Mian Abbas Ahmad vs Commissioner etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,

MULTAN BENCH MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

Mian Abbas Ahmad Versus Commissioner Multan, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing: 12.10.2026 Petitioner by: Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, ASC with the Petitioner/Mian Abbas Ahmad, ASC and Mian Muhammad Ishfaq, ASC.

Respondents by: Mr. Bashir Ahmed Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General.

Mr. Mughees Aslam Malik, ASC with Mahar Ahmad Nawaz Sial, Advocate for the Respondent/MC Multan.

JAWAD HASSAN, J. The Petitioner through this writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”) has impugned the quasi-judicial order dated 11.05.2026, issued by the Respondent No.2/Chief Officer, Municipal Corporation, Multan, being illegal and unlawful.

2.Mr. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti, ASC submitted that the Petitioner applied for sanction of commercial site plan on 08.12.2005, which was initially scrutinized by the then Tehsil Municipal Administration (TMA) and he was directed to deposit Rs.42,470/- as building fee while Rs.12,000/- as processing fee for the commercialization of the property total measuring about 6-Marla, with specification of 70-feet long & 20-feet wide at the corner of the address mentioned therein. This site plan was submitted in

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

view of clause 25 to clause 32 of the schedule-VI of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance 2001 (“Ordinance 2001”), which was notified in view of Section 195 of the Ordinance. The TMA did not process the site plan so submitted within specified period of three months and even thereafter. For the first time it was placed before the Commercialization Committee for the commercialization of the property under the then applicable Commercialization Policy 2004 (the “Policy 2004”) in its meeting held on 03.07.2006 and the Committee deferred the sanctioning of the plan and commercialization against item Serial No.4 with a further direction to the building department regarding the availability of off-set and parking in the site plan. The then TMA did not process the same till issuance of notice to the petitioner dated 22.09.2006, which was accordingly replied and the matter remained pending with the Commercialization Committee and TMA without any order. In the meantime the petitioner completed the building which remained unused for more than 10 years for any purpose, however, same was handed over to Lazer Eye clinic, for Eye Treatment, with the implied impression that the site plan stood sanctioned and all the objections are removed by the TMA. However, in the year 2022, the Petitioner also submitted his application for construction of 2nd storey, whereafter, the matter remained pending either before the TMA/Commissioner Multan Division Multan or before this Court, when the matter was finally decided through writ petition No.3786/2023 on 02.01.2025, whereby the view expressed by the TMO Planning and the commissioner Multan Division Multan dated 10.12.2022 and 05.01.2023 were set aside on legal point by referring certain judgments. Whereupon vide order dated 11.05.2026, the Chief Officer Municipal Corporation Multan rejected the application with a direction to charge commercialization fee on the property applicable in the year 2025-26 under Punjab Local Government Land Use Plan Rules 2020 (the “Plan Rules 2020”), which were framed under Punjab Local Government Land Use Plan (Classification, Reclassification and Redevelopment Rules) 2020 (Rules 2020).

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

3.Learned counsel submitted that while passing the impugned order no proper right of audience has been provided to the Petitioner. He urged that the impugned order is ultra vires, suffers from non-application of mind and without lawful authority, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.

4.Conversely, learned Law Officer as well as learned counsel for the Respondents have objected to the maintainability of this Petition by defending the impugned order being passed in accordance with law and policy.

5.Heard. Record Perused.

6.It is noted that there is a chain of judgments rendered by the Superior Courts of the country from time to time on similar issue. Firstly, the matter was brought before the legal system of Pakistan in the case of Sutlej Cotton Mills Ltd. Okara versus Industrial Court, West Pakistan, Lahore and others (PLD 1966 SC 472) wherein the Supreme Court of Pakistan has enunciated certain principles, which were then followed in the case of Brig. (Retd.) F.B. Ali and another versus The State (PLD 1975 SC 506). In a dispute between a housing society and the Karachi Development Authority (KDA), the Honorable Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Karachi Development Authority, Karachi Versus Works Co-Operative Housing Society, Karachi and Another (PLD 1978 SCMR 307) has decided whether the price to be paid should be the one prevailing at the time of the initial allotment or the one existing after KDA's subsequent actions. The petition of KDA was dismissed by the Court. In the judgment Works Co-operative Housing Society, Karachi and Another v. Karachi Development Authority (PLD 1978 Karachi 529), the Sindh High Court addressed whether the KDA could charge rates prevailing at the time of allotment or at a later date. The Court held: “On the other hand, Mr. Brohi contended that the Society cannot charge any higher rate than the one prevalent at the time when allotment of the area was made to the petitioner Society... the question is whether the K.D.A. is entitled to charge the higher rates which were determined subsequently. We feel that, in view of the

