Manzoor Ahmad Pahsteen Vs Federation of Pakistan & others

Judgment Sheet

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Writ Petition No. 5560-P/2024

Date of hearing: 21.01.2026.

Date of announcement: 03.02.2026.

M/s. Atta Ullah H. Kundi, Shah Muhammad & Jamal ud Din Khattak, advocates, for the petitioners.

Mr. Sana Ullah, Additional Attorney General, along with Noman ul Haq Kakakhel, Addl. AG & Matiullah, SO, Ministry of Interior.

JUDGMENT

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- This

single judgment shall also decide the connected Writ Petition No. 6497-P/2024, titled Muhammad Bilal & others versus Federation of Pakistan & others, as well as the connected writ petition No. 5046-P/2024, titled Masoom Shah v. Federation of Pakistan and others, as the issues involved in the petitions are interrelated and rest upon identical questions of law and fact, we deem it expedient to consolidate them for the purpose of adjudication. Consequently, the same are decided by means of this single,

common judgment. The petitioners have called into question the Notification dated 06.10.2024 (S.R.O. No. 1620(I)/2024), issued by the Federal Government at Islamabad, whereby, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 11- B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) has been included in the First Schedule as a proscribed organization, and under section 11EE, the petitioners Muhammad Bilal & others have been declared as proscribed person. The petitioners contend that the impugned inclusion is illegal, without lawful authority, and violative of their fundamental rights. They have further prayed that Sections 11-B,11-EE, and 11O of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997, as amended by the Anti- Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act, 2014, be declared ultra vires Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, being inconsistent with the constitutional guarantee of fair trial and due process. It is asserted that the said provisions, insofar as they permit proscription of

organizations and individuals without prior notice or affording a meaningful opportunity of hearing, are void in terms of Article 8 of the Constitution and liable to be struck down.

2.Petitioner No. 1 claims to be the founder of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), while the remaining Petitioners assert that they are active members and part of its Central Committee. The present petition has been filed both in their individual capacities and on behalf of PTM, assailing actions allegedly affecting the organization as well as their personal and fundamental rights.

PTM is stated to be a civil and non- violent social movement, established in 2014, advocating for the rights of Pashtuns. Initially, its activities were confined to raising demands for the removal of landmines from conflict- affected areas of the erstwhile FATA.

Subsequently, in 2018, the movement gained prominence after raising demands for justice in respect of the alleged extrajudicial killing of

Naqeebullah Mehsud. Thereafter, PTM claims to have expanded its advocacy to issues relating to fundamental rights, rule of law, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and alleged profiling of Pashtuns. The Petitioners aver that the movement draws inspiration from non-violent principles associated with Abdul Ghaffar Khan and professes adherence to peaceful means. It is further stated that PTM organized a gathering styled as the “Pashtun National Jirga” on 11.10.2024 at Regi Lalma, District Khyber, with the stated object of providing a platform to voice concerns relating to displacement, enforced disappearances, and extrajudicial killings, and to propose peaceful solutions. According to the Petitioners, prior to the said event, law enforcement agencies allegedly disrupted the arrangements, dismantled tents, and arrested more than one hundred members under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960.

On 06.10.2024, the Federal Government issued the impugned notification under Section 11B of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, whereby PTM was proscribed on the ground of alleged involvement in activities prejudicial to the peace and security of the country. It is further averred that a decision has been taken to include the names of the Petitioners in the Fourth Schedule under Section 11EE of the said Act, and their names have been uploaded on the website of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), though the Fourth Schedule has yet to be formally updated. The Petitioners contend that these actions were taken without prior notice or affording them an opportunity of hearing. The Petitioners further assert that despite the statutory requirement to communicate the grounds of proscription within the prescribed period, no such grounds were furnished to them. It is alleged that only after the filing of Writ Petition No. 5046/2024, titled Masoom Shah v. Federation of Pakistan & others, and pursuant to the order passed

therein, a report was submitted by the Ministry of Interior disclosing the reasons for the proscription.

Feeling aggrieved by the impugned notification and the proposed inclusion of their names in the Fourth Schedule, and asserting that no other adequate and efficacious remedy is available, the Petitioners have invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.

3.Arguments of learned counsel for the parties were heard, and the available record was gone through.

4.Historically, the criminal justice system of the country was conceived within the classical paradigm of individual criminal responsibility. The statutory edifice erected under the Pakistan Penal Code, read with the procedural architecture of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was designed to respond to conventional offences committed by identifiable persons acting either singly or in limited concert. Its orientation was

predominantly reactive: the law intervened after the commission of a defined offence, investigated the particular act, and adjudicated upon the culpability of the specific offender.

Even provisions addressing collective misconduct, such as unlawful assembly, rioting, or criminal conspiracy, remained anchored in the prosecution of discrete incidents rather than in the structural dismantling of enduring organizational frameworks. This framework operated upon an implicit assumption reflective of its time: that criminal conduct would manifest episodically, attributable to discernible actors whose liability could be individually assessed and judicially determined. Preventive regulation at the level of organizations, associations, or networks did not occupy a central place in the statutory imagination, for the prevailing security environment had not yet produced entities functioning as permanent and institutionalized vehicles of violence. The law, therefore, was adjudicatory in character, not pre-emptive in institutional reach. Over time,

however, the security landscape underwent a profound transformation. The State was confronted with an escalating pattern of organized terrorism, sectarian militancy, and ideologically driven violence targeting civilians, law-enforcement agencies, and critical infrastructure. Terrorism ceased to be sporadic or incidental; it assumed the form of structured and sustained campaigns conducted by organizations possessing defined hierarchies, recruitment pipelines, training facilities, propaganda machinery, and sophisticated financial channels. Violence was no longer merely the act of an individual offender; it became the manifestation of an organized system capable of regeneration, coordination, and continuity.

