Wilayat Ali Vs Federation of Pakistan & others

IN THE PESHAWAR HIGH COURT,

PESHAWAR

(Judicial Department)

Writ Petition No. 10041-P/2025.

Wilayat Ali v. Federation of Pakistan and others Mr. Mehmood Ali Turi, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Ishaq Khalil, Assistant Attorney General, for the Federation.

Date of hearing: 20.01.2026

JUDGMENT

SAHIBZADA ASADULLAH, J.- This judgment shall decide the captioned petition as well as the connected matters listed in Annexure-A, as they all raise a common constitutional question: Whether administrative travel restrictions such as the Provisional National Identification List (PNIL), Blacklist, or Passport Control List (PCL), imposed without statutory backing or due process, violate the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (Constitution)? The Petitioners, though distinct in their personal circumstances, share a common grievance: they have been barred from travelling abroad, had their passports seized, or been denied

passport renewal based on executive lists (PNIL, Blacklist, PCL) that operate outside the clear statutory framework of the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981 (ECL Ordinance) and the Passport Act, 1974 (Passport Act).

2.For the purpose of clarity and precise adjudication, the petitions have been classified into four distinct categories based on the nature of the administrative action impugned herein:

Category-I: The “PNIL” Cases (Restraint at Airport)

3.The petitioners in this category, comprising overseas laborers, students enrolled in foreign universities, and individuals seeking employment abroad share a common plight: they have been arbitrarily placed on the “Blacklist,” “Passport Control List” (PCL), or “Provisional National Identification List” (PNIL) without prior notice, show-cause proceedings, or the disclosure of any incriminating material.

In many instances (e.g., Ahmad Khan, Muzamil, Sayed Zulfiqar Ali Shah), petitioners were either stopped at immigration counters upon attempting to travel or discovered their blacklisted status only when seeking consular services abroad, effectively leaving them stranded or unable to return to their families in Pakistan. Others (e.g., Hidayat Hussain,

Wajahat Ali) faced detention and passport seizure by FIA authorities upon arrival, despite having no criminal record.

This “invisible” administrative blacklisting has triggered severe humanitarian consequences: visas for employment in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are expiring or have already lapsed (Ajwad Hussain, Qaisar Khan, Qaimt Khan), and students (Syed Abbas) are being prevented from continuing their education. Despite submitting formal representations to the Ministry of Interior for the removal of their names, the petitioners have received no response, leaving them in a state of indefinite limbo that violates their Fundamental Rights to movement, livelihood, and due process under Articles 4, 9, 10-A, 15, and 18 of the Constitution.

Category-II: Passport Confiscation Upon Arrival

4.The petitioners in this category, primarily overseas workers employed in Qatar, UAE, Oman, and Italy suffer from a dual violation of their fundamental rights: unlawful restriction on movement through “Blacklisting” and the arbitrary confiscation of their passports by the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). Upon returning to Pakistan for leave or vacation, these individuals (e.g., Irshad Hussain, Muzahir Hussain, Qamar Abbas, Shahid Hussain) were not

only flagged on the PCL or Exit Control List (ECL) without prior notice but were also subjected to detention ranging from 12 to 48 hours at airports, during which their passports were seized without any seizure order under Section 8 of the Passport Act, 1974. This extra-legal confiscation has created a crisis where petitioners are stripped of their identity documents and rendered unable to return to their employment abroad, even as their visas approach expiry (e.g., Ansar Ali, Wilayat Ali, Charagh Hussain). Despite submitting immediate representations to the Ministry of Interior and FIA for the return of their travel documents and removal of their names from the blacklist, the respondents have failed to act, thereby jeopardizing the petitioners' livelihoods and the survival of their dependent families in violation of Articles 4, 9, 10-A, 14, 15, and 18 of the Constitution.

Category-III: Refusal of Renewal to Overseas Citizens (Statelessness)

5.The petitioners in this category, overseas Pakistanis currently residing and working in Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, face an existential threat to their legal status and livelihood due to the refusal of Pakistani diplomatic missions to renew their passports. These individuals (e.g., Kabir

Hussain, Ismail Hussain, Sohail Abbas) discovered their blacklisted status only upon approaching their respective embassies for passport renewal, where they were informed that their names appear on the PCL or ECL. This administrative blockage has created a cascading legal crisis:

without valid passports, they cannot renew their foreign residency permits or visas, many of which have already expired or are imminent (e.g., Sayed Intizar Hussain, Hujat Ali). Consequently, they are now undocumented in foreign jurisdictions, facing the immediate risk of arrest, deportation, and loss of employment. Despite submitting formal representations through attorneys in Pakistan for the removal of their names, the respondents have failed to act, leaving these citizens stranded and stateless in all but name, in violation of their Fundamental Rights to citizenship, livelihood, and movement under Articles 4, 15, 18, and 25 of the Constitution.

