Kashif & 4 Others vs George etc.

Stereo. H C J D A-38.

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, MULTAN BENCH

MULTAN.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.444-D of 2026 Kashif, etc.

Versus

George Bhatti, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 15.10.2026.

Petitioners by: M/s Samina Nighat Hashmi, Tahir Mehmood and Muhammad Usman Jamil, Advocates.

Respondents by: M/s Malik Muhammad Tariq Rajwana, Hamza Abid Bhutta and Muhammad Ibtisam Ahmad, Advocates.

MUHAMMAD SAJID MEHMOOD SETHI, J.- Through this single judgment, I intend to dispose of the instant petition and connected C.R. Nos.440-D and 442-D of 2026, filed by petitioners, as common questions of law and fact are involved in these cases.

2.Through these revisions petitions, petitioners have assailed the consolidated judgments and decrees dated 16.10.2025 and 02.03.2026, passed by learned Civil Judge and Addl. District Judge, Sahiwal, respectively, whereby suit for specific performance and mandatory injunction filed by petitioner No.1 was concurrently dismissed whereas suits filed by respondents for recovery of possession and for declaration of rights were concurrently decreed.

3.The facts, in brief, are that the petitioner No.1 instituted a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 08.05.2019, allegedly executed in respect of the disputed property for a consideration of Rs.18,00,000/-. The respondents contested the suit by

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filing written statement and also instituted connected suits for recovery of possession and declaration and cancellation of the agreement. All the suits were consolidated and decided by the learned trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 16.10.2025. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit for specific performance while decreeing the connected suits for possession and declaration/cancellation. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the said judgment and decree before the learned appellate Court, who dismissed their appeals vide judgment and decree dated 02.03.2026. Hence, these revision petitions.

4.Learned counsel for petitioners contends that execution of agreement to sell (Exh.P1) was admitted by respondent No.1 in his application under section 22-A & 22-B of Cr.P.C. filed before learned Additional Sessions Judge for registration of criminal case and also in his written statement recorded as DW-1. He further submits that not only valid offer, acceptance, payment of sale consideration and delivery of possession has been established, but the signatures of attorney of respondent No.1 have also been proved by producing attesting witnesses as well as scribe of the document Exh.P1. He contends that in the given circumstances, suit for specific performance of agreement to sell should have been decreed.

5.Conversely, learned counsel for the respondents maintains that the alleged agreement was neither duly proved nor executed by all the persons purportedly bound by it. He further contends that the petitioners had failed to establish payment of the alleged sale consideration and the lawful authority of the vendor to transfer the disputed property. He submits that the pleadings and evidence suffered from material contradictions, rendering the petitioners’ claim untenable. He argues that learned Courts below had concurrently assessed the evidence in accordance with law and that no misreading, non-reading, illegality, or material irregularity had been pointed out to warrant interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. He relied upon Nasrullah Khan and others v. Mukhtar-ul-Hassan and others (PLD 2013 Supreme Court 478), Mst. Asia Bibi v. Dr. Asif Ali

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Khan and others (PLD 2011 Supreme Court 829), Jamil Akhtar and others v. Las Baba and others (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 494), Ijaz ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others (PLD 2023 Supreme Court 653) and Irfan Ahmad v. Ahmad Shah through L.Rs. and 7 others (2016 CLC 114).

6.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the available record with their assistance. The controversy requiring determination in the instant revision petitions is whether the petitioners succeeded in establishing the due execution of the agreement to sell dated 08.05.2019 (Exh.P-1), the authority of the person purportedly acting on behalf of the owners of the disputed property, and payment of the agreed sale consideration, so as to entitle them to a decree for specific performance. The connected controversy relates to the legality of the decrees for possession and declaration and cancellation passed in favour of the respondents. Since all three matters arise out of interconnected transactions and have been decided through a common judgment, the evidence and the findings recorded by the learned Courts below are required to be examined in their proper perspective.

7.The foundation of a suit for specific performance is a legally enforceable obligation undertaken by the person against whom enforceable is sought. The petitioners altered their stance at different stages regarding the persons owning the property and the capacity in which the agreement was allegedly executed. At one stage, joint ownership of the respondents was asserted; at another, Latif Jhon was projected as the exclusive owner and general attorney; whereas, subsequently, the petitioners reverted to the plea of joint ownership. Such inconsistent positions cannot be treated as inconsequential. The purpose of pleadings is to define the controversy and afford each party a fair opportunity to meet the case set up against it. It is a settled principle of law that a party seeking the discretionary relief of specific performance must establish, through clear and cogent evidence, the existence of a valid and enforceable contract and the authority of the

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person who purportedly undertook the contractual obligation. Where the identity of the contracting parties, their respective interests in the property, and the authority under which the transaction was allegedly concluded remain uncertain, the Court cannot supply the missing elements of the contract on the basis of conjecture or inference. The evidentiary burden resting upon the petitioners could not be discharged merely by producing a document whose execution and legal effect were they seriously disputed. Consequently, the inconsistent pleadings assume material significance and lend support to the view taken by the learned Courts below.