Within this altered reality, the limitations of ordinary penal provisions became increasingly apparent. While individual perpetrators could be apprehended and prosecuted, the broader ecosystem enabling

radicalization, financing, indoctrination, and logistical support frequently remained intact.

The law could punish the foot soldier yet leave untouched the organizational spine that produced and replaced him. This structural deficiency revealed a normative gap: a framework crafted to address completed offences was ill-equipped to neutralize institutional threats operating with permanence and collective cohesion. It was in response to this evolving challenge that the legislature was compelled to recalibrate its approach, recognizing that effective counter-terrorism required not only the punishment of individual acts but also preventive and disabling measures directed at the organizational apparatus itself.

This shift in legal philosophy found statutory expression in specialized enactments, most prominently the Anti-Terrorism Act, which introduced mechanisms for proscription, asset freezing, and organizational disruption.

Through this legislative evolution, terrorism was reconceptualised not merely as a series of

isolated crimes but as an institutionalized and continuing threat demanding a correspondingly structured and anticipatory legal response.

5.In the constitutional landscape shaped by the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the concept of proscription must be approached not as an episodic administrative measure, but as a solemn statutory instrument embedded within a carefully constructed preventive architecture.

The Act itself was conceived in recognition of a stark reality: that terrorism is not an isolated eruption of criminality, but an organized, networked, and ideologically sustained enterprise which thrives upon structure, continuity, and coordination. It is this structural dimension of terrorism that the mechanism of proscription seeks to neutralize. The authority to declare an organization proscribed, or, where the statute so contemplates, to designate an individual, is therefore neither ornamental nor unfettered. It is a power of grave consequence, carrying civil, political, and penal ramifications.

Such authority must be exercised within the disciplined confines of statutory purpose, constitutional limitation, and judicially manageable standards. The touchstone is not suspicion, not unpopularity, and certainly not dissent. The touchstone is demonstrable involvement in the architecture of terrorism as defined by law.

At its core, proscription is directed against a collective entity that has assumed an identifiable organizational form and whose objects, activities, or operational conduct fall squarely within the statutory mischief. The legal inquiry is not whether the organization espouses controversial doctrine, but whether it has crossed the threshold from ideology to implementation, from rhetoric to actionable threat. The existence of credible, tangible, and verifiable material linking the organization to the commission, facilitation, preparation, financing, incitement, or promotion of terrorist acts constitutes the minimum juridical

foundation for such a declaration. The applicable test may be articulated in structured terms.

First, there must exist an objective and proximate nexus between the organization’s activities and acts that satisfy the statutory definition of terrorism. Remote association or inferential hostility is insufficient.

Second, the organization must display a discernible structural character, an identifiable leadership, membership framework, operational capacity, or coordinated mechanism through which terrorist objectives are advanced. The statute does not target amorphous gatherings devoid of operational coherence; it addresses structured entities functioning as vehicles of sustained threat.

Third, there must be a continuing or imminent threat assessment, demonstrating that the entity’s ongoing existence poses a real and substantial danger to public order, national security, or the safety of citizens. Proscription

is preventive in character; it is justified where intervention is necessary to forestall further harm.

Fourth, the decision must rest upon evidentiary sufficiency capable of judicial scrutiny. The material relied upon must be credible, specific, and defensible within a legal forum. Executive satisfaction cannot be equated with executive infallibility; it remains subject to constitutional oversight.

6.Where individuals are subjected to designation, the same discipline applies with equal, if not greater, rigor. Mere association, absent knowledge or participation, cannot substitute for culpable linkage. The statute contemplates demonstrable involvement, whether operational, financial, logistical, ideological, or supervisory, in furtherance of a terrorist enterprise. To collapse the distinction between proximity and participation would be to imperil the very constitutional guarantees the Act seeks to defend. Thus understood,

proscription is not an arbitrary stigma; it is a structural disabling mechanism. It interrupts financial flows, criminalizes organized support, restricts mobility, delegitimizes institutional fronts, and dismantles the organizational scaffolding upon which terrorism depends. It is preventive regulation, not punitive vengeance.

It operates not to extinguish lawful dissent, but to incapacitate violent collectives whose continued existence undermines constitutional order. In its highest conception, therefore, the doctrine of proscription reflects a calibrated balance between the imperative of national security and the supremacy of constitutional governance; between anticipatory intervention and procedural fairness; between executive responsibility and judicial supervision. It is in maintaining this equilibrium that the statutory purpose of the Act is vindicated and the rule of law preserved.

7.The power to proscribe is among the gravest authorities entrusted to the State.

Though conferred by statute, it is not a weapon of convenience nor an instrument of political expedience. It is an extraordinary preventive measure, justified only where the security of society stands imperiled by organized violence.

Properly understood, proscription is not directed against ideas, beliefs, identities, or dissenting voices. It is directed against demonstrable, structured, and dangerous conduct that falls within the statutory conception of terrorism or its facilitation. An organization does not become liable to proscription by reason of its name, rhetoric, or ideological persuasion. The law looks beyond form to substance. The inquiry is functional, not formal; objective, not impressionistic.

Proscription may arise only where credible and tangible material establishes that the organization operates as a coordinated collective entity engaged in, promoting, facilitating, or materially supporting acts of terrorism. Such engagement ordinarily manifests through identifiable attributes: an

organized hierarchy or command structure;

continuity and coordination of operations;

recruitment for violent purposes; propagation of material that explicitly incites or glorifies violence; provision of training, logistical support, or safe havens; systematic financial mobilization for unlawful objectives; or operational nexus with terrorist networks. The decisive consideration is not self-description but operational reality, not proclaimed intent, but proven conduct.

