Imtiaz Sher etc. vs Muhammad Nawaz etc.

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgment Sheet

LAHORE HIGH COURT,

Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

C.R. No.968-D/2015 Imtiaz Sher, etc.

VS.

Muhammad Nawaz, etc.

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 14.09.2026

Petitioners by: Raja Munir Ahmed, Advocate.

Respondents No.1 to Ex parte vide order dated 07.09.2026. 22 by:

Respondent No.23 Mr. Muhammad Idrees Rafiq Bhatti, by: Assistant Advocate General.

SYED AHSAN RAZA KAZMI, J. Through the instant Civil Revision filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“C.P.C.”), the petitioners have called in question the judgment and decree dated 16.09.2015 passed by the learned Appellate Court, Chakwal, whereby the appeal preferred by respondents No.1 to 22 was allowed, the judgment and decree dated 14.10.2014 passed by the learned Trial Court were set aside and the suit instituted by the said respondents was decreed.

2.Briefly stated, respondents No.1 to 22 instituted a suit for declaration in respect of land measuring 6 Marlas 84 square feet, situated at Village Multan Khurd, Tehsil Talagang, District Chakwal, claiming proprietary rights on the basis of mortgage deed dated 25.05.1947, allegedly executed by Nand Kishore in favour of Ameer Khan, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. Their case was that the mortgagor failed to redeem the property within the prescribed period. The suit was contested by the defendant/Province of Punjab. After framing of

issues and recording of evidence, the learned Trial Court, vide judgment and decree dated 14.10.2014, dismissed the suit. The respondents preferred an appeal which was allowed by the learned Appellate Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 16.09.2015, whereby the judgment and decree of the learned Trial Court were set aside and the suit was decreed. Hence, the instant Civil Revision.

3.Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that although the petitioners were neither parties before the learned Trial Court nor before the learned Appellate Court, they are aggrieved persons competent to invoke the revisional jurisdiction of this Court, particularly as the dispute concerns Government property. It is further contended that the learned Appellate Court erred in law and on facts in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of the learned Trial Court and decreeing the suit on the basis of the alleged mortgage deed without proper appraisal of the evidence and without the respondents establishing their lawful title or entitlement to declaratory relief.

4.I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned Law Officer and have gone through the record with their able assistance.

5.Before entering into the merits of the controversy, an important question regarding the maintainability of the instant revision petition and the locus standi of the petitioners requires determination. It is an admitted position that the petitioners were neither parties to the suit nor to the appeal which culminated in the impugned judgment and decree. The record further reveals that the petitioners, along with others, had earlier instituted a representative suit against respondents No.1 to 22 and had also moved an application under Order I Rule 10, C.P.C., for impleadment in the proceedings. Both the said suit and application were dismissed vide order dated 25.01.2014. Significantly, the said order was never challenged by the petitioners before the competent forum and, therefore, attained finality to their extent.

6.When confronted with this legal impediment, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that an aggrieved person, even if not a party to the proceedings, can invoke appellate, review or revisional jurisdiction. There can hardly be any cavil with the general proposition that, in appropriate circumstances, a person who is genuinely and directly aggrieved by an order may seek its legal redress notwithstanding that he was not formally arrayed as a party. However, such right is not absolute or unqualified. The person invoking such jurisdiction must, in the first place, establish his status as an aggrieved person having a legally recognizable interest adversely affected by the impugned order. More importantly, a person cannot remain silent when his own claim or proceeding is adjudicated against him and thereafter, at a time of his own choosing, challenge a subsequent judgment rendered in proceedings to which he was not a party.

7.In the present case, if the petitioners genuinely claimed an independent and subsisting legal interest in the suit property, their immediate grievance arose from the order dated 25.01.2014 whereby their own proceedings/application were dismissed. The petitioners admittedly did not assail the said order before any competent forum. Having allowed that order to attain finality, they cannot now circumvent the same by invoking revisional jurisdiction against a subsequent judgment rendered in a suit in which they were never parties. Permitting such a course would not only unsettle a concluded matter but would also enable persons to bypass the ordinary remedies available to them against an order directly affecting their asserted rights.

