University of Agrculture etc Vs The Provincial Ombudsman etc

Stereo.HCJDA 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No.208370 of 2018.

University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, and 04 others.

Versus

The Provincial Ombudsman and 02 others.

J U D G M E N T.

Date of hearing: 21.10.2026.

Petitioner by: M/s Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat, Taha Shoukat, and Nasrullah Khan Dhollon Advocates.

Respondents No.1 & 2by:Ms. Samia Khalid, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab.

Respondent No.3: Ex-parte.28.06.2018.

MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID, J. Through this Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (“the Constitution”), the petitioner-University has called in question the legality and validity of order dated 25.01.2018 passed by respondent No.1, whereby the complaint filed by respondent No.3 was allowed and the petitioner- University was directed to grant her admission to the first semester of the M.Sc. (Chemistry) Morning Programme.

2.The facts, in brief, are that respondent No.3, alleging maladministration in the admission process for postgraduate programmes of the petitioner-University for the academic session 2017–18, approached respondent No.2, the Provincial Ombudsman, Punjab, through its District Office at Faisalabad. After obtaining the requisite reports and rejoinder and affording the parties an opportunity of hearing, the learned Ombudsman allowed the complaint and directed the petitioner-University to grant admission

to respondent No.3 in the first semester of the M.Sc. (Chemistry) Morning Programme. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner- University has invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioner-University submits that respondent No.3 has since completed her studies and that the University does not intend to take any coercive action against her. He, however, maintains that the impugned order is liable to be examined on the jurisdictional ground that the petitioner-University does not fall within the definition of “Agency” under Section 2(1) of the Punjab Office of the Ombudsman Act, 1997 (“the Act, 1997”). He contends that the expression “Agency” encompasses a department, commission or office of the Provincial Government, or a statutory corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Provincial Government. According to him, the petitioner- University was already in existence and was subsequently reconstituted and reorganized under the University of Agriculture (Faisalabad) Act, 1973 (“the Act, 1973”); hence, it cannot be regarded as an institution established by the Provincial Government. He further submits that the University enjoys statutory autonomy and is neither established nor controlled by the Provincial Government. On these premises, he maintains that the learned Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint.

4.Conversely, the learned Law Officer submits that the petitioner-University is a public statutory institution falling within the definition of “Agency” under Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997. She draws attention to the provisions of the Act, 1973, under which the Governor of the Punjab is the Chancellor, the Minister for Agriculture is the Pro-Chancellor, and the Government has a substantive role in determining the qualifications, selection procedure and terms and conditions of service of the Vice- Chancellor. She further points out that the Syndicate, being the executive body of the University, includes representatives of various

departments of the Provincial Government and that the University's accounts are subject to statutory reporting and audit requirements involving the Government. According to her, these provisions, when read collectively, establish the requisite governmental supervision and control, notwithstanding the University's separate corporate personality and statutory autonomy.

5.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the available record and the relevant statutory provisions with their able assistance.

6.The controversy is confined to a single question: whether the petitioner-University falls within the expression “Agency” as defined under Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997, and, consequently, whether its affairs fall within the jurisdiction conferred upon the Provincial Ombudsman by the said enactment. The answer requires interpretation of the statutory definition of “Agency” in the first instance, followed by an examination of the legal status, constitution, governance and administrative and financial arrangements of the petitioner-University under the Act, 1973.

7.Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997 defines “Agency” in the following terms:

““Agency” means a Department, Commission or office of the Provincial Government or a statutory corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Provincial Government but does not include the High Court and Courts working under the supervision and control of the High Court, and the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab and its Secretariat.”

8.A plain reading of the above definition reveals that the expression “Agency” is not confined to departments, commissions or offices forming part of the administrative hierarchy of the Provincial Government. The legislature has separately included within its scope a “statutory corporation or other institution established or controlled by the Provincial Government”. The inclusion of these distinct categories is significant. It demonstrates that an institution need not be an integral part of a government department, nor must it lack a

separate legal personality, to qualify as an Agency under the Act, 1997. The decisive consideration is whether the institution satisfies the statutory criterion of establishment or control by the Provincial Government.