Likewise, the designation of an individual must rest upon demonstrable involvement of a substantive character. The threshold is not crossed by mere proximity, association, or ideological sympathy. It is crossed where credible material reveals direct participation in terrorist acts, leadership or command responsibility within a proscribed organization, facilitation of terrorist financing, strategic coordination, recruitment, harboring, or other meaningful contribution to the machinery of

terror. The law demands evidence of active engagement, not conjecture; participation, not presumption. The governing test for proscription, therefore, is one of objective satisfaction founded upon relevant and reliable material demonstrating that the organization or individual is engaged in, or materially facilitating, terrorist activity and thereby poses a continuing threat to national security or public order. Such satisfaction must be reasoned, recorded, and capable of scrutiny. It cannot rest upon subjective apprehension or political discomfort; it must arise from demonstrable necessity grounded in fact.

Beyond evidentiary sufficiency lies a constitutional discipline: the principle of proportionality. Proscription carries profound civil consequences, reputational, financial, and associational. It must therefore be invoked only where strictly necessary to neutralize a real and subsisting threat, and where ordinary criminal prosecution or regulatory measures would be

inadequate to achieve the protective objective.

The measure must bear a rational nexus to the harm sought to be prevented, impair rights no more than required, and remain proportionate in its impact. When these thresholds are faithfully observed, proscription retains its proper character: not as an expansive sanction wielded against disfavored groups, but as a calibrated instrument of collective security. It becomes a lawful shield rather than an arbitrary sword, preserving the constitutional equilibrium between liberty and order, and affirming that even in confronting terror, the State remains governed by reason, restraint, and the rule of law.

8.The concept of proscription of organizations under anti-terrorism legislation is not a novel legislative innovation confined to a single jurisdiction. Rather, it is a well- established preventive legal mechanism that has evolved in comparative constitutional systems and has been incorporated into modern counter-

terrorism frameworks across democratic states.

The Anti-Terrorism Act reflects a localized adaptation of this internationally recognized model. The structured model of proscription is embodied in the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act of 2000. Section 3, Proscription, the Secretary of State may by order proscribe an organization if he believes that it is concerned in terrorism.

For the purposes of this Act, an organization is concerned in terrorism if it: (a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, (b) prepares for terrorism, (c) promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism), or (d) is otherwise concerned in terrorism. The Secretary of State may, by order, specify that an alternative name or alias is to be treated as another name for a proscribed organization.

Similarly, Section 11 of the Act of 2000 provided for membership of a proscribed organization. Sub- section 1 of Section states: A person commits an offence if he belongs or professes to belong to a proscribed organization. Likewise, Section 12(1) provides: A person commits an offence if

he invites support for a proscribed organization. The statutory scheme

demonstrates executive designation combined with criminal liability and de-proscription procedures.

In India, proscription operates under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

Section 3 provides for declaration of an association as unlawful. Section 3 states: “(1) If the Central Government is of the opinion that any association is, or has become, an unlawful association, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare such association to be unlawful. (2) Every such notification shall specify the grounds on which it is issued.... (3) No such notification shall have effect until the Tribunal has, by an order made under section 4, confirmed the declaration made therein....”

Moreover, Section 35, provides for amendment of Schedule etc. It states: “The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette (a) add an organisation to the [First Schedule] [or the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule]; (b)

add also an organisation to the [First Schedule], which is identified as a terrorist organisation in a resolution adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations [or the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule], to combat international terrorism;” On the contrary, under Section 36 an application may be made to the Central Government for the removal of the name of an organization from the Schedule. These provisions establish formal governmental declaration, tribunal review, listing, and de-listing mechanisms within statutory safeguards.

Under the 1985 Criminal Code of Canada, listing is governed by Part II.1. Section 83.05 provides for establishing a list of entities. It states:

“The Governor in Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister, by regulation, establish a list on which there may be placed any entity if there are reasonable grounds to believe that (a) the entity has knowingly carried out, attempted to carry out, participated in or facilitated a terrorist activity; or (b) the entity is

knowingly acting on behalf of, at the direction of or in association with such an entity.” The provision continues with publication requirements and judicial review mechanisms. The statutory threshold “reasonable grounds to believe” establishes an executive-initiated but legally reviewable designation system.

In the United States, designation authority derives primarily from § 219(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.

1189(a)) amended through Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.

Under this law, the Secretary of State is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist organization if the Secretary finds that: (a) the organization is a foreign organization; (b) the organization engages in terrorist activity or terrorism; and (c) the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the security of United States nationals or the national security of the United States. In the same

vein, the Material Support Statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and § 2339B provides whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined or imprisoned. The U.S. regime, therefore, combines executive designation with criminal penalties and financial restrictions.

When the above statutory provisions are examined collectively, it becomes clear that the proscription mechanism under the Anti- Terrorism Act follows the same structural architecture: Executive determination based on defined statutory criteria; Official notification/publication; Listing in a schedule or equivalent register; Criminal liability for membership/support; Judicial or tribunal review & Mechanism for de-listing. The verbatim provisions from the UK, India, Canada, and the United States demonstrate that proscription is not an isolated legislative invention but a convergent model adopted across jurisdictions.

