Mrs. Rehana Malik & Another Vs Mst. Shamshad Akhtar etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT AT LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No. 54041 of 2026

Mrs. Rehana Malik and another Versus Mst. Shamshad Akhtar and 2 others

JUDGEMENT

Date of Hearing: 06.10.2026 Petitioners by: M/s. Ahmad Hasan Rana and Muhammad Naeem Beryar, Advocates Respondents by: Mr. Imran Khan, Assistant Advocate General, Punjab M/s. Asmat Ullah Khan Niazi and Gull Abbas, Advocates for Respondent No.1

KHALID ISHAQ, J. Through this Constitutional Petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the “Constitution”), the Petitioners have called into question the validity of order dated 08.07.2026 (“Impugned Order”) passed by the learned Civil Judge Class-I, Sargodha (“Trial Court”), whereby an application filed by the Petitioners for transfer of a pending suit to the Special Court established under the Punjab Establishment of Special Courts (Overseas Pakistanis Property) Act, 2025 (“Act, 2025”), has been dismissed.

2.Briefly, Mst. Shamshad Akhtar Respondent/Plaintiff instituted a Suit for Cancellation of the Divorce Deed dated 19.12.2002 titled “Shamshad Akhtar v. Secretary, M.C. No.16, etc.” (the “Suit”), calling into question the validity and effectiveness of the divorce documents pertaining to her marriage with late Muhammad Sharif. During the pendency of the Suit, the Petitioners moved an application under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, 2025, seeking transfer of the Suit to the Special Court on the ground that the Petitioners/Defendants are Overseas Pakistanis and since the determination of the controversy involved in the Suit would ultimately affect

Respondent/Plaintiff’s claim to inheritance in the immovable estate of the deceased Muhammad Sharif, therefore, as contended, the elements of ownership of immoveable properties will eventually become relevant, thus, it was prayed that the Suit be transferred to Special Court. The transfer application was contested and after hearing both sides, the Trial Court dismissed the application while holding that the subject matter of the Suit concerns the divorce documents only and did not constitute a dispute relating to any ‘immovable property or possession thereof’. Hence this Constitutional Petition.

3.Arguments heard. Record perused.

4.It is the case of the Petitioners that the controversy cannot be viewed independently while laying aside its effect upon the consequent inheritance rights, which will ensue from the final outcome of the Suit. In essence, the Petitioners contend that the determination of the effectiveness of the divorce certificate would later govern the rights of the parties viz a viz the inheritance and estate of the deceased Muhammad Sharif, therefore, the matter falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Special Court being connected with and incidental to immovable property, as contemplated by the Act, 2025.

5.In order to resolve this controversy, the jurisdiction conferred by the operative provisions of the Act, 2025 have been perused. Section 3 of the Act, 2025 provides for establishment of Special Courts in relation to immovable properties of Overseas Pakistanis, whereas, Section 4(3) thereof extends the exclusive jurisdiction of the Special Courts viz the proceedings specified therein i.e. where one or more parties are Overseas Pakistanis. Sub-Section (3) of Section 4 of the Act, 2025 cannot be read in isolation for transfer of every civil dispute to the Special Court by merely considering and determining the factum of one or more parties being overseas Pakistanis. Both these provisions, when read together, require satisfaction of twin conditions; firstly, at least one party must qualify as an ‘Overseas Pakistani’; secondly, the dispute must relate to ‘Immovable Property’ and includes the matters, which have requisite nexus therewith. The status of the litigant/party and the subject matter of the proceedings are, thus, distinct but