9.The words “established or controlled” are disjunctive and provide alternative, rather than cumulative, grounds for bringing an institution within the definition. Accordingly, an institution may qualify either because it was established by the Provincial Government or because it is controlled by the Provincial Government. The absence of one element does not necessarily exclude an institution if the other is established. Thus, even if the historical origin of the petitioner-University does not, by itself, establish that it was originally created by the Provincial Government, the question of governmental control must independently be examined.

10.The expression “controlled by the Provincial Government” does not, in the context of this definition, necessarily require complete, exclusive or day-to-day administrative control over every function of an institution. Equally, the mere existence of statutory regulation or the appointment of a public functionary to an institutional office would not, in every case, be sufficient to establish such control. The nature and extent of governmental involvement must be assessed in the light of the governing statute, including the constitution of the institution, the powers of the Government and other public authorities over its administration, the mechanisms of supervision and corrective intervention, and the arrangements governing its financial affairs. The inquiry is, therefore, one of substance, to be determined by reading the relevant provisions collectively rather than isolating individual clauses.

11.In interpreting a definition clause, the language employed by the legislature must be read in the context of the enactment as a whole and in accordance with its object and scheme. In

Commissioner of Income Tax v. Khurshid Ahmad (PLD 2016 SC 545) and Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue v. Al-Technique Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. (PLD 2017 SC 99), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized the importance of construing statutory language in its proper legislative context. The same interpretative approach is reflected in "Pakistan Stock Exchange v. CIR (2026 SCMR 373), Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax and Central Excise, Mardan and others (2019 SCMR 906), Aurangzaib v. Medipak (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (2018 SCMR 2027), Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others (PLD 2018 SC 189), Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigation Agency and others (2017 SCMR 1218), Commissioner of Income Tax v. Khurshid Ahmad (PLD 2016 SC 545), Muhammad Khan v. Obaidullah Jan Babat and others (PLD 2016 SC 492). The governing principle is that the statutory definition must be applied in a manner that gives effect to the language chosen by the legislature without unduly enlarging or restricting its scope.

12.It is also settled that the ordinary grammatical meaning of statutory expressions is the starting point of interpretation, although the context, scheme and legislative purpose may, where necessary, inform their construction. The authorities cited in the pleadings, including Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources and another v. Durrani Ceramics and others (2014 SCMR 1630), Khadim Hussain and another v. The Additional District Judge, Faisalabad and others (PLD 1990 SC 632), Abdul Razak v. Karachi Building Control Authority and others (PLD 1994 SC 512), and Mian Jamal Shah v. The Member Election Commission, Government of Pakistan, Lahore, and others (PLD 1966 SC 1) may be considered in their proper context regarding the construction of statutory language. However, there is no occasion in the present case to depart from the ordinary disjunctive meaning of the word “or” in Section 2(1). The language and structure of the

definition permit the question to be determined by independently examining the element of governmental control.

13.The first contention of learned counsel for the petitioner- University is that the institution existed before the enactment of the Act, 1973 and was merely reconstituted and reorganized thereunder. In support of this contention, reliance is placed upon the preamble of the Act, 1973, which reads as follows:

“An Act

To reconstitute and re-organize the West Pakistan Agricultural University, Faisalabad and to establish the University of Agriculture at Faisalabad.

Preamble.— WHEREAS it is expedient to reconstitute and re- organize the West Pakistan Agricultural University, Faisalabad for the purpose of improving teaching, research, publication and administration thereof, safeguarding its autonomy and democratization of its constitution and to establish the University of Agriculture at Faisalabad.”

(Emphasis Supplied).

The preamble indicates that the legislative object was to reconstitute and reorganize the existing institution, improve its academic and administrative functioning, safeguard its autonomy and democratize its constitution, while providing for the University of Agriculture at Faisalabad under the statutory framework.