Category-IV: The “Blacklist/Passport Control List”

6.The petitioners in this category, long-term expatriate workers in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, face the imminent loss of their employment and legal status due to the refusal of foreign authorities to renew their work visas or residency permits, a

direct consequence of their names appearing on Pakistani blacklists (PCL, PNIL, or ECL). Unlike other categories where the primary hurdle is exit from Pakistan or passport renewal, these individuals (e.g., Naveed Hussain, Safdar Ali, Sayed Ghafoor Hussain) found that their blacklisted status was flagged during the visa renewal process abroad, effectively paralyzing their ability to remain legally employed. Despite having no criminal record and receiving no prior notice or hearing from Pakistani authorities, they are now at immediate risk of deportation and financial ruin. Their formal representations to the Ministry of Interior for the removal of their names remain unanswered, constituting a violation of their Fundamental Rights to life, livelihood, and due process under Articles 9, 10-A, 14, and 18 of the Constitution.

7.Arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner and that of learned Assistant. AG was heard, and with their valuable assistance, the record was scanned through.

8.This Court is seized of a matter that transcends the individual grievances of the petitioners before it. While the immediate prayer involves the restoration of travel documents and the removal of names from restrictive lists (PCL, PNIL,

Blacklist), the core issue invites this Court to examine a pattern of institutional practice that has ossified into a parallel legal system. This case lies at the intersection of executive discretion, technological governance, and the lived experience of citizenship in a modern regulatory state. It concerns how public power is structured, exercised, and reviewed. The question is not merely whether a specific petitioner can travel, but whether the State can construct an administrative architecture comprising digital registries and automated alerts that silently displaces constitutional rights without procedural due process. When administrative systems designed for security inadvertently generate consequences that suffocate the liberty of ordinary citizens, it becomes the duty of this Court under Article 199 to restore coherence. The task is to ensure that administrative convenience does not outpace constitutional design and that the rule of law remains functional, not merely formal.

9.The Constitution recognizes the asymmetry of power between the State and the citizen. The State possesses enforcement machinery, data systems, and border controls; the citizen possesses only the law. Article 4 acts as the bedrock of this relationship, mandating that every individual is entitled to

the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with it.

This is not a procedural formality but a substantive command:

whenever executive authority touches individual liberty, whether by denying passport facilities or blocking exit, the action must be traceable to a specific statute, not a secret memorandum or office order.

10.Liberty is not confined to freedom from physical arrest.

As held in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597/ (1978) 1 SCC 248) and affirmed by our superior courts, it encompasses the freedom to move, to seek employment, and to reunite with family. When a citizen is “blacklisted” without notice, their liberty is not restrained openly; it is suffocated administratively. Similarly, in Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), the US Supreme Court recognized international travel as part of liberty protected under the Fifth Amendment, requiring clear legislative authorization and procedural safeguards. The right to travel abroad is subject only to “reasonable restrictions imposed by law” as envisaged by Article 15 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not authorize indefinite, secret, or unreviewable prohibitions.

Reasonableness requires proportionality, and “law” requires a statutory foundation. In comparative jurisdictions like the

United Kingdom, the House of Lords in a case R (on the application of Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police [2006] UKHL 12, ruled that executive powers affecting liberty must be accompanied by legal safeguards and oversight to prevent misuse. For the petitioners employed overseas, a passport is not a luxury but a tool of economic survival. Blocking their renewal extinguishes their livelihood, violating their right to trade and profession. Arbitrary databases like the “Blacklist” operate in opacity, leading to selective enforcement where some citizens are restricted without transparent criteria, compromising the guarantee of equality.

Similarly, European Union jurisprudence, under the European Convention on Human Rights, recognizes freedom of movement as a fundamental right. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly held that travel bans imposed without adequate reasons, procedural access, or time limits violate Article 8 (private life) and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (freedom of movement). These principles have been affirmed by the ECHR in the most recent case of European Commission v. Republic of Malta (Judgment of Grand Chamber dated 29.04.2025, ECLI:EU: C:2025:283).

Reference may also be made to Janko Rottman v Freistaat

Bayer (European Court Reports 2010 I-01449/ [2010] ECR I-1449); Levakovic v. Denmark (no. 7841/14, ECHR 2018, judgment of 23 October 2018) & NDIDI v. The United Kingdom (Judgment (Grand Chamber) dated 14.09.2017).

Blanket administrative restrictions have been viewed with constitutional suspicion.

11.The Constitutional scheme of Pakistan, particularly under Articles 9 and 15, envisions a robust protection of liberty that cannot be curtailed by mere administrative fiat.

