Turkish Maarif Foundation vs Punjab Labour Court

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT,

MULTAN BENCH MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

Turkish Maarif Versus Punjab Labour Court and 2 Foundation others

JUDGMENT

Date of Hearing: 21.10.2026 Petitioner by: Barrister Waqas Aziz Qureshi, ASC Respondents by: Rana Muhamamd Javed Iqbal, Assistant Attorney General.

Mr. Bashir Ahmed Buzdar, Assistant Advocate General.

Ch. Saleem Akhtar Warraich and Syed Ghazanfar Abbas Bokhari, Advocates for the Respondent No.3/Mst. Ismat Mateen.

JAWAD HASSAN, J. The Petitioner/Turkish Maarif Foundation (the “Petitioner”) through this writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the “Constitution”) has impugned the order dated 08.05.2023, passed by the Respondent No.1/Punjab Labour Court No.IX, Multan (the “Respondent No.1”) and the judgment dated 30.03.2023, by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (the “Respondent No.2”), being illegal and unlawful. This Court in order to protect the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (the “Pakistan”) and the Republic of Türkiye (the “Türkiye”) has already passed the judgment reported as M/s 5H INSAAT Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

versus Secretary and others (2025 CLD 813 = PLJ 2025 Lahore 738) (Rawalpindi Bench), in favour of the 5H İnşaat Ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi, which is a Turkish Construction and Engineering Company affiliated with the Hazinedaroğlu Group, Headquartered in Istanbul by resolving the dispute through mediation, immediately and to avoid arbitration by saving cost of the project. Likewise, this case relates to the Türkiye Maarif Vakfı (Petitioner) which is a State-Supported Public Organization Non-Profit Public Educational Foundation established by Law No.6721 on June 17, 2016, by the Grand National Assembly of Türkiye. It is the sole official entity authorized to open and operate educational institutions abroad including Pakistan on behalf of the Türkiye outside of the Ministry of National Education.

I. OVERTURE OF THE CASE

2.This judgment will decide the questions regarding the statutory jurisdiction of the authorities under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (the “Act 1936”), to entertain the claim against the Petitioner, the legal status of the Petitioner as a non-profit educational organization, its liability, if any, for the employment-related claims arising out from the service rendered under the previous management, and the legality of dismissal of its appeal in limine without adjudication of the jurisdictional objections on merits.

II. PRELUDE OF THE PETITION

3.Brief facts of the Case are that the Petitioner is a non-profit organization sponsored by the Government of the Türkiye and was established under Turkish Legislation No.6721 on 17.06.2016 for the purpose of, inter alia, imparting quality education in multiple countries around the world on a non-profit basis. The Petitioner operates the Pak Turk Maarif International Schools and Colleges (the “Project”), a non-profit project under which it currently operates 27 campuses across the Pakistan. It is pertinent to mention here that, in terms of global engagement, the largest non-profit operation of the Petitioner in the world is in Pakistan, both in terms of the number of students served and the investment made by the

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

Turkish Government. That, considering the brotherly ties between Pakistan and Türkiye, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 16.11.2016 was signed between the Government of Pakistan and the Petitioner, outlining the responsibilities of both parties. The MOU provides that the Petitioner is a non-profit organization (NGO) and shall utilize the funds generated through its activities for the further development of the Project, without retaining or distributing any profits. The arrangement was further fortified by a bilateral MOU executed between the Governments of Pakistan and Türkiye on 13.01.2021, which dealt exclusively with the operations of the Petitioner in Pakistan. Furthermore, the Petitioner is certified by the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy, which further confirms its status as an NGO.

4.It is pertinent to mention here that the schools, prior to the transfer of their administrative control, were managed by the Pak Turk International Cag Education Foundation (the “PTICEF”). However, in compliance of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 13.12.2018, passed in C.P. No. 66 of 2018, the administrative control of the Project was handed over to the Petitioner, following which the schools were rebranded as Pak Turk Maarif International Schools and Colleges (PTMISC). Vide the said judgment, the previous management, i.e. PTICEF, was declared a proscribed organization under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (the “Act of 1997”), owing to its alleged linkage with the Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) and involvement in activities contrary to the interests of Türkiye. Subsequent to the change in administration as directed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the Petitioner’s new administration implemented a series of reforms to reverse the negative association with the Project. These measures included streamlining the administrative mechanism, introducing systematic and periodic personnel evaluations, implementing reforms to prevent financial embezzlement, removing personnel linked with the previous management/proscribed organization, and taking other necessary administrative measures to avoid future legal complications. In this regard,

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

Respondent No.3 was employed by PTICEF in September 2003 and remained in its regular employment.