8.The next question concerns the execution and evidentiary worth of agreement to sell Exh.P-1. Learned counsel for the petitioners has strenuously argued that the execution of the agreement stood admitted by respondent No.1 in the proceedings initiated under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C., and that the document was further proved through the oral testimony of its marginal witnesses and scribe. The contention, though requiring consideration, does not by itself conclude the controversy. An admission must be read in the context in which it was made and in conjunction with the precise fact admitted. An acknowledgment of having received a particular sum of money or of having entered into some transaction is not, without more, necessarily an admission of the execution and binding effect of the particular agreement subsequently relied upon by the claimant. Therefore, the contents of the application allegedly submitted by respondent No.1 before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, as well as the relevant portion of his deposition as DW-1, were required to be examined to ascertain whether he unequivocally admitted the execution of Exh.P-1 in its entirety, including the agreed consideration of Rs.18,00,000/-, the extent of the property, the terms of the transaction, and the obligation alleged against him. If the admission was confined to receipt of Rs.3,00,000/- or to a transaction materially different from the one pleaded by the petitioners, it could not, in isolation, establish the entire contract pleaded in the suit. Conversely, if the original statement

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contains an unequivocal admission of execution of the very document in dispute, such admission would require due evidentiary consideration and could not be brushed aside merely on the ground that the document was subsequently denied. In the circumstances, the alleged admission cannot be treated as conclusive in favour of the petitioners without examining its exact terms and reconciling it with the remaining evidence. The decisive question is not whether some transaction or payment was acknowledged, but whether the particular agreement sought to be enforced was duly executed and whether its essential terms and binding character were established in accordance with law.

9.The petitioners have also relied upon the testimony of the marginal witnesses and the scribe to establish the execution of Exh.P-

1.However, the mere production of witnesses whose signatures appear on a document does not invariably establish its due execution. The Court is required to examine whether such witnesses actually witnessed the execution, understood the nature of the transaction to the extent necessary for their testimony to carry evidentiary weight, and were able to give a reliable account of the circumstances in which the document was executed. In the present case, the testimony of PW-2, Salamat Masih, as discussed in the impugned judgments, suffers from material deficiencies concerning the particulars of the disputed property, the date and manner of payment, and the details of the alleged transaction. Although the relationship of a witness with a party does not, by itself, render his testimony inadmissible or unreliable, the absence of knowledge of material particulars of the transaction is a circumstance that the Court may legitimately consider while assessing the weight of his evidence. More significantly, PW-3, Nadeem Masih, is stated to have admitted that he was not present at the time of execution and had signed a document that had already been written, without knowledge of its terms, consideration, or payment. If this testimony is correctly recorded and has been appreciated in its proper context, it materially undermines the petitioners' reliance upon him as a witness to the execution of the agreement. A person who merely signs

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a document without witnessing its execution cannot, by that act alone, provide reliable proof of the transaction allegedly embodied therein. The evidentiary worth of the testimony of each witness must, therefore, be assessed in light of his actual presence, knowledge, and participation in the transaction.

10.The testimony of the scribe, PW-4, Muhammad Sharif, also requires consideration in the same context. As reflected in the impugned judgments, he did not produce the register maintained by the stamp vendor, while certain particulars relating to the stamp paper and the authentication of the document were either absent or remained unverified. These circumstances were relevant to the assessment of the genuineness of Exh.P-1, particularly when its execution had been seriously disputed by the respondents. Nevertheless, the absence of a stamp vendor's register or of a particular endorsement should not, without examination of the applicable statutory provisions and the circumstances of the case, be elevated into an inflexible rule that invariably renders an agreement incapable of proof. The material question is whether the deficiencies identified by the learned Courts below, considered cumulatively with the other infirmities in the oral and documentary evidence, reasonably justified their conclusion that the petitioners had failed to establish the genuineness and due execution of the document. In the present case, the deficiencies relating to the stamp paper do not stand in isolation; they accompany material shortcomings in the testimony of the alleged attesting witnesses and the disputed particulars of the transaction. Their cumulative effect, therefore, assumes significance in determining whether the petitioners discharged the burden resting upon them.