9.The Preamble of a statute plays a fundamental role in constitutional interpretation, particularly where the validity, scope, or jurisdictional application of extraordinary legislation is in issue. Although it does not create substantive rights or independent causes of action, it serves as a determinative guide to legislative intent and operates as a key tool in resolving ambiguity in statutory construction. Courts consistently rely upon the Preamble to ascertain the mischief sought to be addressed and to confine the operation of the statute within its intended constitutional limits. In the context of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 (Pakistan), the legislative purpose is explicitly expressed in its Preamble, which provides:

“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto;

And whereas it is necessary to provide for the establishment of Special Courts for

the trial of offences specified in the Schedule to this Act and to ensure the effective implementation of such measures;

It is hereby enacted as follows.”

The above declaration clearly

demonstrates that the statute is an exceptional legislative instrument designed to address threats to public order, terrorism, and sectarian violence through the mechanism of specialized judicial forums and expedited procedures. The express reference to prevention, speedy trial, and establishment of Special Courts indicates that the Act is not intended to regulate ordinary criminal conduct but is confined to offences that satisfy the statutory definition of terrorism or fall within the scheduled offences. From a constitutional perspective, the incorporation of special jurisdiction under the Act must be interpreted strictly in light of the Preamble.

Since the Act creates deviation from the ordinary criminal justice system by conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon Special Courts and by prescribing procedural departures, its

application must remain proportionate and consistent with fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. An over-expansive interpretation that brings ordinary criminal disputes within the ambit of anti-terror jurisdiction would undermine due process protections and violate the principle of legality.

10.We entertain no doubt that it is this interpretive approach to the Preamble that enables a proper comprehension and meaningful enforcement of the legislative intent, policy objectives, and foundational aspirations underlying the Act. The Preamble cannot be treated as a decorative recital but must be regarded as a guiding interpretive tool that imparts contextual legitimacy to the concept of proscription within the scheme of preventive counter-terrorism legislation.

Viewed through this purposive lens, the power of proscription is not to be examined in isolation; rather, it operates as an integral and structural mechanism for implementing the

objectives expressly declared by the legislature.

Such construction ensures that proscription is understood not as a mere executive formality but as a constitutionally anchored and purpose- driven instrument designed to protect the values and interests that the statute seeks to safeguard.

The Constitution of 1973 establishes a structured balance between individual liberties and collective security, a balance that becomes particularly significant in the context of anti- terrorism legislation and the statutory mechanism of proscription. While it guarantees fundamental rights such as the right to life and liberty under Article 9, procedural safeguards under Article 10, the right to fair trial under Article 10A, freedom of assembly under Article 16, freedom of association under Article 17(1), and freedom of speech and expression under Article 19, these rights are expressly subject to constitutionally sanctioned restrictions. Article 17(2) empowers the State to impose reasonable restrictions on associations in the interest of sovereignty, integrity, and public order; Article

5 imposes an affirmative duty of loyalty to the Constitution and obedience to lawful authority;

and Article 256 prohibits the formation of private organizations operating as military or parallel security structures.

Within this constitutional framework, statutory provisions under the Anti-Terrorism Act empowering the Government to proscribe organizations function as implementing mechanisms of these constitutional limitations.

Proscription is not an arbitrary executive act but a legally regulated response to activities that threaten sovereignty, public order, or national security, concerns expressly recognized by the Constitution itself. When an organization’s conduct demonstrates involvement in terrorist activity, facilitation of violence, recruitment for armed resistance, or the creation of parallel coercive structures, the State is constitutionally authorized to intervene to prevent structural harm to the legal order. Judicial scrutiny in such matters therefore centers not on whether

restrictions may be imposed for that authority is constitutionally embedded, but whether the exercise of proscription satisfies statutory requirements, procedural fairness, evidentiary sufficiency, and proportionality. In this sense, anti-terrorism proscription represents a constitutional instrument designed to preserve the very rights it temporarily restricts by safeguarding public order, sovereignty, and the supremacy of the Constitution. When the relevant provisions are construed harmoniously in accordance with settled principles of constitutional interpretation, a coherent and integrated statutory framework emerges. The Constitution guarantees freedoms of association and expression; however, such freedoms are neither absolute nor unqualified. They do not extend to violent mobilization, armed militancy, or organized activities directed against the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the State. Fundamental rights cannot be invoked as a protective shield to legitimize conduct that undermines the very constitutional

order from which those rights derive their legitimacy.

It is within this constitutional context that Sections 11B/11EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, assume significance. The provision confers upon the Federal Government the authority to proscribe an organization upon being satisfied, on the basis of material and recorded reasons, that the organization is engaged in terrorism, activities prejudicial to peace and security, or conduct threatening the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan. The exercise of such power is constitutionally anchored in Article 17(2), subject to the limitation clauses contained in Article 19, reinforced by Article 256 prohibiting private armed groups, and fortified by the duty obligation under Article 5 of the Constitution.

Prior to the legislative amendments introducing a structured statutory regime, the mechanism of proscription operated primarily through executive declaration without a comprehensive

codified architecture governing procedural safeguards, institutional review, or appellate scrutiny. The absence of clearly defined statutory checkpoints generated apprehensions regarding possible arbitrariness and insufficient procedural transparency. Sections 11B/11EE of the Act establish the substantive jurisdiction and statutory authority of the Federal Government to proscribe an organization / individual upon recorded satisfaction based on prescribed grounds. This provision constitutes the foundational trigger of the proscription regime. It conditions executive authority upon satisfaction founded on material and thereby introduces legality into what would otherwise be a purely discretionary determination.