Article 9 (Security of Person) has been interpreted expansively by the Superior Courts of Pakistan to include not just the safety of the body, but the freedom to live with dignity and the right to livelihood, both of which are inextricably linked to the freedom of movement. Article 15 specifically guarantees the right to remain in, enter, and move freely throughout Pakistan, subject only to reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest. This phrasing, “imposed by law” is the constitutional lock against executive overreach;

it demands that any restriction on movement must stem from a legislative enactment, not a departmental circular or an intelligence report. As observed by the Honourable Supreme Court in Government of Pakistan v. Dada Amir Haider Khan

(PLD 1987 SC 504), a citizen’s right to travel abroad is an important aspect of personal liberty, and while the State may regulate it, it cannot arbitrarily deny it. The State cannot utilize vague concepts of “national interest” to bypass the specific statutory machinery of the ECL Ordinance. When the Executive restricts movement through non-statutory “Blacklists,” it effectively suspends Article 15 without the sanction of the Legislature, thereby upsetting the trichotomy of powers and violating the fundamental guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law.

12.The core grievance of the Petitioners in Category I is their placement on the PNIL or the “Blacklist,” mechanisms that effectively function as a de facto ECL but entirely lack the statutory safeguards mandated by the Parliament. The Federal Government’s power to restrict a citizen’s exit from Pakistan is exclusively governed by the ECL Ordinance read with the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010 (ECL Rules). It is a settled principle of administrative law that executive authority must be traceable to a statute. Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan (PLD 2022 SC 119) & Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan

(PLD 2007 SC 642). The Federal Government's power to restrict a citizen's exit from Pakistan is exclusively governed by the ECL Ordinance, specifically Section 2, which empowers the Federal Government to prohibit exit by order, and Section 3, which grants the aggrieved person the right to review. Section 2 & 3 mandates:

2.Power to prohibit exit from Pakistan.— (1) The Federal Government may, by order, prohibit any person or class of persons from proceeding from Pakistan to a destination outside Pakistan, notwithstanding the fact that such person is in possession of valid travel documents.

(2)Before making an order under sub-section (1), the Federal Government shall not be necessary to afford an opportunity of showing cause to the person against the order.

(3)If, while making an order under sub-section (1), it appears to the Federal Government that it will not be in the public interest to specify the ground on which the order is proposed to be made, it shall not be necessary for the Federal Government to specify such grounds.

3.Review. — (1) Any person aggrieved by an order of the Federal Government under subsection (1) of section 2 may, within fifteen days of the making of the order, make a representation to the Federal Government for a review of the order, setting out in the representation the grounds on which he seeks the review.

(2)The Federal Government may, after giving the person making a representation an opportunity of being heard, make such order as it may deem fit.

(3)Subject to the order of the Federal Government in review, an order under subsection (1) of section 2 shall be final and shall not be called in question before any courts or other authority.

Section 2 of the Ordinance empowers the Federal Government to prohibit exit by a formal “order,” and Section 3 grants the aggrieved person an indefeasible right to file a representation for review within 15 days. Crucially, the ECL significantly restricts the discretion of the Federal Government by codifying the exact grounds upon which such a ban may be imposed. Rule 2(1) of the ECL Rules explicitly limits exit prohibition to cases involving corruption, large- scale economic crimes, terrorism, heinous crimes, banking default, or drug trafficking. The above provisions and the rules do not mention, authorize, or recognize any parallel “Blacklist” or “PNIL” maintained by the FIA or Immigration authorities. The “Blacklist” and “PNIL” are unknown to the statutory regime. They are administrative creations, products of office memorandums and standard operating procedures rather than legislation. By creating these lists, the Executive has effectively legislated a parallel legal system that bypasses the rigor of the ECL Ordinance. By placing citizens on these lists, the Executive circumvents the rigor of Rule 2. For instance, Rule 2(2) specifically exempts private disputes and minor offenses from the ECL. However, by using the PNIL or Blacklist, authorities often restrain citizens for reasons that would be summarily rejected under the ECL Rules. In other

words, this constitutes a “fraud on the statute.” Reference may be made to Khwaja Ghulam Sarwar v. Pakistan (PLD 1962 SC 142) & Baz Muhammad Kakar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 923). Furthermore, Rule 3 of the ECL Rules mandates that an order made under the Ordinance must be served on the person concerned, ensuring they have the knowledge to exercise their right of review under Section 3 of the ECL Ordinance. The PNIL and Blacklist operate in secrecy; citizens are often stopped at the airport without prior service of any order, rendering the statutory right of review nugatory. If the Legislature intended for the FIA or Immigration authorities to have summary powers to stop citizens for 30 days or more without a formal ECL order, it would have amended the Ordinance to include such a provision. It did not. Even otherwise, it is a settled jurisprudence that a person cannot be blacklisted for going abroad and that the right to travel is an integral part of the fundamental rights to life and liberty. Sheikh Shan Ilahi v.

Federation of Pakistan and others through Secretary Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others (PLD 2023 Lahore 359) & Usman Dar VS Federation of Pakistan (2024 YLR 1406 Lahore). Consequently, a restriction on movement based solely on the PNIL or “Blacklist” without notice

constitutes a “fraud on the statute.” It is an attempt to indirectly stop a citizen without meeting the threshold of Rule 2, which the law does not permit directly. It is a well-settled principle of law that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly (Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum). Reference may be made to Shahid Orakzai v. Pakistan through Secretary Law, Ministry of Law, Islamabad (PLD 2011 SC 365) & Bank of Punjab v.

