Muhammad Fayyaz ul Haq & 1 other Vs DG Health Government of Punjab etc

Stereo. H C J D A 38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No. 14674 of 2025.

Muhammad Fayyaz ul Haq & another

Versus

Director General Health, Government of Punjab & others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 16.10.2026.

Petitioners by: M/s. Ahmad Iqbal Waghra, Fayyaz ul Hassan, Muhammad Ali Johri, Muhammad Shahzad Hanif, Rao Muhammad Akbar Khan Mayo, Umer Hameed Khan, Muhammad Iqbal Khan, Mian Muhammad Arshad Iqbal and Arangzeb Tarar, Advocates.

Respondents by: Mr. Muhammad Naseem Ahmad Kashmiri, Additional Advocate General and Mr. Sikandar Nisar Saroya, Assistant Advocate General for Punjab with Muhammad Ammar Yasir, Litigation Officer, CEO (DHA), Sargodha and Patras Ghouri, Law Officer, CEO (DHA), Okara.

SHIREEN IMRAN, J: By this consolidated judgment, I intend to decide W.P. No.14674 of 2025 (instant petition) as well as W.P. Nos.21095, 29364, 29734, 32938, 50998 of 2025 (connected petitions) having commonality of law and facts.

2.In present petition (W.P. No.14674 of 2025), the petitioners have challenged the withdrawal of upgradation benefits granted under the Four-Tier Allied Health Service Structure. The claim is based on

Notification dated 24.11.2011 and subsequent clarification dated

3.In W.P. No.29734 of 2025, petitioner Sakhawat Ali was initially appointed as Dispenser (BS-06) in 1995. He was subsequently redesignated as Junior Technician (Pharmacy) (BS-09). Vide order dated 15.04.2020, he was upgraded as Senior Technician (BS-14) w.e.f. 24.11.2011. He continued to draw salary in the upgraded scale.

However, through order dated 24.02.2025, the department withdrew the upgradation. Recovery of the alleged excess payment was also ordered.

4.In W.P. No.21095 of 2025, petitioner Muhammad Akram was initially appointed as Laboratory Assistant (BS-05) on 15.06.1988. He was subsequently promoted as Laboratory Technician (BS-09) on 27.12.1999. Under the policy dated 24.11.2011, he was placed in BS-12 w.e.f. 24.11.2011. Thereafter, on the recommendations of the Departmental Promotion Committee, he was upgraded as Chief Technician (BS-16) vide order dated 25.05.2017.

He continued to serve in the upgraded scale for approximately eight years. However, through communication dated 10.03.2025, his upgradation was declared irregular. The reason assigned was that he had bypassed BS-14.

5.In W.P. No.32938 of 2025, petitioners Mst. Najma Naheed Ehtsham and others have challenged speaking order dated 28.03.2025.

Through the said order, the respondents withdrew their upgradation benefits. The petitioners were serving as Lady Health Visitors. Their

claim is that the upgradations were granted under the notified policy.

The benefits had already been implemented. Therefore, their subsequent withdrawal was unlawful.

6.In W.P. No.29364 of 2025, petitioner Rana Allah Ditta is a retired Senior Laboratory Technician. He has challenged the departmental orders dated 02.01.2025 and 06.01.2025. Through these orders, his retirement benefits were directed to be calculated on the basis of BS-09 instead of BS-14. The petitioner claims that he had enjoyed the benefit of BS-14 for approximately ten years. He seeks restoration of the retirement order dated 08.11.2024 and consequential pensionary benefits.

7.In W.P. No.50998 of 2025, petitioner Tariq Javed is a retired Chief Technician (Pharmacy Technology). His upgradation to BS-16 was granted vide order dated 14.01.2015, w.e.f. 01.04.2013. He continued to enjoy the benefit for a considerable period. However, through order dated 21.08.2025, the department withdrew the upgradation. His retirement benefits were also sought to be calculated on the basis of BS-09 instead of Bs-16.

