Muhammad Ismail & 3 others Vs The State etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Criminal Appeal No.29243/2023.

Muhammad Ismail and 3 others.

Vs.

The State and another.

JUDGMENT

DATE OF HEARING: 07.10.2026.

APPELLANTS BY: M/S Arshad Mehmood Asim Warriach & Rana Muhammad Akmal Khan, Advocates.

STATE BY: Ms. Raheela Shahid and Rana Muhamamd Imran Anjum, Deputy Prosecutors General and Ms. Samra Irshad, Deputy District Public Prosecutor.

COMPLAINANT BY: M/s Muhammad Messam and Umair Ahmed Qasrani, Advocates.

Amir Ajam Malik, J:- The appellants Muhammad

Ismail, Muhammad Yaseen, Jamshed Ahmad, and Javed Ahmad, together with Muhammad Nawaz and Waqar (who have since been acquitted), were tried by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, MCTC, Daska. This trial arose from a private complaint concerning allegations spanning sections 324, 337-F(v), 337-F(iv), 337-A(ii), 337-A(i), 337-Fi, 337-L(2), 147, 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). These allegations stemmed from a cross-version case originating from FIR No. 402/2021, dated 29.05.2021, registered

under Sections 302, 109, 148, 149, 337-A(ii), 337-A(i), 337-F(i), and 337-L(2) of the PPC at Police Station Saddar Daska, District Sialkot.

Upon conclusion of the trial, by a judgment dated 27.03.2023, the learned Trial Court acquitted co-accused Muhammad Nawaz and Waqar while convicting and sentencing the appellants as follows:

i)Muhammad Ismail: Under Section 337-F(v) PPC: Directed to pay Daman of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the injured party, Iftikhar.

ii)Javed: Under Section 337-F(iv) PPC: Directed to pay Daman of Rs. 75,000/- to the injured party, Iftikhar.

iii)Yasin: Under Section 337-A(i) PPC: Directed to pay Daman of Rs. 50,000/- to the injured party, Iftikhar.

iv)Jamshaid: Under Section 337-A(ii) PPC: Directed to pay Arsh equivalent to 5% of Diyat of the year 2020-2021, amounting to Rs. 1,38,868/-, to the injured party, Iftikhar.

Aggrieved by their convictions and sentences, the appellants have preferred the instant appeal.

02.The material facts of the private complaint (Exh. PB), as set forth by the complainant, Iftikhar Ali (PW.1), divulge that on the fateful day, May 29, 2021, after Zohar Prayer, he was present at his cattle shed, tending to his livestock with his wife, Rukhsana Bibi (PW.2) and brother Abid, when accused Ismail (armed with Sota) and Yasin (armed with Kassi), Jamshaid and Mudassar (armed with 'Sotas'), Javed (armed with an iron rod), Nawaz and Waqar (armed with 'Dandas'), and Inam (armed with a 'Sota'), accompanied by two unidentified accomplices armed with firearms, arrived on the scene. It is alleged that Ismail then raised a 'lalkara' (war cry) to teach Iftikhar a lesson for creating hurdle in their way to store sand. Ismail then

allegedly inflicted a blow with a 'Sota' upon Iftikhar's (complainant) right arm, causing a fracture. Jamshaid is accused of striking him with Sota on the right side of his head, Yasin of striking his forehead with Kassi, Javed of striking his right leg with an iron rod, and Nawaz of striking the complainant's left leg with a 'Sota'. Seeing her husband bloodied and injured, Mst. Rukhsana Bibi rushed forward to intervene, only to be subjected to assault by Waqar and Inam, who reportedly used their 'Danda' and 'Sota' to inflict injuries on various parts of her body. The complaint further states that firing by the three unidentified accomplices resulted in a fatal injury to Mudassar (the deceased in the FIR). The assailants then allegedly fled the scene, firing aerial shots as they went.