5.However, upon the transfer of administrative control of the Project to the Petitioner, fresh employment contracts were required to be executed with all employees. The Respondent No.3 consistently disregarded the new administrative procedures and her insistence on continuing under the previous management system adversely affected the affairs of the school. As Vice-Principal, she was responsible for the administration and management of a campus situated in Multan. Her unwillingness to follow directions and failure to respect the chain of command caused difficulties for the Petitioner on several occasions. Despite being afforded multiple opportunities to address the concerns raised by the Petitioner, the Respondent No.3 failed to rectify her conduct. Consequently, amid persistent friction, she tendered her resignation through email dated 26.12.2019, which was subsequently accepted. Thereafter, Respondent No. 3 requested a refund of her security deposit and an experience letter. Accordingly, a final settlement amounting to Rs.67,364/- (comprising Rs.25,000/- as security deposit and Rs.42,364/- as salary for 25 days) was prepared on 13.02.2020 and paid to her through a cheque dated 27.02.2020, drawn on HBL. The Respondent No. 3 accepted the said amount without protest. The Petitioner maintains that it possesses written evidence showing that Respondent No.3 had no further claims against it.

6.On 26.08.2020, nearly six months after receiving her final settlement, the Respondent No.3 filed an application before Respondent No.2 claiming to be a “worker” within the meaning of the Act 1936 and seeking additional monetary compensation amounting to Rs.24,598,530/- under various heads i.e. R.969,803/- on account of gratuity for 16 years of service, Rs.392,000/- on account of leave encashment for 16 years, Rs.800,000/- on account of bonus for 16 years, and Rs.22,362,300/- as damages. The Respondent No.2 allowed the application vide impugned judgment dated 30.03.2023 and awarded a total amount of Rs.1,183,967/- in favour of Respondent No.3.

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

Feeling aggrieved thereof, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before Respondent No.1, who, vide the impugned order dated 08.05.2023, dismissed the appeal in limine on the ground of non-appearance and non- compliance of the requirement of depositing the decretal amount, as stipulated in the proviso to Section 17(a) of the Act 1936. Hence, this Petition.

III. PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS

7.Barrister Waqas Aziz Qureshi, ASC has submitted that the impugned judgment passed by Respondent No.2 and the impugned order passed by Respondent No.1 suffer from misreading and non-reading of the law, as the Petitioner, being an NGO, does not fall within the definition of a “commercial establishment” under the Act 1936, or the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (the “Ordinance 1968”). He added that the Petitioner is certified by the Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy and is bound by the MOU executed with the Governments of Pakistan and Türkiye, which require that all funds generated through the Project be utilized for its further development and prohibit the retention or distribution of profits. He further submitted that the Petitioner is engaged solely in providing affordable education and does not carry on any of the commercial activities specified in the relevant statutory definition. He added that several campuses operate at a loss, while the surplus generated by other campuses is utilized to meet operational expenses and establish new schools across Pakistan. He urged that treating the Petitioner as a commercial establishment merely because it charges fees from students is contrary to the applicable law and the findings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

8.Barrister Waqas Aziz Qureshi, ASC further submitted that the impugned order passed by Respondent No.2 is a non-speaking order, as it declares the Petitioner to be a commercial establishment without addressing the documentary evidence demonstrating its non-profit status. He argued that both the impugned order and the impugned judgment violate Articles 4