14.A preamble is a recognized aid to statutory interpretation because it may illuminate the legislative purpose and provide context for understanding the operative provisions. It cannot, however, override or restrict clear substantive provisions of the enactment. In "Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd. (SNGPL), Islamabad v. Messrs S.K. (Pvt.) Limited and others (2025 SCMR 570), the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the need to interpret a statute holistically, giving due regard to its purpose without allowing the preamble to defeat the express language of its operative provisions. The principles governing the use of a preamble as an interpretative aid have also been considered in "Mst. Gulshan Bibi and others v. Muhammad

Sadiq and others" (PLD 2016 SC 769), "District Bar Association, Rawalpindi v. Federation of Pakistan" (PLD 2015 SC 401) and "Sh. Riaz-ul-Haq and another v. Federation of Pakistan" (PLD 2013 SC 501), "Habib Ullah and others V. Abdul Manan and others" (2012 SCMR 1533), "Habib Ullah and others V. Abdul Manan and others" (2012 SCMR 1533) , "Mumtaz Hussain V. Dr. Nasir Khan and others" (2010 S C M R 1 2 5 4 ) "I s m a e e l V . T h e S t a t e " (2010 SCMR 27), "Fazal Dad V. Col. (Rtd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik and others" (PLD 2007 SC 571), "Hasil and another V. Karam Hussain Shah and others" (1995 SCMR 1385), and "Seven Up Company V. Kohinoor Thread Ball Factory and 3 others" (PLD 1990 SC 313).

15.The reference in the preamble to reconstitution, reorganization and autonomy cannot, therefore, be read in isolation or construed as conferring complete immunity from governmental supervision. The nature of the University's legal status and the extent of governmental control must be determined from the operative provisions of the Act, 1973. In this regard, Section 2(y) defines the University as the University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, “as reconstituted under this Act”. Section 3(1) provides for its reconstitution in accordance with the Act, while Section 3(3) declares it to be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal, with the capacity to sue and be sued in its own name. Section 3(5) provides for the transfer to the reconstituted University of the properties, rights, interests and liabilities of the predecessor institution constituted under the West Pakistan Agricultural University Ordinance, 1961. These provisions recognize continuity with the predecessor institution while establishing the legal identity and governing framework of the reconstituted University under provincial legislation. The fact that the institution existed previously does not, by itself, resolve the distinct question whether the University, in its reconstituted statutory

form, is controlled by the Provincial Government within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997.

16.The relevant provisions of the Act, 1973 disclose a statutory framework in which the University possesses its own institutional identity and administrative machinery, but its affairs are not wholly insulated from governmental supervision. Section 2(l) defines “Government” to mean the Government of the Punjab. Section 11(1) provides that the Governor of the Punjab shall be the Chancellor of the University. Under Section 11, the Chancellor exercises powers concerning the annulment of proceedings of University authorities inconsistent with the Act, the Statutes, Regulations or Rules, and has a role in assenting to Statutes. Section 11-A further confers revisional powers upon the Chancellor to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of orders passed by University authorities. These provisions are relevant not merely because a public office- holder occupies the office of Chancellor, but because the governing statute attaches substantive supervisory and revisional powers to that office. The University authorities are, therefore, not entirely beyond statutory review in the exercise of their powers.

17.Section 12 of the Act, 1973, further empowers the Chancellor to cause an inspection or inquiry into any matter connected with the University, including its buildings, laboratories, libraries, institutions, teaching activities and examinations. Under subsections (2) to (4), the Chancellor may communicate his views to the Syndicate, advise it regarding the action to be taken and, where the Syndicate fails to take action to his satisfaction within a reasonable time, issue directions with which the Vice-Chancellor is required to comply. The significance of this provision lies in the nature of the powers conferred. The statutory scheme permits the examination of the University's affairs and provides a mechanism for corrective intervention where the response of the Syndicate is considered unsatisfactory. Such powers extend beyond the imposition of general

regulatory standards and constitute a legally prescribed means of supervision over the University's functioning.