03.The purported motive for this attack was the accused party desires to seize illegal possession of the communal land (Shamlat land) of village and the subsequent occurrence of the alleged events upon complainant’s resistance.

04.After recording the initial statements of Iftikhar Ahmad, Rukhsana Bibi, and Abid as formal witnesses, the accused were summoned to face trial. Formal charges were framed, and the prosecution was called upon to produce its evidence.

05.In support of its case, the prosecution examined the complainant, Iftikhar Ali (PW.1), Rukhsana Bibi (PW.2), Dr. Umar Shahzad (CW.1), Dr. Imran Bashir, Radiologist (CW.2), Dr. Maleeha Amer (CW.3), Dr. Hafiz Akhtar Ali Mughal, Senior General Surgeon

(CW.4), Waseem Arshad 1789/HC (CW.5), Dr. Gulzar Aslam Duggal (CW.6), Muhammad Saeed, SI (CW.7), and Attiq ur Rehman 1891/C (CW.8). The statements of the accused under Section 342 of the Cr.P.C. were also recorded, wherein they denied the prosecution's claims. They opted not to record statements under Section 340(2) of the Cr.P.C. and produced no evidence in their defense. Ultimately, the learned Trial Court acquitted co-accused Nawaz and Waqar but convicted and sentenced the appellants as detailed in the opening paragraph of this order.

06.I have carefully considered the arguments presented by learned counsel at the bar and have meticulously perused the entire record of the case.

07.The threshold question that arises for determination in the present proceedings, and which necessitates the formulation of the ensuing rational inquiries, is whether the deposit of Daman or Arsh by the appellants/convicts subsequent to a contested trial, in purported compliance with the judgment under appeal, operates to obliterate their statutory right to impugn the conviction on the grounds of misreading and non-reading of the evidence. Such a question was formulated vide order dated 05.05.2023 passed by this court whereby the court preferred to examine in the first instance that “...once Daman and Arsh is paid, whether it does not amount to conceding the conviction and sentence setting clouds on the maintainability of the appeal.”

08.It was strenuously contended by the learned Public Prosecutors that the appellants stand disentitled to prefer an appeal against their conviction and sentence, for the reason that, by tendering the respective amounts of Daman in acceptance of the impugned judgment, they have effectively executed the sentence imposed thereunder. It was accordingly urged that once a party has acquiesced in its conviction and has fulfilled the corresponding sentential obligation, the right to challenge the same by way of appeal stands irrevocably forfeited; consequently, the instant appeal is not maintainable.

09.To address this critical issue, it is important to examine the relevant provision of law as embodied in Section 415-A of Cr.P.C., which specifically provides a special right of appeal in certain cases.

For convenience, the said section is reproduced below:

“415-A. Special right of appeal in certain cases. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, when more persons than one are convicted in one trial, and an appealable judgment or order has been passed in respect of any such person, all or any of the persons convicted at such trial shall have a right of appeal.”

A plain and careful reading of the foregoing provision makes it abundantly clear that where several persons stand convicted in the course of a single trial, and an appealable judgment or order has been rendered in respect of any one of them, all or any of the co-convicts are equally clothed with the right to prefer an appeal. Accordingly, the

mere circumstance that the appellants have deposited the amount of Daman in purported compliance with the impugned judgment cannot be construed as a waiver off, or as amounting to satisfaction of, their conviction so as to extinguish their statutory right of appeal. The right of the appellants to challenge both conviction and sentence remains fully preserved under the express mandate of Section 415-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Any construction that stands in conflict with the express statutory mandate of Section 415-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure would, on the contrary, produce a result neither contemplated nor sanctioned by law. Equally, such an approach cannot be permitted to disregard another cardinal principle of interpretation: that a court ought not, by mere inference, to engraft an additional procedural disqualification upon a party, or to ascribe to an act a legal consequence which the governing statute does not itself warrant. Where the legislature has itself prescribed the precise circumstances in which a statutory right may be forfeited, it is the duty of the court to ascertain, with strict fidelity to the statutory text, whether those circumstances have in fact arisen.