Recognizing the necessity of procedural discipline and accountability, the legislature incorporated institutional safeguards to ensure that proscription orders remain subject to structured reconsideration. Section 11C establishes the constitution, composition, and jurisdiction of the designated Review

Committee empowered to examine proscription orders. This provision creates an internal administrative check upon the exercise of the proscription power. It operates as a supervisory forum tasked with examining whether the declaration satisfies statutory requirements and whether continuation of proscription is justified. Section 11D provides the right of representation and procedural opportunity to the aggrieved organization or affected persons to challenge the proscription before the Review Committee. This mechanism operationalizes the principle of natural justice. It ensures that the entity affected by proscription is afforded notice, an opportunity to present material, and an avenue to contest the factual and legal basis of the declaration before it attains finality. The inclusion of such a right transforms the proscription process from a unilateral executive act into a participatory and reviewable determination. Section 11E confers jurisdiction upon the High Court to exercise appellate or judicial review oversight over decisions

emanating from the Review Committee or final proscription determinations. This provision introduces external judicial supervision into the statutory scheme. It ensures that administrative satisfaction and internal review remain subject to constitutional scrutiny. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction, is empowered to examine the legality, jurisdictional propriety, procedural fairness, and proportionality of the impugned action.

11.Sequentially considered, the

statutory architecture reveals a deliberate legislative design. The process commences with Executive Proscription under Section 11B/11EE, based on reasonable grounds of involvement in terrorism, proceeds to Institutional Review under Section 11C (supported by the Proscription Review Committee under Section 11CC) where the aggrieved organization may seek

reconsideration, affords Participatory and Observation Rights through the mechanism of

Section 11D which allows for monitoring and hearings, and culminates in the imposition of Restrictive Measures and Judicial Oversight under Section 11E, where consequential sanctions including travel bans and the freezing of facilities are applied subject to the right of appeal to the High Court under 11C. Each stage operates as a procedural safeguard limiting the possibility of arbitrary deprivation of associative rights. The efficacy of the scheme lies in its layered structure. Authority is conferred, but accountability is embedded.

Administrative action is permitted, yet subject to review. Executive determination is not final until tested through statutory and judicial scrutiny.

Accordingly, this Court finds that the provisions, when read collectively and harmoniously, create a constitutionally balanced mechanism. The proscription regime functions not as an unbridled executive instrument but as a regulated statutory process

safeguarded by institutional checks and judicial oversight, thereby ensuring conformity with constitutional guarantees and the rule of law. In a constitutional democracy, power is never self- authorizing. It draws its validity from the Constitution, remains confined by law, and is perpetually accountable to reason. Sections 11B/11EE of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 may trace its legitimacy to constitutional foundations, particularly the calibrated permissions reflected in Articles 17(2), 19, 256, and 5, yet such legitimacy is neither unconditional nor unfettered. It survives only within the disciplined boundaries of constitutional command. Proscription is not an ordinary administrative measure. It is a solemn declaration that transforms legal status, restricts collective association, suppresses expression, and carries profound reputational

consequences. It does not merely regulate conduct; it reshapes civic existence. When the State invokes the power under Sections 11B/11EE, it does so in a manner that casts

effects far beyond the text of the notification and into the lived reality of those affected.

Precisely for this reason, constitutional governance demands restraint where authority is grave. The omission of recorded reasons is not a trivial procedural lapse; it is a constitutional infirmity. Reasons are the visible manifestation of rational decision-making.

They demonstrate that discretion has not descended into arbitrariness nor authority into unreasoned assertion. Through reasons, the intellectual journey from material to conclusion becomes transparent and reviewable. Absent reasons, power becomes opaque, and opacity stands in direct tension with the foundational ethos of the rule of law. Equally, procedural safeguards are not ornamental appendages to authority. They constitute the structural framework through which justice is administered. Notice, opportunity of hearing, reliance on objective and credible material, and adherence to proportionality are not impediments to governance; they are the

guarantees that governance remains constitutionally legitimate. If, in exercising jurisdiction under Sections 11B & 11EE, the Government proceeds without demonstrable material, without recording objective satisfaction, or without observing due process, the defect lies not in the existence of statutory power but in its execution. Courts do not invalidate lawful authority merely because it has been misapplied; they intervene to correct its distortion so that legality itself is preserved.

The Constitution does not disarm the State from protecting its integrity or safeguarding public order. It permits firmness in defence of constitutional values. Yet it insists that such a defence must operate strictly within legal bounds. Security pursued outside constitutional restraint ultimately corrodes the very sovereignty it seeks to protect. In our constitutional order, sovereignty is not merely territorial; it is legal in structure, moral in foundation, and principled in application. Thus, although Sections 11B & 11EE stand

constitutionally anchored, their arbitrary or reasonless invocation would render the impugned action unsustainable, not because the provision is infirm, but because power exercised without reason cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. In the ultimate analysis, the Constitution empowers strength but restrains caprice; it authorizes regulation but rejects arbitrariness. Where executive action transgresses these limits, this Court, as the sentinel on the qui vive, is duty-bound to restore the equilibrium ordained by the Constitution.

This Court observes that the impugned legislative framework cannot be evaluated as a mere statutory mechanism of domestic security administration; rather, it represents the State’s conscious constitutional response to binding obligations assumed under the international legal order. Article 25 of the UN Charter obligates Member States to “accept and carry out” decisions of the Security Council. Article 24 of the UN Charter vests primary responsibility

for international peace and security in the Security Council. Similarly, Article 103 of the UN Charter establishes the supremacy of Charter obligations over conflicting treaty commitments. Upon accession to the Charter, the State voluntarily accepted these binding commitments. Thus, international responsibility is not discretionary; it is obligatory, and domestic implementation becomes the vehicle through which global commitments are translated into enforceable law. The jurisprudence of comparative constitutional courts affirms this principle with clarity:

In R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58, the United Kingdom House of Lords recognized that binding Security Council resolutions prevail over inconsistent domestic norms, subject to constitutional limits.

