Mehar Farhan Vs The State

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

CRIMINAL APPEAL No.41471-J of 2024

Mehar Farhan Vs The State, etc.

JUDGMENT

DATE OF HEARING: 15.10.2026.

APPELLANT BY: Ch. Ali Murtaza and Muhammad Matloob Sindhu, Advocates.

STATE BY: Barrister Zafar Ullah Khan, Advocate General, Punjab and Ms. Khalida Parveen, Additional Advocate General, Punjab.

Mr. Muhammad Irfan Sadiq Tarar, Prosecutor General, Punjab, Dr. Usman Iqbal and Mr. Muhammad Naveed Umar Bhatti, Deputy Prosecutors General, Punjab.

COMPLAINANT BY: Mr. Majid Mahmood Mirza and Ghulam Sarwar Chaudhary, Advocates.

MUHAMMAD AMJAD RAFIQ, J:- A single, fatal blow from a hockey stick to the head of Abu Huraira sealed a tragic fate and drew appellant Mehar Farhan into a grueling trial. Tried before the Additional Sessions Judge in Gujrat alongside four co-accused who ultimately walked free, Farhan faced the shadow of FIR No. 178 of 2020. On the 30th of May, 2024, the gavel fell: conviction under section 302(b) PPC for qatl-i-amd, translating to a sentence of imprisonment for life. Alongside the heavy toll of imprisonment, justice demanded a monetary reckoning, a compensation of Rs. 500,000 under section 544A of Cr.P.C., to the mourning heirs, backed by six months of simple imprisonment in default, while acknowledging the time he had already spent behind bars under section 382B Cr.P.C.

The titled jail appeal has been preferred by the accused/appellant to assail his above conviction and sentence.

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2.On 10th July afternoon in 2020, a routine motorcycle ride turned into an ambush. As Muhammad Yousaf and his nephew, Abu Huraira, crossed the railway tracks toward G.T. Road, a swarm of motorcycles intercepted them. Shouting fierce incitements, the assailants dragged Abu Huraira from the bike into an adjoining lawn, unleashing a flurry of blows with pistols, pipes, and sticks. Amidst the chaos, a single, devastating hockey strike to the head by the appellant sealed his fate. Leaving their victim unconscious on the grass, the attackers fled into the afternoon with aerial gunfire and echoing threats, leaving a trail of grief that ended the following day at the hospital when Abu Huraira breathed his last.

3.Following a thorough investigation, the formal charge sheet was laid before the court, drawing a line in the sand. The accused faced their indictments, firmly denying the charges and demanding a trial. As the prosecution unspooled its web of evidence, the stage turned to the defence. Refusing to step into the witness box on oath or summon witnesses of his own, the appellant stood silent under his statutory examination, leaving the court to weigh the scales. When the dust finally settled, justice delivered a divided verdict: the co-accused walked away absolved into freedom, while the appellant was left to bear the heavy weight of conviction.

4.The learned counsel for the appellant while giving a primary challenge argued that the FIR suffered from an unexplained delay of over thirty hours. He challenged the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, noting the partisan status of the complainant (the deceased’s paternal uncle) and branding PW-10 as a chance witness, and highlighted that the recovered hockey stick was neither blood-stained nor transmitted to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency. It was further submitted that the deceased, entangled in student-group rivalries, fell victim to an unknown assailant. However, he also raised an alternative plea that without prejudice to the above, the defense contended that no element of premeditation was established. With the co-accused acquitted, the motive unproved, and the investigating officer uncovering no evidence of conspiracy, the lalkara was merely intended to humble the deceased's pride rather than cause his death. Emphasizing that only a single hockey blow was attributed to the

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appellant and that death ensued after more than thirty hours, the counsel urged that the case falls under Section 302(c) PPC rather than Section 302(b) PPC.