10.In the present context, the deposit of Daman and Arsh and the relinquishment of the right of appeal are distinct legal questions. The former is an act of payment in compliance with a judicial order; the latter entails the loss of a procedural remedy. Whether the former produces the latter consequence must be determined by reference to the relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, read in their proper context. Accordingly, neither

Crl. Appeal No.29243 of 2023. 7

the fact of payment nor the general maxim against approbation and reprobation can substitute for an examination of the statutory scheme governing payment, execution, suspension or postponement of sentence, and appellate jurisdiction. Where the right of appeal is preserved by law, it cannot be treated as extinguished merely because the convict took steps to avoid arrest or incarceration, unless the applicable law attaches that consequence to the circumstances established on the record. Equally, where a binding judicial precedent holds that a particular statutory procedure renders a subsequent appeal incompetent, that precedent must be considered and applied or distinguished on legally sustainable grounds. The question of maintainability must, therefore, be resolved by identifying the precise legal consequence of the payment in the circumstances of the case, rather than by treating payment, admission of guilt and waiver of appeal as interchangeable concepts. Even otherwise, no one should remain to suffer on account of an act of court.1

11.The objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the sole ground that the appellants have deposited the amounts of Daman/Arsh requires examination in the light of the statutory scheme governing payment and the right of appeal, read harmoniously with the constitutional guarantees of lawful treatment, fair trial and due process. Section 415-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, expressly provides that, notwithstanding anything contained in the General (Retd.) Parvez Musharraf V. Federation of Pakistan and other (2024 SCMR 60)

relevant Chapter, where more than one person is convicted in one trial and an appealable judgment or order has been passed in respect of any of them, all or any of the persons convicted at that trial shall have a right of appeal. The provision does not expressly make the exercise of that right conditional upon non-payment of Daman/Arsh, nor does it declare that compliance with the monetary component of a judgment necessarily extinguishes the right to challenge the conviction. The said provision must be construed in harmony with Article 4 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to be dealt with in accordance with law, and Article 10-A, which guarantees fair trial and due process in the determination of a criminal charge. It can be aptly mentioned that in the cases of Jeehand2 and Noman Mansoor,3 a salutary principle based on the maxim "Communi observantia non est recedendum" was reiterated by Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan that when law required a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same must be done accordingly and if the prescribed procedure was not followed, it would be presumed that the same had not been done in accordance with law. Such a principle has its genesis dating back to the judgement of Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad,4 involving statutory interpretation that where the law prescribes a particular manner for doing an act, the act must ordinarily be performed in that manner and not otherwise; which has been Jeehand V. the State through Prosecutor General Balochistan (2025 SCMR 923) Noman Mansoor V. The State (PLD 2024 SC 805)

Nazir Ahmad v. King-Emperor (AIR 1936 PC 253)

Crl. Appeal No.29243 of 2023. 9

invariably followed to ensure that statutory powers and procedures are exercised within the limits prescribed by the legislature.

12.The constitutional guarantees5 do not dispense with statutory requirements governing appellate jurisdiction; rather, they militate against the imposition of a restriction upon an existing statutory remedy unless such restriction is warranted by the applicable law. The payment of Daman/Arsh and the relinquishment of the right of appeal are distinct legal concepts. A convict may deposit the amount in compliance with the operative judgment, or to secure release and avert the hardship of incarceration, while maintaining that the conviction is vitiated by misreading or non-reading of evidence. The act of payment, standing alone, does not necessarily establish an unequivocal abandonment of the appellate remedy. In this regard, the case of Abdul Rasheed,6 is directly relevant wherein the Court rejected an objection that payment of Daman extinguished the appellate right of qualifying co-convicts, relying upon the express language of section 415-A, Cr.P.C. The decision reinforces the distinction between the existence of the right of appeal and the ultimate determination of the appeal on its merits. Accordingly, where the statutory requirements of section 415-A, Cr.P.C., are fulfilled, the mere deposit of Daman/Arsh cannot, without an independent and The Constitutional Argument is more directly relevant to the question of Appellate Maintainability, including Article 4-right to be dealt with in accordance with law; Article 9- security of person Article 10A-right to a fair trial and due process, Article 14-Invialbility of dignity of man, Article 25-equality before law, and Article 227- conformity of laws with the injunctions of Islam.