Haris Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2010 SC 1109).

Therefore, the Executive cannot invent new chains to bind the citizen outside the authority of Parliament. Therefore, the placement of the Petitioners on Blacklists or PNIL without prior notice is declared illegal and void ab initio as it bypasses the substantive and procedural protections guaranteed by the ECL Ordinance and the ECL Rules. Reference may be made to Muhammad Akhtar Mengal v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2026 Balochistan 1).

13.Regarding the Petitioners in Category-III and IV, many of whom are overseas and have been denied passport renewal based on “agency flags” or “security checks,” the Directorate of Immigration & Passports has erred in law. The Directorate is a creature of the Passport Act; it is not a security agency but

a facilitation body. Its powers to refuse or cancel a passport are strictly enumerated in Section 8 of the Act. Section 8(1) provides:

8.Power to cancel, impound, or confiscate a passport. — (1) A passport issued by or on behalf of the Federal Government shall be the property of the Federal Government and may, by an order under the hand of a Secretary to the Government of Pakistan, [or an officer authorized by the Federal Government in this behalf] be required to be returned and shall also be liable to be cancelled, impounded or confiscated by a like order.

Furthermore, the Passport Rules, 2021 (Passport Rules) provide explicit instructions on how this power is to be exercised. Crucially, Rule 21 of the Passport Rules now comprehensively lists specific grounds for refusal, including situations where a person’s name is on the PNIL or ECL, or where there are reports from security agencies regarding smuggling or human trafficking. It is pertinent to note the Explanation to Rule 21, which clarifies that for sub-clauses dealing with national security or public interest (clauses g, h, and i), the action “shall be based on reasonable likelihood or suspicion.” This standard of “reasonable likelihood” demands an objective assessment of facts, not a subjective or arbitrary whim. The Respondents have placed significant reliance on Rule 22 of the Passports Rules, which establishes a “Passport Control List”. Rule 22(2) divides this list into Category ‘A’

(anti-state activities/security risks) and Category ‘B’ (other grounds). Specifically, Rule 22(2)(b) states that names in Category ‘B’ may also be placed on the recommendations of government agencies or departments. However, the application of these rules to the present Petitioners, who are already residing abroad, exposes a fatal legal contradiction.

Rule 21(c) allows refusal if a person on the PNIL is “likely to flee the country to evade prosecution.” It is logically impossible for a citizen already residing in London, Dubai, or New York to “flee” Pakistan. To invoke a flight-risk provision against a person who is not in the country is an absurdity that betrays a total lack of application of mind.

Moreover, the manner in which these Petitioners were placed on the PCL or PNIL constitutes a “surprise” administrative attack. These citizens, while lawfully residing abroad, were placed on restrictive lists without a shred of prior intimation. They only discovered their status when they attempted to renew their expiring documents while contacting the Pakistani embassy, effectively finding themselves trapped and stateless. This violates the fundamental principles of natural justice and Article 10-A of the Constitution. Most

importantly, Section 8(2) of the Act mandates that before any order under sub-section (1) is passed:

(2)Subject to sub-section (3), before making an order under sub-section (1) in respect of the passport issued to any person, the Federal Government shall give such person notice in writing calling upon him to show cause why the order should not be made:

Provided that no such notice need be given in the case of an order impounding a passport if it is necessary in the opinion of the Secretary or such other officer to take immediate action, but an opportunity to show cause against the making of the order shall be afforded to the person to whom the order relates, within two weeks from the making of the order.]

The legislative intent behind Section 8(2) is unambiguous: it codifies the principle of audi alteram partem as a statutory precondition for the deprivation of a passport.

The main clause establishes the “Prior Notice Rule,” requiring the authority to disclose its grounds and hear the citizen’s defense before taking adverse action. The proviso acknowledges that urgent security situations may arise, allowing for immediate impounding, but it strictly circumscribes this power by mandating a “Post-Action Hearing” within two weeks. This structure confirms that the right to a hearing is not discretionary; it is absolute. Whether notice is given before or immediately after, the administration cannot act in a vacuum of silence. Under Article 10-A of the Constitution, the right to a fair trial includes the right to know

the case against oneself. A secret “flag” or “stop list” that operates indefinitely without ever triggering a Section 8(2) notice constitutes a procedural black hole. It transforms a regulated statutory power into an arbitrary license to punish, effectively suspending the citizen’s rights without the courtesy of a reason.