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

and 10-A of the Constitution, as they were passed without proper consideration of the relevant law and the material placed before the authorities. He added that the impugned order also fails to comply with Section 24(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (the “Act 1897”), which requires judicial and quasi-judicial orders to be supported by reasons. He further submitted that an establishment which does not fall within the statutory definition of a commercial establishment cannot be subjected to the provisions of the Act 1936. He contended that disputes arising out of a master-and-servant relationship involving a non-industrial or non- commercial establishment are to be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court. Learned counsel next contended that the Petitioner and PTICEF are separate and distinct legal entities and the transfer of administrative control of the Project to the Petitioner, pursuant to the afore-mentioned judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court dated 13.12.2018, did not render it liable for the liabilities of the previous management. He added that the Hon’ble Supreme Court directed the transfer of the assets of the Project to the Petitioner but did not impose upon it the liabilities of PTICEF. He further submitted that the impugned order was passed without supporting evidence, as Respondent No.3 failed to substantiate her claims under the various heads through documentary evidence. He further argued that the Respondent No.2 wrongly placed the burden of proof regarding jurisdiction upon the Petitioner, whereas it was for Respondent No.3 to establish that she was a “worker” employed in an “industrial or commercial establishment” within the meaning of the relevant law. Learned counsel also submitted that the Respondent No.3 had accepted the amount of Rs. 67,364/- as full and final settlement of her dues through a cheque dated 27.02.2020 and had acknowledged the same in writing without protest. He urged that, in view of the doctrine of estoppel, the Respondent No.3 could not subsequently raise further claims against the Petitioner after accepting the settlement. He further contended that the Respondent No.1 erroneously recorded in the impugned order that no arguments had been advanced on the question of maintainability, despite the

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

fact that arguments had been addressed on 04.05.2023 and the matter had been fixed for orders on 08.05.2023. He added that the appeal had been dismissed in limine without deciding the Petitioner’s application seeking exemption from the deposit requirement under the proviso to Section 17(a) of the Act 1936. He urged that, even if the exemption was not granted, the Petitioner ought to have been afforded an opportunity to deposit the decretal amount before the appeal was decided on its merits. Lastly, learned counsel submitted that both Respondents No. 1 and 2 lacked jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the claim against the Petitioner and that the impugned judgment and order are, therefore, without lawful authority and liable to be set aside. He accordingly prayed that the writ petition be accepted and the impugned judgment and order be declared illegal and set aside.

IV. RESPONDENTS’ SUBMISSIONS

9.Conversely, learned Law Officer as well as learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 have objected to the maintainability of this Petition by defending the impugned order and judgment having been passed in accordance with law and policy.

10.Heard. Record Perused.

V. DETERMINATION BY THE COURT

11.Perusal of the record reveals that the dispute arose from the transfer of administrative control of the Pak Turk Maarif International Schools and Colleges to the Petitioner, pursuant to the judgment dated 13.12.2018 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in C.P. No. 66 of 2018. Following the change in administration, the Petitioner introduced certain administrative reforms, whereupon the Respondent No.3, who had been employed by the previous management, resigned from service and subsequently filed an application before the Respondent No.2 seeking gratuity, leave encashment, bonus and damages. The Respondent No.2 partly allowed the claim, while the appeal preferred by the Petitioner was dismissed in limine by Respondent No.1 for non-appearance/non-

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

compliance with the deposit requirement under Section 17(a) of the Act 1936.

12.The Petitioner’s case is that all necessary administrative changes were made in compliance of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. It maintains that it is an NGO and does not fall within the statutory definition of a commercial establishment; therefore, the authorities under the Act 1936, lacked jurisdiction to entertain the Respondent No.3’s claim. It was further contended that the Petitioner is a separate legal entity from the previous management i.e. PTICEF and cannot be held liable for its predecessor’s liabilities merely because the administrative control and assets of the Project were transferred to it.

13.Perusal of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 13.12.2018, passed in C.P. No. 66 of 2018, reveals that the transfer of the Project to the Petitioner was directed in the backdrop of the declaration by the Government of Türkiye that PTICEF and its related organizations were affiliated with FETÖ. The Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the relevant circumstances, including the reported nexus between the previous management and the organization involved in the failed coup attempt in Türkiye on 15.07.2016 and directed the transfer of the schools and their movable and immovable assets to the Petitioner to secure their continued operation and the provision of education in Pakistan. The international context was also reflected in Resolution No.47/43-POL adopted at the 43rd Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), held at Tashkent, Uzbekistan, on 18-19 October 2016, whereby the OIC condemned the attempted coup and expressed its full solidarity with the Government and people of Türkiye in their efforts to safeguard democracy, justice, security and national unity. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are reproduced as under:

4.We have been informed that the Turkish Government declared the PTICEF and its related organizations as

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

Fetullah's Terrorist Organization (FETO). FETO was also recognized as a Terrorist organization by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) at its 43rd Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Tashkent. The OIC declared its full solidarity with the Government and people of Turkey in its fight against FETO to ensure and preserve democracy, justice, security and unity in Turkey. It called upon member States, which include Pakistan, to take every necessary measure against the entities and groups manned or directed by Turkish nationals affiliated with FETO and cooperate with the Government of Turkey to this end. Pakistan being a member of the OIC was a part of the declaration and is bound by the same. The terrorist status of FETO was also recognized by the Asian Parliament Assembly (APA) which required all member States to take necessary measures to stop FETO related entities from operating in the member States.