8.Learned counsel for the petitioners contend that the upgradations were granted under the notified policy. The competent departmental authorities approved the same. The petitioners continued to enjoy these benefits for several years. No fraud or misrepresentation has been attributed to them. It is argued that the impugned orders were passed without affording a proper opportunity of hearing. The action is contrary to the principles of natural justice. It also offends the

doctrine of locus poenitentiae. Learned counsel further submit that the respondents cannot approbate and reprobate. Reliance is placed upon Notification dated 24.11.2011, subsequent clarification dated 22.04.2015 and judgment reported as Secretary to Government of N.- W.F.P. Zakat/Social Welfare Department, Peshawar and another v.

Sadullah Khan (1996 SCMR 413).

9.Conversely, learned Law Officer supports the impugned actions. He submits that the upgradations were granted erroneously and contrary to the prescribed service structure. An illegal benefit cannot confer any vested right. The department is competent to correct an irregular order. Dismissal of the petitions is accordingly sought. It is contended that the authority who granted the benefit can also withdraw the same.

10.Arguments heard. Record perused.

11.The controversy requires examination of Notification dated 24.11.2011. Through this notification, the Government of the Punjab introduced the Four-Tier Allied Health Service Structure. The posts were distributed in the ratio of 50:34:15:1. The corresponding scales were BS-09, BS-12, BS-14 and BS-16. Paragraph 2(ii) provided for one-time upgradation or adjustment of existing incumbents. Such adjustment was to be made within the respective categories according to seniority. Paragraph 2(iii) made the exercise subject to the sanctioned strength of posts. The notification thus introduced a mechanism for placement of existing employees in different tiers. The aforesaid notification is reproduced below for ready reference: -

12.The above notification was followed by communication dated 20.04.2015, operative portion of which is reproduced below for ready reference: -

“a). Summary for time Scale Service Structure of BS-1 to 17 of Health Support Staff will be submitted to Chief Minister Punjab by upgrading employees and give them time scale after every O5 year of their services and it will be given to all existing incumbent

b). Implementation of 4-Tier Service Structure of Allied Health Professionals (Paramedies)

i. Disputed points in the above referred Govt. notification shall be clarified as was approved by the Chief Minister, Punjab, to facilitate the Administrative Officers to implement the 4-Tler Service Structure of Allied Health Professionals in its true perspective. Service Rules, 2012 shall be relaxed for one time for promotion of existing Allied Health Professionals. However, the new entrants will be governed under service Rules, 2012.

ii. Controlling Officers of the field / Institutions shall upgrade all posts of Allied Health Professionals (Technicians & Technologists) mentioned in the Govt. notification as one time dispensation and Incumbents of the posts shall be upgraded accordingly, with effect from 24.11.2011.

iii. The up-gradation of the posts of Medical Assistants and Sanitary Inspectors etc. shall be made from their selection grades considering it as substantive grade.

iv. The Category-wise Seniority Lists of all Allied Health Professionals (Technicians) shall be prepared, circulated and notified by the controlling officers.

v. The Category-wise, district/institution wise Seniority Lists of BS-9 to BS-16 Allied Health Professionals (Technicians) shall be prepared at District/Institution level on the basis of their initial appointment date and seniority list of upgraded BS-16 and above shall be prepared in the office of DGH Punjab, Lahore for consolidation and completion. However, the seniority will be notified and further procedure will be done by the Administrative Secretary.

vi. The Departmental Promotion Committees; already notified by the Govt. shall notify the time-line for implementation of 4-Tier Service Structure for BS-9 to BS-16 with the ratio of vii. The 4-Tier up-gradation of the Allied Health Professionals already granted by the different Districts/Institutions shall be placed before Departmental Promotion Committees /Institutional Committees, for consideration and clearance. Any Irregularities made earlier will be settled by the concerned DPC w.e.f 24.11.2011 at their own level.

viii. The Director General, Health Services, Punjab, Lahore, after notification of the seniority lists of Allied Health Professionals (category-wise), shall frame time line of convening meeting of the Departmental Promotion Committees and implementation of the 4-Tier Service Structure.”