5.In opposition to the appeal, the learned Deputy Prosecutor General, assisted by counsel for the complainant, contended that the accused was expressly named by the victim himself in the medical history recorded in his medicolegal certificate. Furthermore, they maintained that the eyewitness account of an independent witness is fully corroborated by the medical evidence. However, they candidly conceded that the incident lacked any element of premeditation or pre-concert.

6.Heard. Record perused.

7.It was a case with a single hockey blow, yet the trial court found its hands tied. Under Section 302(b) of the Pakistan Penal Code, it had no option left to pass a lesser sentence, compelled to hand down imprisonment for life. This realization weighed heavily on the Court: a tragic qatl-i-amd triggered by a trivial dispute and committed with an unconventional weapon now bore the exact same weight in the eyes of the law as a calculated, brutal atrocity. Left without formal, enacted sentencing guidelines, courts often struggle to explore alternatives. Instead, judges are left hunting for scattered aggravating and mitigating circumstances buried across various superior court judgments, exercising their own discretion to pass sentences. The result? A troubling inconsistency in sentencing that leaves the criminal justice system trapped in a loop, falling short of society's demands for true justice. A glimmer of hope had emerged when the Provincial Legislature enacted the Punjab Sentencing Act of 2019. Yet, its operability remained frozen, dependent entirely on an official notification from the Government of the Punjab. Determined to ascertain the status and enforceability of this vital legislation, the Court issued notices to the learned Advocate General, Punjab, and the learned Prosecutor General, Punjab, for October 15, 2026. When the learned Advocate General appeared before the bench, he shared a welcome development: following a formal letter addressed by his office to the

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provincial government, the long-awaited notification had finally been issued. The text of the notification reads as follows:

The aforesaid notification has brought the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019, into operation; the sentencing is no longer a matter of guesswork. Per Section 6, neither the prosecution nor the defense can sway the court toward a harsher or more lenient penalty through mere arguments, assumptions, or conjecture. Every aggravating or mitigating circumstance must be rigorously proven through legally admissible witness testimony or documentary evidence brought directly onto the record during trial.

8.However, while applying the Act to the case in hand, this Court encounters a difficulty that requires consideration. The foremost issue before the Court was whether the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 could be invoked in cases of qatl-i-amd committed under the mitigating circumstances enumerated in Section 7 of the Act, so as to meaningfully distinguish between a homicide arising out of a trivial altercation resulting

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in a single blow inflicted with an unconventional weapon, and a brutal, calculated act involving multiple injuries. However, a plain reading of Section 3 of the Act revealed that its provisions apply only where the prescribed punishment consists of a range of terms of imprisonment; conversely, they do not extend to cases in which capital punishment forms part of the statutory spectrum of penalties. The relevant section is as under;

3.Scope and application of the Act. – (1) The provisions of the Act shall be applicable in cases where a time range of imprisonment is a punishment.

(2)The provisions of the Act shall not be applicable in cases where capital punishment is provided within the range of punishments.

Significantly, Section 3 employs the term “cases” rather than “offences.” The distinction is neither accidental nor inconsequential. An offence is the unlawful act, omission, or conduct that the law declares punishable; theft, hurt, and murder are offences because the legislature has criminalized them and prescribed corresponding punishments. A case, on the other hand, is the procedural and judicial process that commences once an offence is alleged. It originates with the registration of a First Information Report, progresses through police investigation and the submission of a report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 and culminates in a trial before a competent court. Consequently, a single case may encompass multiple offences and penal provisions.

9.This distinction gave rise to a pivotal legal question: whether cases involving offences that carry capital punishment among the available sentencing options stand excluded from the ambit of the Sentencing Act at the very inception, or whether the applicability of the Act falls to be determined only after the trial court has assessed the facts and decided which of the statutorily prescribed punishments is ultimately warranted. Put differently, where an offence provides for three alternative punishments, namely death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment extending up to twenty-five years, and the trial court, upon evaluating the evidence, concludes that the circumstances justify the lesser punishment of imprisonment up to twenty-five years, can the Court then invoke the

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provisions of the Sentencing Act despite the exclusionary language contained in Section 3?