Abdul Rasheed and others V. The State and others (2026 MLD 649)

legally sustainable basis, be treated as an automatic forfeiture of the right of appeal. The objection to maintainability must therefore be determined by reference to the applicable statutory provisions, the circumstances in which payment was made, and the binding judicial precedents governing the case. If the appeal is found maintainable, the grounds of misreading and non-reading of evidence must be examined independently on their merits.

13.The objection as to the maintainability of the present appeal, predicated upon the circumstance that the appellants have deposited the amount of Daman/Arsh, falls also to be examined in the light of the governing statutory provisions. Section 337-Y of the Pakistan Penal Code regulates the determination and payment of Daman and prescribes the consequences that ensue upon its non-payment; it does not, however, expressly provide that the mere act of payment shall, of itself, operates as a waiver or abandonment of the statutory right of appeal. Moreover, once the conditions prescribed by Section 415-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, stand fulfilled, the right of appeal thereby conferred cannot, in the ordinary course, be treated as extinguished merely by reason of the appellants’ compliance with the monetary direction embodied in the impugned judgment. In this regard, the principle enunciated in the afore-referred case of Abdul Rasheed7, is relevant. Accordingly, the deposit of Daman/Arsh, without more, does not furnish a sufficient ground for non-suiting the appellants; the maintainability of the appeal must be determined in Ibid. Abdul Rasheed and others v. The State and others (2026 MLD 649)

accordance with the applicable statutory provisions and the circumstances borne out by the record. Section 337-Y of the Pakistan Penal Code primarily regulates the determination, mode of payment and consequences of non-payment of Daman. Although the provision prescribes the legal consequences flowing from default in payment, it does not, in express terms, declare that the mere deposit of Daman constitutes an admission of guilt or an irrevocable relinquishment of the statutory right of appeal. The question whether such deposit precludes an appeal must, therefore, be determined by construing the provision harmoniously with the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure governing the right of appeal and the execution, postponement or suspension of sentence. The mere fact of payment cannot be considered in isolation from the circumstances in which it was made, the terms of the order pursuant to which it was deposited, and the legal status of the sentence at the relevant time. The Court must also consider the principle laid down in the case of Riaz Hussain8 and determine whether the facts of the present case fall within its ratio. If the circumstances are materially distinguishable, and the applicable statutory requirements for maintaining the appeal stand fulfilled, the right of appeal ought not to be treated as extinguished solely by an inference of waiver unsupported by the governing law. This construction would preserve the statutory scheme governing payment of Daman while avoiding the imposition of an Riaz Hussain v. The State and others (2022 PCr.LJ 1793)

additional disqualification from appeal not expressly prescribed by the legislature.

14.The objection to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appellant has deposited the amount of Daman must be examined in the context of section 337-Y of the Pakistan Penal Code, the applicable provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and the circumstances in which the payment was made. Section 337-Y principally regulates the determination and payment of Daman and the consequences of default. It does not expressly declare that every deposit made pursuant to a judgment constitutes an irrevocable abandonment of the statutory right of appeal. The mere fact of payment and the relinquishment of an appellate remedy are conceptually distinct, although their legal consequences must be determined in accordance with the governing statutory scheme.

Payment made to avert detention may explain the appellant's conduct;

whether it also amounts to legally effective acceptance of the conviction cannot be determined without examining the application moved by the appellant, the order passed thereon, the terms and circumstances of payment, and the legal status of the sentence.