In Yassin Abdullah Kadi & AL Barakaat International Foundation v Council & Comission (Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P), the Court of Justice of the European Communities (Grand Chamber) acknowledged the binding force of Security Council sanctions while affirming that their implementation remains subject to

fundamental rights scrutiny within the constitutional order.

In Gramophone Company of India Ltd. v Birendra Bahadur Pandey (1984) 2 SCC 534, the Supreme Court of India articulated that municipal law, wherever possible, must be interpreted harmoniously with international obligations.

12.These authorities collectively reflect a universal jurisprudential thread:

sovereignty does not imply isolation, and domestic law operates in responsible dialogue with international commitments. The legislative scheme under consideration functions as an implementing mechanism for binding Security Council measures, including: Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; mandates

criminalization of terrorist financing, freezing of assets, denial of safe haven, suppression of support networks, and strengthening international cooperation. Security Council Resolution 1267 of 1999 and successor resolutions, establishing targeted sanctions, listing and delisting procedures, asset freezing,

travel bans, and arms embargoes against designated entities and associated individuals.

These resolutions derive binding authority from the combined operation of Articles 24, 25, and 103 of the UN Charter, thereby obligating domestic incorporation through legislative and administrative action. Within this framework, counter-terrorism legislation, particularly provisions relating to proscription, designation, asset freezing, and enforcement coordination, operates not as an isolated domestic creation but as an operational extension of the global security architecture.

The statutory regime also gives effect to treaty commitments undertaken by the State, including: International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; criminalization of terrorist financing, freezing and confiscation of terrorist funds:

Jurisdictional competence over financing offences; mutual legal assistance and extradition cooperation. Treaty obligations,

once ratified, bind the State in international law and require good faith implementation under the principle of pacta sunt servanda (Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). Domestic enforcement mechanisms, therefore, serve as vehicles of treaty compliance.

This Court emphasizes that the legitimacy of such legislation derives from a dual foundation: constitutional competence grounded in sovereign authority to preserve public order, security, and territorial integrity.

International Obligation, rooted in binding charter commitments and treaty accession. The convergence of these two sources produces normative reinforcement rather than conflict.

However, implementation must remain subject to constitutional guarantees, procedural fairness, and proportionality, ensuring that designation powers and sanctions mechanisms do not transgress fundamental rights without lawful justification.

Accordingly, where domestic counter- terrorism provisions faithfully implement binding Security Council resolutions and treaty obligations, while preserving judicial review and due process, they stand fortified by international law and integrated within constitutional supremacy. In this synthesis of sovereignty and global responsibility, the State fulfills its higher duty: to protect its citizens, to preserve constitutional governance, and to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security as envisioned under the Charter of the United Nations.

13.In constitutional democracies, the power of the State to preserve security and maintain public order is never regarded as extinguished merely because it operates in sensitive or exceptional terrain.

Constitutionalism does not require paralysis of State authority; rather, it demands its disciplined and structured exercise. Across jurisdictions, superior courts have consistently

upheld anti-terror and proscription frameworks as constitutionally permissible, provided they remain anchored in safeguards of

reasonableness, proportionality, and effective judicial review.

In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994 SCC (3) 569), the Supreme Court of India upheld stringent anti-terror legislation, observing that the Constitution does not render the State powerless in the face of forces threatening its sovereignty and integrity. At the same time, the Court emphasized that extraordinary powers must be exercised with circumspection and subject to procedural safeguards to prevent misuse or abuse. Similarly, in Holder v.

Humanitarian Law Project (561 U.S. 1 (2010)), the Supreme Court of the United States sustained restrictions on material support to designate terrorist organizations, recognizing the Government’s interest in combating terrorism as “an urgent objective of the highest order.” Yet, even while upholding the statute, the Court reaffirmed that such regulatory

measures remain subject to constitutional scrutiny and judicial review. Likewise, in Lord Alton of Liverpool) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 443; [2008] 1 WLR 2341, the United Kingdom’s Court of Appeal upheld the legality of the proscription regime under the Terrorism Act 2000, acknowledging the executive’s institutional competence in matters of national security.

However, it underscored that executive determinations are not immune from judicial supervision and remain reviewable for legality, rationality, and proportionality.

These authorities collectively demonstrate a settled constitutional position: legislative frameworks addressing terrorism and proscription have not been invalidated per se;

rather, courts have preserved their validity while imposing principled restraints on their application. The consistent judicial message is that State power in security matters is constitutionally sanctioned, but its exercise must be reasoned, proportionate, and

accompanied by safeguards to prevent arbitrary interference with fundamental rights. It is in this balance between authority and accountability that the true strength of constitutional governance resides.

14.We categorically reaffirm the well- settled constitutional principle that duly enacted legislation, passed by a competent legislature within its constitutionally assigned domain, carries a strong and rebuttable presumption of constitutionality and is entitled to substantial judicial deference. Courts exercising the power of judicial review do not function as super- legislatures, nor do they possess the authority to invalidate statutory enactments merely on disagreement with legislative policy choices or perceived wisdom. The scope of constitutional judicial review is confined to examining whether a statute clearly and irreconcilably contravenes express constitutional provisions, infringes fundamental rights without lawful justification, or exceeds legislative competence.

In the absence of demonstrable constitutional infirmity, judicial interference is impermissible.

This principle finds consistent affirmation in comparative constitutional jurisprudence; In United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated the foundational presumption of constitutionality applicable to economic legislation and introduced rational-basis deference. The Court emphasized that legislative determinations are presumed valid unless proven otherwise, and judicial intervention is limited except where constitutional protections are clearly implicated. In Charanjit Lal Chowdhury v.