10.Upon careful consideration, it emerges that the applicability of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 is determined by the legal character of the offence as defined by the relevant penal statute, rather than by the particular sentence ultimately awarded by the trial court. The inquiry, therefore, is directed at the offence in its statutory form and not at the punishment eventually selected after the conclusion of the trial. In this context, Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code is inherently a capital offence, as death is expressly prescribed among the punishments authorized by the provision. The inclusion of capital punishment is integral to the statutory scheme of the offence and forms part of its legal classification. It is, therefore, the nature of the offence itself, and not the sentence eventually imposed in a given case, that governs the question of jurisdictional applicability under the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019. The legislative framework of the Act indicates a deliberate exclusion of offences carrying capital punishment from its ambit. Consequently, where an accused is tried for an offence under Section 302 PPC, the case falls outside the operational scope of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 notwithstanding the fact that Section 302 also contemplates alternative punishments of imprisonment for life or imprisonment extending up to twenty-five years.

10.1 Thus, while offences under Sections 308, 316, 319, and 320 PPC may fall within the ambit of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019, the Act has no application to punishments consisting exclusively of fine, Arsh, Daman, or Diyat. Consequently, where Diyat alone is prescribed as the punishment, such as under Section 322 PPC, the sentencing framework provided by the Act is inapplicable. Likewise, where Diyat or Arsh is coupled with a term of imprisonment, the Court's discretion under the Act extends only to the custodial sentence. The amount of Diyat or Arsh remains governed by the substantive provisions of law and cannot be enhanced or reduced on the basis of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, in offences under Sections 308, 316, 319,

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320, 322 PPC, and the relevant provisions relating to hurt, the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 may regulate the term of imprisonment where applicable, but it does not authorize any variation in the quantum of Diyat, Arsh, Daman, or fine.

11.Another question arising within the framework of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 concerns offences for which the legislature has prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence, despite such offences not carrying capital punishment. In this regard, it is a settled principle that structured sentencing legislation serves as a procedural framework intended to guide judicial discretion within the limits established by the substantive law; it does not override or amend the penal statute creating the offence. Consequently, where a penal provision prescribes a minimum sentence, that minimum constitutes a mandatory statutory floor below which the court cannot descend. Mitigating circumstances, such as youth, lack of previous convictions, or genuine remorse, may justify the imposition of the lowest sentence permitted by law, but they cannot authorize a sentence below the prescribed minimum. The court's discretion remains confined to the range between the statutory minimum and maximum punishments. Therefore, the Act regulates the exercise of sentencing discretion within the boundaries fixed by the legislature; it does not empower courts to disregard or dilute mandatory minimum sentences.

12.In the United Kingdom (specifically England and Wales), the legal framework handles this differently than systems that completely wall off capital or historical "capital-equivalent" crimes from standard sentencing legislation. Murder and life-imprisonment crimes are not excluded from the main body of UK sentencing legislation; in fact, they are explicitly integrated into it. UK permanently abolished the death penalty for murder through “The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965”. Capital punishment no longer exists in British law, there is no longer a category of "capital offences" carrying execution. The most severe penalty available is mandatory life imprisonment. Rather than being excluded from modern sentencing laws, the sentencing rules for murder form a core part of the Sentencing Act 2020 (specifically through Schedule 21 of the Act). A life

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sentence is mandatory for murder, a judge cannot choose a fixed-term number of years (like 15 or 20 years total) as the primary sentence. Instead, the judge must sentence the offender to life imprisonment. Under the Sentencing Act 2020, the judge uses statutory "starting points" (e.g., 15 years, 25 years, 30 years, or a Whole Life Order) laid out by Parliament to calculate the minimum term the offender must serve in prison before becoming eligible for parole. Even though a life sentence is mandatory for murder, the UK sentencing framework heavily incorporates mitigating and aggravating factors:

Adjusting the Tariff: Mitigating circumstances (such as provocation, a lesser role in the crime, mental disorders, youth, or lack of premeditation) do not allow the judge to escape the life sentence, but they directly reduce the minimum tariff term that the offender must serve behind bars.

