Adeena Naz Vs Judge Family Court etc

Form No: HCJD/C-121

ORDER SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT LAHORE

(JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT)

Case No. W.P. No.39820/2026

Adeena Naz Versus Judge Family Court/Guardian Judge Lahore, etc.

Sr.No.of order/ Date of order/ Order with signatures of Judge, and that of parties or counsel, Proceedings Proceedings where necessary.

07.10.2026 Ch. Muhammad Yousaf Advocate, along with the petitioner.

Respondents No.2 & 3 are ex-parte.

Amicus curiae, Ms. Amber Qayyum, Advocate.

Through the instant writ petition, the petitioner, Mst. Adeena Naz, has assailed the judgment and decree dated 14.05.2026 passed by the learned Judge Family Court, Lahore, whereby her suit for dissolution of marriage, originally instituted on the grounds of cruelty and non-maintenance, was decreed on the basis of Khula, subject to the return of dower. The grievance of the petitioner is that her claim founded upon statutory grounds was converted into a decree for Khula, carrying financial consequences, without proper consideration of the distinction between the two remedies and the implications of such conversion.

2.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Family Court ought not to have treated the petitioner’s expression of unwillingness to continue the marriage as a sufficient basis for depriving her of her right to dower. It is argued that the petitioner had approached the Court seeking dissolution on the grounds of cruelty and non-maintenance, but the consequences of electing Khula, particularly in relation to dower, were not adequately explained to her.

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3.Despite service through the prescribed modes, respondents No.2 and 3 did not appear and were proceeded against ex parte vide order dated 20.07.2026.

4.Arguments heard. Record perused.

5.Perusal of the record reflects that the petitioner contracted marriage with respondent Muhammad Subhan on 24.12.2023 against dower of Rs.100,000/-, stated to have been paid at the time of Nikah. Subsequently, she instituted a suit for dissolution of marriage on the grounds of cruelty and non- maintenance. The proceedings for reconciliation before the ADR Centre, Lahore, remained un-successful. Thereafter, the learned Family Court recorded the statement of the petitioner, wherein she expressed her inability and unwillingness to live with the respondent, requested dissolution through Khula, and stated that she was ready and willing to return the dower. On the basis of the said statement, the marriage was dissolved through Khula, accompanied by a direction for restitution of dower.

6.The statement of the petitioner, as reproduced in the impugned judgment, reads as follows:

“Stated that I cannot live with defendant Muhammad Subhan at any cost. I have developed severe hatred against him. My suit for dissolution of marriage on the basis of Khula be decreed. I am ready and willing to return the dower to defendant.”

7.The statement undoubtedly contains an express request for Khula and an offer to return the dower. It is, therefore, distinguishable from a case in which the Court, without any such request, converts a suit for dissolution on statutory grounds into one for Khula. However, the existence of an express statement does not dispense with the Court’s responsibility to ensure that the election made by a litigant is voluntary and that its material legal consequences are understood. The question is not whether a woman is competent to choose Khula; she unquestionably is. The question is whether the Court has adequately safeguarded her

ability to make that choice with knowledge of the available alternatives and the consequences attached to them.

8.In Ibrahim Khan v. Mst. Saima Khan and others, reported as PLD 2024 SC 645, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan explained the distinction between dissolution of marriage upon statutory grounds under the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, and dissolution through Khula. The Court held that the two remedies operate in distinct legal domains and carry different consequences, particularly concerning dower. A Family Court cannot independently substitute Khula for a statutory claim when the woman has not unequivocally elected that remedy. Where the statutory grounds are established, section 5 of the 1939 Act protects the wife’s right to dower. By contrast, Khula may entail restitution or relinquishment of dower in accordance with the applicable law.

