Barkat Ullah & 12 Others vs Pop etc.

HCJDA-38

JUDGMENT SHEET

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT

MULTAN BENCH MULTAN

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

RFA No. 297 of 2025

Barkatullah and 12 others versus Province of Punjab and 9 others

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing 13.10.2026

Appellants by: Mr. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, learned Advocate.

Respondents No. 1 Mr. Salman Asif Warraich, learned and 2 by: AAG.

Respondents No. 3 Syed Muhammad Najam ul Saqib to 5 by: Mumtaz, learned Advocate.

Respondent No. 6 Ms. Kausar Daha, learned Advocate. by:

Sultan Tanvir Ahmad, J:- Through this judgment, the captioned regular first appeal as well as appeal No. 87 of 2026 shall be decided together, being outcome of same judgment and decree dated 24.10.2025 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge (Civil Division), Khanewal.

2.The appellants instituted suit No. 202 dated 16.08.2010 seeking declaration that order dated 25.08.2004 passed by the District Officer Revenue, Khanewal (respondent No. 2) and mutation No. 2347 passed on 30.11.2004 with respect to the property as detailed in the suit (the “suit property”), in favour of Manzoor Ahmad (respondent No. 3) is against the law and facts, thus they are liable to be struck down. Permanent injunction is also sought

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in the suit as consequential relief. On the other hand, Manzoor Ahmad and others (respondents No. 3 to 5) filed suit No. 203 dated 29.07.2011 for possession and mesne profit, asserting that they are lawful owners of land measuring 11-kanals 10-marlas in khasra No.63/17 and 63/21, which was purchased through an open auction in the year 1955. They pleaded that their land was in two portions. One measuring 7-kanals 2-marlas is on the southern side of LMQ road. The second portion measuring 4-kanal 8-marla is on the northern side of the said road and out of the same property measuring 02-kanals 02-marlas in khasra No.63/17/1 is in the illegal possession of the appellants.

The suits were contested and out of divergent pleadings, the following issues were framed:-

1.Whether order dated 25.08.2004 of the defendant No. 2 and mutation No. 2347 dated 30.11.2004 are illegal, void and as such inoperative qua the rights of the plaintiffs? OPP

2.Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree as prayed for? OPP

3.Whether the defendant No. 3 Manzoor Ahmad is entitled to recover possession and mesne profit of the suit property measuring 2-K 2-M situated in khasra No. 63/17/1 as detailed in the headnote of the plaint?OPD-3

4.Whether plaintiff has no cause of action and locus standi to file the instant suit? OPD

5.Whether the suit of the plaintiff is within time?

OPD

6.Whether the defendant No. 3 is entitled to receive special costs u/s 35-A CPC from the plaintiff? OPD 7. Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to try this suit in hand? OPD1

8.Relief.

3.The parties led the evidence to their satisfaction. The suit of the appellants was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 18.02.2019, whereas, the suit of respondents No. 3 to 5 was decreed, permitting them to obtain possession of land measuring 02-kanals 02-marla in khasra No. 63/17/1 along with the mesne profit at the rate of Rs.2,000/- per

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month per shop for the past three years from the date of institution of suit with 6% annual increase and till the possession is handed over. The same was called in question before this Court in RFA No. 138 of 2019. Vide order dated 26.02.2024 this Court, while setting-aside judgment and decree dated 18.02.2019, remanded the case for impleading National Highway Authority (NHA) in the array of parties.

4.Accordingly, NHA has been impleaded as party. NHA has also filed written statement. After rehearing the parties the learned trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 24.10.2025, has again dismissed the suit of the appellants. The suit for possession is decreed in favour of Manzoor Ahmad and others (respondents No. 3 to 5) and they are also held entitled to get the possession of the property along with mesne profit at the rate of Rs.2,500/- for each shop, every month from the past three years of the date of institution of the suit, with 6% annual increase till the possession is handed over to respondents No. 3 to 5. Aggrieved from the same, captioned appeal as well as appeal No. 87 of 2026 have been filed.

5.Mr. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, learned ASC has submitted that the learned Court below has misread the evidence and it has been overlooked that the appellants” property falls in khasra Nos. 13 to 15 of square No. 63, while the land of respondent No.3 is in khasra Nos. 17/1 and 21/1 of square No. 63. He has added that even otherwise, the entire land of the private respondents (11-kanals 10-marlas) was acquired and the said respondents cannot claim any land beyond their legal entitlement. The main thrust of his argument remained that the land claimed by respondents No. 3 to 5 is ghair mumkin sark, however, they in collusion with the revenue staff have managed to change the character of the land which has been done by the revenue staff and officers in utter bad faith.