W.P. No. 54041 of 2026. Page 3

cumulative jurisdictional requirements. The remaining statutory scheme of the Act, 2025 reinforces this construction. Section 4(2) of the Act, 2025 requires particulars concerning the property and the rights asserted therein; Section 7 prescribes a leave-to-defend procedure and contemplates security linked to the estimated market value of the subject property. Likewise, Section 15 of the Act, 2025 restricts the transfer, alienation, encumbrance, removal or parting with possession of property in dispute during pendency of the proceedings. A conjoint reading of these provisions envisages a special procedure directed towards expeditious adjudication and protection of property rights. Its application to a dispute outside that field would also subject the parties to substantive and procedural restrictions prescribed by the legislature for the particular class of proceedings covered by the Act, 2025. The beneficial purpose of the enactment i.e. Act, 2025, warrants an interpretation which would advance its remedial nature and in no case, it dispenses with the conditions upon which the said special jurisdiction depends. It is well settled that the provisions of a statute have to be read as a whole and all its provisions must be harmoniously reconciled; the intention of the lawmakers is gathered by reading the enactment as a whole and not in isolation1, any interpretation of a provision, which is made in isolation of other provisions and overall scheme of the statute, is not in accordance with the cannons of construction of statutes. It is equally well-settled that the meaning of the words used in any portion of the statute must depend upon the context in which they are placed, therefore, while interpreting an enactment, all its parts must be construed together as forming one whole and it is not in accordance with sound principles of construction to consider one section, or group of sections, divorced from the rest of the provisions of a statute. Further, so far as possible, that construction must be placed upon words used in any part of the statute which makes them consistent with remaining provisions and with the intention of the legislature to be derived from a consideration of the enactment2. Thus, it is a rule now firmly Kamaluddin Qureshi v. Ali International Co. (PLD 2009 SC 367), Combined Investment (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Wali Bhati and others (PLD 2016 SC 730), Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed (2017 SCMR 152), Waqar Zafar Bakhtawari and 6 others v. Haji Mazhar Hussain Shah and others

(PLD 2018 SC 81),

N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, (Eleventh Ed., pp. 293), published by LexisNexis

W.P. No. 54041 of 2026. Page 4

established that the intention of the legislature must be found by reading the statute as a whole. Such rule of construction is referred to as an "elementary rule"3 by Viscount Simonds; a "compelling rule"4 by Lord Somervell of Harrow; and a “settled rule”5 by B.K. Mukherjea, J. “I agree”, said Lord Halsbury, “that you must look at the whole instrument inasmuch as there may be inaccuracy and inconsistency; you must, if you can, ascertain what is the meaning of the instrument taken as a whole in order to give effect, if it be possible to do so, to the intention of the framer of it”6 and per Lord Davey: “Every clause of a statute should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses of the Act, so as, as far as possible, to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute or series of statutes relating to the subject-matter. The rule is of general application as even plainest terms may be controlled by the context, and “it is conceivable,”7.

6.Section 13(1)(a) of the Act, 2025 does not either independently enlarge that jurisdiction in isolation of the other provisions; it provides for transfer of pending proceedings falling within the ambit of Act, 2025 and their continuation before the Special Court. The mandatory character of such transfer is triggered once the twin jurisdictional requirements, as elucidated above, are satisfied. It cannot be employed to bring a subject matter within the ambit and scope of Act, 2025, which subject matter otherwise falls outside its scope. The persistent reference of the learned counsel for the petitioner to the preamble is also not tenable as a preamble may assist in resolving ambiguity and understanding legislative purpose but cannot enlarge or curtail a clear statutory provision.8 Preamble of a statute is not a substantive and enforceable part of an enactment, yet being its usher, it provides primary guidelines about the object and scope of the enactment. The preamble of a statute may be relied upon to understand the true purpose and meaning of the particular provisions of a statute, however, it cannot be read in isolation for destroying the very essence of the provisions, if the Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 463 (HL).

Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover [1957] AC 436, 473 (HL).

Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, 1953 SCR 677, 683; AIR 1953 SC 274.

Leader v. Duffey (1888) 13 App Cas 294, 301 (HL).

Canada Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. The Queen [1898] AC 735, 741 (PC).

Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Ltd., Islamabad v. Messrs S.K. Pvt. Limited and others (2025 SCMR 570)

W.P. No. 54041 of 2026. Page 5

same are clear and unambiguous. It cannot be doubted that the ‘preamble precedes the words of enactment and is in the nature of a recital of the facts operative in the mind of the law giver in proceeding to enact.’ It is one of the cardinal principles of construction that where the language of an enactment is clear the preamble must be disregarded, though, wherever the object and meaning of an enactment is not clear, the preamble may be resorted to, to explain it. Thus, one cannot, therefore, start with the preamble for construing the provision of an enactment, though resorting to the preamble would be justified, if the language used by the legislature is ambiguous or is too general. Neither the preamble nor the supposed object of an enactment can control the express language of the statute; preamble merely afford help in the manner of construction, if there is any ambiguity. Where the language is clear, the Court is bound to give it effect.9 According to Earl T. Crawford: ‘it is an excellent aid to the construction of an ambiguous statute or statutes of doubtful meaning or as has been said it is a key to the construction of a statute and should be resorted to unlock the mind of the makers.’10 Similarly, Maxwell opines: ‘the preamble of a statute has been said to be a good means of finding out its meaning, and, as it were, a key to the understanding of it. Besides, as it usually states or professes to state, the general object and intention of the legislature in passing the enactment, it may legitimately be consulted to solve any ambiguity or to fix the meaning of words, which may have more than one, or to keep the effect of the Act within its real scope, whenever the enacting part is in any of these respects open to doubt.’11 The preamble to a statute does not invariably recite the real reason for its enactment. Its statements of facts are neither infallible nor conclusive. This should operate as a restraint upon the disposition to attach too great weight to the preamble as evidencing the purpose and intention of the lawmakers.12

N S Bindra’s Interpretation of Statutes, (Eleventh Ed., pp. 198-200), published by LexisNexis Earl T. Crawford’s The Construction of Statutes, (1940 Ed., p. 124), published by Thomas Law Book Company, St. Louis.

Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, (Seventh Ed., pp. 37–38), published by Sweet & Maxwell.

Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (2nd Ed., 1911), p. 255; quoted in Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012 Ed.), Canon No. 34 (Prefatory-Materials Canon), p. 218, Thomson/West.

W.P. No. 54041 of 2026. Page 6

7.The object of facilitating Overseas Pakistanis must accordingly be understood in the context of the property disputes for which the special forum has been established. The reliance of the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgment reported as Muhammad Mudassar Iqbal v. The Lake City Holdings Pvt. Ltd. (2026 LHC 2886) is also misplaced as the cited judgment does not dispense with this requirement and rather authoritatively explains that the jurisdiction is neither confined to admitted ownership or possession nor dependent upon the Overseas Pakistani being a plaintiff rather than a defendant; it also envisages that the connection with immovable property may be direct or indirect, nevertheless, it expressly identifies the two jurisdictional prerequisites i.e. requiring the Court to ascertain the both i.e. the status of a litigant being an overseas Pakistani and a nexus with immovable property.

8.Keeping in view the above distinctions, the controversy relating to the Suit concerns the validity and effectiveness of the divorce documents, the determination whereof, does not require adjudication of ‘title to’, ‘possession of’ or ‘any transaction concerning immovable property’. The Petitioners’ contention that the outcome would affect the parties’ entitlement to inheritance is a long drawn figment of imagination as the consequence of a determination must be distinguished from the subject matter being determined. The expressions ‘connected therewith’ and ‘incidental thereto’ must be understood in their true import while retaining their reference to the special subject of the enactment i.e. Act, 2025. These expressions enable complete determination of disputes relating to immovable property and the questions arising in that determination. These provisions cannot be extended to every independent controversy concerning personal status merely because its outcome may subsequently be relied upon in asserting proprietary rights. Such a construction would displace the ordinary forum without first establishing the statutory basis for doing so. The principle discussed in the case of S.M. Waseem Ashraf 13, relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, requires jurisdiction to be traced to its constitutional or statutory S.M. Waseem Ashraf v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, M/O Housing and Works, Islamabad and others (2013 SCMR 338)

conferment; it cannot be assumed on the ground that determination of a matter may facilitate adjudication of another dispute. In a nub, even accepting the Petitioners’ status as Overseas Pakistanis, the asserted effect of the divorce dispute upon inheritance does not, in the circumstances of the Suit, satisfies the additional jurisdictional requirement of the Act, 2025. The Trial Court, therefore, rightly declined the transfer of the Suit to the Special Court, thus, no illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution has been established.

9.For what has been discussed above, this Constitutional Petition fails and is accordingly dismissed.

(Khalid Ishaq) Judge

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

(Khalid Ishaq) Judge Awais!