Articles 4, 9, 10-A and 14 of the Constitution support the requirement that the appellant's rights and liabilities be determined in accordance with law and through a fair judicial process. The principles of justice and verification reflected in the Qur'anic injunctions likewise commend a careful assessment of the relevant facts rather than an unwarranted assumption concerning the appellant's intention. These

Crl. Appeal No.29243 of 2023. 13

constitutional9 and Islamic principles,10 however, must operate consistently with the statutory nature of the right of appeal and the binding interpretation of the applicable law.

15.The Court has considered the case of Riaz Hussain,11 wherein the effect of payment of Daman and the execution of sentence was examined in the circumstances of that case. The said authority cannot be disregarded; its applicability must be determined by reference to its ratio and the material facts. Where the record establishes a material distinction in the circumstances of payment, the terms of the relevant order, or the legal status of the sentence, the question of maintainability must be decided on that distinction and under the applicable statutory provisions. Accordingly, the deposit of Daman should not be treated as an automatic waiver of the right of appeal merely by inference, unless such consequence follows from the governing law as properly interpreted and applied to the established facts. This conclusion neither negates the victim's lawful entitlement to Daman nor confers an unrestricted right of appeal; it requires only that the question of maintainability be resolved through the applicable law, rather than by treating payment and abandonment of appellate rights as necessarily synonymous. The contention advanced by the learned Public Prosecutors is, accordingly, wholly untenable when measured against the clear, unambiguous, and settled legal position.

Supra Note 4

Surah al-Nisa (4:135) -Justice must prevail regardless of personal consequences; Surah al- Ma’idah (5:8) - Justice must not yield to prejudice or preconception; Surah al-Isra (17:15) - No person bears another's burden; and Surah al-Hujurat (49:6) -Verification before reaching a conclusion.

Supra Note 7.

16.Upon a meticulous perusal of the record, it transpires that the medical examination of the injured witness Rukhsana Bibi (PW-2) was conducted a full ten days subsequent to the occurrence of the alleged incident. Dr. Imran Basheer (CW-2), in the course of his cross-examination, candidly acknowledged that he obtained the X-ray of the injured Iftikhar on 01.06.2021 rather than on 29.05.2021. It is further noteworthy that the injured Iftikhar was referred to the District Hospital Gujranwala on 29.05.2021 where, according to his own testimony under cross-examination, the medical staff discharged him from the said facility. It is thus rendered abundantly clear that he was never readmitted to the DHQ Hospital, Gujranwala. This circumstance renders highly doubtful the assertion that Dr. Imran Basheer (CW-2) conducted the X-ray examination of the injured on 01.06.2021.

Significantly, neither the X-ray film nor its accompanying report has been placed on the record. In the absence of these essential documents and the consequent want of corroborative medical evidence, the prosecution’s case to the extent of the injured Iftikhar Ali stands substantially weakened. These major discrepancies raise serious doubts on the credibility of prosecution witnesses of ocular account as well as the medical evidence. In these circumstance, a doubt that has arisen in the prosecution case, must give its benefit to the appellants.

It is a settled law that a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of accused makes him entitled to its benefits, not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of

right.12 The conviction must be based on unimpeachable, trustworthy and reliable evidence. Any doubt arising in prosecution case is to be resolved in favour of the accused. As discussed above, in the present case the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond any reasonable shadow of doubt.

17.It is further pertinent to observe that the complainant, Iftikhar Ali (PW-1), preferred his private complaint on 15.07.2022 after an inordinate delay of about one year and two months, a circumstance which, by itself, is sufficient to indicate that apparently the complaint was the product of subsequent legal consultation and afterthought.

Such unexplained procrastination speaks volumes of possible deliberation, concoction, and the false implication of the respondents.