11.Another material circumstance is the admitted absence of the signatures of George Bhatti on Exh.P-1, as statedly acknowledged by the petitioners themselves during cross-examination. Where the relief sought is to enforce a contractual obligation against a person who neither signed the agreement nor is otherwise shown to have assented to its terms, the Court must determine the legal basis upon which that

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person is sought to be bound. The absence of a signature is not, in every conceivable circumstance, conclusive proof that no contract exists; nevertheless, where execution is specifically disputed and no other legally sufficient basis for establishing assent or authority is proved, the omission constitutes a significant evidentiary circumstance. In the instant case, the petitioners were required to establish not merely that a document had been prepared and signed by some of the persons concerned, but that the agreement created an enforceable obligation against the person or persons from whom specific performance was sought. The petitioners' own admission regarding the absence of George Bhatti's signatures, read alongside the inconsistencies in their pleadings and the deficiencies in the testimony of their witnesses, materially weakens their case. The alleged acknowledgment in the proceedings under Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C., could assist the petitioners only to the extent of the facts actually admitted therein; it could not, without further examination, cure every deficiency concerning the execution, terms, and binding effect of Exh.P-1.

12.The question of payment of the agreed sale consideration presents a further difficulty for the petitioners. Their case is that the entire amount of Rs.18,00,000/- was paid in respect of the disputed property. However, the evidence referred to in the impugned judgments does not appear to furnish satisfactory corroboration of this assertion. PW-2 is stated to have acknowledged that no receipt was prepared in respect of the payment of Rs.3,00,000/-, whereas PW-3 denied having witnessed any payment. These circumstances assume particular importance because payment of the alleged consideration constitutes a material part of the transaction upon which the petitioners seek enforcement. It is true that the absence of a written receipt does not invariably defeat a claim of payment, as payment may, where legally permissible, be established through credible oral evidence and the surrounding circumstances. The question, however, is whether the evidence produced in the present case inspires confidence and establishes the alleged payment on the applicable standard of proof.

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Where the testimony of the witnesses is uncertain or contradictory concerning the amount, date, and manner of payment, the Court cannot accept the assertion of full payment merely because it has been repeated in the pleadings. The petitioners' case is further required to be examined alongside the panchayat document, Exh.D-1, dated 08.01.2020, which, according to the respondents, reflects a transaction involving consideration of Rs.15,00,000/- for 15 marlas, with Rs.1,50,000/- paid as token money. If the document pertains to the same property and transaction, its contents materially differ from the petitioners' assertion of payment of Rs.18,00,000/- for 18 marlas in 2019. The legal effect of Exh.D-1 depends upon its authenticity, admissibility, and connection with the disputed transaction; nonetheless, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the discrepancy, it constitutes a relevant circumstance in assessing the reliability of the petitioners' version.

13.The authority of Latif John to execute the alleged agreement on behalf of the other persons interested in the property is equally material. The petitioners have sought to rely upon the general power of attorney, Exh.P-2, allegedly executed by Emanuel and Christopher in his favour. However, the respondents have disputed the petitioners' entitlement to rely upon that document on the ground that the necessary factual foundation was not incorporated in the plaint and that the instrument did not sufficiently identify the disputed property or establish authority to transfer the relevant shares. A party is ordinarily required to establish its case within the framework of its pleadings, and evidence concerning a materially different factual foundation cannot ordinarily be used to construct a case that was never pleaded. The purpose of pleadings is to define the controversy between the parties and afford each side a fair opportunity to meet the case set up against it. Accordingly, where the petitioners seek to establish the authority of the alleged attorney through Exh.P-2, it is necessary to determine whether the relevant authority was pleaded, whether the instrument was duly proved, and whether its terms legally authorised the

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transaction in question. Even otherwise, the mere description of an instrument as a general power of attorney does not dispense with the requirement of examining its actual terms and scope. The instrument must be construed to ascertain the identity of the principals, the nature of the powers conferred, and whether those powers extended to the sale of the disputed property and the interests purportedly conveyed. Unless these foundational matters are established, the Court cannot presume that the person executing the agreement possessed authority to bind all the owners or transfer their respective interests.

