Dr. Mohi ud Din Dilshad Vs Asia Munir etc

Stereo.HCJDA 38.

Judgment Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE.

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Writ Petition No.64369 of 2021.

Dr. Mohi-ud-Din Dilshad.

Versus

Mst. Asia Munir, etc.

J U D G M E N T.

Date of hearing: 29.10.2026.

Petitioner by: Mr. Ghulam Abbas Chaudhry, Advocate.

Respondent No.1 by: Ch. Muhammad Usman, Advocate.

Respondents 2-3 by: Ms. Samia Khalid, Addl. Advocate General, Punjab.

MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID, J. .— Through this judgment, I intend to decide the instant Constitutional Petition along with connected Writ Petition No.70796/2021, as both petitions arise out of the same proceedings initiated under the Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

2.Briefly stated, the controversy emanates from a complaint lodged by respondent No.1, Ms. Asia Munir, against the petitioner, Dr. Mohi-ud-Din Dilshad, alleging harassment at the workplace. Upon conducting an inquiry, the learned Ombudsperson, Punjab, accepted the allegations and, vide order dated 26.03.2021, imposed upon the petitioner the major penalty of compulsory retirement. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner filed a representation before the Governor, Punjab, which was allowed vide order dated 11.08.2021 to the extent that the major penalty was substituted with the minor penalty of withholding of annual increment for one year. The petitioner has approached this Court seeking setting aside of the

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impugned order and dismissal of the complaint, whereas respondent No.1, through the connected petition, seeks restoration of the major penalty originally imposed by the learned Ombudsperson.

3.Learned counsel for the parties, as well as the learned Law Officer, have been heard, and the available record has been examined with their assistance.

4.The controversy, in substance, requires determination of whether the order dated 11.08.2021 passed by the Governor, Punjab, suffers from any illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Constitution”). The question must be examined from two distinct perspectives: first, whether the petitioner has established a legally sustainable ground for setting aside the proceedings and securing dismissal of the complaint; and, second, whether respondent No.1 has demonstrated any lawful basis for restoration of the major penalty of compulsory retirement.

5.At the outset, it is necessary to emphasize that harassment at the workplace is a serious matter, implicating the dignity, security and equal participation of women in professional life. Complaints involving intimidation, exploitation or sexually demeaning conduct must be examined with due sensitivity and in accordance with law. At the same time, the seriousness of the underlying social problem does not dispense with the requirement that the conduct complained of satisfy the statutory definition of harassment. The distinction between general workplace misconduct, unprofessional behaviour or objectionable remarks, on the one hand, and harassment falling within the scope of the Act, on the other, is fundamental to the lawful exercise of jurisdiction conferred upon the competent statutory forum. This distinction neither trivializes the complainant’s grievance nor prescribes an unrealistic standard of proof; rather, it requires the allegations to be assessed in their factual and legal context, having regard to the nature of the conduct alleged and the

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material available on record. Word "harassment" has been defined in Section 2(h) of the Act, which reads as under:- “(h) ‘Harassment’ means—

(i)any unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual favours, stalking or cyber stalking or other verbal, visual or written communication or physical conduct of a sexual nature or sexually demeaning attitudes, including any gestures or expression conveying derogatory connotation causing interference with work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment, or the attempt to punish the complainant for refusal to comply to such a request or is made a condition for employment; or

(ii)discrimination on basis of gender, which may or may not be sexual in nature, but which may embody a discriminatory and prejudicial mind set or notion, resulting in discriminatory behaviour on basis of gender against the complainant.”

6.In interpreting a definition clause, the language employed by the legislature must be read in the context of the enactment as a whole and in accordance with its object and scheme. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Khurshid Ahmad (PLD 2016 SC 545) and Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue v. Al-Technique Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. (PLD 2017 SC 99), the Hon’ble Supreme Court emphasized the importance of construing statutory language in its proper legislative context. The same interpretative approach is reflected in "Pakistan Stock Exchange v. CIR (2026 SCMR 373), Pakistan Match Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. and others v. Assistant Collector, Sales Tax and Central Excise, Mardan and others (2019 SCMR 906), Aurangzaib v. Medipak (Pvt.) Ltd. and others (2018 SCMR 2027), Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Imran Khan Niazi and others (PLD 2018 SC 189), Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investigation Agency and others (2017 SCMR 1218), Commissioner of Income Tax v. Khurshid Ahmad (PLD 2016 SC 545), Muhammad Khan v. Obaidullah Jan Babat and others (PLD 2016 SC 492). The governing principle is that the statutory definition must be applied in a manner that gives effect to the language chosen by the legislature without unduly enlarging or restricting its scope.