In the present cases, the Passport Office has abdicated its statutory duty. It has treated the “recommendations” under Rule 22(2)(b) as binding verdicts rather than administrative inputs requiring independent verification. By placing citizens on the PCL without notice, the Respondents have denied them the opportunity to contest the “reasonable likelihood or suspicion” mentioned in the Explanation to Rule 21. A suspicion that cannot be disclosed to the accused for rebuttal is not a “reasonable suspicion” in the eyes of the law; it is merely a secret prejudice. The refusal to renew was not based on an independent opinion formed under Section 8, Rule 21, or Rule 22, but was a mechanical obedience to a “stop list” or “flag.” Rule 9(e) of the 2021 Rules states that the passport officer shall ensure the “applicant does not fall in the category of refusal of passport mentioned in rule 21 or in the integrated border management system (IBMS) with active status.” While

this rule acknowledges these lists, it does not absolve the Passport Officer of the responsibility to satisfy himself as to the grounds for refusal, nor does it override the explicit due process requirements of Section 8(2) of the Act. This constitutes a surrender of discretion. An authority vested with statutory powers cannot bargain away or fetter its powers by accepting dictation from an external body. Even where Rule 22 allows for recommendations, the final decision-making authority remains with the Federal Government (Additional Secretary or DG), who must apply their independent mind.

The law requires that where a statute directs that certain acts shall be done by a specified person, their performance by any other person is impliedly prohibited. In this regard, the Honorable Supreme Court in the case reported as Messrs H.

M. Abdullah v. The Income Tax Officer, Circle V, Karachi and 2 others (1993 SCMR 1195) held that:

“...as a general rule an authority in whom discretion is vested under provisions of Statute cannot bargain away or fetter its powers. The position is however different when such fetters are authorized by the Statute itself. Reference in this connection may be made to the following observations appearing at page 588 in "Constitutional and Administrative Law" by S.A. de Smith, Second Edition: --- “One authority cannot lawfully act under the, dictation of another unless the other is a superior in the administrative hierarchy or is empowered by law to give instructions to it.”

Similarly, in Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others v. WAPDA and others (1997 SCMR 641), it was held:

“40. Reference has also been made to Administrative Law by Basu, in which it has been stated that ‘the general rule is that where a statute directs that certain acts shall be done by a specified person; their performance by any other person is impliedly prohibited’. This rule is so well-settled that needs no further elaboration. Any authority vested with a discretion must exercise it himself by applying his independent mind uninfluenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations. He should neither accept any dictation nor delegate his authority to any other person. Violation of these rules for exercise of discretion will render such decision illegal. If the argument that WAPDA has independent power under section 25 of the WAPDA Act to determine rate/tariff, then it has defaulted in exercise of its power and discretion by accepting the dictates of Task Force, Ministry of Water and Power and ECC approved by the Prime Minister ignoring

CCL.”

Furthermore, denying a passport to a citizen residing abroad is a far graver violation than denying it to one at home, as it renders the citizen stateless in practice, forces them into illegality in a foreign jurisdiction, and strips them of the ability to earn a livelihood, violating Article 14 regarding the dignity of man and Article 18 regarding freedom of trade and profession. The scheme of the Passport Act and the Passports Rules, 2021, makes it abundantly clear that a reasoned order is a precondition to the placement of a citizen’s name on the PCL under Rule 22. No citizen can arbitrarily be prevented from exercising his fundamental right to liberty and his fundamental right to travel freely guaranteed by Articles 9 and

15 of the Constitution. Where such right is being curtailed, the same has to be done in accordance with law, and the penal action restricting the exercise of such fundamental rights is to be exercised in a manner that is least restrictive to such fundamental right. In this regard, the findings rendered by Islamabad High Court in case of Nadir Mukhtiar v.

Directorate of Immigration and Passport (PLD 2026 Islamabad 1) is of worth perusal:

The scheme of the Passports Act and the Passports Rules as discussed above makes it abundantly clear that a reasoned order declaring that the passport of a citizen is liable to be impounded, confiscated, cancelled or inactivated is a precondition to the placement of a citizen's name on the PCL. No citizen can arbitrarily be prevented from exercising his fundamental right to liberty and his fundamental right to travel freely guaranteed by Articles 9 and 15 of the Constitution. Where such right is being curtailed, the same has to be done in accordance with law, and the penal action restricting the exercise of such fundamental rights is to be exercised in a manner that is least restrictive to such fundamental right. This constitutional scheme also underscores why it is imperative that a reasoned order be passed declaring that the passport of a citizen is liable to be impounded or confiscated or cancelled or inactivated before the Federal Government seeks to interfere with the right of such citizen to liberty and/or to travel freely by placing the citizen's name in the PCL.

Therefore, the refusal to renew passports for these Petitioners is set aside as arbitrary, unlawful, and without jurisdiction. By treating “agency flags” as binding commands and failing to issue the mandatory show-cause notice, the Passport Office has committed a dual violation: it has

breached the substantive due process guarantee of Section 8(2) of the Passport Act, and it has simultaneously ignored the procedural framework of its own Passport Rules. Specifically, the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the refusal was based on the exhaustive grounds listed in Rule 21;

instead, they relied on extraneous “security checks” not envisaged by the Rules. Furthermore, even where Rule 22 permits the placement of names on the Passport Control List (PCL), such placement is not an independent source of power but a regulatory mechanism that must still comply with the “reasonable likelihood” standard of Rule 21 and the notice requirements of the parent Act.