The principle was reaffirmed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Mst. Naila Javed and another v. Nasir Khan and others, Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.3767 of 2025, decided on 12.01.2026 and reported as PLD 2026 SC 302. These authorities require the Court to respect the woman’s election and not to treat the two remedies as interchangeable. The distinction is substantive: it concerns not merely the form of the decree, but the rights and liabilities that follow from it.

9.It follows that a woman who seeks dissolution on the grounds of cruelty or another statutory ground should not be presumed to have abandoned that claim merely because she expresses hatred, refuses reconciliation, or states that she cannot continue to live with her husband. Such expressions may be consistent with the allegations forming the basis of her suit. Equally, where a woman, after understanding the available remedies and their consequences, chooses Khula and offers the consideration required by law, her decision must be respected. The Court must neither impose Khula upon her nor obstruct her access to it by requiring unnecessary formalities.

10.The responsibility of the Family Court assumes particular importance because the choice is often made at a stage when the parties are under considerable emotional distress and are seeking an immediate resolution of their marital dispute. The Court is not required to persuade a woman to pursue statutory grounds, nor to dissuade her from seeking Khula. Its duty is to explain the distinction neutrally, ascertain her actual preference, and record that preference in clear terms. The Court must not assume that a litigant understands the financial consequences merely because she has used the expression Khula or has stated that she is willing to return the dower.

11.The expression “informed choice” does not mean that a woman must prove the intensity of her aversion or justify her decision to leave the marriage before she can seek Khula. Nor does it require the Court to conduct a lengthy inquiry in every case. It requires an explanation proportionate to the decision being made, in language understood by the woman, followed by a direct and unambiguous statement of her election. The explanation must be especially clear where the woman has already pleaded statutory grounds and the proposed change of remedy may affect her financial rights.

12.In the present case, the statement of the petitioner demonstrates that she expressly requested Khula and offered to return the dower. However, the impugned judgment does not sufficiently record whether she was informed that she could continue to pursue her original statutory claim, that the legal consequences concerning dower differ between the two remedies, or whether she understood those consequences before making her statement. The record reproduced before this Court does not permit a confident conclusion that these matters were explained. The Court cannot fill that evidentiary gap by presuming that an explanation must have been given merely because the petitioner’s statement was recorded.

13.At the same time, the petitioner’s express request for Khula cannot be disregarded, nor can the dissolution of marriage be treated as an involuntary act simply because the judgment does not record a detailed explanation. The proper course is to distinguish the petitioner’s desire to terminate the marriage from the question whether the financial consequence attached to the selected remedy followed from a sufficiently informed election. In the circumstances of this case, the omission calls for a limited reconsideration rather than an automatic conclusion that the petitioner never sought Khula.

14.It is, therefore, considered appropriate to lay down the following procedural safeguards for the guidance of Family Courts. These safeguards are intended to give practical effect to the law declared by the Honourable Supreme Court, protect the autonomy of the woman, and ensure that the financial consequences of dissolution are determined according to law.

Guidelines for Family Courts A. Identification of the remedy

(i)At the appropriate stage, the Family Court shall ascertain whether the wife seeks dissolution of marriage on statutory grounds, Khula, or Khula as an alternative remedy. Where the plaint alleges cruelty or another statutory ground, the Court shall not presume that the wife has abandoned that claim merely because she expresses an inability or unwillingness to continue cohabitation.

(ii)The Court shall explain that a wife may seek Khula without establishing matrimonial fault, whereas dissolution on statutory grounds requires determination of the grounds pleaded in accordance with law. The choice between these remedies belongs to the wife and shall not be made on her behalf by the Court. B. Explanation of legal and financial consequences (i) Before accepting an election of Khula in a case originally brought on statutory grounds, the Court shall explain, in a language understood by the wife, the material distinction between the remedies and their consequences concerning dower.

(ii)The Court shall clarify that a decree on an established statutory ground attracts the protection of section 5 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, whereas Khula may

entail restitution or relinquishment of dower in accordance with the applicable law. The Court shall not state or imply that every form of dissolution necessarily requires the wife to return her dower.