(emphasis provided)

13.The above position was further clarified through communication dated 22.04.2015, issued by the Director General Health Punjab. For ready reference and proper appreciation of the matter, the scanned images of the aforesaid communication are reproduced hereunder: -

14.The above illustration leaves no ambiguity regarding the object of the policy. The existing incumbents were to be adjusted in different tiers according to the prescribed ratio. It was not necessary for every employee to pass through each intermediate scale. The one- time dispensation contemplated direct placement in the relevant tier.

Such placement remained subject to seniority, sanctioned strength and approval of the competent authority. The clarification also provided for further time-scale upgradation in cases involving single or fewer posts. The respondents were, therefore, required to examine the cases of the petitioners in the light of the complete policy. A contrary interpretation based merely upon the absence of service in an intermediate scale cannot be sustained. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that the Notification dated 24.11.2011 stands clarified through Notification dated 22.04.2015, specifically qua one-time dispensation of posts: -

S. No. of One time Ration of distribution No. Sanctioned Posts dispensation BS-09 BS-12 BS-14 BS-16 (BS-05 to 08) (50%) (34%) (15%) (01%)

15.At this stage, the doctrine of locus poenitentiae assumes significance. The expression means an opportunity to withdraw from an intended course of action. In administrative law, it recognizes the power to reconsider a decision before its final implementation.

However, the position changes when a lawful order has been implemented. Rights may accrue in consequence thereof. Such rights cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily. The doctrine is firmly recognized in Pakistani jurisprudence. Its object is to ensure certainty and fairness in

administrative dealings. Nevertheless, it does not protect an order which is patently illegal or without jurisdiction. Nor does it validate a benefit obtained through fraud or misrepresentation.

16.In this regard, reference may be made to Shakirullah and others v. The Secretary E&SE Department Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Peshawar and another [2026 PLC (C.S.) 1033]. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the doctrine of locus poenitentiae in paragraphs 31 to 34. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the power of an authority to revisit its earlier administrative decision. The distinction between a lawful order and a patently illegal order was emphasized. A completed lawful decision cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily. However, an inherently unlawful order does not become valid merely through implementation. The relevant paragraphs 31 to 34 of the aforesaid judgment [2026 PLC (C.S.) 1033], which elucidate the legal principles governing the doctrine of locus poenitentiae, the scope of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and the recovery of pecuniary benefits, are reproduced below for ready reference: -

“31. As mentioned above, vide Directorate of E&SE s notifications dated 04.04.2019 and 05.04.2019, the appointment of the petitioners was disowned in purported exercise of the power under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It was the said notification which was first restored through notification dated 11.06.2021 and subsequently through notification dated 30.08.2024, which was upheld by the KP-ST vide the impugned judgment. Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads thus: - Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and

conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or byelaws so issued.

32.This section ensures that when an authority is empowered to issue a rule, order, notification, or bye- law, it also possesses the implied power to modify, amend, or withdraw the same unless the parent statute provides otherwise. However, once a decisive step has been taken, other legal considerations may arise. If such a step has not yet been taken, there is no justification for restricting the authority s power to alter or rescind its order, as held in Shahbaz v. The Crown (PLD 1956 FC 46). The exercise of power under Section 21 is subject to the principle of locus poenitentiae, which in law denotes the right to withdraw or rescind an order until a conclusive step has been taken. This principle was most aptly explained by this Court in Pakistan v. Muhammad Himayatullah Farukhi (PLD 1969 SC 407) in the following terms:

There can hardly be any dispute with the rule as laid down in these cases that apart from the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, locus poenitentiae, i.e., the power of receding till a decisive step is taken, is available to the Government or the relevant authorities. In fact, the existence of such a power is necessary in the case of all authorities empowered to pass orders to retrace the wrong steps taken by them. The authority that has the power to make an order has also the power to undo it. But this is subject to the exception that where the order has taken legal effect, and in pursuance thereof certain rights have been created in favour of any individual, such an order cannot be withdrawn or rescinded to the detriment of those rights.