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6.Syed Muhammad Najamul Saqib Mumtaz, learned Advocate for respondents No. 3 to 5, has vehemently opposed this appeal, taking us through different parts of evidence and various rounds of litigation between the parties. Besides merits, he also pleaded rigours being faced by private respondents due to expanded litigation. Mr. Salman Asif Warraich, Learned AAG, has also stated that the assertion of collusion or mala fide, against the revenue authorities is based on sweeping and frivolous allegations, which are required to be curbed. He has also invited the attention of this Court towards preliminary objection No. 5 set-up in the written statement filed by the Province of Punjab and stated that the suit is barred by law.

7.Ms. Kausar Daha, learned Advocate for NHA is also present and she has stated that as per the record 4-kanals 8-marlas land of respondent No. 3 is located in north and 7- kanals 2-marlas is in south. She has stated that vide notification dated 30.03.1994 land measuring 11-kanlas 10- marlas was acquired and then 3-kanals 7-marlas land was de-notified through notification dated 04.08.2001 (the “notification”) and NHA has no concern with the land and the same is not in its possession or utilization. She stood by the prayer in the written statement that the suit of the appellants is liable to be dismissed.

8.Heard. Record perused.

9.The first issue, framed by the learned trial Court, is with regard to order dated 25.08.2004 passed by respondent No. 2 / District Officer (Revenue) Khanewal and the mutation No. 2347 dated 30.11.2004. The order dated 25.08.2004 was passed on the application filed by respondents No. 3 to 5 and after obtaining a report from the field staff. It is an acknowledged fact that NHA has de- notified the land which was not in their utilization. The

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notification has attained finality. Initially, some land was acquired for widening a road; however, the land situated on the northern side was also included in mutation No. 1766 dated 30.04.1999 (Exh.P-7). This land was not part of the approved map. The revenue field staff filed a report dated 03.03.2017 (Exh.P-19) that no road was constructed over the same. Subsequently, vide order dated 25.08.2004 mutation No. 1766 was reviewed and mutation No. 2347 dated 30.11.2004 was passed in favour of respondent No. 3.

10.A scrutiny of the suit filed by the appellants reflects that their principal grievance remained that they have constructed shops. As a result of the order dated 25.08.2004 and the consequent mutation, the value of their property would deplete.

11.Barkat Ullah (appellant No. 1) has been examined as PW-1. In his examination-in-chief, he stated that the land in question does not belong to respondents No. 3 to 5; however, he never deposed in his examination-in-chief that he owned any land comprised in khasra Nos. 63/17-1 or 63/21-1. In his cross-examination, he specified that 60 to 62 shops are existing at the spot and he at that time was receiving different amounts of monthly rent from the tenants, ranging from Rs. 1,500/- to Rs. 10,000/-. He admitted that the land at the backside of these shops is also in his possession.

As a matter of fact, he kept denying the existence of khasra No. 63/17-1, assuming the stance that the NHA had constructed a road in front of his shops. This stance is evidently refuted by the Province of Punjab, the Revenue Department and the NHA. One way or another, Barkat Ullah (PW-1) denied maximum questions for want of knowledge, especially those concerning the previous rounds of litigation vis-à-vis the suit property, and then stated that it might be correct that the previous suit was pertained to the same

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property. He denied that an application/suit had been filed for correction of the revenue record, which in fact was dismissed on 12.05.2004, nonetheless he realized that the said suit was filed by his co-plaintiff No. 12. It is highly improbable that he was unaware about those facts which relate to the property dispute, lasting for years. His evidence, as it plainly appears, is absurd. The remaining oral evidence of the appellants has no difference with regard to credibility.

12.Mr. Muhammad Ali Siddiqui, learned Advocate, during the course of his arguments, insisted that the notification was illegal. However, the core witness Barkat Ullah, although reluctantly, had to admit that the said notification was already challenged in Writ Petition No. 7956, filed in the year 2001. Even otherwise, the filing of said petition is a matter of record, and the petition as well as decision thereupon by this Court are available as Exh. D-31 and Exh. D-32.

This Court vide decision dated 13.11.2002 passed in said constitutional petition, reached to the following conclusion:- “...The petitioners admittedly do not have any legal right, title or interest in the land which was acquired and de-notified and have, therefore, got absolutely no concern with it if it is returned to the owner as being not required by the Acquiring Authority. The petitioner have no vested right which may be enforced by invoking constitutional jurisdiction hence they cannot be deemed as aggrieved party within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed.”

The above was called into question in Intra Court Appeal No. 201 of 2002 when a learned Division Bench of this Court declared that Niaz Ahmad-deceased (present appellant No. 11 through his successors) is not even an aggrieved party.

