time within six years after the passing of the sentence, and if, under the sentence, the offender be liable to imprisonment for a longer period than six years, then at any time previous to the expiration of that period; and the death of the offender dose not discharge from the liability any property which would, after his death, be legally liable for his debts.

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The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

386.Warrant for levy of fine : (1) Whenever an offender has been sentenced to pay a fine, the Court passing the sentence may take action for the recovery of the fine in either or both of the following ways, that is to say, it may—

(a)issue a warrant for the levy of the amount by attachment and sale of any movable property belonging to the offender;

(b)issue a warrant .to the [District Officer (Revenue)] authorising him to realise the amount by execution according to civil process against the movable or immovable property, or both, of the defaulter. Provided that, if the sentence directs that in default of payment of the fine the offender shall be imprisoned, and if such offender has undergone the whole of such imprisonment in default, no Court shall issue such warrant.

(2)The Provincial Government, may make rules regulating the manner in which warrants under sub- section (1), clause (a), are to be executed, and for the summary determination if any claims made by any person other than the offender in respect of any property attached in execution of such warrant.

(3)Where the Courts issue a warrant to the [District Officer (Revenue)] under sub-section (1), clause- (b) such warrant shall be deemed to be a decree, and the Collector to be the decree-holder, within the meaning of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the nearest Civil Court by which any decree for a like amount could be executed shall, for the purposes, of the said Code, be deemed to be the Court which passed the .decree, and all the provisions of that Code as to execution of decrees shall apply accordingly: Provided that no such warrant shall be executed by the arrest or detention in prison of the offender.

431.Abatement of appeals: Every appeal under Section 411-A, sub-section (2), or Section 417 shall finally abate on-the death of the accused, and every other appeal under this Chapter except an appeal from a sentence of fine shall finally abate on the death of the appellant.

General Clauses Act, 1897 (hereinafter referred to as GCA).

25.Recovery of fines.—Sections 63 to 70 of the Pakistan Penal Code and the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the time being in force in relation to the issue and the execution of warrants for the levy of fines shall apply to all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law unless the Act, Regulation, rule or bye-law contains an express provision to the contrary.

As per the statutory scheme of the P.P.C. reproduced above, a fine is prescribed as punishment; the legislature has conferred

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discretionary jurisdiction upon the trial court to award imprisonment in default of payment of fine as a coercive measure to compel the offender to pay the fine1. Imprisonment in default of payment of a fine is not a sentence; rather, it is a penalty an offender incurs for non-payment of the fine. This is in excess of any other imprisonment to which the offender may have been sentenced. For this reason, the law does not authorize the court to direct sentences of imprisonment in default of payment of fine to run concurrently2. A fine may be levied notwithstanding that the offender has served the full term of imprisonment for default of payment of fine3; serving the imprisonment does not extinguish the liability to pay the fine and the same may not be taken as a discharge of the liability, but it is only a reasonable punishment for the non-payment of fine. Even the death of a convict does not discharge from liability any property that may be legally liable for his debts. As per section 431 Cr.P.C. (ibid), even an appeal against conviction does not abate to the extent of fine4. Through Section 25 ibid, the legislature has made the aforesaid provision of sections 63 to 70 P.P.C. and Cr.P.C. applicable for the levy of all fines imposed under any Act, Regulation, Rule or By-law unless the same contains an express provision to the contrary. It would suffice to observe that the pecuniary liability of fine as punishment does not extinguish even after undergoing imprisonment thereof or even after death of a convict, as the same remains recoverable, albeit subject to the time limitation prescribed by section 70 P.P.C. ibid.

6.It has been canvassed at the bar that since the provisions of sections 63 to 70 P.P.C. and section 386 Cr.P.C. are applicable to all fines by virtue of section 25 GCA, hence, recovery proceedings Ashfaq Ahmad v. State (PLD 1968 Lahore 1124, Bagh and 3 others v. The State (PLD 1979 Karachi 261)

Abdul Wahid v. The State (2006 YLR 915), Shaheen Tahir v. Superintendent, Central Jail, Faisalabad (PLD 2008 Lahore 497), Jaffar Khan v. The State (2010 YLR 2205), Fazal- e-Haq v. Superintendent Central Prison Mardan (2020 P Cr.L.J 1067) Ahmad Ali Siddiqui v. Sargodha Central Cooperative Bank Limited and another (1989

SCMR 824)

Asmat Ullah Khan and others vs. The State and others (PLD 2024 SC 1119

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in this case were illegal and without lawful authority for having become time-barred and no warrant could be issued under section 386 Cr.P.C. as the petitioner has undergone the whole of imprisonment in default thereof. We need not delve into the question of the starting point of the limitation prescribed by Section 70 P.P.C., nor do we need to examine whether Section 386 Cr.P.C., being a provision of an adjective and procedural law, may control Section 70 P.P.C., which is substantive law.