33.In the realm of service law, the principle of locus poenitentiae has often been invoked to quash orders for the recall of appointment letters which were said to have been issued by government departments as a result of procedural irregularities. Recently, in the case of Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Aslam (2024 SCMR 97), the respondent was absorbed as Guard Grade-I on 06.08.2012 but his absorption was denied vide letter dated 02.08.2018. The Service Tribunal as well as this court held that certain valuable rights had already been accrued in the respondent s favour which could not be denied keeping in mind the principle of locus poenitentiae. Furthermore, it was held that it was a well settled exposition of law that the power of rescission remains with the relevant authorities to undo the action till a decisive step is taken or as long as certain rights are not created or the action was found to be patently illegal. In the case of Inspector General of Police v. Fida Muhammad and others (2022 SCMR 1583), the

respondents, after participating in the competitive process for appointment to posts in the Balochistan Police, were issued appointment letters. After one month their appointment letters were withdrawn through an omnibus order. Before the withdrawal of the appointment letters, neither was any inquiry conducted nor were the respondents issued any show-cause notice. This court held that since their appointments had been made after fulfilling the codal formalities and since this has resulted in the creation of vested rights in the respondents favour, the withdrawal of their appointments was hit by the principle of locus poenitentiae.

34.Although this court has consistently held that locus poenitentiae is the power of receding till a decisive step is taken, but it is not a principle of law that an order once passed becomes irrevocable and is a past and closed transaction. If an order is illegal, then a perpetual right cannot be created on the basis of such illegal order as held in the case of Province of Punjab v. Atta Muhammad Zafar (2021 SCMR 1195). Indeed, the principle of locus poenitentiae does not extend to orders which are patently illegal or orders obtained as a result of fraud. In the case of Government of the Punjab v. Muhammad Imran (2019 SCMR 643), this court, after referring to several judgments on the principle of locus poenitentiae, deduced the following principles:-

I)The Authority which can pass order is entitled to vary, amend, add or to rescind the same under section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

II)The jurisdiction to recall an earlier order is based on the principle of locus poenitentiae.

III)There is an exception to the principle of locus poenitentiae vesting power in an authority to recall its earlier order: if in pursuance of the order passed by the authority, an aggrieved person takes decisive steps, and changes his position.

IV)None can retain the benefits of a withdrawn order, claiming the protection of having taken a decisive step, when the very order passed by the authority is illegal, void or without lawful authority. In such circumstances, it would not matter, even if decisive steps have been taken by the person in pursuance of the illegal order passed by the authority.

However, the pecuniary benefit accrued

and already received by a person in pursuance of an illegal order passed by the competent authority cannot be recovered from him unless the benefiting order was obtained by the person through fraud, misrepresentation or concealment of material facts.”

(emphasis provided)

17.Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, empowers the competent authority to amend, vary or rescind an earlier notification or order, subject to the conditions governing the original exercise of authority. The said provision reads as follows: - “21. Power to make, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, orders, rules or bye-laws.- Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws so issued”

Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897, further obligates every authority exercising statutory powers to act reasonably, fairly and justly, in furtherance of the purposes of the enabling enactment and to record reasons for its orders or directions, wherever necessary or appropriate. The said provision reads as follows: - 24-A. Exercise of power under enactments.-

(1)Where, by or under any enactment, a power to make any order or give any direction is conferred on any authority, office or person such power shall be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purposes of the enactment.

(2)The authority, office or person making any order or issuing any direction under the powers conferred by or under any enactment shall, so far as necessary or appropriate, give reasons for making the order or,

as the case may be, for issuing the direction and shall provide a copy of the order or as the case may be, the direction to the person affected prejudicially.”