(iii)Where dower is disputed, unpaid, partly paid, or paid in property, the Court shall ascertain the relevant facts and identify the applicable legal consequences. The amount or property proposed to be returned or relinquished shall be specified, and the Court shall not extend a general statement into a surrender of unrelated rights.

C. Recording of informed and voluntary choice

(i)After giving the explanation, the Court shall ask the wife to state whether she wishes to proceed with her statutory claim, elects Khula, or seeks Khula as an alternative. Her answer shall be recorded in her own words, as far as practicable.

(ii)The Court shall ensure that the decision is voluntary and is not the result of pressure, misunderstanding, or an impression that she has no alternative but to surrender dower to obtain dissolution. Where there is a genuine doubt regarding understanding or voluntariness, the Court shall give the wife a reasonable opportunity to obtain legal advice or clarify her position.

(iii)No rigid or lengthy formula is prescribed. The substance of the inquiry is that the wife understands the available choices, the material financial consequences, and the effect of the election she makes. A statement shall not be rejected merely because it does not follow prescribed wording, provided that the record establishes a clear and informed choice.

D. Adjudication and protection of rights

(i)Where the wife maintains her statutory claim, the Court shall proceed to determine that claim in accordance with law and the evidence, without converting it into Khula merely because reconciliation has failed or the wife has expressed aversion to her husband.

(ii)Where the wife knowingly and voluntarily elects Khula, the Court shall give effect to that election and determine the consequences concerning dower under the applicable law. It shall not require proof of cruelty as a precondition to Khula.

(iii)The Court shall state in its judgment the remedy elected by the wife, the material explanation provided, the statement demonstrating her election, and the legal basis for any direction concerning dower. The Court shall also make clear that Khula does not, by itself, extinguish independent claims relating to

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dowry articles, personal belongings, or the maintenance of children.

(iv)These safeguards shall be applied in a manner that facilitates expeditious disposal. They shall not be used to prolong a marriage against the woman’s wishes, to compel reconciliation, or to subject a woman seeking Khula to an unnecessary trial concerning matrimonial fault.

دنمرہجابالدعایتلرامنہا لكئااف یلموکرسٹوکافمداعہمیکاخرطاُردوزابمںیمیھبرحتریایکاجراہےہ۔ افل۔ولطمہباقونیناچرہوجیئیکواضتح