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7.Above quoted definition draws a distinction between conduct which merely constitutes workplace misconduct and conduct which falls within the statutory meaning of harassment. Every act of discourtesy, unprofessional behaviour, personal disagreement, inappropriate remark or breach of workplace discipline does not, by itself, amount to harassment. To attract the provisions of the Act, the conduct must fall within either of the two limbs of the statutory definition: it must constitute unwelcome sexual conduct or sexually demeaning behaviour having the requisite connection with work performance or the creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment, or it must amount to gender-based discrimination, even if non-sexual in nature, reflecting a discriminatory or prejudicial mindset resulting in discriminatory treatment of the complainant on the basis of gender. Thus, the decisive consideration is not merely whether the conduct is objectionable or unbecoming of an employee, but whether its nature, context and effect bring it within the specific statutory parameters of harassment. Conduct falling short of these requirements may nevertheless constitute misconduct warranting disciplinary action under the applicable service rules; however, it cannot be brought within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson merely by describing it as workplace harassment.

8.The aforesaid principle has been elucidated by the Hon’ble Federal Constitutional Court in "Usman Shahid and another v. Nadia Sarwar" (CPLA Nos.1011 and 1113 of 2025, decided on 23.07.2026), wherein the statutory definition of harassment under Section 2(h) of the Act was examined. The Court emphasized that every instance of misconduct or objectionable behaviour at the workplace does not necessarily constitute sexual harassment within the contemplation of the statute. The conduct complained of must satisfy the essential ingredients of the applicable statutory definition, and the jurisdiction conferred by the Act cannot be invoked merely because the conduct is inappropriate, unprofessional or otherwise amenable to disciplinary action under the relevant service rules. The governing distinction was expressed in the following terms: “every

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instance of sexual harassment constitutes harassment”, but “every instance of harassment does not necessarily constitute sexual harassment”.

9.The aforesaid interpretation requires the competent forum to examine the nature and context of the alleged conduct and determine whether it falls within the statutory parameters. Where the allegations, even if accepted, do not satisfy the applicable definition, the conduct may, depending upon its nature, attract disciplinary consequences under the relevant service law; however, the jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson cannot be enlarged beyond that conferred by the legislature.

10.The scope of interference by this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution must also be kept in view. Constitutional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and is not ordinarily exercised to substitute the Court’s own assessment for that of a competent statutory authority merely because another view may be possible. Interference is justified where the impugned decision suffers from a jurisdictional defect, patent illegality, material misreading or non- reading of the record, violation of the principles of natural justice, arbitrariness or another recognized infirmity warranting judicial review. The Court is not required to undertake a de novo appraisal of the entire controversy or to reassess the quantum of punishment solely because one party considers it excessive and the other insufficient. The principles governing the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction find support in "Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner of Pakistan and another (PLD 1973 SC 24), Muhammad Lehrasab Khan v. Mst. Aqeel-un-Nisa and 5 others (2001 SCMR 338), and Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Forest, Peshawar and others v. Sher Aman and others (2022 PLC (C.S.) 1225)".

11.Reverting to the facts of the present case, respondent No.1 alleged that the petitioner had attempted to develop personal relations with her and had made inappropriate and sexually

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demeaning remarks during their professional interaction. She further alleged that the petitioner had shown her a vulgar picture and, on another occasion, blocked her car in an attempt to attract her attention. According to respondent No.1, these incidents were not isolated but formed part of a continuing course of conduct that caused her discomfort and adversely affected her working environment. The petitioner denied the allegations and maintained that the complaint had been instituted on account of ulterior considerations, personal animosity and departmental politics.