Viewed against this backdrop, the attendant circumstances admit of no other inference than that the instant private complaint was instituted as a counterblast against the respondents, founded upon distorted facts and tainted by dishonest improvements. It is the bounden duty of the complainant to furnish a satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging the complaint, a duty which remains wholly undischarged in the present case. The unexplained delay is, without question, fatal to the complainant’s case. It is the duty and obligation of the Court to examine this aspect of the case even if the counsel of the parties had failed to raise this plea on the well-known principle that a judge must wear all the laws of the country on the sleeve of his robes and failure Mehmood Khan and others Vs. The State (2026 SCMR 1606)

of the counsel to properly advise is not complete excuse in the matter.13

18.It may further be aptly noted that the complainant, Iftikhar Ali (PW-1), deposed that he had preferred only a single application for the registration of his case and categorically denied the suggestion that he had moved two separate applications bearing No. SDSK-1724, dated 22.06.2021 and 24.06.2021 respectively. Conversely Muhammad Saeed, Sub-Inspector and Investigating Officer (CW-7), testified that the accused in the State case, who is the complainant in the present private complaint, had indeed preferred the same applications. This discrepancy eloquently demonstrates a deliberate attempt on the part of the complainant to suppress material facts with the apparent design of falsely implicating certain of the appellants through an expanded net of accusation. The conflict in testimony irresistibly points to a willful distortion of material facts by the complainant.

19.The complainant, Iftikhar Ali (PW-1), further conceded that in his first application (Ex.P.A), PW Abid had neither been cited as a witness nor had any cursory statement of the said witness been recorded; yet the said individual was never produced as a witness before the Court, an omission that escaped the notice of the learned trial Court. It is also significant that no empties were recovered from the relevant time and place. The investigation further revealed that petitioners/appellants Nos. 2 and 3 were not present at the scene so as Muhammad Fiaz Khan Vs. Ajmer Khan and another (2010 SCMR 105)

to serve as witnesses to any recovery of empties. These circumstances engender grave and substantial doubt in the prosecution narrative.

20.The complainant deposed in his evidence that the injured persons belonging to the accused party, namely Jamshed, Ismail and Mudassir Nawaz, were departing from the Civil Hospital Daska, at the very moment when he arrived there for his medical examination.

Remarkably, the entry time recorded in the Medico-Legal Certificate of appellant Ismail, an injured person in the FIR case, stands at 04:48 p.m. on 29.05.2021, which coincides precisely with the entry time of the complainant Iftikhar (PW-1) on the same date. This striking identity of timing gives rise to a serious doubt as to the authenticity of the facts and strongly suggests that the Medico-Legal Certificate was a maneuvered document. In these circumstances, the possibility of the false implication of the appellants through a wider net, as a counterblast to the FIR case, cannot be ruled out, particularly when appellants Jamshed Ahmed, Muhammad Ismail, Muhammad Yasin and Javed Ahmed were found innocent during the course of investigation into the cross-version, and no recovery was effected from any of them save a kassi from accused Javed Ahmed. The foregoing facts amply demonstrate that the complainant cast a wider net against several innocent persons, the majority of whom were declared innocent in the police investigation, and Such circumstances could serve no other purpose than to establish that the entire narrative is a sheer concoction, wherein the possibility of a substitution of roles

in the infliction of the alleged injuries by the accused party assumes the character of a moral certainty.