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

directions given by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the K.D.A. has to honour the commitments made by the Central and the Provincial Governments to the petitioner Society, as expressed in Notification dated 9th June 1964, we have got to implement those orders in the light of the rates and the charges that were prevalent on 9th June 1964.” In another judgment reported as Mrs. Hamida Suleman and Another v. Sindh Building Control Authority through Director General and 6 others (2017 MLD 1391), the Court laid down the principle that the law prevailing at the time when the cause of action accrued governs the rights of the parties, particularly in fiscal matters. The Court, relying on a precedent of the Honorable Supreme Court, observed: "As regards the issue of applicability of the policy for change of land use and master planning 2003, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Petition No.429-K of 2004 has observed that 'it is settled principle of law that rights of the parties shall be governed/ decided as per the law prevailing at the time when cause of action has accrued, particularly in the matters pertaining to fiscal disputes.' Admittedly, the subject plot was commercialized as far back as in 1987 and there arises no occasion for the petitioners to seek change of land use as the status of subject plot already stood changed from residential to commercial and respondent/KMC cannot demand difference of commercial fee at the new rates once the petitioners have paid the commercialization and town planning charges at the then prevailing rate to the respondent, as such, the policy for change of land use and master planning 2003 would certainly be not applicable to the petitioners' plot. Later on this view was further affirmed in the cases of City District Government, Karachi versus Muhammad Irfan and others (2010 SCMR 1186), Government of Sindh through Secretary Agriculture and Livestock Department and others versus Messrs Khan Ginners (Private) Limited and 57 others (PLD 2011 SC 347), Dy. District Officer (Revenue) Lahore and others Raja Muhammad Yousaf and others (2016 SCMR 203), Taisei Corporation and another versus A.M. Construction Company (Pvt.) Ltd. and another (2024 SCMR 640). The issue was also dealt with by

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

various High Courts and in this regard, reference can be made to the judgments reported as Mst. Sobia Hanif versus The Collector (Deputy Commissioner), Lahore District, Lahore and 5 others (1993 CLC 2073), Major (Rtd.) Muhammad Suleman Khan versus D.C./Registrar, Lahore District (2002 CLC 226), Sardar Muhammad versus Province of Punjab through Sub-Registrar and another (2017 CLC Note 49) and Mrs. Nighat Saimi and another versus Province of Sindh through Secretary Revenue and 10 others (PLD 2017 Sindh 596) whereas the main judgment has been passed by this Court in the case of Syed Ali Shah versus Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Defence and 2 others (1994 CLC 369) in which the principle of non-retroactivity has been discussed. Moreover, this Court recently in the judgment reported as “Muhammad Abbas versus Province of Punjab and others” (PLD 2025 Lahore 749), has discussed in detail the principle of non-retroactivity in context of prospective, fair and transparent application of law.

7.In view of above, it is abundantly clear that while passing the impugned order the Respondent No.2 has neither provided any solid grounds for rejection of representation nor mentioned the specific rules or the relevant provision of law. Hence, passed a non-speaking order which is not sustainable in the eye of law. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of “MOLLAH EJAHAR ALI Versus GOVERNMENT OF EAST PAKISTAN and Others” (PLD 1970 SC 173) has explained the need and importance for passing a speaking order by stating that: "There is no doubt that the High Court's order which is unfortunately purfunctory gives the impression of a hasty off- hand decision which, although found to be correct in its result, is most deficient in its content. if a summary order of rejection can be made in such terms, there is no reason why a similar order of acceptance saying "there is considerable substance in the petition which is accepted", should not be equally blessed. This will reduce the whole judicial process to authoritarian

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

decrees without the need for logic and reasoning which have always been the traditional pillars of judicial pronouncements investing them with their primary excellence of propriety and judicial balance. Litigants who bring their disputes to the law Courts with the incidental hardships and expenses involved do expect a patient and a judicious treatment of their cases and their determination by proper orders. A judicial order must be a speaking order manifesting by itself that the Court has applied its mind to the resolution of the issues involved for their proper adjudication. The ultimate result may be reached by a laborious effort, but if the final order does not bear an imprint of that effort and on the contrary discloses arbitrariness of thought and action, the feeling with its painful results, that justice has neither been done nor seems to have been done is inescapable. When the order of a lower Court contains no reasons, the appellate Court is deprived of the benefit of the views of the lower Court and is unable to appreciate the processes by which the decision has been reached."

8.Similarly, the Honorable Courts in various judgments, has directed several authorities to adhere to the above-mentioned principle while passing a speaking order with reasons and after keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, applicable law as well as precedents, if available. Reliance is placed on the case titled “TOWN COMMITTEE, PIPLAN Versus Muhammad Hanif and others” (2008 SCMR 723). It is also worth mentioning that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law as envisaged by Article 4 of the Constitution. Hence, it is the duty and obligation of every public functionary, including the Respondents, to act within the four corners of the mandate of the Constitution and pass a speaking order.

W.P. No.9785 of 2026

9.When confronted with the above legal position, learned Law Officer and learned counsel for the Respondent/MC Multan did not submit any satisfactory reply.

10.According to the jurisprudence developed in the aforesaid judgments, it is a settled principle that the rights of the parties, particularly in fiscal matters, are to be determined in accordance with the law and prevailing rates at the time when the cause of action arose. A retroactive application of policy or imposition of additional demands, after full compliance of the lawful requirement, is not justified. Hence, in order to advance the cause of justice and to prevent any miscarriage of justice, this Court is of the view that the Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed, impugned order dated 11.05.2026, issued by the Respondent No.2/Chief Officer, Municipal Corporation, Multan, is set aside. No order as to costs.

Copy dasti on payment of usual charges.

(JAWAD HASSAN)

JUDGE

[email protected]