Waheed Rahim Vs The State etc

Stereo. H C J D A 38.

Judgement Sheet

IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE

JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Crl. Misc. No. 57749-M of 2026 (Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

JUDGMENT

Date of hearing: 27.10.2026

Petitioner by: Barrister Asad Ullah Chatha, Advocate State by: Rana Muhammad Asif Iqbal, ADPP with Tanzeem, ASI Respondent No.2 Mr. Zain Ali, Advocate by:

MUHAMMAD JAWAD ZAFAR, J.: Through this petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ("Cr.P.C."), the petitioner, Waheed Raheem, has assailed two orders. The first is the order dated 18.05.2026 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Section-30, Model Town Courts, Lahore, whereby the report for cancellation of case FIR No. 743/2026 dated 31.03.2026, registered at Police Station Gulberg, Lahore, under Sections 354, 506, 147 and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 ("PPC"), was disagreed with, and the petitioner and his co-accused were summoned to face trial. The second is the order dated 24.09.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore ("revisional Court"), whereby Criminal Revision No. 1241/2026 against the summoning order was dismissed.

2.The facts, shorn of unnecessary detail, are that Razia Begum, respondent No. 2, the mother of the petitioner, lodged the FIR. She alleged that she is the Chief Executive Officer of the company running Bundu Khan Hotel. According to her, on 31.03.2026 the Annual General Meeting ("AGM") of the company was convened at 02:00 p.m. in Board Room No. 2, first floor, Nishat Hotel, Gulberg, Lahore, to which all directors and shareholders had been invited. During the meeting, the petitioner, himself a shareholder, entered the board room along with his co-accused, misbehaved with her,

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

threatened to do away with her life, caught hold of her collar and pushed her, and her clothes were torn in the ensuing scuffle. She further alleged that her other son, Wahaj Raheem, was severely beaten, that she sustained an injury on her shoulder, and that the occurrence was recorded by the CCTV cameras installed in the hotel.

3.During the course of investigation, the investigating officer inspected the place of occurrence, recorded the statements of witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., and took into possession CCTV footage on a USB device. He concluded that the allegations were unsubstantiated and arose out of a dispute over the control of the family company, noting that respondent No. 2 and the petitioner are on opposite sides of C.O. No. 34629 of 2023 (Waheed Raheem and others v. Messrs Bundu Khan Foods Limited and others), pending before this Court. Finding no medical or other independent material in support of the allegations, he submitted a report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. read with Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934 for cancellation of the case. The learned Judicial Magistrate disagreed with the cancellation report and summoned the accused, and the learned revisional Court affirmed that order.

4.Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that both impugned orders suffer from patent illegality and non-application of judicial mind. He submits that while a Magistrate may disagree with a police report, he cannot take cognizance and summon the accused in the absence of incriminating material on the record. He further submits that the FIR has been lodged to gain leverage in the pending corporate litigation.

5.Per contra, the learned Deputy Prosecutor General, assisted by learned counsel for respondent No. 2, opposes the petition. It is contended that the Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of the investigating officer and is competent under Section 190 Cr.P.C. to take cognizance and summon the accused, and that the complainant nominated the accused with specific roles. It is further contended that

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

the truth or falsity of the allegations can only be determined after recording of evidence, and that concurrent orders of two Courts below ought not to be disturbed under Section 561-A Cr.P.C.

6.Arguments heard. Record perused.