5.In view of the above declaration of the parent organization of PTICEF as a Terrorist Organization, many countries extradited and expelled members of the foundation from their territories and took over control of the schools established by the foundation. More than 40 Asian countries have already declared FETO as a terrorist organization and all its moveable and immovable assets have been taken over by the concerned governments. The Government of Turkey has authorized TMF to take over all schools and colleges in different countries operating under the umbrella of CEC including PTICEF.

6.It is pertinent to mention that the PTICEF was granted the status of an International NGO in Pakistan. It is alleged that in order to conceal its designs, the PTICEF has deceptively registered itself as a company with the Securities

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) without the consent, knowledge or approval of the original signatories of the MoU. We have however been informed that the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, has already cancelled all MoUs signed with the PTICEF.

7.The TMF has been established under the laws of Turkey. Its objectives include providing educational services and it has been designated as the only organization authorized to provide educational services on behalf of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, the TMF wishes to take over administrative and financial control of the schools functioning under PTICEF. It has been informed by the learned Deputy Attorney General that a new MoU between the Government of Pakistan and TMF dated 16.11.2016 has already been signed. A large number of countries around the world have already handed over assets of the schools being run under the parent organization (CEC) to the TMF which is operating in more than 50 countries.

8.It appears that there is complete consensus and harmony in the views of the Governments of Pakistan and Turkey in this matter. The administrative and financial control of the schools has been agreed to be delivered to TMF and in order to give effect to that arrangement the MoU signed between the PTICEF and the Government of Pakistan has been cancelled and revoked.

9.In order to frustrate the aforesaid arrangement, it appears that the PTICEF had fraudulently got a Section 42 Company registered with the SECP and created a fake Board of Governors to run the schools. Although No Objection Certificate and other documents had earlier been issued in favour of the PTICEF, all such NOCs, permissions and

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

approvals stand revoked by virtue of the parent organization of PTICEF being declared a terrorist organization. It is alleged that the school system is a front to conduct illegal activities. Furthermore, money generated by the said school system is being laundered and channeled into financing unlawful activities of FETO around the world.

14.It is pertinent to observe that Pakistan, being a member State of the OIC has an established framework for cooperation with other member States in promoting peace, security and the fight against terrorism, in accordance with applicable international commitments and domestic law. Pakistan and Türkiye have historically maintained close and brotherly relations, which have progressively developed into a strategic partnership encompassing defence, security, education, trade, investment and other fields of mutual interest. The bilateral relationship has also been institutionalized through the High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC), established in 2009 and subsequently upgraded to strengthen strategic cooperation between the two countries. The seventh session of the said Council was held in Islamabad on 13.02.2025, reaffirming the commitment of both countries to further deepen their strategic partnership and continue cooperation against terrorism. These circumstances explain the international and bilateral context in which the administrative control of the Project was transferred to the Petitioner. However, the question whether the Petitioner can be held liable for the employment-related claims of Respondent No.3 and whether the Respondents No.1 and 2 possessed the requisite statutory jurisdiction to adjudicate upon those claims, must independently be determined in accordance with the applicable law and the record of the case.