13.We are also afraid that the appellant-side, is in

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utter disregard of the doctrine of election of remedies and instead of adopting one course, has been dragging proceedings before the revenue, constitutional side and civil Court. This forum shopping is clearly intended to entangle the respondents in protracted litigation.

14.The revenue authorities have been empowered by the Punjab Land Revenue Act-1967 to correct any entry in record of rights, periodical record or register of mutation, in addition to error therein due to accidental slip or omission 1. Undeniably, the appellants, instead of raising a challenge or availing the remedies available to them, up to the Board of Revenue, have approached the learned civil Court in its plenary jurisdiction. This practice has already been discouraged by the Honourable Supreme Court in Administrator Thal Development2. The relevant extract reads:- “Another legal aspect of the case, which also materially affected the maintainability of the suit before the Civil Court in terms of section 9, C.P.C., but escaped the sight of the Court below is the availability of remedy of appeal against the impugned resumption, order dated 27-4-1985 in the hierarchy of revenue laws in terms of section 161 of the Land Revenue Act 1967, which was admittedly not availed, but impliedly barred the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in such matters where the jurisdiction to adjudicate exclusively vested with the revenue Courts.”

15.This Court has already adopted the view that revenue Courts have hierarchy of their own and unless their orders are without lawful authority or jurisdiction, the learned civil Court hardly has any jurisdiction to interfere in the same3.

“Dildar Ahmad and others versus Member (Judicial-III) BOR, Punjab, Lahore and another” (2013 SCMR 906) “Administrator, Thal Development through EACO Bhakkar and others versus Ali Muhammad” (2012 SCMR 730) “Shaukat Ali and others v. Jalal-ud-Din and others” (1999 CLC 1396). Also see“Tanveer Ahmad and 3 others v. Mst. Maqaddas Begum and 7 others” (2014 MLD 687)

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16.In Muhammad Ali4 case, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed the limitation of maintaining a civil suit, in such factual matrix. Paragraph No. 4 reads as under:- “We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at length. We find that the petitioner did not avail the statutory remedies of appeal and revision before the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue respectively against the orders passed by the Collector. The learned counsel failed to satisfy us that such remedies, even if availed, would have been an exercise in futility. The averments in the plaint do not spell out that the orders of the Collector were illegal or beyond the scope of the powers of the Collector and in any other way suffered from any jurisdictional defect so as to be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in view of the dicta of this Court in Abdul Rab and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 1980 SCMR 139 and Bashir Ahmad and others v. Manzoor Ahmad and others 1987 SCMR 1620. The High Court has taken a correct view that the plaint was liable to be rejected on account of bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under section 36 of the Act...”

(Underlining is added)

17.This legal facet, is somewhat similar to a matter before the Supreme Court in Muhammad Siddique5 case wherein it is observed that the orders of Assistant Commissioner and Additional Commissioner were assailable before the Board of Revenue, therefore, suit before the learned civil Court was not competent. It will be beneficial to reproduce paragraph No. 6 of this judgment, which reads:- “6. There are concurrent findings of fact of the two learned Courts below. We have observed that there are further defects in the Suit whereby the orders of the revenue hierarchy i.e. the Assistant Commissioner and the Additional Commissioner were challenged in the Suit. In our view, orders of the Assistant Commissioner as well as the Additional Commissioner were liable to be challenged before the Board of Revenue, Punjab; therefore, a Suit before the Civil Court was not competent before exhausting the available remedy under the law. It is a settled principle of law that where a special remedy is “Muhammad Ali versus Province of Punjab and others” (2005

SCMR 1302)

“Muhammad Siddique (deceased) through LRs and others versus Mst. Noor Bibi (deceased) through LRs. and others”

(2020 SCMR 483)

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provided for under the law, it may not be bypassed and the Civil Courts should not be approached directly without exhausting the highest forum in the authority. Reference may be made to the judgment reported as Hakam and others v. Tassadaq Hussain Shah (PLD 2007 Lahore 261), Zahid Hussain and 10 others v. Shamasuddin and 9 others (2014 CLC 1334) and Muhammad Jalat Khan v. Faisal Hayat Khan and 4 others (2003 CLC 837). Furthermore, the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is also impliedly barred where an alternate remedy has been provided under the law, provided that the authority was not exercised in excess of the jurisdiction conferred upon the authority. Reference in this regard may be made upon the judgment of this Court reported as Bashir Ahmed v. Messrs Muhammad Saleem, Muhammad Siddique & CO. (REGD) and others (2008 SCMR 1272).”

(Emphasis provided)

18.It is also important that the present appellants kept entangling the respondents in litigation at the various stages. For example W. P. No. 5718 of 2018 was dismissed having no force and this Court observed that the actual intent of the appellants is to cause delay in the final outcome. The relevant part reads as under:- “......This is the real intention of the petitioners not to allow the final conclusion of the present suit which goal not only directly but also indirectly cannot be allowed to be achieved...”