Judicial Discretion: Unlike systems where statutory minimums completely block judicial leniency, UK judges use structured guidelines to weigh culpability and adjust the severity of the punishment within the mandatory life framework.

13.In Pakistan this judicial discretion is not available but the minimum tariff term is handled by the executives. Rule 140 of the Pakistan Prisons Rules 1978 reads as under;

Rule. 140. (i) Imprisonment for life will mean twenty- five years rigorous imprisonment and every lifer prisoner shall undergo a minimum of fifteen years substantive imprisonment.

(ii)The case of all prisoners sentenced to imprisonment for life shall be referred to Government, through the Inspector General, after they have served fifteen years substantive imprisonment for consideration with reference to section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

(iii)The cases of all prisoners sentenced to cumulative periods of imprisonment aggregating twenty-five years or more shall also be submitted to Government, through the Inspector General, when they have served fifteen years substantive sentence for orders of the Government.

However, executive authority of the government has a discretion to seek judicial indulgence in such matters, because when the case of a prisoner is sent to the government under section 401 of Cr.P.C. it can remit the whole

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or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced but before passing any order it may, under section 401 (2) of Cr.P.C., require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was had or confirmed to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists.

14.Mr. Usman Iqbal, the learned Deputy Prosecutor General called on to assist the Court who argued that perforce section 3 of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019, any offence carrying a death sentence is excluded from the law's operation. He pointed out that section 295C of the PPC is punishable solely by death; sections 365A, 375A, and 402B carry both death and imprisonment for life; and sections 132, 364A, 376, and 396 include death, imprisonment for life, or specified alternative prison terms. He maintained that for all other offences carrying either imprisonment for life or lesser terms, the Act applies, treating imprisonment for life as equivalent to 25 years under section 57 of the PPC, which places it in schedule of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019.

15.However, after hearing these submissions, I disagree with the learned DPG because Sr. No. 7 of the Schedule attached to the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 outlines the sentencing zones for a punishment range of up to 25 years as follows:

• Zone A (Less than 10 years): Less than ten years • Zone B (10 to 15 years): Ten to fifteen years • Zone C (15 to 20 years): More than fifteen years to twenty years • Zone D (20 to 25 years): More than twenty years to twenty-five years

Under section 57 of the PPC, a term of imprisonment for life is technically equivalent to 25 years. However, imprisonment for life remains a distinct and separate category of punishment that cannot be subdivided into blocks of 10, 15, or 20 years, as no such legal breakdown exists. Nevertheless, if

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another specific range of imprisonment is prescribed alongside imprisonment for life, that range can be utilized. Otherwise, under the provisions of the PPC, offences carrying a punishment of up to 25 years, such as sections 303, 308, 354A, 371A, 371B, and 493A, fall exclusively in schedule at Sr. No.7 of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019. Meanwhile, although sections 302(c), 367A, and 376 also carry punishments of up to 25 years, they are already excluded from the scope of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 because capital punishment is included within their permissible range of penalties. However, the case relied upon by Mr. Usman Iqbal DPG reported as “SHADIULLAH versus The STATE through Special Prosecutor, Balochistan and another” (2026 SCMR 1622) seeks to apply the provisions of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 on cases under section 302 (b) PPC. His lordship Mr. Justice Athar Minallah as he then was, in the above judgment observed as under;

8.........................In the recent past, two provincial legislatures i.e. the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assemblies have enacted legislation setting out statutory sentencing guidelines, The Punjab Sentencing Act, 2019 and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sentencing Act, 2021 respectively. It would be beneficial to examine the precedent law enunciated regarding the principles and guidelines in the context of exercising discretion while handing down one of the prescribed legal sentences under section 302(b) of the P.P.C.