7.We confine ourselves to the controversy involved herein. The instant case is under NAO, which is a special law. It is of its own kind in the field of criminal law; it was promulgated with overriding effect over all other laws when the P.P.C., the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and the Offenses in Respect of Bank Ordinance, 1984 were already in force. What distinguishes the NAO from the other laws on the subject of corruption is its object and purpose as reflected in its preamble, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereunder:- “WHEREAS it is expedient and necessary to provide for effective measures for the detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, misuse or abuse of power or authority, misappropriation of property, taking of kickbacks, commissions and for matters connected and ancillary or incidental thereto;

AND WHEREAS there is an emergent need for the recovery of outstanding amounts from those persons who have committed default in the repayment of amounts to Banks, Financial Institutions, Governmental agencies and other agencies;

AND WHEREAS there is a grave and urgent need for the recovery of state money and other assets from those persons who have misappropriated or removed such money or assets through corruption, corrupt practices and misuse of power or authority: .....”

The purpose and object as reflected in the preamble and overall scheme of NAO has also been elaborately explained in several judgments; some of which are cited below:-

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Saleem Raza case ... [T]he object and purpose of enacting the NAB Ordinance is not to keep the accused persons in custody for longer periods, but the main purpose is to recover the outstanding amounts and State money misappropriated by the persons prosecuted. The entire scheme of plea bargain, power to freeze the property, holding the transfer of property void, voluntary return, constitution of Conciliation Committees for payment of loans, reference of cases to Governor State Bank of Pakistan and prior approval of State Bank, are directed in this behalf. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while, examining various provisions of the NAB Ordinance in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 S.C. 607, held that one of the purposes and object of the law was to recover the ill-gotten money.

The Supreme Court of Pakistan cited Saleem Raza with approval in Nazar Hussain v. State, PLD 2010 SC 1021, and Mazhar Iftikhar v. Shahbaz Latif, PLD 2015 SC 1. At this stage, it would be advantageous to reproduce the other provisions of the NAO, relevant to the controversy herein.

Section 3. Ordinance to override other laws:- The provisions of this Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force.

10.Punishment for corruption and corrupt practice:-

(a)A holder of public office or any other person who commits the offence of corruption and corrupt practices shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to fourteen years and with fine and such of the assets and pecuniary resources of such holder of public office or person, as are found to be disproportionate to the known sources of his income or which are acquired by money obtained through corruption and corrupt practices whether in his name or in the name of any of his dependents, or benamidars shall be forfeited to the appropriate Government or the concerned bank or financial institution as the case may be.

Section: 17 (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, unless there is anything inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Act V of 1898) shall mutatis mutandis, apply to the proceedings under this Ordinance.

Section 33-E. Recovery of amount of fines, etc., as arrears of land revenue:- Any fine or other sum due under this Ordinance, or as determined to be due by a Court, shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue.

Saleem Raza v. State, PLD 2007 Karachi 139 (3 member bench)

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The combined perusal of the preamble, section 10 and the interpretation as per the above judgments makes it clear that unlike other laws, the primary purpose and object of the NAO is not only the punishment but also the fine and forfeiture of assets and pecuniary resources acquired through corruption and corrupt practices either in the name of the accused or any of his dependents or benamidars. In simple words, the legislative intent is not only to punish but also to recover the proceeds of corruption. The legislature, in its own wisdom, has given the NAO an overriding effect over all other laws, and the Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis unless anything in the NAO is inconsistent; Section 33-E provides its own mode of recovery of fine and other sum determined to be due by the court as arrears of land revenue. Hence, section 386 Cr.P.C. is not applicable being inconsistent with section 33-E ibid. Since the NAO contains an express provision for recovery of fines contrary to Section 25 GCA, it is also inapplicable to the extent of the express provisions of the NAO, and similarly,the limitation period prescribed under Section 70 of P.P.C. also does not apply to recovery proceedings under Section 33-E of the NAO, 1999. Reading such a limitation into the NAO framework would undermine the clear, deliberate legislative focus on recovering public assets. The entire design of the NAO, including the creation of special tools like Voluntary Return, Plea Bargain, and recovery as arrears of land revenue, shows that the legislative intent was to prioritize enforcement of financial liability without the procedural barriers applicable under general criminal law. Under Section 33-E ibid, fine or other sum determined as due by the court remains recoverable notwithstanding undergoing the full term of imprisonment in default thereof. This is not without reason, as at times, even with diligent efforts by the authority, certain factors may prevent timely recovery. These factors may include a lack of knowledge of the offenders’ assets, the offender subsequently inheriting or acquiring property after serving imprisonment in default, or

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procedural or administrative delays not attributable to NAB. It is for this reason that no time limitation has been provided in the NAO, and the recovery proceedings may be initiated later when assets come to light. It would defeat the very purpose of the NAO if a convict is allowed to discharge his liability to pay a fine by serving a default imprisonment. Such an interpretation would run contrary to the legislative intent, undermine the public interest in restoring public assets and render section 33-E ibid largely redundant.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we hold that Section 70 P.P.C. and Section 386 Cr.P.C. have no application to the recovery of fine or other sums determined as due under the NAO. Consequently, the limitation contemplated under Section 70 P.P.C. cannot be imported into proceedings under Section 33-E, nor does the convict’s having undergone imprisonment in default of payment of fine extinguish his underlying liability to pay the fine. Reliance in this regard is placed upon the following judgments by the Honorable Supreme Court:

Muhammad Kaleem Bhatti case

3.In some of the present cases an issue had also arisen as to whether by virtue of the provisions of section 70, P.P.C. the amount of fine imposed upon a convict can be recovered after a period of six years after passage of the sentence or fine or not. We note that in section 33-E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 it has categorically been provided that a fine imposed upon a convict is to be recovered by way of arrears of land revenue and the said provision is not controlled by or subject to the provisions of section 70, P.P.C. It appears that in the relevant present cases the High Court had again misdirected itself upon the law and had relied upon the provisions of section 70, P.P.C.

without appreciating that the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 were to prevail in the matter as that was the special law catering for the situation at hand.”

State and others v. Muhammad Kaleem Bhatti and others (2019 SCMR

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Mumtaz Ali case “10. The learned counsel for the applicant referred to the case State and others v. Muhammad Kaleem Bhatti and others (2019 SCMR 1321) in which the point in issue before this Court was whether by virtue of the provisions of Section 70, Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ("P.P.C.") the amount of fine imposed upon a convict can be recovered after a period of six years after passage of the sentence or fine, or not. This Court held that in Section 33-E of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 it has categorically been provided that a fine imposed upon a convict is to be recovered by way of arrears of land revenue and the said provision is not controlled by or subject to the provisions of Section 70, P.P.C. It was further held that the High Court had misdirected itself upon the law and had relied upon the provisions of Section 70, P.P.C. without appreciating that the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 were to prevail in the matter as that was the special law catering for the situation at hand. Finally, this Court set aside the judgments passed by the High Court and clarified that by undergoing a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine a convict is not absolved of his liability to pay fine and the amount of fine can still be recovered from him despite undergoing the sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine because a sentence of imprisonment in default of payment of fine is only a punishment for non-payment of fine and is not a substitute for the sentence of fine.”

8 While parting with this judgment, another issue has engaged our attention, i.e., whether recovery of fine from the petitioner who has undergone imprisonment in default of payment of fine may attract the mischief of double jeopardy. For the sake of convenience, the relevant provisions are reproduced hereunder:- Article of the Constitution:

13.No person -

(a)shall be prosecuted or punished for the same offence more than once; or

(b)Shall, when accused of an offence, be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Mumtaz Ali v. The State through Chairman NAB and others (2024 SCMR

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Cr.P.C.

"403. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same offence.

(1). A person who has once been tried by a court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under section 236 or for which he might have been convicted under section 237.

(2). A person acquitted or convicted of any offence may be afterwards tried for any distinct offence for which separate charge might have been made against him on the former trial under section 235, subsection (1).

(3). A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequence which, together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted, may be after wards tried for such last-mentioned offence if the consequences had not happened, or were not known to the court to have happened, at the time when he was convicted.

(4)A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any act may, notwithstanding such acquittal or conviction, be subsequently charged with, and tried for, any other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the Court by which he was first tried was not competent to try the offence with which he is subsequently charged.

(5). Nothing in this section shall affect the provisions of section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 or section 188 of this Code.

Explanation.- The dismissal of a complaint, the stopping of proceedings under section 249, or the discharge of accused is not an acquittal for the purposes of this Section."

26 GCA.

"26. Provision as to offences punishable under two or more enactments.- Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished for same offence."

A bare reading of the above provisions conjointly makes it clear that the protection against double punishment may apply only in a case of a second prosecution and punishment for the same offence which is not the case herein. As noted above, the conviction and sentence awarded to the petitioner attained finality upon withdrawal of his petition for leave to appeal from the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. The proceedings against him under section 33-E ibid to recover the fine are merely

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consequential to enforcing the financial liability determined by a court of competent jurisdiction and do not amount to subjecting the petitioner to a second prosecution or punishment for the offence for which he has already been tried and convicted8. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner was under a binding legal obligation to pay the fine imposed upon him, which he not only failed to discharge but also protracted the matter on one pretext or the other for more than two decades; we have found the instant petition to be devoid of any merit; rather, the same is frivolous; hence, the same is hereby dismissed. We have shown judicial restraint and have not imposed costs.

9.Since recovery of the fine has been pending for the last twenty years, the concerned authorities are directed to conclude the recovery proceedings, strictly in accordance with law, within three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order, positively and without fail. A compliance report shall be submitted to the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) of this Court.

(AALIA NEELUM) (MUHAMMAD AMJAD PERVAIZ)

CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

(AALIA NEELUM) (MUHAMMAD AMJAD PERVAIZ)

CHIEF JUSTICE JUDGE

This judgment has been pronounced on 30.09.2026, dictated, prepared and signed on the 15.10.2026.

M.J.Mehmood

Abdul Jabbar v. Chairman NAB (PLD 2016 Peshawar 298 (3 members Bench)