18.The provisions concerning the Pro-Chancellor and the appointment of the Vice-Chancellor reinforce this conclusion. Under Section 13(1) of the Act, 1973, the Minister for Agriculture, Government of the Punjab, is the Pro-Chancellor of the University, while Section 13(2) of the Act, 1973, provides for the exercise of such powers and functions as are vested in the Pro-Chancellor under the Act or assigned or delegated by the Chancellor. More significantly, Section 14 of the Act, 1973, confers upon the Government the power to prescribe, by notification, the qualifications, experience and other requirements for appointment as Vice-Chancellor, constitute a Search Committee, determine the procedure and criteria for selection, and prescribe the Vice- Chancellor's terms and conditions of service. Although the appointment is made by the Chancellor, the Government's statutory role in determining the eligibility requirements, selection framework and service conditions of the University's principal executive officer constitutes a material element of governmental involvement in its administration. These provisions must be considered together with the supervisory and revisional powers already discussed.

19.The constitution of the Syndicate, being the executive body of the University, provides further evidence of the nature of the statutory relationship. Under Section 24 of the Act, 1973, the Syndicate includes, inter alia, the Vice-Chancellor as its Chairman; 3 members of the Provincial Assembly of the Punjab nominated by the Speaker; two members of the Senate; the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court or his nominee from amongst the Judges of the High Court; and the Secretaries to the Government of the Punjab, Agriculture Department, Livestock and Dairy Development Department, and Finance Department, or their respective representatives. The Syndicate also comprises members elected from

within the University and persons nominated by the Chancellor, along with other members specified in the section. The participation of governmental representatives in the University's principal executive body is not, stand alone, conclusive of governmental control. Its significance, however, becomes apparent when considered alongside the powers vested in the Government and the Chancellor under Sections 11, 11-A, 12, 13 and 14 of the Act, 1973. The statutory arrangement ensures that the University's executive affairs are conducted through a body whose composition includes designated governmental functionaries and whose decisions operate within a framework of external statutory supervision.

20.Section 25(1) of the Act, 1973, declares the Syndicate to be the executive body of the University and entrusts it with general supervision over the University's affairs and the management of its property. Section 25(2) of the Act, 1973, confers extensive powers concerning the administration of property and funds, regulation of finances, accounts and investments, consideration of annual reports and budget estimates, creation of posts, appointment of officers and teachers, and other matters relating to the University's functioning. These provisions undoubtedly recognize the University's capacity to administer its affairs through its own statutory authorities. However, the vesting of executive powers in the Syndicate does not render the University immune from the other supervisory mechanisms expressly provided by the same enactment. The proper construction requires the provisions to be read harmoniously; the Syndicate manages the University's ordinary affairs, while the Chancellor and the Government exercise the supervisory, revisional, appointment- related and other powers conferred upon them by statute. The resulting arrangement is one of institutional autonomy within a legally prescribed framework of governmental oversight.

21.The financial provisions also bear upon the question of control. Section 39 of the Act, 1973, establishes the University Fund,

comprising income from fees, donations, trusts, bequests, endowments, contributions, grants and other sources, while Section 40 of the Act, 1973, regulates the maintenance and audit of the University's accounts. The statutory scheme requires the annual statement of accounts to be submitted to the Government and provides for annual audit by an auditor appointed by the Government. Section 19 of the Act, 1973, also provides for a Resident Auditor to be taken from the Government on deputation. The fact that the University may generate income from its own sources and administer its funds through its statutory authorities does not negate the significance of these arrangements. The requirements relating to governmental receipt of accounts, appointment of an auditor and deputation of a Resident Auditor demonstrate that the University's financial affairs are subject to statutory scrutiny involving the Provincial Government. Although financial oversight alone would not necessarily establish control in every case, it forms an important part of the cumulative statutory framework in the present matter.