Accordingly, the impugned actions must conform to the requirements of Section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

18.In Capital Development Authority through Chairman, Islamabad and others v. Shabir Hussain and others (2022 SCMR 627), the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the effect of an administrative benefit granted through departmental proceedings and approval of the competent authority. The distinction between a mere recommendation and an implemented decision is material. An order which has been approved and acted upon cannot be withdrawn without lawful justification. However, its implementation does not cure any fundamental illegality.

19.Likewise, in Inspector General of Police, Quetta and another v. Fida Muhammad and others (2022 SCMR 1583), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the scope of protection available to rights flowing from administrative orders. A lawful and completed administrative act cannot be rescinded merely on a change of opinion.

Conversely, the doctrine of locus poenitentiae cannot be invoked to perpetuate an inherently illegal order. The legality of the original decision is therefore of primary importance.

20.In Shakeel Ahmad Zaidi and others v. Secretary, Higher Education, Government of Punjab, Lahore and others (2021 SCMR 474), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also considered the effect of an administrative order upon which action had already been taken. The

protection claimed under the doctrine of locus poenitentiae presupposes an order lawfully passed by the competent authority.

Thus, the authority seeking withdrawal must identify the legal defect in the original decision. Mere passage of time does not validate an illegal order. Equally, a lawful benefit cannot be withdrawn without justification.

21.The principle was further discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pakistan Railways through Chief Executive Officer/Senior General Manager, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Aslam (2024 SCMR 97). Paragraph 6 emphasizes that a right already created cannot be withdrawn in a perfunctory manner. Mere presumption or conjecture is insufficient. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also recognized the doctrine of locus poenitentiae as an established principle of Pakistani jurisprudence. The judgment is relevant to the present controversy. The benefits granted to the petitioners remained operative for considerable periods. Their withdrawal must therefore rest upon a legally sustainable ground. The relevant paragraph 6 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced below for ready reference: - “6. The deceased respondent was absorbed as Guard Grade-I vide Office Order dated 06.08.2012 and, after a lapse of six years, the benefit of absorption was withdrawn on 02.08.2018. The learned Tribunal declared this action illegal after affording an ample opportunity of hearing to the parties with further directions to maintain the respondent's job status as Guard Grade-I on the analogy of the similarly placed official absorbed as Guard Grade-I. A deceased person cannot be a party to any legal proceeding and, on his death, legal proceedings are suspended until and unless his legal representatives are impleaded and

swapped as party provided that the cause of action survives which is indeed a prime consideration to declare any legal proceedings abated before the final adjudication. By and large, the right to sue survives except the right to sue which is closely associated with the individual or is a personal right of action. The case adjudicated in the service appeal is not the claim lodged by respondent in his life time for the recovery of unpaid dues, pension or gratuity etcetera, rather the service appeal had direct nexus with the act of withdrawing the absorption of the respondent after a considerable period of time without providing any right of audience. More so, it was not pleaded that the respondent was accorded the benefit of absorption due any misunderstanding, error, misconception of law, therefore, in our view, the right created could not have been withdrawn or cancelled in a perfunctory manner on mere presupposition or conjecture which action is also hit by the doctrine of locus poenitentiae which is well acknowledged and embedded in our judicial system.”.

(emphasis provided)

22.There is another aspect of the matter i.e. principle of approbate and reprobate also deserves consideration. A party cannot adopt two mutually inconsistent positions regarding the same transaction, despite their own subsequent clarification. An authority cannot first extend a benefit under a policy and subsequently disown its own decision without lawful justification. Consistency is an essential feature of fair administration. Public authorities are equally bound by this principle. However, it cannot override an express statutory prohibition. Nor can it validate an inherently illegal act.