15.Although the Respondent No.2 framed as many as four (04) Issues including the Issue No.1 i.e. Whether the Authority has no jurisdiction to hear the case? (OPR), which was decided in a very slipshod and casual

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

manner. For ready reference the same reads as follows: Issue No. 1:

It is established from the available record that the applicant had been in the service of respondent establishment for Sixteen years and when resigned from duty, she was not paid the wages which she was entitled to get as per the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 because the establishment was not exempted from the application of the said law. The establishment school has been charging exorbitant fees and undoubtedly was making profits. Therefore, it came under the definition of commercial establishment and the change of management in 2018 does not exclude the liabilities of the previous employers because the assets of previous management were taken in possession by the successive management, therefore, they cannot shrug off their duties which accompany these assets. Moreover, honorable Supreme Court has also not exempted the new management from the liabilities and nothing on record proved that the new management had ever communicated to the existing employees about their lawful wages due to the previous service. Therefore, this issue is decided in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent. It shows that the Respondent No.2, while deciding the Issue No.1, did not consider the background of the case, the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Türkiye; especially the legal status of the Petitioner mentioned in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 13.12.2018, which is otherwise binding upon him under Article 189 of the Constitution. This situation fully attracts the Order XIV Rule 2 CPC, which reads as follows:

2.Issues of law and facts.--- Where issues both of law and fact arise in the same suit, and the court is of opinion that the case or any part thereof may be disposed of on the issue of

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

law only, it shall try those issues first, and for that purpose may, if it thinks fit, postpone the settlement of the issues of fact until after the issues of law have been determined.

The above reproduced provision of law makes it amply clear that where an issue of law arises, that issue must be tried first. But this provision also specifies a condition that by deciding the said Issue of law, the case or any part thereof may be disposed of. This conditional principle of application has been elaborated through numerous judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan wherein, it has been held that the provision of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC is mandatory though before trying the Issue of law as a preliminary issue, the court has to be convinced that by doing so, fate of whole case can be decided. Issues of law which go to the root of the whole case and capable to be decided without evidence, the court should decide that issue first. Reliance in this regard is placed on the recent judgment of this Court reported as “Manzoor Elahi versus Rehmat Ali” (2025 CLC 306), wherein the same question of law has been decided. The relevant paragraph is reproduced as under:

The interpretation of the provision of Order XIV Rule 2 CPC has put a clear condition, thereby leaving it to the discretion of the trial court to frame and decide the legal issue first or together with the issues pertaining to factual controversy. It has further been settled that it is open to the court to allow parties to lead evidence on legal issues without having it formally framed or whether pressed or not by the parties. Further reliance is placed on the judgments reported as The Province of East Pakistan versus Hassan Askary (PLD 1971 S.C 82) and Messrs Zarkhaiz Agro Engineering and Services (Pvt.) LTD. Versus Messrs Sargodha Farms Aids (Pvt.) LTD. (2005 YLR 200).

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

16.Thereafter, the Respondent No.1 instead of deciding the Appeal on merits dismissed it in limine on the basis of technicalities, vide impugned order in the following manner:

Briefly, the respondent/applicant filed her application under section 15 of Payment of Wages Act, 1936 against the respondent / present appellant which application was accepted by the learned Authority under Payment of Wages Act at Multan vide order dated 30.03.2023 whereby the respondent / present appellant was held responsible to pay an amount of Rs.11,83,967/- to the said applicant and the learned Authority directed to deposit the said amount within 30 days for disbursement to the applicant.

It is evident that while bringing the instant appeal under section 17 of the Payment of the Wages Act 1936 on 27.04.2023, the appellant preferred not to first deposit the decretal amount with the learned Authority but straightaway filed the instant appeal. In the body of the instant appeal, detail regarding the status of the appellant of being an international school is mentioned alongwith the alleged special status statedly available to it, however perusal of the relevant law quite clearly reveals that the condition precedent for deposit of the decretal amount is absolute and exclusive, exemption whereof cannot be claimed by an appellant under any circumstances. Therefore the instant appeal is hereby held to be incompetent being barred by law as the above referred condition has not been fulfilled by the Appellant while brining the same.

Bare reading of the aforesaid impugned order reveals that the Respondent No.1 has passed the same basically on technical grounds rather than a proper appraisal of the merits of the case. Recently the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the judgment authored by the Hon’ble Mr. Justice Shahid

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

Waheed, reported as “PROVINCE OF PUNJAB through the District Collector, Bhakkar versus MUHAMMAD CHIRAGH and others” (PLD 2026 SC 53), has held that:

The phrase "off on a technicality" aptly encapsulates the situation before us and underscores its complexity and implications. In our assessment, we believe that the order issued by the District Judge was flawed and ought to have been revised by the High Court. Before delving into the specific reasons for this conclusion, it is important to acknowledge that legal practitioners sometimes make unintentional mistakes when drafting pleadings or filing cases. Such errors, while regrettable, often result in outcomes that can attract sanctions or penalties. However, in the administration of justice, it is crucial to recognise that not all mistakes warrant strict punitive measures. To give life to the principle that wrong must not go unpunished, and that right must not go unenforced, a degree of leniency must be accorded to errors that do not stem from contumacy or intentional misconduct. By adopting a more forgiving approach towards certain minor mistakes, the judiciary can prevent the rigid application of A rules from hindering the broader mission of justice delivery. This perspective is vital because the judiciary is respected not because it has the technical ability to legitimise unfairness. Instead, its respect is rooted in its fundamental role as an arbiter of fairness- capable of identifying and rectifying injustices. The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system. It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes.”

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

17.At this juncture, it is also worth mentioning that this Court has already passed judgment strengthening the scope of mediation to avoid arbitration and dispute by saving cost of the project in the recent judgment reported as M/s 5H INSAAT Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi versus Secretary and others (2025 CLD 813 = PLJ 2025 Lahore 738) (Rawalpindi Bench), which also protects the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Türkiye.

18.It is a settled principle of law that any order having adverse consequences must conform to the requirements of due process and fair play as envisaged under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Reliance in this regard is placed on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as NEW JUBILEE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD., KARACHI--- Appellant versus NATIONAL BANK OF PAKISTAN, KARACHI (P L D 1999 Supreme Court 1126), wherein it has been observed that:

18.Adverting to the second submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent had violated the principle of natural justice, it may be observed that Mr. Muhammad Ali Sayeed has relied upon the following cases:

(1)Muhammad lqbal v. Fatima Jinnah Medical College and another (1989 MLD 4237).

(2)Sri Rama Engineering Contractors v. Construction Engineer Civil Engineering, Department of Space, Government of India, Sariharikota, Nellore and another (AIR 1981 Andhra Pradesh 165), and

(3)Preetam Pipes Syndicates v Tamil Nadu Slum Clearance Board Madras (AIR 1986 Mad. 310).

In the first case learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court has held that the order blacklisting the plaintiff without issuing previous show-cause notice is void of being against the principles of natural justice. In the second case it has been held that wherever an order inflicts civil consequences on the applicant the principles of natural justice should be observed.

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

In the third case it was held ' that blacklisting of and forfeiture of the security of the appellant without hearing him was violative of the principles of natural justice. 19. There cannot be any cavil with the proposition that when an act or order inflicts civil consequences on a person in respect of his reputation or property which is harmful to his interest, he is entitled to be heard before such an action or order is taken or passed. In the instant case though there was no formal showtause notice issued, but the appellant inter alia was served with the notice, dated .3-4-1993 (copy at page 47 of the paper book) whereby it was called upon to j review its decision with regard to repudiation of the claim within seven days and settle the claim amicably failing which the respondent was to have no Option but to delist the appellant from the Bank's approved list of hlsurance Companies. This letter was received and replied to by the appellant. In our view, this has been sufficient compliance of the principle of natural justice. 20. The upshot of the above discussion is that the appeal is allowed. This order of the High Court is set aside, the appellant's above Constitutional petition is allowed, the order of delisting the appellant is quashed and the respondent is directed to include the name of the appellant in the approved list of the Insurance Companies and to notify the same to the parties to whom the delisting was notified. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, in the above-said judgment has categorically held that where an order inflicts civil consequences, the principles of natural justice are to be observed, and the affected person must be afforded a reasonable opportunity of hearing before passing such order.

19.When confronted with the above legal position, learned Law Officer and learned counsel for the Respondent No.3 did not submit any satisfactory reply.

W.P. No.8460 of 2023

VI. CONCLUSION

20.In view of above, in order to advance the cause of justice and to prevent any miscarriage of justice and without further commenting upon merits of the case, this Court is of the view that the Petitioner is entitled to the relief sought for. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed, the impugned order dated 08.05.2023 and the judgment dated 30.03.2023, passed by the Respondents No.1 and 2, respectively, are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936/Respondent No.2, to decide the same afresh especially the preliminary Issues, etc. in the light of the background of the case, the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and Türkiye; especially the legal status of the Petitioner mentioned in the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan dated 13.12.2018, which is binding upon him under Article 189 of the Constitution. No order as to costs.

(JAWAD HASSAN)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

[email protected]