19.Even otherwise, trial by the learned civil Court for re-determination of factual controversy after the statutory remedies, cannot be conducted unless a case of jurisdictional defect, mala fide, absence of lawful authority or a decision based on no evidence is made out6. Needless to reiterate that the vires of the notification were also called in question by one of the appellants which was repelled in the manners reproduced above.

20.Facing this position, learned counsel for the appellants has pleaded mala fide on the part of revenue officials. He stated that the notification by NHA and the “Province of Punjab through District Officer Revenue / Collector District Bhakkar and 3 others versus Zualfiqar and 8 others” (PLD 2026 Supreme Court 269)

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order impugned in the suit are result of collusion of the private respondents with NHA and revenue. In this regard, we have noticed that the appellants have miserably failed to lead any persuading evidence to prove taint of bad faith. Unsubstantiated allegations of mala fide, for habitual or ill- advised litigants having no actual causes to merely rope in others to achieve dishonest objectives and/or as a tool to blackmail, has assumed the shape of regular practice in civil cases. This allegation of bad faith, necessarily means that one is challenging the official”s fidelity to his duty or allegiance to his department. The unfounded allegations of bad faith or disloyalty to the society, if not discouraged, then those who are faithfully serving the Country would be crestfallen, causing further damage to the society. While observing this we are not incognizant of wrongdoers and unscrupulous elements. This situation creates a hefty duty on the Courts in civil cases to guard citizens who may be victims of dereliction of duty by official(s). On the other hand, civil Courts should keep in mind that due to the referred dishonest elements there is no presumption of law arising against the official acts which are not in deviation of law, rules and regulations. The officials, institutions and departments are to be protected proportionately, from false accusations, resulting into humiliation, by habitual and ill-advised litigants having objectives highlighted above. In civil cases this perhaps, for the time being and for the purposes of deterrence, can be achieved by imposing costs.

The way to examine it is to initially presume the given act of the department or its official as untainted. This presumption, however, is a rebuttable presumption that arises in favour of the official act, and until this presumption is rebutted, the action cannot be challenged by raising baseless allegation(s) of bad faith. Article 129 of the Qanun-e- Shahadat Order, 1984, and illustration (g) of the said Article,

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in its true spirit, embody the same wisdom, which require the presumption that official acts have been regularly performed. The one who raises this allegation must bring something rational on record showing a deviation from due process of law or a nonconformity of rules clearly noticeable from the circumstances, as an initial burden to establish a cause for concern. Then, for final success on the plea of mala fide, the party alleging it has a heavy burden to discharge7.

21.As already discussed, the appellants have asserted bald accusations of mala fide and the allegation of collusion between private respondents and the officials, however, they failed to lead any independent and reliable evidence. It is noticed with grave concern that appellants have avoided to approach higher forums of the revenue department to show any deviation from rules and regulation made by revenue field staff and the district collector. Evidently, the remedies available to them in revenue hierarchy are deliberately circumvented. As deliberated above, the suit is filed after remaining unsuccessful in the constitutional petition and the intra court appeal. They were dismissed on account that the appellant cannot be even considered as “aggrieved party” and serious observations were made with regard to the intention to avoid the final conclusion. The decisions are not challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court. The referred observations and outcome attained finality.

22.The appellants are admittedly not owners in khasra No. 63/17/1. They are not holding any title or mutation in their favour with respect to this khasra. Learned counsel, when confronted as to the maintainability of the suit seeking declaration in absence of title or lawful authority, has failed to give any plausible answer.

“Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and Others versus Federation of Pakistan and Others” (2012 SCMR 455). Also see “Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others versus Muhammad Khurshid” (2021 SCMR 369)

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23.It is legally settled that the person in possession of an immovable property acquires a right to possession, which cannot be taken away but when the challenge is made thereto by a person who shows prior or better title through transfer or inheritance8. Private respondents have clearly established their prior rights and better title. Barkat Ullah (PW-1) categorically admitted the existence of shops on the land, which is already discussed above. He admitted receiving rent between Rs.1500/- to Rs.10,000/- per month from various shops.

24.After going through the record and hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the clear view that no mistake is made by the learned trial Court, therefore, the findings are concurred and judgment and decree dated 24.10.2025 is upheld. The captioned appeal along with appeal No. 87 of 2026 are dismissed, with cost of Rs.

(Muhammad Sajid Mehmood Sethi) (Sultan Tanvir Ahmad) Judge Judge

Approved for reporting Announced in open Court on 27.10.2026.

Iqbal* Judge Judge

“Taj Wali Shah versus Bakhti Zaman” (2019 SCMR 84)