23.The matter may also be examined in the light of Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the

Constitution), which guarantees the right to fair trial and due process in the determination of civil rights and obligations. Where departmental action adversely affects the service and financial rights of an employee, the competent authority is required to observe the principles of natural justice and afford a fair opportunity of defence, wherever required by law. In Muhammad Abid v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Excise, Taxation and Narcotics Control Department, Peshawar and others (2026 PLC (C.S.) 640), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, while emphasizing the constitutional guarantee of fair trial and due process in departmental proceedings, held as under: - “7. In the case of Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue FBR House, Islamabad and others v. Zahid Malik (2023 SCMR 603), one of us, speaking for the bench, held that the primary objective of conducting departmental inquiry is to grasp whether a clear-cut case of misconduct is made out against the accused or not. The guilt or innocence is founded on the end result of the inquiry. The learned Service Tribunal may observe whether due process of law or right to fair trial was followed or ignored which is a fundamental right as envisaged under Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. In a regular inquiry, it is a precondition that an even-handed and fair opportunity should be provided to the accused and if any witness is examined against him then a fair opportunity should also be afforded to cross- examine the witnesses. In a departmental inquiry on the charges of misconduct, the standard of proof is that of balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence. Where any authority regulates and performs its affairs under a statute which requires the compliance of the principles of natural justice then it should have been adhered to inflexibly. Yet again, in the case of Ghulam Murtaza Sheikh and another v. The Chief Minister, Sindh and others (2024 SCMR

1757), it was held by one of us that a fair opportunity of cross-examination metes out the opposing party a leeway and possibility to accentuate the weaknesses or flaws in a testimony which is a most effective tool to shatter the testimony of witnesses to disprove the charge or allegations both in civil and criminal matters including in domestic/departmental inquires conducted under labour laws or civil servant laws. The purpose of conducting inquiries, on one hand, is to fix the responsibility of the delinquent vis- -vis the charges levelled against him in the show-cause notice or statement of allegations, but in unison, it also aids and facilitates the catching and exposing of the actual culprit or delinquent. No evidence which is accusatorial to the opposite party would be admissible unless such party is afforded an evenhanded opportunity of assessing its exactitudes by cross-examination, which is a most essential device to unearth the truth. If the elementary principle of law is not contented, then obviously, the whole edifice of unwarranted proceedings will fall apart. Whether the evidence is trustworthy or inspires confidence could only be determined with the tool and measure of cross-examination. The possibility cannot be ruled out in the inquiry that a witness may raise untrue and dishonest allegations due to some animosity against the accused which cannot be accepted unless he undergoes the test of cross- examination which indeed helps to expose the truth and veracity of allegations. It is the legal duty of the Service Tribunal to vet the whole inquiry report for the purposes of fact-finding, including, the effect of non-affording the right to cross-examine, which is necessary to decide the appeals on merits.” (emphasis provided)

24.The question of discrimination also requires consideration in the light of Article 25 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before law and equal protection of law. In Federation of Pakistan through Secretary v. Sultan Ahmad Shams and 17 others (2014 SCMR 570), the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan considered the

constitutional test for determining whether differential treatment amounts to discrimination and observed in paragraph 12 as follows: - “12. As regards discrimination, grievance of the respondents is that in announcing the basic pay scales 2011 all these allowances were merged in the basic pay scales 2008 so as to introduce basic pay scales 2011 and it was made effective from 1-7-2011 meaning thereby that the benefit of these allowances will be admissible to the employees who were in employment on 1-7-2011 or retiring on or after the said date as having become the part of their emoluments and denying the benefit of this merger of allowances in the emoluments to the respondents amounts to discrimination. This grievance of the respondents in our view is not well founded in the face of the established law, which has been propounded by this Court time and again the leading one is the case of I.A. Sherwani (supra). It was specifically held in this case that on the basis of reasonable classification pensioners as a group are treated as one class and all serving civil servants as a group are to be treated as a separate class and in this view of the matter if the pay scales of serving civil servants are revised, the civil servants, who have by then already retired cannot have any legitimate grievance to agitate for notional revision of their basic pay scales for re-computing their pension amounts for any purpose as the pension amount is to be computed on the basis of pension rules in force on the date of retirement of a civil servant, the pension rules contain formula as to the method of computation of pension amount with reference to salary drawn by the civil servants till the date of retirement and there cannot be uniformity in the amount of pension among the civil servants despite having equal rank and equal length of service, if they retire not on one date but on a different dates and in between such dates pay scales are revised. Thus the revision of the pay scales of serving employees were held not to be applicable to the civil servants who stood already retired and they will have no justification or right to claim benefit of the revision of pay scales subsequent to their retirement. This being the state of law, where pensioners have been