7.To appreciate the controversy in its proper perspective, it is necessary first to advert to the statutory scheme. Upon completion of investigation, the officer in charge of the police station is required by Section 173 Cr.P.C. to submit a final report to the Magistrate. Rule 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934 supplements this provision. Where a case registered as cognizable is found on investigation to be maliciously false, false owing to a mistake of fact or law, non- cognizable, or of a civil nature, the police cannot close it on their own authority. A report for cancellation must instead be submitted, and the case may be cancelled only by order of a Magistrate of the first class, so that its closure rests on the Magistrate”s scrutiny of whether the conclusion of the investigation is borne out by the material collected. In ““Bahadur and another v. The State and another””1, the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a Magistrate dealing with such a report acts in an administrative or executive capacity and not as a criminal court. His order agreeing with the cancellation of a case is not a judicial adjudication, does not operate as an acquittal or discharge, and leaves the complainant at liberty to pursue a private complaint before the competent forum. The same view was reaffirmed in ““Muhammad Sharif v. The State””2. It follows from this distinction that, whereas an order agreeing with a cancellation report is administrative, an order disagreeing with it and summoning the accused under Section 190 Cr.P.C. is a judicial order, and is open to scrutiny on that footing.

8.Building upon this distinction, it bears emphasis that the Magistrate's role on a cancellation report is supervisory. He is not a PLD 1985 Supreme Court 62

1997 SCMR 304

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

post office bound to accept the opinion of the police. Equally, he cannot convert this preliminary stage into a mini-trial, nor substitute an impression of his own for the findings of the investigation without reference to the record. Where he declines a cancellation report and elects to take cognizance and summon the accused under Section 190 Cr.P.C., his decision must rest on material available on the record which, if unrebutted, would furnish reasonable ground to proceed. In “Federation of Pakistan v. Mumtaz Hussain”3, the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan held that a Magistrate is not bound by the opinion of the police and may either agree or disagree with its report, but where he disagrees and decides to summon the accused, that decision must be based on incriminating material available on the record, and not merely on the allegations of the complainant. See also “Muhammad Ahmad v. The State”4. The question at this stage is not whether the prosecution will ultimately succeed, but whether the Magistrate has identified material on which a prosecution can reasonably rest. Summoning a person to face a criminal trial carries public opprobrium, curtailment of liberty and the burden of protracted proceedings. It cannot be ordered mechanically, or merely to give the complainant a forum to explore allegations that the investigation found unsupported.

9.Before embarking upon the merits, two objections to the exercise of jurisdiction require consideration. First, it is urged that the orders of the two Courts below are concurrent. The dismissal of a revision by the Court of Session does not oust the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, which Section 561-A Cr.P.C. expressly preserves. That jurisdiction, however, is not a substitute for a second revision. It is exercised sparingly, and only where the impugned orders disclose a patent illegality or an abuse of the process of the court. Secondly, although not specifically urged, an accused may ordinarily seek acquittal before the trial Court under Section 249-A Cr.P.C., and this

1997 SCMR 299

2010 SCMR 660

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

Court does not ordinarily pre-empt that remedy, as emphasised by the Honorable Supreme Court in “Director General, Anti-Corruption Establishment, Lahore and others v. Muhammad Akram Khan and others”5. The rule is one of propriety, not of jurisdiction. Accordingly, quashing of proceedings remains available in an exceptional case where, taking the prosecution's own material at face value, no offence is made out, or where the continuance of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of process, as held in “Miraj Khan v. Gul Ahmed”6. The question, therefore, is whether the instant case falls within that exception.

10.In the light of jurisprudence expounded above, the impugned orders and the material available on the record have been carefully scrutinised. At the very outset, the setting of the alleged occurrence assumes importance. Respondent No. 2 is the Chief Executive Officer of the company, and the petitioner, her son, is a shareholder litigating against the company in C.O. No. 34629 of 2023, which was pending before this Court well before the FIR was lodged. The occurrence is alleged to have taken place at the AGM of that very company, during proceedings concerning its affairs. The pendency of corporate litigation confers no immunity from criminal prosecution, and this Court does not proceed on any assumption that a complaint is false merely because the parties are in litigation. Where, however, the allegations arise directly out of an ongoing commercial contest, the Court must examine with care whether there is any material on the record independent of the complainant's own account.