22.The cumulative effect of the foregoing provisions is decisive. Sections 11 and 11-A of the Act, 1973, confer supervisory and revisional powers upon the Chancellor; Section 12 the Act, 1973, provides for inspection, inquiry and corrective directions; Sections 13 and 14 the Act, 1973, establish a governmental role in the University's leadership and the appointment framework for the Vice- Chancellor; Sections 24 and 25 the Act, 1973, provide for an executive body incorporating governmental representatives while assigning it responsibility for the University's affairs; and Sections 19 and 40 the Act, 1973, establish mechanisms of financial scrutiny involving the Government. These provisions cannot reasonably be treated as isolated or merely incidental references to public office- holders. Read collectively, they establish a legally enforceable relationship of supervision and control between the Provincial Government, acting through the statutory authorities and mechanisms prescribed by the Act, 1973, and the petitioner-

University. The control contemplated by Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997 is, therefore, established by the substantive powers conferred by the governing statute, rather than merely by the University's status as a public institution or the presence of governmental nominees in its governing bodies.

23.The contention that the petitioner-University is autonomous does not alter this conclusion. Autonomy and governmental control are not necessarily mutually exclusive concepts. A statutory institution may enjoy considerable independence in academic, administrative and financial matters while remaining subject to specified powers of supervision, revision, inspection and corrective intervention. The decisive question is not whether the University exercises independent powers, but whether the governing statute reserves to the Provincial Government or the authorities acting under its statutory framework powers of such nature and extent as bring the institution within the expression “controlled by the Provincial Government”.

24.In the present case, the powers identified above extend to the University's executive leadership, the composition and functioning of its governing body, the review of its decisions, the inspection of its affairs and the scrutiny of its finances. The University's separate corporate personality and statutory autonomy do not displace the legal effect of these provisions. Nor does Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997 require an institution to be an ordinary department of the Government or to be subject to direct governmental intervention in every administrative decision before it can qualify as an Agency.

25.The judgment in University of Agriculture, Faisalabad through Vice-Chancellor v. Provincial Ombudsman, Punjab, Lahore and another (2015 PLC (C.S.) 802), relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner-University, does not advance the petitioner's case. In that matter, the Court expressly refrained from deciding whether the University fell within the definition of “Agency”, as the

controversy could be resolved on the separate statutory bar relating to complaints concerning a public servant's personal service grievance. The said judgment, therefore, cannot be construed as a binding determination that the University falls outside the scope of Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997. The issue presently before this Court was left open and must accordingly be determined on the basis of the relevant statutory provisions and the nature of the complaint in question.

26.It is also pertinent that Section 9(1) of the Act, 1997 empowers the Provincial Ombudsman to investigate allegations of maladministration on the part of an Agency or any of its officers or employees. Section 2(2) defines maladministration in terms broad enough to include, inter alia, decisions or omissions contrary to law or established procedure, arbitrary or unreasonable conduct, and administrative inefficiency. The legislative scheme is directed towards providing a remedy against maladministration in institutions falling within the statutory definition. Nevertheless, the fact that an institution qualifies as an Agency does not render every decision taken by it automatically amenable to interference by the Ombudsman. The complaint must independently satisfy the applicable requirements of the Act, 1997, and the Ombudsman's jurisdiction must be exercised within the limits prescribed by law. In the present case, however, the objection raised by the petitioner- University is confined to its asserted exclusion from the definition of “Agency”. For the reasons discussed above, that objection is not sustainable.

27.For the foregoing reasons, I am of the considered view that the petitioner-University falls within the expression “other institution established or controlled by the Provincial Government” under Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997. Its reconstitution under the Act, 1973, its status as a body corporate and the autonomy conferred upon it by its governing statute do not negate the cumulative effect of the

provisions establishing governmental supervision and control over its executive, administrative and financial affairs. The alternative statutory criterion of control is independently satisfied. Consequently, the objection to the jurisdiction of the learned Ombudsman, founded solely upon the assertion that the petitioner-University is not an Agency, is without merit.

28.In view of the above, the question whether the petitioner- University qualifies as an “Agency” under Section 2(1) of the Act, 1997, is answered in the affirmative. The Ombudsman, therefore, has rightly exercised the jurisdiction. The instant Constitutional Petition is accordingly dismissed.

(MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID)

JUDGE.

Approved for Reporting.

JUDGE.

M. Arsalan*