The absence of a reasoned, speaking order and the failure to serve a notice under Section 8(2) either prior to the refusal or immediately thereafter render the invocation of Rule 21 and Rule 22 legally defective. An administrative “flag” cannot silently override a parliamentary statute or the explicit text of the rules. Even regarding the rules framed under the parent statute, the Honorable Supreme Court in Farrukh Raza Sheikh v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and others (2022 SCMR 1787) held that rules being framed under its parent statute “...cannot contradict or add to the

clear provisions of the parent statute.” In Province of Punjab through Secretary, Agriculture Department, Lahore v.

Saleem Ijaz and others (2023 SCMR 774), it was held “...No rule can be framed so as to be in conflict with or in derogation from the statute under which it is framed or in conflict with any other statute, which is not inconsistent with the parent statute under which the rule is framed. However, before declaring so, the court should endeavour to reconcile the rule, that is to say, the rule may be so read, if the phraseology permits it, as to make it consistent with the provisions of the statute.” Consequently, the “stop lists” obstructing the Petitioners’ passport renewals are declared to be without lawful authority. The Directorate of Immigration & Passports is directed to process the applications of the Petitioners independently, strictly adhering to the grounds of refusal in Rule 21 and the procedural safeguards of Section 8(2), without making the renewal contingent upon any extraneous security clearance that finds no mention in the Passport Act or the Passports Rules.

14.The grievance raised by the Petitioners in Category-II pertains to the inclusion of their names on the ECL maintained under the provisions of the ECL Ordinance. While

Section 2 of the Ordinance undoubtedly empowers the Federal Government to prohibit any person from proceeding abroad, this authority is neither absolute nor unbridled. It is regulated by the ECL Rules, which structure the exercise of executive discretion. The record suggests that in several instances, the Federal Government has proceeded primarily upon the recommendations of investigating agencies. However, the statutory scheme envisages an independent application of mind by the Federal Government. Rule 2 of the ECL Rules explicitly enumerates the grounds upon which such a prohibition may be imposed, limiting it to cases involving corruption, economic crimes of a certain magnitude, terrorism, drug trafficking, or banking default.

Rule 2(2) provides necessary safeguards by excluding private disputes and minor offenses from the purview of the ECL. Therefore, a mechanical adoption of agency recommendations, without verifying whether the allegations satisfy the specific criteria of Rule 2, constitutes a defect in the decision-making process. The mere pendency of an inquiry or registration of a case does not automatically warrant placement on the ECL unless the case falls strictly within the ambit of the Rules. Section 3 of the Ordinance

confers a statutory right of review upon an aggrieved person.

This provision imposes a concomitant duty on the Federal Government to adjudicate such representations expeditiously.

A review mechanism that remains undecided for an indefinite period renders the statutory remedy inefficacious and offends the principles of due process enshrined in Article 10-A and Article 4 of the Constitution. The administrative authority is obligated to pass a reasoned order, allowing the citizen to understand the justification for the restraint on their movement. On the other hand, the freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 15 of the Constitution, subject only to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. An indefinite restraint, without periodic review of necessity, may become disproportionate. The power to regulate exit is intended to secure attendance or prevent evasion of the legal process, not to serve as a punitive measure prior to conviction.

In view of the peculiar circumstances of these category of petitions, the Federal Government is directed to decide the pending review representations filed by the Petitioners under Section 3 of the ECL within a period of fifteen (15) days from the receipt of a certified copy of this order. The decision on

review shall be conveyed through a Speaking Order that specifically addresses whether the grounds for placement meet the criteria set forth in Rule 2 of the ECL Rules. Reliance on general observations shall not be sufficient; the order must reflect an independent application of mind to the specific facts of each case. In the event the representations are not decided within the stipulated timeline, the names of the Petitioners shall be deemed explicitly removed from the Exit Control List, and the immigration authorities shall permit them to travel, subject to any valid order to the contrary passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction.

15.Beyond the specific statutory deviations, the Court also notes with concern the jurisdictional overreach of the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) in imposing or facilitating these travel bans. Established under the National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000, NADRA’s mandate is unequivocally confined to registering citizens, issuing identity documents, and maintaining a national database. It is not, and was never intended to be, an enforcement agency empowered to control borders or adjudicate fundamental rights, particularly the right to travel. The practice of “tagging” Citizen National Identity

Cards (CNICs) in the NADRA database, which subsequently triggers an automatic alert at immigration counters via systems like the PNIL, effectively transforms NADRA into an unintended and unauthorized enforcer of travel restrictions.

This “proxy jailer” role for other departments, such as investigating agencies, exceeds NADRA's statutory boundaries. While NADRA’s data is vital for identity verification, its utilization for “no-fly” flagging based on third-party requests, without independent application of mind or statutory authority, is an act ultra vires its enabling legislation. This Court reiterates that digital governance, while efficient, cannot serve as a shield for executive overreach. The ease with which a system like PNIL facilitates the stopping of a citizen does not, in itself, confer legality upon such an action. NADRA is therefore directed to confine its operations strictly to identity management as per its mandate and must not act as an auxiliary enforcement arm for travel restrictions outside the established statutory framework.