) .(iیلموکرٹانمبسرمےلحرپاخوتمےسہیواحضرکےیگہکآایوہاشدیےکاخےمتےکےیلاقونمںیمرقمررکدہ دوعیںیمملظو دوعیرکریہےہ،علخاچیتہےہ،ایعلخوکابتمدكاچرہوجیئےکوطررپاایتخررکاناچیتہےہ۔ارگ ٰ اینبدوںرپ ٰ دشتد ای وکیئ دورسی اقونین اینبد ایبم یک یئگ وہ وت ضحم اس وہج ےس ہک اخوتموشرہ ےک اسھت رےنہ ےس ااکنر رکیت ےہ ،ہی وصترںیہنایکاجف اگہکاسےناینپاقونیناینبدےسددربتداریاایتخررک یےہ۔ ) .(iiدعاتلاخوتموکریغاجدبنارا ہاادازںیمئاھجمف یگہکعلخےکےیلازدوا یروصربا ترکانوروریںیہن،ہکب اقونمںیم رقمر رکدہ اینبد رپ اکنح ےکاخےمت ےک ےیلہقلعتم اقونین اینبداکوبثت اور اساکنیعتوروریےہ۔ام دوونں ںیمےسیسکاکیرطۂقیاکراکااختنباخوتماکاانپقحےہ؛دعاتلاسیکہگجہیااختنبںیہنرکےیگ۔ ب۔اقونیناورام یاتنجئیکواضتح دوعیدارئایکوہاوردعبںیمعلخاایتخررکےناکارادہاظرہرکےوتدعاتل ) .)iارگاخوتمےنادتباںیماقونیناینبدوںرپ ٰ اسااختن بوکوبقكرکےنےسےلہپ،اخوتمیکھجمسںیمآےنوا یزابمںیم،دوونںرطۂقیاکراکرفقاورقحِرہمرپامےک ارثاتواحضرکےیگ۔ ) (iiدعاتلواضتح رکے یگ ہکڈِوسولنش آفملسمریمزج اٹکی 9191 ،یک دہعف 5ےک تحتاقونین اینبدرپاکنحمتخ وہےنیک لرتںیمقحِرہماکظفحت لےہےہ،ہکبعلخیک لرتںیماقطا اق ققاقونمےک قبقحقحِرہمیکواای ای اس ےس ددربتداریاک وساكدیپا وہاتکس ےہ۔دعاتل ہیاترث ںیہن دے یگہک اکنح متخ رکاےنیک رہ لرتںیم قحِرہم واسپرکانالزیمےہ۔ ) .(iiiارگقحِرہمیکادایگیئ،دعلادایگیئ،زجویادایگیئایاجدیئادیک لرتںیمادایگیئانتمزعوہوتدعاتلہقلعتماقحقئ ولعمل رکے یگ اور اقطا اق قق اقونم ےک قبقح ہلصیف رکے یگ۔ واسپ ےیک اجےن ای وھچڑے اجےن واےل قحِ رہم یک رمق ای اجدیئاد واحض وطر رپ ایبم یک اجف یگ۔ یسک ومعیم ایبم وک زیہج ،ذایت اسامم ای درگی ریغ ہقلعتم وقحق ےس ددربتداری ںیہنئاھجماجف اگ۔ ج۔آزادا ہاورابربخااختنباکاادراج ) .(iواضتح ےک دعب دعاتل اخوتم ےس درایتف رکے یگ ہک آای وہ اےنپ اقونین دوعے وک اجری رانھک اچیتہ ےہ ،علخ اایتخر رکیتےہ ،ای علخوک ابتمدكاچرہ وجیئ ےکوطر رپاچیتہےہ۔ اہجں کتنکمم وہ ،اساکوجاب ایسےک اےنپاافلظںیم ملقدنبایکاجف اگ۔