Though KP law of sentencing is somewhat different on the subject like inclusion of a provision for exclusive hearing on sentencing; that is why the Honorable Peshawar High Court in a case reported as “NAWAZ KHAN alias Murgha versus The STATE and 2 others” (2024 YLR 1986) held that:

“22. We have no central law of sentencing. Two provinces—the Punjab and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—have introduced sentencing laws in 2019 and 2021, respectively. Both the laws have the same text. They don’t apply to cases where capital punishment is provided within the range of punishments. However, they lay down aggravating and mitigating factors which the (trial) court only may take into consideration while passing a sentence. Section 14(3) of the KP law provides that the court shall schedule a separate hearing for sentencing. Though, the 2021 KP law is not applicable to offences carrying capital punishment, still a separate hearing on sentencing would be helpful for a trial court. We

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respectfully urge the trial courts to conduct such separate hearing.

16.It is strongly recommended that the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019 be amended to incorporate the offences which are punishable with imprisonment for life and then a beneficial provision empowering courts to exercise judicial discretion when adjusting minimum tariff, in cases of imprisonment for life, during judgment. Alternatively, the Sentencing Council to be established under the Act should be tasked with framing comprehensive guidelines for this purpose. Furthermore, lawmakers must ensure that a formal sentencing hearing becomes a mandatory component of the Act. Accompanying this, the Government is directed to actively deliberate on suitable legislative amendments to extend the application of these provisions to cases involving qatl-i-amd.

Case in Hand

17.It is a case of capital sentence therefore, stands excluded from the application of the Punjab Sentencing Act 2019; therefore, is to be decided on merits keeping in view the principles governing the situation. The occurrence took place on 10.07.2020 at 12:30 p.m., whereas the FIR was registered on 11.07.2020 at 09:35 p.m. The delay stands explained, as the injured was shifted to the hospital by Rescue 1122 and the complainant remained with him. The FIR was lodged soon after his death. More importantly, the name of the accused/appellant had already come on record on the day of occurrence through the deceased himself. Thus, the delay has not caused any prejudice to the accused/appellant.

18.The ocular account is furnished by Muhammad Yousaf (PW-9) and Mian Hasnat Mehmood (PW-10). PW-9 states that the appellant made a hocky blow on the head of his nephew in his view due to which the deceased stood injured and fell on the ground and became unconscious, and PW-10 also deposed on the same line. PW-10 is an independent witness, as he neither belonged to complainant nor appellant. The cross- examination of both the witnesses mainly remained confined to peripheral matters, such as the college of the deceased and the registration numbers of motorcycles, and nothing material could be elicited to doubt their

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presence or the specific role of the appellant. A real uncle is not expected to spare the real culprit and substitute him with an innocent person, more so in a daylight occurrence on a public road.

19.The eyewitness testimony is fully consistent with the medical evidence. PW-11 observed a lacerated wound measuring 3 x 0.4 cm on the left parieto-occipital region, concluding it was caused by a blunt weapon. Dr. Muhammad Ayaz (PW-6), who performed the autopsy, confirmed that this injury resulted in a skull fracture and established the cause of death as vital organ damage to the brain. Conversely, injuries No. 2, 3, and 4 were determined to be simple and non-contributory to death. Furthermore, PW- 6 ruled out the possibility of a fall, stating that injuries No. 1 and 2 could not have been sustained from falling to the ground. However, the recovery of the hockey stick remains inconsequential, as it was neither broken nor blood-stained, nor was it submitted to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency (PFSA) for analysis.