Union of India (AIR 1951 SC 41), the Supreme Court of India recognized the strong presumption in favor of legislative validity and held that courts should not lightly strike down enactments unless clear constitutional violations are demonstrated. In our own jurisdiction, for declaring a law unconstitutional or ultra vires, the Supreme Court has laid down

the following test in the case of Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) which must be applied by the Courts:

I. There is a presumption in favour of constitutionality and a law must not be declared unconstitutional unless the statute is placed next to the Constitution and no way can be found in reconciling the two;

II. Where more than one interpretation is possible, one of which would make the law valid and the other void, the Court must prefer the interpretation which favours validity;

III. A statute must never be declared unconstitutional unless its invalidity is beyond reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the statute being valid;

IV. If a case can be decided on other or narrower grounds, the Court will abstain from deciding the constitutional question;

V. The Court will not decide a larger constitutional question than is necessary for the determination of the case;

VI. The Court will not declare a statute unconstitutional on the ground that it violates the spirit of the Constitution unless it also violates the letter of the Constitution;

VII. The Court is not concerned with the wisdom or prudence of the legislation but only with its constitutionality;

VIII. The Court will not strike down statutes on principles of republican or democratic government unless those principles are placed beyond legislative encroachment by the Constitution;

IX. Mala fides will not be attributed to the Legislature.

15.We therefore hold that duly enacted legislation must be upheld unless it demonstrably and unmistakably violates constitutional supremacy, and judicial invalidation is reserved exclusively for cases of manifest constitutional conflict. Accordingly, the doctrine herein articulated constitutes binding precedent and shall govern future constitutional adjudication concerning the

presumption of validity and judicial deference to legislative enactments.

16.Upon careful consideration of the pleadings, submissions, and material placed before us, we find that the petitioner has failed to show any constitutional infirmity of such gravity as would warrant a declaration that sections 11B & 11EE of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are ultra vires the Constitution. Judicial review remains a constitutional obligation;

however, its scope is confined to correcting clear violations of constitutional mandates and does not extend to substituting judicial preference for legislative judgment. It is a fundamental rule of interpretation that the duty of the Court is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of Parliament as expressed in the words of the statute. Where the language of the enactment is clear and unambiguous, the Court must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences, for it is not the function of the Court to question the wisdom or policy of the

Legislature. The Legislature is supreme within its domain, and its intention, as gathered from the statutory text, must prevail. This position has been aptly explained by Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes Pages 28 and 29 as follow:

“The rule of construction is “to intend the Legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed.” The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, “but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used,” for “it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law.” Where the language is plain and admits of but one meaning, the task of Interpretation can hardly be said to arise. “The decision in this case said Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in a revenue case, “calls for a full and fair application of particular statutory language to particular facts as found. The desirability or the undesirability of one conclusion as compared with another cannot furnish a guide in reaching a decision.” Where, by the use of clear and unequivocal language capable of only one meaning, anything is enacted by the Legislature, it must be enforced however harsh or absurd or contrary’ to common sense the result may be. The interpretation of a statute is not to be collected from any notions which may be entertained by the Court as to what is just and expedient: words

are not to be construed, contrary to their meaning, as embracing or excluding cases merely because no good reason appears why they should not be embraced or excluded. The duty of the Court is not to expound the law as it stands, and to “leave the remedy (if one be resolved upon) to others.”

Examined through the prism of

proportionality and due process principles embedded in Articles 4, 9, and 10A of the Constitution, the impugned provision satisfies constitutional scrutiny. The objective underlying section 11EE, read harmoniously with the proscription framework under Chapter XI-B and specifically section 11B of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997, is the protection of national security, preservation of public order, and prevention of terrorism. The mechanism of proscription is activated upon the formation of reasoned satisfaction by the competent authority on the basis of relevant material, thereby establishing a rational nexus between the measure adopted and the purpose sought to be achieved. Equally significant is the statutory architecture of safeguards. The legislation does

not confer unstructured or arbitrary power. It provides avenues for representation and reconsideration under section 11B, institutional review mechanisms, and ultimate recourse to judicial scrutiny before the High Court. These procedural safeguards collectively ensure notice, opportunity of hearing, reconsideration, and independent adjudication, the essential constituents of fairness and procedural propriety. Viewed in its entirety, the impugned provision reflects a measured legislative response that balances collective security with constitutional guarantees. It neither extinguishes remedies nor excludes judicial oversight. The challenge raised, resting primarily on apprehension rather than demonstrable constitutional violation, is insufficient to rebut the presumption of validity attaching to a duly enacted statute.

17.Accordingly, sections 11B and 11EE of the Act, and the broader statutory scheme, withstands constitutional examination

and does not contravene the guarantees invoked before this Court. Having examined the matter in its proper constitutional perspective, we find no repugnancy between the challenged provisions and the mandate of the Constitution.

The provisions are in consonance with the constitutional framework and do not transgress any fundamental or structural limitation.

Consequently, they are held to be intra vires and constitutionally valid.

18.We now address the second and most pivotal issue common to all three petitions. It pertains to the validity of the impugned notification, which forms the foundational basis for placing the petitioners’ names in Column-IV of the Fourth Schedule as well as for the proscription of the organization.

The consequential actions under challenge derive their authority solely from this notification. The relief sought in all petitions is identical: a declaration that the said notification is without lawful authority and was issued by a

forum lacking competence, rendering it void ab initio. Since the issue is common, interlinked, and determinative of the fate of all connected petitions, we deem it appropriate to examine and decide it through this consolidated order.