11.Taking up first the allegation of physical violence, respondent No. 2 alleged that she sustained an injury on her shoulder and that her son, Wahaj Raheem, was severely beaten. Allegations of this nature, if true, would ordinarily leave their trace in medical evidence. Yet no Medic Legal Examination Certificate or other medical record of either of them is available on the file. The FIR does not describe the nature PLD 2013 Supreme Court 401

2000 SCMR 122

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

of the injury to the complainant's shoulder, nor the injuries allegedly suffered by her son. The allegation of physical violence, therefore, rests solely on the bare word of the complainant and finds no independent support on the record.

12.Turning next to the CCTV footage, the complainant asserted that the occurrence was recorded by the hotel”s cameras, and the footage was taken into possession on a USB device. In ““Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza and 2 others v. Federation of Pakistan and others””7, the Hon”ble Supreme Court, recognising that advances in technology have made audio and video recordings easy to edit or doctor, held that no such recording can be relied upon unless it is first proved to be genuine and free from tampering, and laid down safeguards to that end, including disclosure of the source of the recording, proof of its safe custody from preparation till production, and proper identification of the persons appearing in it. These safeguards admittedly govern proof at trial, and a Magistrate is not expected to insist on their full compliance at the stage of cognizance, but the principle underlying them holds good at every stage. A recording can furnish ground to proceed against an accused only if there is some assurance that it is what it purports to be and shows what it is said to show, and neither assurance is available here. Nothing on the record discloses the source of the footage or establishes its safe custody until its submission to the Punjab Forensic Science Agency, and no exercise has been undertaken to identify the persons appearing in it. The footage, as it stands on the record, therefore rises no higher than the complainant”s own assertion that the occurrence was recorded.

13.Having found the allegation of violence uncorroborated and the footage unverified, this Court now examines whether the allegations, taken at face value, attract the offences charged. Section 354 PPC is attracted where assault or criminal force is used against a woman with the intention of outraging her modesty, or with the knowledge that her PLD 2019 Supreme Court 675

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

modesty is likely to be outraged. The culpable intention or knowledge of the accused is the essence of the offence, as was held by the Supreme Court of India in State of Punjab v. Major Singh8. At the stage of summoning, however, this Court does not determine the intention or knowledge of the accused, which is ordinarily a matter for trial. The question is whether the allegations, taken at face value, describe an act of that character. On the complainant's own version, the petitioner caught hold of her collar and pushed her in the course of a heated altercation over the affairs of the company, and her clothes were torn "in the ensuing scuffle". The FIR does not attribute to any accused an act directed at her person or clothing in a manner bearing on her modesty. The tearing of her clothes is described as an incident of the scuffle, and not as an act aimed at her. This distinguishes the instant case from Mushtaq Ahmed v. The State9, in which the Honorable Supreme Court held that pulling and tearing the burqa of a pardah-observing woman amounted to outraging her modesty. There, the pulling and tearing of the burqa was itself the act directed at the woman. Here, no such act is attributed to anyone. Neither the nature nor the extent of the alleged tearing is described, and there is no material on the record, independent of the complainant's account, on this aspect. Apart from above, when examined in light of the relationship between the informant and the petitioner, the allegations under Section 354 PPC are inherently improbable. The informant alleges that her own son caught hold of her collar and attempted to tear her clothes. It is difficult to accept, in the absence of cogent corroboration, that a son would publicly tear the clothes of his own mother, and that too in a formal board meeting held at a public hotel, in the presence of the directors and shareholders of the company. The relationship between a mother and her son occupies a position of the highest reverence in our society and faith, and an allegation of this nature, by its very gravity, demands a correspondingly high degree of

AIR 1967 SC 63

1982 SCMR 951

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

supporting material before a court may act upon it. No such material was collected during the investigation. The conclusion rests on what the FIR itself alleges and on the absence of supporting material. The ingredients of Section 354 PPC are, therefore, not prima facie attracted.