14.The foregoing deficiencies must be considered cumulatively rather than in isolation. A suit for specific performance cannot succeed merely upon proof that some negotiations took place or that a sum of money may have changed hands. The claimant must establish the existence of a concluded and enforceable contract, the material terms of that contract, the identity and authority of the persons bound by it, and the other legal requirements governing the grant of the relief claimed. The Court must also consider the petitioners' entitlement to equitable relief in accordance with the applicable law and the evidence on record. In the present case, the inconsistent assertions regarding ownership and the capacity of the alleged vendor, the absence of George Bhatti's signatures, the deficiencies in the testimony of the alleged attesting witnesses and scribe, the disputed payment of consideration, and the unresolved question of the authority conferred by Exh.P-2 collectively raise substantial doubts concerning the petitioners' version. These are not merely peripheral discrepancies; they relate to the identity of the persons contractually bound, the execution of the agreement, the payment of consideration, and the authority to transfer the disputed property. In such circumstances, the petitioners cannot be held entitled to a decree for specific performance unless the material deficiencies are satisfactorily reconciled with the evidence available on record. Reliance is placed on Muhammad Asif Awan v. Dawood Khan and others (2021 SCMR 1270) and Mrs. Zakia

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Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 401).

15.The grant of specific performance is discretionary and equitable in nature, and depends upon a judicial assessment of the contractual obligations, the conduct of the parties, and the circumstances in which the transaction remained incomplete. The requirement of readiness and willingness on the part of the vendee is likewise material; however, it does not dispense with the foundational obligation to establish a valid and enforceable contract. In the present case, the principal deficiencies relate to the due execution of agreement to sell Exh.P-1, the authority of the person purportedly acting on behalf of the owners, and proof of the agreed consideration. The petitioners' entitlement to the discretionary relief of specific performance must, therefore, be determined on the basis of the evidence available on record and the applicable legal requirements, which they have failed to satisfy.

16.The next question is whether the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Courts below warrant interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115, C.P.C., is supervisory and is not intended to provide a further unrestricted appeal on questions of fact. Where the subordinate Courts have exercised jurisdiction vested in them, followed the procedure prescribed by law, and recorded findings on the basis of a lawful appreciation of the evidence, this Court ordinarily does not substitute its own assessment merely because another view of the evidence may be possible. Interference may, however, be justified where a finding is shown to be the result of material misreading or non-reading of evidence, an error of law, an exercise or refusal of jurisdiction contrary to law, or a material procedural irregularity falling within the scope of the revisional provision. The existence of concurrent findings does not render them immune from scrutiny; equally, the revisional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to secure a fresh appraisal of evidence without identifying a legally sustainable ground for intervention. In the present matters, learned counsel for the petitioners has emphasised the

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alleged admission of respondent No.1 and the testimony of the witnesses produced in support of Exh.P-1. However, the material placed before this Court does not, by itself, demonstrate that the learned Courts below ignored an unequivocal admission of the entire agreement or that their conclusions resulted from a material misreading of the evidence. The impugned judgments, as described in the record placed before this Court, address the material deficiencies in the petitioners' case and explain why the alleged agreement was not accepted as a sufficient basis for granting specific performance. No particular jurisdictional defect or material procedural irregularity has been established merely by reiterating the petitioners' interpretation of the evidence.

17.The connected suits for possession and declaration/cancellation must also be considered in the light of the findings recorded above. The failure of the petitioners to establish their entitlement to specific performance does not, by itself, automatically entitle the respondents to every relief claimed in the connected suits. The respondents were equally required to establish the facts constituting the basis of their respective claims, and the decrees in their favour must rest upon the evidence and legal grounds applicable to those suits. In the present case, however, the learned Courts below examined the connected claims together with the petitioners' suit and, by the impugned judgments, accepted the respondents' entitlement to the reliefs granted. The petitioners have not demonstrated, through any specific ground substantiated from the record, that the decrees for possession and declaration/cancellation suffer from a jurisdictional defect, a material error of law, or such misreading or non-reading of evidence as would warrant interference under Section 115, C.P.C. In the absence of a legally sustainable ground for disturbing those findings, the concurrent decrees in the connected suits are also not liable to be set aside in revisional jurisdiction.

18.For the reasons discussed above, I am of the considered view that the petitioners have failed to establish a legally enforceable

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agreement to sell, duly proved in accordance with law, so as to warrant a decree for specific performance. The material deficiencies in their pleadings and evidence, when examined collectively, substantially undermine the foundation of their claim. The alleged admission attributed to respondent No.1 does not, without examination of its precise contents and context, furnish a sufficient basis for granting the relief sought. The petitioners have further failed to establish a ground falling within the scope of Section 115, C.P.C., that would justify interference with the concurrent findings recorded by the learned Courts below.

19.Consequently, all three civil revision petitions, namely C.R. No.444-D of 2026, C.R. No.442-D of 2026 and C.R. No.440-D of 2026, being devoid of merit, are dismissed. The judgments and decrees dated 16.10.2025 and 02.03.2026, passed by the learned Civil Judge and the learned Additional District Judge, Sahiwal, respectively, are maintained. There shall be no order as to costs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) Judge

Approved for reporting

Judge *Waseem.