16.The most insidious and disturbing characteristic of the “Blacklist” and PNIL regimes, which impacts all categories of petitioners, is their inherent secrecy. Petitioners were frequently kept in the dark about their placement on these lists

until they were arbitrarily offloaded at airports or denied essential consular services abroad. This clandestine operation directly contravenes Article 10-A of the Constitution, which elevates the Right to Fair Trial to a constitutional imperative.

This fundamental right implicitly mandates adherence to the principles of natural justice, including the right to notice, the right to an opportunity to be heard, and transparency in decision-making. A citizen cannot be expected to defend against an accusation or a restriction when its very existence is concealed. The prevailing practice of “silent displacement of responsibility” where various governmental entities evade accountability by deflecting blame onto one another creates an impenetrable “wall of silence” that effectively denies citizens any meaningful remedy. This Court unequivocally holds that no travel restriction can lawfully exist without either a prior or, in cases of extreme urgency, a contemporaneous show- cause notice, which must then be followed by a comprehensive reasoned order. In such urgent circumstances, the notice must be issued to the affected person within 24 hours of the restriction being imposed.

17.Even where the State asserts legitimate grounds such as “security of Pakistan” under Section 8 of the Passport Act or

“public interest” under the ECL Ordinance, any such action must rigorously satisfy the constitutional test of Proportionality. This doctrine demands an objective assessment: whether the restriction imposed is excessive in relation to the legitimate object sought to be achieved. It is an unconstitutional overreach to subject a citizen to a travel ban for years merely due to a pending inquiry that has yet to culminate in a conviction. Similarly, denying a passport and effectively stripping an overseas Pakistani of their livelihood based on an unverified intelligence report is disproportionate and unjustifiable. Comparative jurisprudence, as already discussed, consistently establishes that travel bans must embody the “least restrictive measure” necessary to achieve a legitimate State interest. If the objective is merely to ensure a person’s attendance for an inquiry, less draconian alternatives, such as requiring a bond or surety, are readily available. Total immobilization and the arbitrary stripping of essential citizenship documents are extreme measures, justifiable only in the most severe and proven threats to national security.

Their application to ordinary citizens for minor administrative inquiries or unproven allegations is inherently unreasonable and patently liable to be struck down by this Court. The non- statutory “Blacklist” by their very design, invariably fail this

critical test of proportionality due to their over breadth, lack of specific criteria, and absence of timely review mechanisms

18.This Court’s intervention is fundamentally corrective, not disruptive. It does not diminish the Executive’s legitimate power to protect the State but rather compels it to exercise such power strictly within the bounds of constitutional and statutory authority. The FIA, as an investigative body, generates inputs for the ECL but is not vested with the authority to unilaterally impose travel bans or seize passports on its own motion. That power is explicitly reserved for the Federal Government under the ECL Ordinance and the Passport Act. The Ministry of Interior, as the designated gatekeeper, must assume full ownership and responsibility for every name placed on any exit control list. It cannot merely hide behind generalized “agency reports” or “security flags.”

If a citizen’s name is on such a list, the Ministry must be prepared to articulate and defend the specific, legally sound reasons for that restriction. The “Blacklist” and PNIL, in their current non-statutory form, operate as a “lawless law”—a system of rules enforced by the State but entirely unconstrained by its own constitutional and legislative frameworks. Such a system is anathema to the Constitution of

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and undermines the very foundation of the rule of law.

19.While the focus of judicial scrutiny often falls upon the authorities maintaining lists and restricting movement, it is equally necessary to recognize that the citizen bears reciprocal responsibilities. Freedom of movement, whether internal or international, is not an unfettered privilege. It is contingent upon adherence to procedural and statutory obligations.

Interstate and international activities, such as visa applications, travel bookings, professional engagements, or cross-border commerce, require strict compliance with the relevant regulations. The record before this Court indicates that a significant proportion of individuals placed on restrictive lists have inadvertently or otherwise failed to satisfy these obligations, whether by submitting incomplete information, overstaying visas, or engaging in activities that trigger scrutiny under security or administrative frameworks.

This reality underscores a principle that is both legal and philosophical: liberty and responsibility are inseparable. Just as the State must act within constitutional bounds, ensuring due process, transparency, and opportunity for redress, the individual must also act lawfully, maintaining compliance

with travel regulations, passport formalities, and immigration rules, but the record on taking into consideration indicates that a significant number of restrictions, whether on the Passport Control List, Provisional National Identification List, or Airline Control List, often stem from procedural lapses, incomplete disclosures, or inadvertent violations of visa and immigration protocols by individuals themselves. However, it must be clarified that neither these observations nor the striking down of extra-legal lists should be interpreted as a clean chit for those indulged in unlawful and illegal activities to evade justice or accountability. Just as the Executive is barred from arbitrary excess, the citizen cannot claim immunity from the consequences of their own non- compliance, for liberty and responsibility are inseparable.