20.The defence plea that the deceased was a gangster and had been murdered by some unknown person remained unsubstantiated, as it was confined merely to suggestions put to the prosecution witnesses, which were denied. Moreover, PW-16 categorically negated the assertion that the deceased had formed a gang to terrorize the general public, stating that no such fact emerged during the course of his investigation. The accused/appellant neither recorded his statement under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. nor produced any defence evidence. Hence, the prosecution has proved that the accused/appellant caused the fatal hockey blow on the head of the deceased.

21.The pivotal question, however, is whether the act of the accused/appellant attracts section 302(b) PPC or section 302(c) PPC. The prosecution projected the occurrence as a planned attack by a group; however, the learned trial Court acquitted four co-accused while holding that “there is nothing in the prosecution evidence showing that they were having common intention with co-accused Mehar Farhan to murder Abu Huraira”, and the said acquittal is not under challenge. The prosecution failed to substantiate the alleged conspiracy or consultation, as PW-16

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categorically stated that the complainant had produced no witness during the investigation in this regard. PW-16 further confirmed that no evidence relating to the alleged motive was produced before him during the investigation. The learned trial Court also rightly observed that the prosecution had failed to establish the motive for the occurrence as alleged. The available record, at best, reflects a rivalry between two groups of boys, without any independent evidence establishing the alleged motive or conspiracy.

22.The meeting of the parties on G.T. Road was not shown to be pre- arranged, as the complainant and the deceased were returning from a personal task and the boys came all of a sudden. The lalkara attributed to the assailants, reflects an intention to humiliate and beat the deceased rather than a settled design to kill him. Within this sudden scuffle, the accused/appellant, armed with a hockey which is not a lethal weapon per se, is attributed a single blow, which he did not repeat, and the other injuries were simple in nature. The deceased also survived for a considerable period, as PW-6 opined the time between injury and Death as 30 to 32 hours. Thus, the fatal blow was given in the heat of a sudden confrontation between rival groups of boys rather than pursuant to any prior design or deliberation.

23.In the totality of the circumstances, although the prosecution evidence is sufficient to establish that the accused/appellant caused the fatal injury to the deceased, the element of prior deliberation or premeditated design necessary to maintain the conviction under section 302(b) PPC has not been satisfactorily established, rather it was a case of sudden occurrence; therefore, while relying on cases reported as “MUHAMMAD ABBAS and another versus The STATE” (2023 SCMR 487), “MUHAMMAD AJMAL versus The STATE” (2022 SCMR 88), “MUHAMMAD USAMA versus The STATE” (2022 SCMR 2143), “GUL ZARIN and others versus KAMAL-UD-DIN and others” (2022 SCMR 1085) & “MUHAMMAD ASHRAF alias NIKKA versus The STATE” (2022 SCMR 1328), “MUHAMMAD NAWAZ and others Versus THE STATE through P.G. and others” (PLD 2022 Supreme Court 523) & “ZEESAN

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@ Shani versus THE STATE” (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 165), the conviction of accused/appellant Mehar Farhan is altered from section 302(b) PPC to section 302(c) PPC.

24.As regards the quantum of sentence, the jail report dated 15.10.2026 reveals that including the remissions the accused/appellant has already undergone a total period of twelve years, eleven months and two days. Keeping in view that the occurrence arose out of a sudden confrontation without any proof of prior design, coupled with the period already undergone by the accused/appellant, the ends of justice would be adequately met if his sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone by him. Accordingly, his sentence of imprisonment is reduced to the period already undergone by him. However, the compensation of Rs.500,000/- awarded under section 544A Cr.P.C. with consequence of default and the benefit of section 382B Cr.P.C. shall remain intact.

25.Consequently, the instant criminal appeal is partly allowed with above modification in conviction and sentence. It is, however, clarified that the findings recorded hereinabove shall not affect the case of the proclaimed offenders, if any, who have not been tried so far. The record of the learned trial Court be sent back immediately and the case property, if any, shall be dealt with as directed by the learned trial Court.

(Muhammad Amjad Rafiq) Judge Approved for reporting

Judge Signed on 20.10.2026 M. Umar*