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) .(iiدعاتلاانیمطمرکےیگہکااختنبآزادا ہوطررپایکایگےہاوریسکدابؤ،طلغیمہفایاساترثےکےجیتنںیمںیہنہک اکنح متخ رکاےن ےک ےیل قحِ رہم ےس ددربتداری ےک وسا وکیئ راہتس وموجد ںیہن۔ ارگ اخوتم یک ھجمس ای راضدنمی ےک ابرےںیمیقیقحہبشوہوتاےساقونینوشمرہےنیلایاانپؤمفقواحضرکےناکانمبسومعقدایاجف اگ۔ ) .(iiiیسکوطلیایوصخمصاافلظرپ لمتشمافرومےلیکاپدنبیالزلںیہن وہیگ۔اینبدیاقتاضہیےہہکاخوتم دایتسب اقونین راوتسں ،ام ےک امہ ام ی اتنجئ اور اےنپ ااختنب ےک ارثات وک یتھجمس وہ۔ ارگ راکیرڈ ےس آزادا ہ اور ابربخ ااختنب با توہوتضحمرقمرہاافلظاامعتسك ہرکےنیکوہجےسایبموکرتسمدںیہنایکاجف اگ۔ د۔ہلصیفاوروقحقاکظفحت ) .(iارگ اخوتم اےنپ اقونین دوعے وک اجری رانھک اچےہ وت دعاتل اس دوعے اک ہلصیف اقونم اور اہشدت ےک قبقح رکےیگ۔ضحماصمتحلیکاناکیمایوشرہےکےیلرفنتایاندنسپدییگےکااہظروکعلخںیمدبتیلییکاینبدںیہنانبایاجف اگ۔ ) .(iiارگ اخوتم ابربخ اور آزادا ہ وطر رپ علخ اایتخر رکے وت دعاتل اس ااختنب وک ؤمرث انبف یگ اور قحِ رہم ےک قلعتم اتنجئاکنیعتاقطا اق ققاقونمےک قبقحرکےیگ۔علخےکےیلملظودشتدایازدوا یروصربا ترکےنیکرشطاعدئ ںیہنیکاجف یگ۔ ).)iiiےلصیف ںیم دعاتل واحض رکے یگ ہک اخوتم ےن وکم اس اقونین راہتس اایتخر ایک ،اےس ایک واضتح دی یئگ ،اس ےک ااختنباکوکماسایبمراکیرڈرپوموجدےہ،اورقحِرہمےکقلعتممکحسکاقونیناینبدرپاصدرایکاجراہےہ۔ہییھبواحضایک اجف اگہکعلخ ِ ذباتوخدزیہج،ذایتاساممایوچبںےکانموہقفنےسقلعتمآزادا ہوقحقوکمتخںیہنرکات۔ ) .(ivام رامنہا لولں رپلمع درآدمرکےت وہف دقمامتوک دلجاٹمنےناکاقتاض شیپرظن راھکاجف اگ۔ اما لولں وکاکنحزئادیتسئارقاررےنھک،اصمتحلرپوبجمررکےنایعلخیکوخاشہرےنھکوا یاخوتموکازدوا یروصربا ترکےنےک ریغوروریدقمےمںیمااھجلےنےکےیلاامعتسكںیہنایکاجف اگ۔

15.The foregoing safeguards are intended neither to make the exercise of the right to Khula more difficult nor to presume that a woman is incapable of making her own decision.

Their purpose is to ensure that the decision is “genuinely hers”.

The Court must respect her autonomy while ensuring that a consequential judicial order is not founded upon an uninformed or misunderstood election. A brief, neutral explanation at the appropriate stage can prevent substantial injustice and avoid unnecessary subsequent litigation.

16.Applying these principles to the present case, the petitioner’s statement establishes that she expressly sought Khula and offered to return the dower. However, the available record

does not adequately establish that the distinction between Khula and dissolution on statutory grounds, together with the consequences for dower, was explained to her before the election was accepted. In the absence of such material, this Court is unable to sustain the financial direction merely by presuming informed consent. At the same time, the petitioner’s recorded desire to end the marriage must be respected and the proceedings should not be prolonged unnecessarily.

17.Consequently, the instant writ petition is partly allowed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 14.05.2026 are set aside to the extent that the petitioner’s election of Khula and the consequential direction concerning return of dower require reconsideration in accordance with the foregoing guidelines. The matter is remanded to the learned Judge Family Court, Lahore, for a limited and expeditious inquiry into the petitioner’s informed and voluntary election of remedy.

18.The learned Family Court shall explain to the petitioner, in a language understood by her, the distinction between Khula and dissolution on statutory grounds and the material consequences concerning dower. It shall thereafter record her clear and voluntary choice. If she elects Khula after such explanation, the Court shall determine the consequence concerning dower in accordance with the applicable law and the relevant facts. If she elects to pursue her original statutory claim, the Court shall proceed in accordance with law, affording the necessary opportunity to the parties and avoiding any presumption that the original claim was abandoned merely by reason of her earlier expression of aversion. The proceedings shall be concluded expeditiously, preferably within 30-days of receipt of this judgment, subject to the requirements of law and a fair opportunity to the parties.

19.The object of the remand is confined to ensuring that the remedy and its financial consequences reflect her informed and

voluntary choice. The learned Family Court shall pass a reasoned order in the light of the above directions.

(Mohsin Akhtar Kayani) Judge

Approved for reporting

Judge JahanZaib*