Therefore, while this Court staunchly protects fundamental rights against opaque administrative actions, it equally emphasizes that individuals engaged in cross-border activities must proactively satisfy all legal formalities, as the equilibrium of rights and duties ensures that restrictions are responsive to lawful circumstances rather than punitive or arbitrary.

20.In light of the foregoing extensive analysis, these Writ Petitions are allowed in the following terms:

i. The “Provisional National Identification List” (PNIL) and the so-called “Blacklist,” in their application to restrict international travel, are hereby declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. They are not valid substitutes for the Exit Control List (ECL) as exclusively governed by the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981, and the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Rules, 2010. The Respondents are directed to immediately remove the names of all Petitioners in Category I from the PNIL and Blacklist.

These Petitioners shall be allowed to travel freely unless a fresh order is passed placing them on the ECL strictly in accordance with the 1981 Ordinance and its associated Rules, adhering to all procedural and substantive safeguards.

ii. The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) is directed to return any passports seized from the Petitioners in Category-II within fifteen (15) days from the date of this order. The power to impound or confiscate passports lies solely with the Federal Government under Section 8 of the Passports Act, 1974, not with the FIA. Furthermore, the Federal Government is directed to decide any pending review representations filed by these Petitioners under

Section 3 of the ECL Ordinance within a period of fifteen

(15)days from the receipt of a certified copy of this order, through a speaking order that specifically addresses whether the grounds for placement meet the criteria set forth in Rule 2 of the ECL Rules. Failure to decide these representations within the stipulated timeframe shall result in the deemed removal of the Petitioners’ names from the Exit Control List.

iii. The Directorate of Immigration & Passports is directed to process and renew the passports of Petitioners in Category- III and Category-IV forthwith. The mere existence of a name on a non-statutory “Blacklist” or “PNIL” shall not be considered a valid or lawful ground for refusal. The processing must adhere strictly to the exhaustive grounds for refusal enumerated in Rule 21 of the Passports Rules, 2021, and the mandatory procedural safeguards of Section 8(2) of the Passports Act, 1974, without making renewal contingent upon any extraneous “security clearance” not mentioned in the relevant statutory framework.

iv. The Respondents, and all governmental agencies and departments under their purview, are permanently restrained from placing any citizen on a travel ban list or imposing any restriction on their freedom of movement without issuing a prior Show Cause Notice and a Reasoned Order. This mandatory procedural requirement can only be deviated

from in cases of extreme urgency involving national security, where such notice must nevertheless be issued within 24 hours of the restriction being imposed.

v. The Secretary, Ministry of Interior, is directed to submit a comprehensive compliance report regarding the implementation of these directions to this Court within 30 days from the date of this judgment.

JUDGE

JUDGE

Announced.

Tariq Jan (DB) Mr. Justice Sahibzada Asadullah, HJ & Mr. Justice Dr. Khurshid Iqbal, HJ.

ANNEXURE A: LIST OF CONNECTED PETITIONS

S.No. Petition Title

1.W.P. No. 10042 Ali Haider v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

2.W.P. No. 10043 Muzamil v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

3.W.P. No. 10044 Kabir Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

4.W.P. No. 10045 Hidayat Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

5.W.P. No. 10046 Charagh Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

6.W.P. No. 10047 Mudasir Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

7.W.P. No. 10049 Qamar Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

8.W.P. No. 10050 Shahid Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

9.W.P. No. 10051 Atif Hussain etc v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

10.W.P. No. 10052 Wajahat Ali v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

11.W.P. No. 10053 Tajir Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

12.W.P. No. 10054 Asif Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

13.W.P. No. 10055 Ismail Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

14.W.P. No. 10058 Sayed Intizar Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

15.W.P. No. 10059 Sayed Haider Abbas v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

16.W.P. No. 10137 Hujat Ali v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

17.W.P. No. 10138 Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah v. Federation P/2025 of Pakistan

18.W.P. No. 10139 Naveed Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

19.W.P. No. 10141 Safdar Ali v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

20.W.P. No. 10142 Sohail Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

21.W.P. No. 10143 Waseem Haider v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

22.W.P. No. 10144 Sohail Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

23.W.P. No. 10145 Syed Ghafoor Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

24.W.P. No. 10038 Irshad Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

25.W.P. No. 10039 Muhammad Shoaib v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

26.W.P. No. 10040 Abdullah v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

27.W.P. No. 10048 Sayed Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

28.W.P. No. 10056 Qiamat Khan v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

29.W.P. No. 10057 (Muzahir Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan)

30.W.P. No. 8144 Ahmad Khan v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

31.W.P. No. 7639 Ansar Ali v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

32.W.P. No. 4312 Haider Abbas v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

33.W.P. No. 4313 Fida Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025

34.W.P. No. 4314 Ajwad Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

35.W.P. No. 4317 Qaiser Hussain v. Federation of P/2025 Pakistan

36.W.P. No. 7424 Israr Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan

P/2025