12.Upon inquiry, the learned Ombudsperson accepted the allegations and imposed the major penalty of compulsory retirement vide order dated 26.03.2021. In his representation before the Governor, Punjab, the petitioner challenged the findings and the proportionality of the punishment, contending, inter alia, that the allegations had not been established in accordance with law. The Governor, Punjab, vide order dated 11.08.2021, examined the allegations, the material available on record and the nature of the conduct attributed to the petitioner. While observing that the petitioner’s conduct was unprofessional and that the allegations concerning inappropriate remarks had not been satisfactorily rebutted, the Governor considered the major penalty of compulsory retirement disproportionate to the misconduct established. Consequently, the punishment was modified and substituted with the minor penalty of withholding of annual increment for one year under Section 4(4)(i)(b) of the Act.

13.The foregoing account indicates that the Governor, Punjab, did not exonerate the petitioner of all allegations or disregard the grievance raised by respondent No.1. Rather, the Governor interfered with the punishment imposed by the learned Ombudsperson after considering the nature of the conduct and the proportionality of the penalty. Nevertheless, the legality of the impugned order cannot be determined solely by reference to the fact that some allegations were found to be unprofessional or were not satisfactorily rebutted. The

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statutory question remains whether the conduct established on the record satisfies the applicable definition of harassment under Section 2(h) of the Act and, consequently, whether the statutory authority exercised its jurisdiction within the limits prescribed by law.

14.In this regard, the allegations concerning attempts to develop personal relations, sexually demeaning remarks and the showing of a vulgar picture must be considered in their proper factual context. Equally, the allegation concerning the blocking of respondent No.1’s car must be assessed in the context of the conduct attributed to the petitioner and the material supporting it. No single allegation should be isolated from the remaining circumstances where the complaint concerns a course of conduct. Conversely, the cumulative nature of the allegations cannot, by itself, dispense with the requirement that the essential statutory ingredients be established. The principle laid down in "Usman Shahid and another v. Nadia Sarwar" (supra) accordingly requires the conduct complained of to be tested against the statutory definition, rather than being characterized as harassment merely because it is objectionable or unprofessional.

15.During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that respondent No.1 failed to specify the date, time and place of the alleged incidents and, therefore, the complaint was liable to be rejected on this ground alone. The contention, however, is misconceived. The proceedings under the Act are not criminal proceedings initiated through registration of an F.I.R. under Cr.P.C., wherein the particulars of the alleged occurrence are ordinarily required to be stated in accordance with the applicable procedural law. The complaint in question was required to be examined in the context of the nature of the allegations, the surrounding circumstances and the material available before the competent forum. The absence of precise particulars of date, time or place, by itself, cannot constitute an automatic ground for rejection of a complaint, particularly where the allegations relate to a course of conduct allegedly occurring during professional

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interaction. The relevant question is whether the allegations, considered as a whole and in the light of the available material, are sufficiently intelligible to enable the respondent to answer them and the competent forum to determine whether the conduct complained of falls within the statutory definition of harassment. Accordingly, the objection raised by learned counsel, in the form advanced, does not by itself furnish a ground for interference with the impugned order. This, however, does not dispense with the requirement that the essential ingredients of harassment under the Act must be established in accordance with law.

16.Examined in the context of the rival challenges, the petitioner has not demonstrated any legally sustainable ground warranting setting aside of the impugned order and dismissal of the complaint. His denial of the allegations and assertion of ulterior motives, without establishing a recognized ground for judicial review, do not by themselves justify interference with the decision of the competent authority. On the other hand, respondent No.1 has also failed to demonstrate that the Governor, Punjab, acted unlawfully in substituting the major penalty of compulsory retirement with the minor penalty of withholding of annual increment for one year. The mere fact that the learned Ombudsperson had initially imposed a major penalty does not, in itself, establish that the Governor’s subsequent modification was illegal or that the original punishment must necessarily be restored.

17.The exercise of constitutional jurisdiction does not permit this Court to enhance or reduce a penalty merely on the basis of its own assessment of the seriousness of the conduct. Such interference must be founded upon a demonstrable legal infirmity in the decision under challenge. In the present case, neither petitioner has established a sufficient basis for such intervention. The petitioner has not made out a case for annulment of the proceedings and dismissal of the complaint, while respondent No.1 has not established a lawful ground for restoration of the major penalty.

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18.For the foregoing reasons, both Constitutional Petitions, being devoid of merit, are dismissed.

(MUHAMMAD AJMAL ZAHID)

JUDGE.

APPROVED FOR REPORTING.

JUDGE.

M. Arsalan*