classified as a separate group/class from the one, who are in service, the question of discrimination or violation of Article 25 of the Constitution will not arise as the two groups are not to be dealt-with in the same manner.”

(emphasis provided)

25.In the present cases, the respondents themselves granted the upgradations. The relevant orders were implemented. The petitioners continued to draw salary in the upgraded scales. Some of them also retired after enjoying these benefits for several years. No material has been identified which establishes fraud or misrepresentation on their part. The impugned actions were taken after considerable delay. Such action required a clear legal foundation.

26.The case of Muhammad Akram, petitioner in connected petition (W.P. No.21095 of 2025) deserves particular attention. His upgradation to BS-16 was withdrawn primarily because he had not served in BS-14. This reasoning overlooks the illustration contained in the clarification dated 22.04.2015. The one-time dispensation contemplated adjustment of existing incumbents in different tiers. It did not necessarily require successive passage through every intermediate scale. The impugned communication does not adequately address this distinction.

27.Likewise, Sakhawat Ali, petitioner in connected petition (W.P. No.29734 of 2025) enjoyed the benefit of BS-14 for approximately five years. His upgradation was subsequently withdrawn with retrospective effect. Recovery was also ordered. The respondents were required to establish that his original placement was

contrary to the applicable policy. A general reference to irregular upgradation was insufficient. The same principle applies to the remaining petitioners. Their individual service records and the governing policy required proper consideration.

28.The withdrawal of retirement benefits also calls for careful scrutiny. Retirement benefits are determined on the basis of the applicable service law and lawful service entitlements. A departmental decision cannot be reversed merely because a different interpretation is subsequently adopted. This principle assumes greater significance where the earlier decision has remained operative for years or has already been acted upon in certain cases. The respondents were required to demonstrate a patent legal defect. The impugned actions do not disclose adequate justification for the retrospective financial consequences imposed.

29.The directions for recovery are equally unsustainable on the reasons presently disclosed. The petitioners received the benefits under departmental orders. They did not determine their pay scales by themselves. No irregularity has been established on their part.

Recovery cannot be ordered mechanically in such circumstances. The authority must first establish its lawful entitlement to recover the amount. The requirements of fairness must also be observed.

30.In view of the above discussion, the impugned actions cannot be sustained. The respondents failed to appreciate Notification dated 24.11.2011 in conjunction with clarification dated 22.04.2015. The distinction between one-time placement and successive promotion was

overlooked. The earlier departmental decisions remained operative for substantial periods. Their subsequent withdrawal was not supported by sufficient legal justification. The impugned actions as well as orders withdrawing regularization of the petitions are therefore contrary to the principles of fair administration and the doctrine of locus poenitentiae.

31.Consequently, all six writ petitions are allowed. The respective impugned orders and communications withdrawing the upgradation benefits of the petitioners are hereby set aside. The consequential directions for recovery and reduction of retirement benefits are also set aside. The respondents shall restore the respective upgradation benefits of the petitioners in accordance with the earlier operative orders. Their consequential service, salary and pensionary benefits shall be determined accordingly. Any amount deducted solely pursuant to the impugned withdrawal orders shall be refunded in accordance with law.

32.In cases where recovery has been effected following the withdrawal of a regularization order, the amounts so recovered shall likewise be refunded to the petitioners forthwith.

(SHIREEN IMRAN)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

Umar