21.Muhammad Saeed, Sub-Inspector and Investigating Officer (CW-7), deposed that the accused party in the FIR case, namely Iftikhar Ali and others, had initiated the scuffle at the time of the occurrence, and that the complainant of the present private complaint was himself found involved in the said FIR. It therefore appears that material facts were deliberately withheld and concealed from the learned trial Court. It further appears that incident occurred spontaneously with no evidence of premeditation and eventually resulted in a free fight. In these circumstances, it has become naturally impossible to discern the truth from a heap of falsehood. When statements of even injured witnesses suffer from dishonest improvements and material contradictions in a private complaint, lodged with the delay of more than one year, in which many of the accused were found not involved in the alleged occurrence, renders the testimony of those injured PWs as doubtful, the benefit of such reasonable doubt, as a settled principle, was therefore liable to be extended in favour of the accused. It is trite that injuries on the prosecution witnesses indicate if present at the spot, but what he deposed cannot be accepted as gospel truth. His testimony must be evaluate on sole merit in accordance with settled principles of criminal justice.14

Amin Ali and another Vs. The State (2011 SCMR 323)

22.For the afore going in view, it can be concluded that the witnesses of ocular account appear to be doubtful, not believable and also cannot be considered to convict accused persons in the face of contradictions, discrepancies and inconsistencies pointed out in the afore referred analysis; which made the manner of occurrence as doubtful, and reinforced the necessity for the benefit of the doubt to be extended to him. Since the presence of P.Ws has become doubtful at the relevant time and place of occurrence, the credibility of evidence furnished by the prosecution cannot be termed as impeachable, trustworthy and reliable. Given the facts and circumstances of the instant cases, accused persons have become entitled to the benefit of doubt. Allah, the Almighty and all Omnipotent, ordained in the Holy Qur'an "And do not mix the truth with falsehood or conceal the truth while you know [it]."15 Given the above analysis, the benefit of doubt has accrued in favour of the accused. The rule of benefit of doubt, which was described as the golden rule, was essentially the rule of prudence, which could not be ignored while dispensing the justice according to law.16 Such a rule was based on the maxim that “it is better that ten guilty persons be acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted”.17 This rule occupied a pivotal place in Islamic law and was enforced vigorously.

The expression “beyond reasonable doubt” seeks to ensure that no innocent person is convicted, which is fundamentally important to the Surah Al-Baqarah: verse 42

Khalid Mehmood v. The State (2 0 1 1 S C M R 664) Ayub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048)

criminal justice system. “Mistake of judge in releasing a criminal is better than his mistake in punishing an innocent.”18 Many circumstances creating doubt are not necessarily required for giving benefit of doubt on any account. Circumstance creating a reasonable doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of accused persons would make them entitled to the benefit of the doubt not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right. The conviction must be found on unimpeachable evidence and certainty of guilt, and any doubt that arises in the prosecution case must be resolved in favour of the accused as it is imperative for the court to examine and consider all the relevant proceedings so as to arrive at a correct conclusion.

23.In the attending circumstances, the prosecution has failed to establish the charge against the accused/appellants beyond the shadow of a doubt given the numerous infirmities and doubts that crept into the evidence, the benefit whereof accrues to the appellants not as a matter of grace or concession, but as an absolute matter of right.19 Hence, this Court arrives at the unequivocal conclusion that the prosecution has failed miserably to adduce credible evidence that could establish the commission of the alleged offence by the appellants. It was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove its case against the accused beyond any reasonable doubt, a burden it has failed to discharge. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The Ibid.

MAQSOOD ALAM and another Versus The STATE and others" (2024 SCMR 156), "ABDUL QADEER Versus The STATE" (2024 SCMR 1146), "MUHAMMAD IMTIAZ BAIG and another Versus The STATE through Prosecutor General, Punjab, Lahore and another" (2024 SCMR 1191), "MUHAMMAD HASSAN and another Versus The STATE and others" (2024 SCMR 1427), "KHIAL MUHAMMAD Versus The STATE" (2024 SCMR 1490), and "MUHAMMAD IJAZ alias BILLA and another Versus The STATE and others" (2024 SCMR 1507) Relied.

conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Trial Court against the appellants are hereby set aside, and the appellants stand acquitted of the charges. The case property, if any, shall be disposed of in accordance with law, and the record of the learned Trial Court be remitted back forthwith.

(Amir Ajam Malik) Judge

Approved for reporting.

Judge

Gulzar*