14.Akin to the above, for the allegation of criminal intimidation, the position is no different. Criminal intimidation is defined in Section 503 PPC and is constituted where a person threatens another with injury to his person, reputation or property, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause him to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat. The threat must be real and must be held out with the intention specified in the provision; angry words uttered in the heat of an altercation do not, by themselves, suffice. In the present case, the alleged threats are said to have been uttered by the son to his own mother in the course of a heated exchange at the Annual General Meeting of the family company, over a dispute concerning its affairs. No weapon of offence is alleged to have been displayed or used by the petitioner, which renders the alleged threat to life all the more doubtful. There is nothing on record to show that the alleged words were intended to cause alarm to the informant, or that she was in fact put in fear. Nor is there any evidence that, as a result of the alleged threats, she was made to do any act which she was not legally bound to do, or to omit any act which she was legally entitled to do. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The essence of criminal intimidation lies in a threat of injury to be inflicted in the future, held out as a means of coercion. On the informant”s own version, however, the alleged threats did not remain mere threats; they were immediately followed by a scuffle in which she was allegedly pushed and her clothes were torn, and her other son was allegedly beaten. The threat, according to the prosecution itself, was thus actualised then and there. Where a

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

threat is carried into execution in the course of the same transaction, it loses its independent character and merges into the overt acts actually committed, and the culpability of the accused falls to be judged by reference to those acts. It is precisely those acts, however, that find no independent corroboration. As noted above, neither the informant nor her son was medically examined, no Medico Legal Examination Certificate is available on record, and the footage relied upon remains unverified. The alleged threats having merged into overt acts that are themselves wholly uncorroborated, the allegation of criminal intimidation cannot survive independently. On the material on the record, therefore, the ingredients of Section 506 PPC are not prima facie made out. Reliance is placed on “Rana Muhammad Imran Nasrullah v. The State and others”10.

15.In the same vein, the offence of rioting under Section 147 PPC presupposes an unlawful assembly within the meaning of Section 141 PPC, that is, an assembly of five or more persons sharing a common object of the kind specified therein, and the use of force or violence by that assembly in prosecution of that object. Section 149 PPC creates no independent offence and only imposes constructive liability on members of such an assembly. Even if the number of persons nominated is taken to satisfy the numerical requirement of Section 141 PPC, the petitioner, a shareholder, attended a meeting to which shareholders had been invited, and his presence there was not by itself unlawful. The common object of an unlawful assembly may, no doubt, include the commission of an offence, but nothing on the record, beyond the complainant's bare assertion, shows that the accused came together with any such object, and the alleged use of force remains uncorroborated. The charges under Sections 147 and 149 PPC cannot, therefore, be sustained.

16.In the instant case, the investigation found the allegations unsupported. The learned Judicial Magistrate, in disagreeing with the

2022 SCMR 1946

(Waheed Raheem vs. The State, etc.)

cancellation report and summoning the accused, was therefore required to identify the material on the record, apart from the bare assertion of the complainant, on which he relied, and to indicate why that material furnished reasonable ground to proceed. The impugned order does neither. It points to no such material that could justify a departure from the findings of the investigation, while the learned revisional Court treated the learned Magistrate”s discretion as beyond examination, overlooking that such discretion must be reasoned and anchored in the record. Both Courts thus accepted as incriminating material the very assertions that the investigation had found uncorroborated.

17.For the reasons recorded above, this petition under Section 561- A Cr.P.C. is allowed. The order dated 18.05.2026 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate Section-30, Model Town Courts, Lahore, and the order dated 24.09.2026 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, in Criminal Revision No. 1241/2026, are set aside. Consequently, the report for cancellation of case FIR No. 743/2026 dated 31.03.2026, registered at Police Station Gulberg, Lahore, under Sections 354, 506, 147 and 149 PPC, is concurred with, and the case shall stand cancelled.

18.Before parting with this judgment, it is deemed appropriate to clarify that the observations made herein are tentative and confined to the decision of this petition, and they shall not prejudice any party in C.O. No. 34629 of 2023 or in any other proceedings between them.

(MUHAMMAD JAWAD ZAFAR)

JUDGE

Approved For Reporting.

Judge Ejaz/*