Learned counsel for the petitioner(s) contended that the impugned proscription is vitiated at its inception. It was urged that no valid approval of the Federal Cabinet was secured; that the requisite quorum was lacking;

that the decision was unilateral and devoid of lawful deliberation; and that no material, documentary or otherwise, was placed on record or communicated to the organization.

The absence of reasons, according to him, renders the executive satisfaction illusory. It was strenuously maintained that when the very foundation of authority is absent, the edifice must fall. In such a case, relegation to a statutory forum would amount to sanctifying an illegality. The constitutional jurisdiction of this Court, it was submitted, cannot be ousted where

executive action is manifestly without lawful authority.

19.The learned Additional Attorney General, in reply, placed before the Court the complete original record, including the summary initiated by the Ministry of Interior.

The documents were examined in chambers;

copies were furnished to learned counsel for the petitioner; and the procedural chronology was laid bare. He demonstrated that the summary was duly moved; that the Federal Cabinet deliberated upon the matter; that participation and consent of members were recorded; that the requisite quorum stood satisfied; and that, consequent upon approval, the notification was issued in the Official Gazette. It was further submitted that the Act itself provides a structured post-notification remedy before a statutory Review Committee, thereby reflecting legislative intent that grievances as to sufficiency or propriety of material be examined by that forum in the first instance.

20.Sections 11B & 11EE of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 vests in the Federal Government the authority to proscribe an organization/individuals upon formation of reasonable grounds to believe that it is concerned in terrorism or associated with terrorist elements. The statutory scheme is neither unanalyzed nor arbitrary. Intelligence inputs and reports are processed

administratively; a formal summary is prepared; the matter is placed before the Federal Cabinet in exercise of executive authority; and upon approval, a notification is issued in the Official Gazette. The proscription takes effect by virtue of such publication.

Importantly, the legislature has engrafted a remedial safeguard in the form of a Review Committee empowered to examine applications for de-proscription. The architecture thus balances executive necessity with institutional accountability.

21.We have examined the original

record with anxious care. The summary was duly initiated and processed. The Cabinet meeting was convened. Deliberations were undertaken. The requisite quorum was available. Signatures and recorded consent appear on the original documents. The copies supplied are faithful reproductions of authentic originals. No material has been brought before us to demonstrate fabrication, manipulation, or procedural impropriety. The Gazette notification was issued as a lawful consequence of Cabinet approval. The procedural spine of the impugned action, therefore, remains intact.

The petitioner’s grievance that no material was disclosed to establish anti-state activities pertains to the sufficiency and adequacy of the information forming the basis of executive satisfaction. Judicial review, at this stage, is concerned with the legality of process, not with the substitution of opinion. Where the statute entrusts satisfaction to the executive, and where the process leading to that satisfaction conforms

to law, the Court does not convert itself into an appellate forum to weigh the evidentiary sufficiency ab initio. The legislature, in its wisdom, has designated the Review Committee as the primary forum for such examination. It is there that questions of adequacy, credibility, or misapprehension of material may be urged and determined.

The principle that constitutional

jurisdiction should not ordinarily be invoked in the presence of an efficacious statutory remedy is not a rule of limitation but of judicial restraint. It preserves the functional integrity of statutory forums and respects legislative design.

The Supreme Court of India, in Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid [1964] 6 SCR 654: AIR 1964 SC 1419], held that writ jurisdiction ought not to be exercised where an adequate alternative remedy exists. In the cases of Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das (1984) 2 SCC 436: (AIR 1984 SC653), Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1983) 2 SCC 433: (AIR 1983 SC 603), Union of India v. Oswal

Woollen Mills Ltd (1984) 2 SCC 646: (AIR 1984 SC 1264), the Supreme Court of India categorically emphasized that where a statute provides a complete machinery for redress, that remedy must be pursued. The principle was reaffirmed in Assistant Collector of Central Excise v. Dunlop India Ltd. (AIR 1985 SC 330;

(1985) 1 SCC 260), cautioning against circumvention of statutory processes.

While Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks (1998) 8 SCC 1 recognized limited exceptions, absence of jurisdiction, violation of natural justice, or patent unconstitutionality, no such exceptional circumstance is demonstrated here. The dictum was further strengthened in United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110, underscoring the duty of constitutional courts to exercise restraint where statutory remedies are available. These pronouncements illuminate the path of judicial discipline.

In the case at hand, the statutory procedure was duly observed, Cabinet approval was lawfully obtained, and the notification was validly issued. No foundational illegality is established. A statutory Review Committee exists with defined jurisdiction. Further appellate recourse remains open. To assume jurisdiction at this juncture would not only bypass but effectively nullify the statutory forum created by the legislature. Such an approach would erode the carefully constructed remedial hierarchy.

22.Having given our thoughtful

consideration to the rival submissions and upon scrutiny of the record, we hold:

The procedural prerequisites for proscription under section 11B & 11EE were complied with in letter and spirit.

The impugned notification is not vitiated by any jurisdictional or foundational defect.

Questions relating to the sufficiency or adequacy of material fall within the

competence of the statutory Review Committee.

In the presence of an efficacious alternate remedy, the invocation of constitutional jurisdiction at this stage is premature and impermissible.

23.The petition is, accordingly, dismissed as non-maintainable, with liberty to the petitioner to avail the remedy provided under the Act. The sealed envelope was de- sealed in the Chamber for perusal, re-sealed, and returned to the learned Addl. Attorney General (Sana Ullah).

JUDGE

JUDGE

Announced.

Tariq Jan (DB) Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, HJ & Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, HJ.