8.The distinction between a person who is merely interested in the subject matter of litigation and one who is legally aggrieved by the impugned judgment is material. The expression “aggrieved person” does not encompass every person who may have an indirect or subsequent interest in the subject matter. The petitioners have failed to demonstrate that the impugned judgment has directly operated upon any adjudicated right of their own. Their own proceedings had already culminated in the

order dated 25.01.2014, which they chose not to challenge. Consequently, they cannot acquire locus standi merely by asserting, at this belated stage, that the property in dispute concerns Government land. This Court, therefore, finds that the petitioners have failed to establish the requisite locus standi to maintain the instant Civil Revision.

9.Even otherwise, the impugned judgment, when examined on merits, does not call for interference. Admittedly, the suit property was owned by Nand Kishore prior to partition and that he had executed mortgage deed Ex.P-1 dated 25.05.1947 in favour of Ameer Khan, predecessor-in- interest of respondents No.1 to 22. The document records the value of the transaction as Rs.99/- and, being a document of more than thirty years’ standing, has the presumption available under the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. No convincing evidence was brought on record by the petitioners or respondent No.23 to dislodge its authenticity.

10.The respondents further produced Ex.P-2, a certified copy of Settlement Scheme VII, wherein an entry at serial No.79 reflected the name of Ameer Khan in the column of possession. In contrast, the Province of Punjab relied upon photocopy Ex.D-1. The learned Appellate Court rightly attached greater evidentiary value to the certified copy obtained through the competent authority. The contents of Ex.P-2 were not effectively rebutted through any better or contemporaneous documentary evidence.

11.The respondents also founded their claim upon paragraph 5(4) of Settlement Scheme VII, specifically pleading in paragraph No.7 of the plaint that, according to the National Census of 1951, the population of Village Multan Khurd was below 3,000 and that they consequently fell within the relevant category for conferment of proprietary rights. This assertion was not specifically denied by the Province of Punjab. The respondents’ claim under the Settlement Scheme, therefore, could not be discarded in the absence of rebuttal by the Province. In terms of Order VIII Rule 5, C.P.C., an allegation of fact not specifically or by necessary implication denied may be treated as admitted, subject to the discretion of

the Court. The learned Appellate Court was, therefore, justified in taking the said uncontroverted assertion into consideration.

12.The objection of limitation was also rightly examined by the learned Appellate Court in the context of the nature of the relief and the respondents’ asserted possession. The finding regarding possession recorded by the learned Trial Court against the Province was not shown to have been successfully assailed. Reliance was placed upon “REHMAN Vs. YARA through L.Rs. and others” (2004 SCMR 1502), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the maintainability of a declaratory suit by a person in possession where the cause of action arose from a subsequent denial of his asserted right. The plea of limitation, therefore, could not by itself defeat the respondents’ claim in the circumstances found by the learned Courts below.

13.Likewise, the mere assertion that a Veterinary Hospital had been constructed over the suit property could not, in the absence of proof of lawful acquisition, transfer, allotment or vesting, establish the Province’s title thereto. If the Government claimed a lawful right over the property on account of its use by the Veterinary Hospital, the necessary documentary foundation of such claim was required to be produced. No such evidence has been identified from the record.

14.The learned Lower Appellate Court, after examining the entire evidence available on record and appreciating the material in its proper perspective, has rightly reversed the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court. It is a settled principle of law that where there is a divergence or inconsistency between the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court and those arrived at by the learned Lower Appellate Court, the findings of the latter, being the final court of fact, ordinarily carry greater persuasive value and are to be accorded due weight, particularly where such findings have been recorded after a fresh and independent appraisal of the evidence available on record. Unless the findings of the learned Lower Appellate Court are shown to be perverse, arbitrary, based on misreading or non-reading of material evidence, or otherwise suffer from some patent

illegality or material irregularity, the same are not liable to be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction. Reliance can be place upon the case-laws titled as “BAHAR SHAH and others Vs. MANZOOR AHMAD” (2022 SCMR 284) and “AMJAD IKRAM Vs. Mst. ASIYA KAUSAR and 2 others” (2015 SCMR 1). In the present case, no cogent, convincing or legally sustainable ground has been brought on record warranting departure from the findings recorded by the learned Lower Appellate Court. Consequently, the findings rendered by the learned Appellate Court, being based upon proper appreciation of the evidence and sound reasoning, call for no interference.

15.Consequently, the instant Civil Revision is dismissed, being not maintainable for want of locus standi and, in any event, devoid of merit.

(Syed Ahsan Raza Kazmi)

JUDGE

Approved for reporting.

JUDGE

Ejaz*